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2026:HHC:22391
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No. 1233 of 2025
Reserved on: 07.05.2026
Date of Decision: 16.06.2025
Surinder Manhas & another
...Petitioners
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh and others
...Respondents
_____________________________________
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the petitioners
:
Mr Sanjeev Kumar Suri, Advocate.
For the Respondents
:
Mr Jitender K.Sharma, Additional
Advocate General for respondents
No.1 and 2/State.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioners have filed the present petition for
quashing of the criminal complaint pending before the learned
Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No.1, Amb, District
Una, H.P., (learned Trial Court) for the commission of offences
punishable under Sections 498-A and 406 of the Indian Penal
Code (IPC) and summoning order dated 23.02.2018 passed by the
learned Trial Court. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:22391
same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for
convenience.)
2.
Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
petition are that the complainant filed a complaint before the
learned trial Court against the accused (petitioners) for the
commission of offences punishable under Section 498-A and
406 of the IPC. It was asserted that the marriage of the
complainant and Sunil Manhas was solemnised on 28.10.2012 as
per Hindu rites and customs. One daughter, Ruhani, was born to
them. The accused started maltreating the complainant after
one month of her marriage. They demanded dowry and gold.
Complainant’s husband, his father and her sister-in-law started
saying what wood and stone had been brought by her. They also
abused the complainant’s parents. The complainant tolerated
this behaviour with the hope that better sense would prevail
upon the accused person, but the situation did not improve.
Complainant's father-in-law used filthy language against the
complainant and her parents. The complainant’s sister-in-law
took the complainant’s gold ornaments and refused to return
them. Complainant’s husband demanded ₹10,000 from her
parents. Complainant’s certificates and other clothes were taken
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by her husband and his relatives. The petitioner No.1 turned the
complainant out of her matrimonial home by saying that she
had no right in the house. The complainant’s parents sent her
husband to Doha. He returned from Doha and demanded more
money from the complainant. Therefore, a complaint was filed
before the learned Trial Court for taking action as per the law.
3.
The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to
summon the accused/petitioners. They appeared before the
learned Trial Court on 24.03.2018 and furnished the surety
bonds on 02.06.2018.
4.
Being aggrieved by the filing of the complaint, the
petitioners have filed the present petition asserting that the
F.I.R. and criminal proceedings initiated against them do not
disclose the commission of any cognizable offence. The
allegations are vague and do not disclose the commission of any
offence. The petitioner No.1 had bequeathed his entire property
to petitioner No. 2 and dispossessed his son of the property. The
complaint was filed to harass the petitioner No.1. The Learned
Trial Court failed to apply its mind while summoning the
petitioners. No preliminary enquiry was conducted. The
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continuation of the proceedings amounts to an abuse of the
process of the Court. Therefore, it was prayed that the present
petition be allowed and the proceedings pending before the
learned Magistrate be quashed.
5.
I have heard Mr Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel
for the petitioners and Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned
Additional Advocate General, for respondents No. 1 and 2 /State.
6.
Mr Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel for the
petitioners, submitted that the petitioners are innocent and they
were falsely implicated. The allegations made against them are
false and do not disclose the commission of any offence.
Continuation of the proceedings before the learned trial Court
amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. Hence, he
prayed that the present petition be allowed and the proceedings
pending before the learned trial Court be quashed.
7.
Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate
General for respondents No.1 & 2, submitted that the allegations
in the complaint disclose the commission of a cognizable
offence. The Learned Trial Court is seized of the matter, and this
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court should not exercise the inherent jurisdiction in the present
case. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
8.
I have given
a considerable thought to the
submissions at the bar and have gone through the records
carefully.
9.
The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was
explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of
U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned,
it is now more or less well settled as regards the
principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one
may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana
v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court
has summarised some of the principles under which
FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the
following words:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter
XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this
Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of
the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which
we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the
following categories of cases by way of illustration
wherein such power could be exercised either to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise
to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be
possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and
sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or
rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad
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kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they
are taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence
or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first
information report and other materials, if any,
accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the
Code except under an order of a Magistrate
within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made
in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not disclose
the commission of any offence and make out a
case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a
non-cognizable offence, no investigation is
permitted by a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of
the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding against
the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned
Act (under which a criminal proceeding is
instituted) to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings, and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
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providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to a
private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)
8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6)
would be of relevance to us in this case.
In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the
allegations made in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute
any offence or make out a case against the accused, then
the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.
As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in
such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.
Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an
express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the
CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal
proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be
quashed.”
10.
This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of
Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:
“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising
its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC,
may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes
or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are
neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory
provision. However, given the broad and profound nature
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of this authority, the High Court must exercise it
sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are
embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing
the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of
process or where intervention is essential to uphold the
ends of justice.
9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of
several decades, has laid down the principles and
guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing
criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby preempting the Prosecution from building its case before the
Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia,
contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal
complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR
represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima
facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature;
(v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus
allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and
compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v.
Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335)
11.
The present petition is to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
12.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Neelu Chopra v. Bharti, (2009) 10 SCC 184: (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 286:
2009 SCC OnLine SC 1693 that the Court has to see that
particulars of the offences committed by every accused and the
role played by the accused in committing the offence are given in
the complaint made to the police. It was observed: “9. To lodge a proper complaint, the mere mention of the
sections and the language of those sections is not the be-all
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and end-all of the matter. What is required to be brought to
the notice of the court is the particulars of the offence
committed by each and every accused and the role played by
each and every accused in committing that offence.
10. When we see the complaint, it is sadly vague. It does
not show which of the accused has committed what
offence, and what is the exact role played by these
appellants in the commission of the offence. It could be
said that something is against Rajesh, as the allegations
are made against him more precisely, but he is no more
and has already expired. Under such circumstances, it
would be an abuse of the process of law to allow the
prosecution to continue against the aged parents of
Rajesh, the present appellants herein, on the basis of a
vague and general complaint which is silent about the
precise acts of the appellants.” (Emphasis supplied)
13.
Similarly, it was held in Abhishek v. State of M.P., 2023
SCC OnLine SC 1083: 2023 INSC 779 that the tendency of false
implication by way of general omnibus allegations, if left
unchecked, would result in the misuse of the process of law. It
was observed:
“13. Instances of a husband's family members filing a
petition to quash criminal proceedings launched against
them by his wife in the midst of matrimonial disputes are
neither a rarity nor of recent origin. Precedents aplenty
abound on this score. We may now take note of some
decisions of particular relevance. Recently, in Kahkashan
Kausar alias Sonam v. State of Bihar [(2022) 6 SCC 599],
this Court had occasion to deal with a similar situation
where the High Court had refused to quash an FIR
registered for various offences, including Section 498A
IPC. Noting that the foremost issue that required
determination was whether allegations made against the in-
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laws were general omnibus allegations which would be liable
to be quashed, this Court referred to earlier decisions wherein
concern was expressed over the misuse of Section 498A IPC
and the increased tendency to implicate relatives of the
husband in matrimonial disputes. This Court observed that
false implications by way of general omnibus allegations
made in the course of matrimonial disputes, if left unchecked,
would result in misuse of the process of law. On the facts of
that case, it was found that no specific allegations were
made against the in-laws by the wife, and it was held that
allowing their prosecution in the absence of clear
allegations against the in-laws would result in an abuse
of the process of law. It was also noted that a criminal
trial, leading to an eventual acquittal, would inflict severe
scars upon the accused, and such an exercise ought to be
discouraged.
14. In Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand [(2010) 7 SCC 667],
this Court noted that the tendency to implicate the
husband and all his immediate relations is also not
uncommon in complaints filed under Section 498A IPC. It
was observed that the Courts have to be extremely careful and
cautious in dealing with these complaints and must take
pragmatic realities into consideration while dealing with
matrimonial cases, such as allegations of harassment by the
husband's close relations, who were living in different cities
and never visited or rarely visited the place where the
complainant resided, would add an entirely different
complexion and such allegations would have to be scrutinised
with great care and circumspection.
15. Earlier, in Neelu Chopra v. Bharti [(2009) 10 SCC 184],
this Court observed that the mere mention of statutory
provisions and the language thereof for lodging a
complaint is not the ‘be all and end all’ of the matter, as
what is required to be brought to the notice of the Court is the
particulars of the offence committed by each and every
accused and the role played by each and every accused in the
commission of that offence. These observations were made
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in the context of a matrimonial dispute involving Section
498A IPC.” (Emphasis supplied)
14.
It was held in Achin Gupta v. State of Haryana, 2024
SCC OnLine SC 759:2024 INSC 369 that asking a person to face
criminal allegations without any specific instance of criminal
misconduct amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. It
was observed:
“18. The plain reading of the FIR and the chargesheet
papers indicates that the allegations levelled by the First
Informant are quite vague, general and sweeping,
specifying no instances of criminal conduct. It is also
pertinent to note that in the FIR, no specific date or time
of the alleged offence/offences has been disclosed. Even
the police thought fit to drop the proceedings against the
other members of the Appellants' family. Thus, we are of
the view that the FIR lodged by Respondent No. 2 was
nothing but a counterblast to the divorce petition & also
the domestic violence case.
25. If a person is made to face a criminal trial on some
general and sweeping allegations without bringing on record
any specific instances of criminal conduct, it is nothing but an
abuse of the process of the court. The court owes a duty to
subject the allegations levelled in the complaint to thorough
scrutiny to find out, prima facie, whether there is any grain of
truth in the allegations or whether they are made only with
the sole object of involving certain individuals in a criminal
charge, more particularly when a prosecution arises from a
matrimonial dispute.” (Emphasis supplied)
15.
It was further held that in matrimonial disputes, the
parents, including the close relatives, make a mountain out of a
2026:HHC:22391
molehill, and every matrimonial conduct amounting to nuisance
does not constitute cruelty. It was observed: “32. Many times, the parents, including the close
relatives of the wife, make a mountain out of a molehill.
Instead of salvaging the situation and making every
possible endeavour to save the marriage, their action,
either due to ignorance or on account of sheer hatred
towards the husband and his family members, brings
about the destruction of the marriage over trivial issues.
The first thing that comes to mind for the wife, her
parents and her relatives is the Police as if the Police is
the panacea of all evil. No sooner does the matter reach
the Police than even if there are fair chances of
reconciliation between the spouses, they would get
destroyed. The foundation of a sound marriage is
tolerance, adjustment and respecting one another.
Tolerance of each other's faults, to a certain bearable
extent, has to be inherent in every marriage. Petty
quibbles and trifling differences are mundane matters
and should not be exaggerated and blown out of
proportion to destroy what is said to have been made in
heaven. The Court must appreciate that all quarrels must
be weighed from that point of view in determining what
constitutes cruelty in each particular case, always keeping
in view the physical and mental conditions of the parties,
their character and social status. A very technical and
hyper-sensitive approach would prove to be disastrous
for the very institution of marriage. In matrimonial
disputes, the main sufferers are the children. The spouses
fight with such venom in their hearts that they do not
think even for a second that if the marriage were to come
to an end, then what would be the effect on their
children? Divorce plays a very dubious role so far as the
upbringing of the children is concerned. The only reason
why we are saying so is that instead of handling the whole
issue delicately, the initiation of criminal proceedings
would bring about nothing but hatred for each other.
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There may be cases of genuine ill-treatment and
harassment by the husband and his family members
towards the wife. The degree of such ill-treatment or
harassment may vary. However, the Police machinery
should be resorted to as a measure of last resort and that
too in a very genuine case of cruelty and harassment. The
Police machinery cannot be utilised for the purpose of
holding the husband to ransom so that he could be
squeezed by the wife at the instigation of her parents,
relatives or friends. In all cases where the wife complains
of harassment or ill-treatment, Section 498A of the IPC
cannot be applied mechanically. No FIR is complete
without Sections 506(2) and 323 of the IPC. Every
matrimonial conduct which may cause annoyance to the
other may not amount to cruelty. Mere trivial irritations
and quarrels between spouses, which happen in day-today married life, may also not amount to cruelty”
16.
Similarly, it was held in Mamidi Anil Kumar Reddy v.
State of A.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 127: 2024 (2) SCR 252 that the
phenomenon of false implication by a general omnibus
allegation in the case of a matrimonial dispute is not unknown
to the Court. When the allegations are general and omnibus, the
prosecution should not be continued. It was observed: “14. In the considered opinion of this Court, there is
significant merit in the submissions of the Learned
Counsel for the Appellants. A bare perusal of the
complaint, statement of witnesses and the charge sheet
shows that the allegations against the Appellants are
wholly general and omnibus in nature; even if they are
taken in their entirety, they do not prima facie make out a
case against the Appellants. The material on record
neither discloses any particulars of the offences alleged
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nor discloses the specific role/allegations assigned to any
of the Appellants in the commission of the offences.
15. The phenomenon of false implication by way of
general omnibus allegations in the course of matrimonial
disputes is not unknown to this Court. In Kahkashan
Kausar alias Sonam v. State of Bihar (2022) 6 SCC 599, this
Court dealt with a similar case wherein the allegations
made by the complainant-wife against her in-laws u/s.
498A and others were vague and general, lacking any
specific role and particulars. The court proceeded to
quash the FIR against the accused persons and noted that
such a situation, if left unchecked, would result in the
abuse of the process of law.
xxxx
17. Considering the dicta in Mahmood Ali (supra), we find
that the High Court, in this case, has failed to exercise due
care and has mechanically permitted the criminal
proceedings to continue despite specifically finding that
the allegations are general and omnibus in nature. The
Appellants herein approached the High Court on inter alia
grounds that the proceedings were re-initiated on
vexatious
grounds
and
even
highlighted
the
commencement of divorce proceedings by Respondent
No. 2. In these peculiar circumstances, the High Court had
a duty to consider the allegations with great care and
circumspection so as to protect against the danger of
unjust prosecution.”
17.
This position was reiterated in Geddam Jhansi v. State
of Telangana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 263, wherein it was observed:
“31. Invoking criminal process is a serious matter with
penal consequences involving coercive measures, which
can be permitted only when the specific act(s) which
constitute offences punishable under the Penal Code or
any other penal statute are alleged or attributed to the
accused and a prima facie case is made out. It applies with
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equal force when criminal laws are invoked in domestic
disputes. Criminalising domestic disputes without
specific allegations and credible materials to support the
same may have disastrous consequences for the
institution of family, which is built on the premise of
love, affection, cordiality and mutual trust. The
institution of family constitutes the core of human
society. Domestic relationships, such as those between
family members, are guided by deeply ingrained social
values and cultural expectations. These relationships are
often viewed as sacred, demanding a higher level of
respect, commitment, and emotional investment
compared to other social or professional associations. For
the aforesaid reason, the preservation of family
relationships has always been emphasised. Thus, when
family relationships are sought to be brought within the
ambit of criminal proceedings, rupturing the family bond,
courts should be circumspect and judicious and should
allow invocation of the criminal process only when there
are specific allegations with supporting materials that
clearly constitute criminal offences.
32. We have to keep in mind that in the context of
matrimonial disputes, emotions run high, and as such in
the complaints filed alleging harassment or domestic
violence, there may be a tendency to implicate other
members of the family who do not come to the rescue of
the complainant or remain mute spectators to any alleged
incident of harassment, which in our view cannot by itself
constitute a criminal act without there being specific acts
attributed to them. Further, when tempers run high and
relationships turn bitter, there is also a propensity to
exaggerate the allegations, which does not necessarily
mean that such domestic disputes should be given the
colour of criminality.
33. It goes without saying that genuine cases of cruelty
and violence in the domestic sphere, which do happen,
ought to be handled with utmost sensitivity. Domestic
violence typically happens within the four walls of the
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house and not in the public gaze. Therefore, such violence
is not noticed by the public at large, except perhaps by the
immediate neighbours. Thus, providing visible evidence
by the victim of domestic violence may not be easily
forthcoming and producing direct evidence may be hard
and arduous, which does not necessarily mean that
domestic violence does not occur. In fact, to deal with this
pernicious phenomenon, stringent statutes like the
Protection from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, have been
enacted with a very expansive meaning and scope of what
amounts to domestic violence. Since violence perpetrated
within the domestic sphere by close relatives is now
criminalised, entailing serious consequences on the
perpetrators, the courts have to be careful while dealing
with such cases by examining whether there are specific
allegations with instances against the perpetrators and
not generalised allegations. The purpose and mandate of
the law to protect the victims of domestic violence is of
paramount importance, and as such, a balance has to be
struck by ensuring that while perpetrators are brought to
book, all the family members or relatives are not
indiscriminately brought within the criminal net in a
sweeping manner.
34. For a matrimonial relationship that is founded on the
basis of cordiality and trust to turn sour to an extent to
make a partner hurl allegations of domestic violence and
harassment against the other partner, would normally
not happen at the spur of the moment, and such an
acrimonious relationship would develop only in the
course of time. Accordingly, such a situation would be the
culmination of a series of acts that turn, otherwise, an
amicable relationship into a fractured one. Thus, in such
cases involving allegations of domestic violence or
harassment, there would normally be a series of
offending acts, which would be required to be spelt out by
the complainant against the perpetrators in specific
terms to rope such perpetrators in the criminal
proceedings sought to be initiated against them. Thus,
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mere general allegations of harassment without pointing
out the specifics against such perpetrators would not
suffice, as is the case in respect of the present appellants.
35. We are, thus, of the view that in criminal cases
relating to domestic violence, the complaints and charges
should be specific, as far as possible, as against each and
every member of the family who is accused of such
offences and sought to be prosecuted, as otherwise, it
may amount to misuse of the stringent criminal process
by indiscriminately dragging all the members of the
family. There may be situations where some of the family
members or relatives may turn a blind eye to the violence
or harassment perpetrated on the victim and may not
extend any helping hand to the victim, which does not
necessarily mean that they are also perpetrators of
domestic violence unless the circumstances clearly
indicate their involvement and instigation. Hence,
implicating all such relatives without making specific
allegations and attributing offending acts to them and
proceeding against them without prima facie evidence
that they were complicit and had actively collaborated
with the perpetrators of domestic violence would amount
to abuse of the process of law.”
18.
The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
19.
In the present case, the complainant has specifically
asserted that petitioner No.2 has retained her gold ornaments,
which she is not returning despite the demands. She also
asserted that petitioner No.1 had abused her and her parents. He
turned her out of her matrimonial home and tortured her by
saying what wood and stone had been brought by her. Therefore,
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the complainant has made specific allegations against the
petitioners and the submission that no specific allegations have
been made and only vague allegations have been made cannot be
accepted.
20.
It
was submitted that the allegations in the
complaint are false. This submission will not help the
petitioners. The Court exercising inherent jurisdiction does not
go into the validity or otherwise of the allegations and has to
treat them as correct. This position was laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 983, wherein it was observed: “29. It is settled law that the power of quashing a
complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with
circumspection, and while exercising this power, the
Court must believe the averments and allegations in the
complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly
held that, save in exceptional cases where noninterference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the
Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the
stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and
inherent powers of the Court should not be used routinely
according to its whims or caprice.”
21.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the
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Court cannot conduct a mini-trial to determine the genuineness
of the allegations. It was observed: “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court
would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to
the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the
allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage
of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C.
However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if
taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of
an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the
cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations
made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face
value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or
make out a case against the accused. We are of the
considered view that the present case would fall under
Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in
the case of Bhajan Lal (supra).
14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this
Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of
Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC
1060:
“14. First, we would like to deal with the submission
of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that
once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for
quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any
merit in this submission, keeping in mind the
position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of
Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7
SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A.
[Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59:
(2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the
question of whether the High Court could entertain
the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when
the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the
pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed:
(SCC p. 63, para 16)
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“16. Thus, the general conspectus of the
various sections under which the appellant
is being charged and is to be prosecuted
would show that the same are not made out
even prima facie from the complainant's
FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed,
the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A.
v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365]
could have still examined whether the
offences alleged to have been committed by
the appellant were prima facie made out
from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet,
documents, etc. or not.”
22.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392:
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a minitrial while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC. It
was observed at page 397:
“17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that
while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482
of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is
not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference
can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v.
Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379].
The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted
hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7)
6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of
discharge and/or
quashing
of
the
criminal
proceedings, while exercising the powers under
Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct
the mini-trial. …
7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising
the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very
2026:HHC:22391
limited jurisdiction and is required to consider
‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed
further against the accused for which the accused is
required to be tried or not’.”
23.
The petitioners had appeared before the learned Trial
Court in the year 2018, and they have filed the present petition
after the lapse of eight years. They have not provided any
explanation for the delay in filing the present petition. The
inherent jurisdiction is a discretionary jurisdiction and cannot
be exercised in case of inordinate delay. It was laid down by the
Delhi High Court in Ajit Kumar Gola v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026
SCC OnLine Del 1398, that ordinarily a petition under Section 482
of CrPC should be filed within 90 days and the delay beyond 90
days should be satisfactorily explained. It was observed:
“12. In Bata v. Anama Behera, 1989 SCC OnLine Ori 325:
1990 Cri LJ 1110, the learned Single Judge of the Orissa
High Court observed as under:
“Though for filing an application under Section 482 there
is no limitation, the application should be filed within a
reasonable time, so that the progress of the case is not
disturbed at a belated stage. A revision petition
challenging an order can be filed within 90 days from the
date of the order. Similarly, a period of 90 days, which is
at par with a revision petition, should be treated as a
reasonable time for filing an application under Section
482, and if it is filed beyond the period of 90 days, the
applicant would have to explain the cause of the delay.”
13. Similarly in Gopal Chauhan v. Smt Satya, 1978 SCC
OnLine HP 33: 1979 Cri LJ 446, it was observed that a
2026:HHC:22391
petition under Section 482 CrPC and Article 227 of the
Constitution of India filed after expiry of 3 years from the
date of summoning ought not to be entertained when the
case is fixed for the stage of evidence and that too, when
the petitioner has approached the Revisionist Court.
14. Thus, although the question of inordinate delay and
laches has not been dealt with in many cases but the fact
remains that a party who invokes the jurisdiction of the
High Court for the purpose of quashing of FIR and the
consequent proceedings by embarking on to show that
the ingredients of Section 409 or 420 IPC are not made
out, is not only required to meet the test of expeditious
dispatch of approaching to the Court but he should also be
able to show that the facts are so glaring that it calls for
interference of the High Court rather than raising the
disputed questions of fact. In the present case, the FIR
was admittedly registered in the year 1999, and a charge
sheet had also been filed in the same year. Therefore, the
petitioner was aware as to what are the accusations
against him when he appeared before the Court for the
first time in 1999, as a complete set of the charge sheet
must have been supplied to him. If at all, the petitioner
felt that there was a case for quashing of FIR, he ought to
have approached the Court at the earliest possible stage. I
agree with the observation made by the Orissa High Court
that if a revision against an order of summoning could be
filed within a period of 90 days then ordinarily a period of
90 days should have been sufficient to invoke the
jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482 CrPC
Admittedly, this has not been done and if the period is
calculated from 1999, the present petition has been filed
after more than 11 years and, therefore, there was
inordinate delay and laches on the part of the petitioner
for which not even an iota of Explanation is forthcoming
in the petition.
15. Even if, the contention of the learned counsel for the
petitioner that the cause of action for filing the petition
accrued to the petitioner only after 09.052009 when the
2026:HHC:22391
charges against him under Section 409 and 420 IPC
were framed, is taken to be correct even then from the
date of framing of the charge, there has been a lapse of
almost two years in invoking the jurisdiction of this
Court. As I have observed hereinabove that a revision
against an order ought to be filed within a period of 90
days and the said period has been held by Orissa High
Court Court to be reasonable and sufficient to invoke the
revisionary power of a Court, then ordinarily the said
period can also be said to be reasonable in normal
circumstances while preferring a petition under Section
482 CrPC while as in the instant case, there is a lapse of
almost two years without there being even an iota of
averment in the petition as to what the petitioner was
doing during these two years.”
24.
In the present case, the petitioners have failed to
provide any explanation for the delay, and the inherent
jurisdiction cannot be exercised at their instance.
25.
It is undisputed that the matter is pending before the
Learned Trial Court. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine
SC 949 that when the matter is pending before the learned Trial
Court, it should be left to appreciate it. It was observed:
“At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the
investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is
ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the
FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the
absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged
offences, we are of the view that the appellants should
prefer a discharge application before the trial court under
Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We
2026:HHC:22391
say so because even according to the State, the
investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be
filed before the competent court. In such circumstances,
the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials
which the investigating officer might have collected,
forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge
application is filed, the trial court shall look into the
materials and take a call whether any discharge case is
made out or not.”
26.
No other point was urged.
27.
In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it
is dismissed.
28.
The observations made hereinbefore shall remain
confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing
whatsoever on the merits of the case.
16th June, 2026
(ravinder)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
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