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2026:HHC:15032
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA
CWP No.18292 of 2025
Reserved on: 09.04.2026
Decided: 06.05.2026
__________________________________________________________________
Surendra Singh
...Petitioner
Versus
SJVN Ltd. and another
...Respondents
__________________________________________________________________
Coram
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Jiya Lal Bhardwaj, Judge
Whether approved for reporting? 1 Yes
For the petitioner:
Mr. Sunil Mohan Goel, Senior
Advocate with Mr. Paras Dhaulta and
Mr. Abhinav M. Goel, Advocates.
For the respondents:
Ms.
Devyani
Advocate with
Advocate.
Sharma,
Senior
Ms. Srishti Negi,
Jiya Lal Bhardwaj, Judge
The petitioner by way of present writ petition, has
prayed for the following substantive reliefs:“a)
of
That Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue writ
certiorari
quashing
order
dated
04.07.2025
(Annexure P-1) whereby the petitioner has been put
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
under suspension in contemplation of disciplinary
proceedings under SJVN Conduct, Discipline and
Appeal Rules.
b)
That Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue writ
of mandamus directing the respondents to pay to the
petitioner all the benefits as provided under FRSR Rule
53.”
2.
Shorn of unnecessary details, the key facts of the
case are that the petitioner, who was working as General
Manager with respondent No.1-Company, while posted at
Devsari Hydro Electric Project Tharali, District Chamoli,
Uttrakhand,
put
under
suspension
vide
order
dated
04.07.2025, passed by respondent No.2.
3.
It has been averred that the petitioner has
approached this Court contending that the order of
suspension was required to be reviewed by the authority,
which is competent to modify or revoke the suspension
before expiry of 90 days from the date of suspension on the
recommendation of the review committee constituted for the
purpose. However, since the Article of Charges dated
08.10.2025 were served upon him on 10.10.2025, i.e., beyond
the period of 90 days as contemplated under the Central Civil
Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (for
short “CCS (CCA) Rules”), and no orders either extending or
revoking the suspension of the petitioner have been passed
by respondent No.1-Company, the said act on its
part is
arbitrary, discriminatory, wrong, and illegal in the teeth of the
law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajay Kumar
Choudhary vs. Union of India and another, (2015) 7 SCC 291.
Respondent No.1-Company has its own Rules called as SJVN
Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules (for short SJVN CDA
Rules), but Rule 20 is silent about the aspect of period of
suspension and thus, respondent No.1-Company, being a
public sector undertaking under the Ministry of Power,
Government of India, CCS (CCA) Rules, are to be taken into
account. Further when the Rules are silent, the respondent
No.1-Company falls back on the instructions/memorandum,
issued by the Department of Personnel & Training (DoPT)
Government of India and the DoPT has issued the office
memorandum dated 23.08.2016, which clearly provides that
the suspension should not exceed beyond three months, if
within three months charge-sheet is not served on the
charged officer.
4.
It has also been averred that the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has held that while continuing the suspension of an
employee, the disciplinary authority has to take into
consideration whether the continuance of the employee in
service would prejudice the investigation, trial, or enquiry by
apprehending tampering with witnesses or documents, or
whether continuance in office is likely to seriously subvert
discipline. Once respondent No.1-Company had not served
the charge-sheet within ninety days, the order of suspension
is liable to be revoked in view of the instructions issued after
the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajay
Kumar Choudhary’s case (supra).
5.
The respondents filed reply to the petition and
averred
that
the
petition
filed
by
the
petitioner
is
misconceived inasmuch as no legal right, much less
fundamental right of the petitioner, has been violated, so as
to enable him to invoke the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this
Court. The action of the replying respondents is strictly in
accordance with the SJVN CDA Rules, which are applicable to
the petitioner and there is no challenge to the said Rules. The
suspension order was issued to the petitioner on receipt of a
complaint against him relating to hiring of office premise for
SJVNL at Kanpur, during his posting at the said place and
after receipt of enquiry in respect of serious allegations of
misconduct made in the complaint, he was put under
suspension. On enquiry, it was found that the allegations are
prima facie substantiated and the competent authority in
exercise of the powers conferred under Rule 20(1)(a) of the
SJVN CDA Rules, placed him under suspension on 04.07.2025
and he was informed through email dated 04.07.2025 and by
registered post on 07.07.2025 (5th and 6th July, 2025 being
holidays on account of Saturday and Sunday). The petitioner
was served with the memorandum of charges, vide letter
dated 08.10.2025, with a direction to submit his reply within
15 days from the date of receipt of the memorandum. It is
incorrect to submit that Rule 20 of the SJVN CDA Rules, is
silent with respect to the provisions, as having been provided
under CCS (CCA) Rules, with regard to suspension and further
the DoPT guidelines are not applicable unless specifically
mentioned and endorsed by the Department of Public
Enterprises (in short DPE). Respondent No.1-Company has
not adopted the said guidelines in view of the Rules. The
chargesheet has been issued to the petitioner
on
08.10.2005, which has slightly exceeded the period of 90
days. There is no specific period of 90 days, within which
suspension order is required to be reviewed under SJVN CDA
Rules.
6.
It has further been averred that Rule 21 of SJVN
CDA Rules, provides that suspension order can exceed six
months and even more and only subsistence allowance can
be varied, in case, suspension continued for six months or
more. The allegations against the petitioner are serious and
since the Director (Projects) was not manning the post,
therefore, some time was taken for deliberations with regard
to seek advice and decision of the appropriate authority as
disciplinary authority, which is Chairman-cum-Managing
Director, in the absence of Director (Projects). There is no
mandatory period of 90 days prescribed under the Rules for
issuance of charge-sheet within 90 days of suspension and
further no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner since
there is marginal delay in issuing the charge-sheet. The
judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court was dealing
with a case in which CCS (CCA) Rules were applicable, but in
the facts of the present case, the same are not applicable and
thus the action on the part of respondents is justified.
7.
The petitioner has filed rejoinder to the reply filed
by the respondents and controverted the facts alleged in the
reply.
8.
I have heard Mr. Sunil Mohan Goel, learned Senior
Counsel duly assisted by Mr. Paras Dhaulta and Mr. Abhinav
M. Goel, learned counsel as well as Ms. Devyani Sharma,
learned Senior Counsel duly assisted by Ms. Srishti Negi,
learned counsel and also perused the record carefully.
9.
Before delving upon the issue of quashing the
order of suspension, it would be relevant to have a bare look
on the provisions of Rules 20 and 21 of the SJVN CDA Rules,
which are reproduced as under:“Rule 20
Suspension:
1) The appointing authority or any authority to which it
in subordinate or the Disciplinary Authority or any other
authority empowered in that behalf by the Competent
Authority by general or special order may place an
employee under suspension:
a) where a disciplinary proceeding against him is
contemplated or is pending; or
b) where a case against him in respect of any
Criminal offence is under investigation or trial.
c) Where, in the opinion of the authority aforesaid, he
has engaged oneself in activities prejudicial to the
interest of the security of the State/CPSE.
2) An employee who is detained in police/judicial custody,
whether on criminal charge or otherwise, for a period
exceeding 48 hours shall be deemed to have been
suspended with effect from the date of detention, by an
order of the appointing authority and shall remain under
suspension till further orders.
3) Where a penalty of dismissal or removal from service
imposed upon an employee under suspension is set aside
on appeal or on review under these rules and the case is
remitted for further inquiry or with any other directions
the order of his suspension shall be deemed to have
continued in force on and from the date of the original
order of dismissal or removal and shall remain in force
until further orders.
4) Where a penalty of dismissal or removal from service
imposed upon an employee is set aside or declared or
rendered void in consequence of or by decision of a court
of law and the Disciplinary Authority, on consideration of
the circumstances of the case, decides to hold a further
inquiry against the employee on the allegations on which
the penalty of dismissal or removal was originally
imposed, the employee shall be deemed to have been
placed under suspension by the appointing authority
from the date of the original order of dismissal or
removal and shall continue to remain under suspension
until further orders.
5) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been
made under this Rule may at any time be revoked by the
authority which made or is deemed to have made the
order or by any authority to which that authority in
subordinate.
6) The suspended employee shall not leave the station
without the written permission of the Competent
Authority.
Rule 21
Subsistence Allowance:
1) An employee under suspension shall be entitled to
draw subsistence allowance equal to 50 percent of his
basic pay provided the Disciplinary Authority is satisfied
that the employee is not engaged in any other
employment or business or profession or vocation. In
addition the employee shall be entitled to Dearness
Allowance admissible on such subsistence allowance and
any other compensatory allowance of which the
employee was in receipt on the date of suspension
provided the suspending authority is satisfied that the
employee continues to meet the expenditure for which
the allowance was granted.
2) Where the period of suspension exceeds six months,
the authority which made or is deemed to have made the
order of suspension shall be competent to vary the
amount of subsistence allowance for any period
subsequent to the period of the first six months as
follows:
i) The amount of subsistence allowance may be
increased to 75 percent of basic pay and allowances
thereon if, in the opinion of the said authority the
period of suspension has been prolonged for reasons
to be recorded in writing not directly attributable to
the employee under suspension.
ii) The amount of subsistence allowances may be
reduced to 25 percent of basic pay and allowances
thereon if in the opinion of the said authority, the
period of suspension has been prolonged due to the
reasons to be recorded in writing directly attributable
to the employee under suspension.
3) If an employee is arrested by the Police on a criminal
charge and bail is not granted, no subsistence allowance
is payable. On grant of bail, if the competent authority
decides to continue the suspension, the employee shall
be entitled to subsistence allowance from the date
employee is granted bail.”
10.
A perusal of Rule 20 of SJVN CDA Rules, reveals
that there is no period prescribed for suspension and subrule 5 thereof only talks about the order of suspension, may
at any time be revoked by the authority, which made or is
deemed to have made the order or by any authority to which
that authority is subordinate. Sub-rule 2 of Rule 21 of SJVN
CDA Rules, prescribes that where the period of suspension
exceeds six months, the authority, which made or is deemed
to have made the order of suspension, shall be competent to
vary the amount of subsistence allowance for any period
subsequent to the period of first six months. Thus, it is clear
that the authority is not mandatorily required to take decision
before expiry of 90 days as required under the CCS(CCA)
Rules, which are not applicable in the case of the petitioner.
Sub-rule 2 of Rule 21 of SJVN CDA provides that if the period
of suspension, exceeds six months, the competent authority
can vary the amount of subsistence allowance for any period
subsequent to the period of first six months. Once the Rule
does not prescribe a fixed period and furthermore, the
services of the petitioner are governed by the Rules framed
by respondent No.1-Company, no assistance can be taken
from CCS (CCA) Rules, under which the Hon’ble Supreme
Court had issued the guidelines in the aforementioned case.
11.
Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has
vehemently contended that once Rule 20 of SJVN CDA Rules,
is silent regrading the period of suspension, one has to fall
back upon CCS (CCA) Rules. But the said contention cannot
be accepted for the simple reason that once there are specific
Rules to govern the service conditions of the employees of
respondent No.1-Company, the petitioner cannot harp upon
CCS (CCA) Rules. Furthermore, as already held above, once
there is no period prescribed to consider the order of
suspension under Rule 20, Rule 21 has to be taken into
account, which provides that where the period of suspension
exceeds six months, the authority would be competent to
vary the amount of subsistence allowance, meaning thereby,
the period of suspension can be beyond even six months and
the authority has only to consider the varying of the
subsistence allowance. Learned counsel for the petitioner has
vehemently contended that once Rule 20 is silent regrading
the period of suspension, Rule 21 cannot be attracted. If this
plea is accepted, then the vary purpose of engrafted Rule 21,
become otiose. If Rule 20 is silent regrading period of
suspension one can fall back upon Rule 21. The purpose of
engrafting sub-rule 2 of Rule 21, is that if the period of
suspension exceeds six months, the amount of subsistence
allowance may be increased. So far as the guidelines issued
by DoPT are concerned, the same cannot be ipso facto made
applicable to the employees of respondent No.1-Company,
while governing their service conditions, especially when the
same were not adopted by it.
12.
Learned counsel representing the petitioner
placed heavy reliance upon the judgment passed by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu vs. Promod
Kumar IPS and another, (2018) 17 SCC 677, to contend that
once the respondents had not issued the charge-sheet or not
taken any decision to revoke the suspension order, the order
of suspension cannot subsist. However, in the present case,
the said judgment is not attracted for the simple reason that
the same is under CCS (CCA) Rules. It is true that the person
under suspension should be for short duration, but once the
Rules do not stipulate that the same has to be revoked after a
particular time, a slight delay cannot automatically result the
revocation of the suspension order.
13.
Ms. Devyani Sharma, learned Senior Counsel,
representing the respondents, has vehemently argued that
the prayer made by the petitioner has rendered infructuous
in view of the fact that after serving the charge-sheet upon
the petitioner, the enquiry is complete and the Enquiry
Officer has submitted his report on 12.02.2026 and further
suspension is not a punishment. She has further argued that
since the petitioner had not laid challenge to the Rules
framed
by
respondent
No.1-Company,
and
further
instructions of DoPT have not been followed by respondent
No.1-Company, the action on the part of the respondents in
not revoking the suspension order is justified.
14.
Learned counsel representing the respondents
has placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the Division
Bench of Delhi High Court in Union of India and another vs.
Ajay Kumar Choudhary, (2013) SCC OnLine Del 3437, to
contend that in the case, which was relied upon by the
learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court had interpreted the CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965 and
since in the present case, the petitioner is governed by
different set of Rules, the judgment passed by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court is not attractive.
15.
Reliance has also been placed by the learned
counsel for the respondents upon the judgment in CWP
No.3702 of 2024, titled, Dr. Harminder Singh Baweja vs. Dr.
Y.S. Parmar University and another, wherein, it was held that
once the Rule does not contain any provision akin to Rule
10(7) of CCS(CCA) Rules, the suspension order cannot be
altered.
16.
The judgment passed by the Agartala Bench, in
Kinkar Sarkar vs. State of Tripura and others, (2012) 4
Gauhati Law Reports 880, has also been relied upon by the
learned counsel for the respondents, to contend that until
and unless the amendments are adopted, the same cannot
be made applicable automatically.
17.
Learned counsel representing the respondents
has also placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the
Full Bench in P. Kannan vs. Commissioner for Municipal
Administration and Others, (2022) SCC OnLine Mad 1154, to
contend that the suspension is not a punishment and further
the decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is
binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or co-equal
strength and thus the law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhary’s case (supra), ignoring the
set of Rules applicable therein, was not laying absolute
preposition of law that in no case, the order of suspension
can
continue
beyond
a
period
of
three
months,
if
memorandum of charges/chargesheet is not served to the
delinquent within a period of three months rather it was not
applied in the said case itself. The relevant paras of the
judgment reads as under:“24.
Admittedly, in Ajay Kumar Choudhary, supra,
the Two-Judges Bench did not consider the earlier
Constitution Bench judgments on the issue of suspension.
Qua the binding precedent of the law laid down by a
Bench of larger strength, a Constitution Bench of the Apex
Court in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v.
State of Maharashtra, (2005) 2 SCC 673 held as under:
“12.
Having
carefully
considered
the
submissions made by the learned Senior
Counsel for the parties and having examined
the law laid down by the Constitution Benches in
the abovesaid decisions, we would like to sum
up the legal position in the following terms:
(1) The law laid down by this Court in a
decision delivered by a Bench of larger
strength is binding on any subsequent Bench
of lesser or coequal strength.
(2) A Bench of lesser quorum cannot disagree or
dissent from the view of the law taken by a
Bench of larger quorum. In case of doubt all
that the Bench of lesser quorum can do is to
invite the attention of the Chief Justice and
request for the matter being placed for hearing
before a Bench of larger quorum than the Bench
whose decision has come up for consideration.
It will be open only for a Bench of coequal
strength to express an opinion doubting the
correctness of the view taken by the earlier
Bench of coequal strength, whereupon the
matter may be placed for hearing before a
Bench consisting of a quorum larger than the
one which pronounced the decision laying down
the law the correctness of which is doubted.
(3) The above rules are subject to two
exceptions:
(i) the abovesaid rules do not bind the
discretion of the Chief Justice in whom vests
the power of framing the roster and who can
direct any particular matter to be placed for
hearing before any particular Bench of any
strength; and
(ii)
in
spite
of
the
rules
laid
down
hereinabove, if the matter has already come
up for hearing before a Bench of larger
quorum and that Bench itself feels that the
view of the law taken by a Bench of lesser
quorum, which view is in doubt, needs
correction or reconsideration then by way of
exception (and not as a rule) and for reasons
given by it, it may proceed to hear the case
and examine the correctness of the previous
decision in question dispensing with the
need of a specific reference or the order of
the Chief Justice constituting the Bench and
such listing. Such was the situation in
Raghubir Singh (1989) 2 SCC 754) and
Hansoli Devi [(2002) 7 SCC 273].”
[emphasis supplied]
25. Inasmuch as the Apex Court in Ajay Kumar
Choudhary, supra, has not considered the earlier
judgments of Constitution Benches of the Apex Court, the
earlier Judgments, delivered by Bench of larger strength
would be binding on High Courts too and it cannot be
said that the judgment in Ajay Kumar Choudhary, supra,
lays down absolute proposition of law on suspension, as
what was held in paragraph (21) of the judgment was not
applied in the said case itself in paragraph (22). It is
despite the fact that charge-sheet therein was submitted
much beyond the period of three months.
26. Learned counsel for the petitioners referred to the
judgment in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary, supra,
ignoring the set of rules applicable therein and otherwise
the judgment therein was not laying absolute proposition
of law that in no case the order of suspension can
continue
beyond
a
period
of
three
months
if
memorandum of charges/charge-sheet is not served to
the delinquent within a period of three months, rather it
was not applied in the said case itself.
35. For the foregoing reasons, the reference is answered
by holding that:
(i) The judgment of the Apex Court in the
case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary, supra, does
not lay down absolute proposition of law
that an order of suspension cannot be
continued beyond the period of three
months
if
the
memorandum
of
charges/charge-sheet has not been served
within three months, or if memorandum of
charges/charge-sheet
is
served
without
reasoned order of extension.
(ii) The judgment in R. Balaji, supra, has no
reference to the earlier judgments of coequal strength and is thereby rendered per
incuriam.
(iii) The issue of challenge to the order of
suspension should be analyzed on the facts
of each case, considering the gravity of the
charges and the rules applicable.
(iv) Revocation of suspension with a direction
to the employer to post the delinquent in a
non-sensitive post cannot be endorsed or
directed as a matter of course. It has to be
based on the facts of each case and after
noticing the reason for the delay in serving
the memorandum of charges/charge-sheet.”
18.
Further, the learned counsel for the respondents
has laid emphasis on the judgment passed by the Delhi High
Court in Munendra Kumar vs. Government of NCT Delhi and
others, (2024) SCC OnLine Del 8186, wherein it was held that
if the charge-sheet is not issued within a period of 90 days
from the date of suspension, the suspension would not
automatically lapse. The relevant paras of the judgment reads
as under:“8. The primordial contention of the Petitioner, as
canvassed by learned counsel, is that in view of the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhary
(supra), if the charge sheet is not issued within a period of
90 days from the date of suspension, the suspension
would automatically lapse. There is no quarrel with the
proposition that even though suspension is not a specified
penalty but it does affect an employee and prolonged and
indefinite suspension causes injury and prejudice and
therefore,
Courts
have
repeatedly
asserted
that
disciplinary proceedings, if initiated, must be concluded
within a reasonable time and an employee should not be
indefinitely
suspended.
Prolonged
suspension
does
become punitive in nature, more so when it is for an
unjustified reason. However, it cannot be overlooked that
the employer has a right to suspend an employee to
refrain him from perpetuating the alleged misconduct
and/or destroying the evidence. Each case, therefore,
turns on its own facts and circumstances and no hard and
fast rule can be laid down that only because chargesheet
has not been issued within 90 days of initial suspension
period or even during extended suspension period for a
justified
reason,
the
suspension
period
would
automatically lapse. In this context, it would be useful to
refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in State of
Orissa through its Principal Secretary, Home Dept. v.
Bimal Kumar Mohanty, (1994) 4 SCC 126, as follows:
"13. It is thus settled law that normally when an
appointing
authority
or
the
disciplinary
authority seeks to suspend an employee,
pending inquiry or contemplated inquiry or
pending investigation into grave charges of
misconduct or defalcation of funds or serious
acts of omission and commission, the order of
suspension would be passed after taking into
consideration the gravity of the misconduct
sought to be inquired into or investigated and
the nature of the evidence placed before the
appointing authority and on application of the
mind by disciplinary authority. Appointing
authority
or
disciplinary
authority
should
consider the above aspects and decide whether
it is expedient to keep an employee under
suspension pending aforesaid action. It would
not be as an administrative routine or an
automatic order to suspend an employee. It
should be on consideration of the gravity of the
alleged misconduct or the nature of the
allegations imputed to the delinquent employee.
The Court or the Tribunal must consider each
case on its own facts and no general law could
be laid down in that behalf. Suspension is not a
punishment but is only one of forbidding or
disabling an employee to discharge the duties of
office or post held by him. In other words it is to
refrain him to avail further opportunity to
perpetrate the alleged misconduct or to remove
the impression among the members of service
that dereliction of duty would pay fruits and the
offending employee could get away even
pending inquiry without any impediment or to
prevent an opportunity to the delinquent officer
to scuttle the inquiry or investigation or to win
over the witnesses or the delinquent having had
the opportunity in office to impede the progress
of the investigation or inquiry etc. But as stated
earlier,
each
case
must
be
considered
depending on the nature of the allegations,
gravity of the situation and the indelible impact
it creates on the service for the continuance of
the delinquent employee in service pending
inquiry
or
contemplated
inquiry
or
Investigation. It would be another thing if the
action is actuated by mala fides, arbitrary or for
ulterior purpose. The suspension must be a step
in aid to the ultimate result of the investigation
or inquiry. The authority also should keep in
mind public interest of the impact of the
delinquent's continuance in office while facing
departmental inquiry or trial of a criminal
charge".
9. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has vehemently
relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ajay
Kumar Choudhary (supra) to contend that on the failure
of the employer to issue a chargesheet within 90 days
from the date of the suspension order, the suspension
order would lapse. This contention, in my considered view,
only deserves to be rejected for the simple reason that this
proposition canvassed by the Petitioner does not even
flow from a plain reading of the said judgment. In
paragraph 21 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court
has directed that currency of the suspension order should
not extend beyond three months, if within this period
memorandum of charges is not served on the delinquent
employee. This, in my view, does not lay down an absolute
proposition of law that in every case, failure to issue a
charge sheet within three months would lead to the
suspension order coming to an end, automatically. In
fact, in para 22 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court,
noting that charge sheet had now been issued to the
Appellant, permitted him to challenge his continued
suspension, if so advised and this was despite the fact
that the charge sheet was issued much beyond a period of
08 months.
10. It may be relevant to note that a Division Bench of this
Court in Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. Dr. Rishi Anand, 2017 SCC
OnLine Del 10506, had the occasion to consider the same
issue and after going through the judgment in Ajay
Kumar Choudhary (supra), the Division Bench held as
follows:"13. We have heard learned counsels for the
parties and considered their submissions.
We have also perused the decision of the
Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhary
(supra). In Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra),
the appellant had assailed his suspension
even before issuance of the charge sheet. He
had been suspended with effect from
30.09.2011 and the Supreme Court observed
that the same "has been extended and
continued ever since".
xxx xxx xxx
16. It appears that before the Supreme Court
rendered its decision on 16.02.2016, the
charge sheet had been served on the
appellant though from a reading of the
decision it is not clear as to on what date the
same was so served. This development was
taken note of by the Supreme Court in its
decision. In para 22 of the decision, the
Supreme Court observed:
"22. So far as the facts of the present
case are concerned, the appellant has
now been served with a charge-sheet,
and, therefore, these directions may
not be relevant to him any longer.
However, if the appellant is so advised
he
may
challenge
his
continued
suspension in any manner known to
law, and this action of the respondents
will be subject to judicial review".
(emphasis supplied)
17. Thus, even though the charge sheet had
not been served on the appellant Ajay Kumar
Choudhary when he initially assailed his
suspension, or even till the hearing of the
appeal took place before the Supreme Court
on
09.09.2014
(it
was
only
between
09.09.2014 and the date of decision on
16.02.2015 that the charge sheet appears to
have been served), the Supreme Court held
that since the charge sheet had been served
on the appellant, therefore, the directions
issued by it would not be relevant to his case.
Despite the fact that the appellant Ajay
Kumar Choudhary had remained under
suspension
right
from
30.09.2011,
the
Supreme Court did not set aside the order of
suspension since, in the meantime, Ajay
Kumar Choudhary had been served with a
charge sheet sometime after 09.09.2014, i.e.
nearly three years after his suspension.
xxx xxx xxx
19. There can be no quarrel with the
proposition that a government servant who
is
suspended
disciplinary
in
contemplation
proceedings
or
of
a
criminal
proceedings under Rule 10 of the CCS (CCA)
Rules, should not be kept under suspension
indefinitely or unnecessarily. It is for this
reason that a review of the on-going
suspension is required to be undertaken by
the government at regular intervals under
Rule 10(6) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, which
reads as under:
"10(6) An order of suspension made or
deemed to have been made under this
rule shall be reviewed by the authority
competent to modify or revoke the
suspension [before expiry of ninety
days
from
the
effective
date
of
suspension] on the recommendation of
the Review Committee constituted for
the purpose and pass orders either
extending or revoking the suspension.
Subsequent reviews shall be made
before expiry of the extended period of
suspension. Extension of suspension
shall not be for a period exceeding one
hundred and eighty days at a time."
(emphasis supplied)
20. It may not always be possible for the
government to serve the charge sheet on the
officer concerned within a period of 90 days,
or even the extended period, for myriad
justifiable reasons. At the same time, there
may be cases where the conduct of the
government servant may be such, that it
may be undesirable to recall the suspension
and put him in position once again, even
after sanitising the environment so that he
may not interfere in the proposed inquiry.
On a reading of Ajay Kumar Choudhary
(supra), we are of the view that the Supreme
Court has not denuded the Government of
its
authority
to
continue/extend
the
suspension of the government servant before, or after the service of the charge
sheet of if there is sufficient justification for
it. The Supreme Court has, while observing
that the suspension should not be extended
beyond three months if within this period the
memorandum of charges/charge-sheet is
not served on the delinquent officer, has
stopped short of observing that if the charge
memo/charge-sheet is not issued within
three months of suspension, the suspension
of
the
government
servant
shall
automatically lapse, without any further
order being passed by the Government. No
such consequence the automatic lapsing of
suspension at the expiry of three months if
the charge memo/charge-sheet is not issued
during that period, has been prescribed. In
Kailash v. Nanhku, (2005) 4 SCC 480: AIR
2005 SC 2441, while examining the issue
whether
the
obligation
cast
on
the
defendant to file the written statement to the
plaint under Rule (1) of Order 8 CPC within
the
specified
time
was
directory
or
mandatory i.e. whether the Court could
extend the time for filing of the written
statement beyond the period specified in
Rule 1 of Order 8, the Supreme Court held
that the Court had the power to extend the
time for filing of the written statement, since
there
was
no
consequence
prescribed
flowing from non-extension of time. In para
29 of this decision, the Supreme Court
observed as follows:
"29. It is also to be noted that though
the power of the court under the
proviso appended to Rule 1 Order 8 is
circumscribed by the words "shall not
be later than ninety days" but the
consequences
flowing
from
non-
extension of time are not specifically
provided for though they may be read
in by necessary Implication. Merely
because a provision of law is couched
in
a
negative
language
implying
mandatory character, the same is not
without exceptions. The courts, when
called upon to interpret the nature of
the provision, may, keeping in view the
entire context in which the provision
came to be enacted, hold the same to
be directory though worded in the
negative form."
(emphasis supplied)
21. The direction issued by the Supreme
Court is that the currency of the suspension
should not be extended beyond three
months, if the charge memorandum/chargesheet is not issued within the period of 3
months of suspension. But it does not say
that if, as a matter of fact, it is so extended it
would be null and void and of no effect. The
power of the competent authority to pass
orders under Rule 10(6) of the CCS (CCA)
Rules extending the suspension has not been
extinguished by the Supreme Court. The said
power can be exercised if good reasons
therefor are forthcoming.
22. The decision of the Supreme Court in
Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra) itself shows
that there cannot be a hard and fast rule in
this regard. If that were so, the Supreme
Court would have quashed the suspension of
Ajay Kumar Choudhary. However, in view of
the fact that the charge memo had been
issued to Ajay Kumar Choudhary though
after nearly three years of his initial
suspension, the Supreme Court held that the
directions issued by it would not be relevant
to his case.
23. From a reading of the decision in Ajay
Kumar Choudhary (supra) and Rule 10 of the
CCS (CCA) Rules, it emerges that the
government is obliged to record its reasons
for extension of the suspension which, if
assailed, would be open to judicial scrutiny
not as in an appeal, but on grounds
available in law for judicial review of
administrative action.
24. Learned counsel for the respondent has
argued that since the charge sheet/charge
memo was not served on the respondent
within the initial 90 days of suspension, the
suspension of the respondent automatically
lapsed. Under Rule 10 of the CCS (CCA) Rules,
there is no automatic reinstatement of a
suspended government servant upon expiry
of 90 days, or the extended period of
suspension if, by the date of expiry of such
suspension/extended period of suspension,
the charge sheet is not issued. The only
circumstance in which the suspension of the
government servant lapses automatically is
the one contained in sub-rule (7) of Rule 10.
The same reads as under:
"(7) An order of suspension made or
deemed to have been made under subrules (1) or (2) of this rule shall not be
valid after a period of ninety days
unless it is extended after review, for a
further period before the expiry of
ninety days.
Provided
that
no
such
review
of
suspension shall be necessary in the
case of deemed suspension under subrule (2), if the Government servant
continues to be under suspension at
the time of completion of ninety days of
suspension and the ninety days period
in such case will count from the date
the Government servant detained in
custody is released from detention or
the date on which the fact of his release
from detention is intimated to his
appointing
authority,
whichever
is
later."
(Emphasis supplied)
25. Thus, it is only if the suspension is not
extended after review within the initial
period of 90 days (in a case to which sub-
rule (2) does not apply), that the suspension
of the government servant would lapse
automatically.
In
all
other
cases,
the
suspension would continue unless and until
it is modified or revoked by the competent
authority though it would not imply that
there is no requirement to conduct periodic
renewal of the suspension. This is so
provided in sub-rule (5)(a) of Rule 10, which
reads as follows:
"10(5)(a) Subject to the provisions
contained in sub-rule (7), an order of
suspension made or deemed to have
been made under this rule shall
continue to remain in force until it is
modified or revoked by the authority
competent to do so."
(Emphasis supplied)
26. Thus, there is no force in the submission
of the respondent that the suspension of the
respondent automatically lapsed since the
charge sheet was not issued within the initial
period
of
days.
Pertinently,
the
respondents suspension was reviewed and
extended by the government within the
initial period of 90 days on 27.09.2016. Thus,
the suspension of the respondent did not
lapse under sub rule (7) of Rule 10 CCS (CCA)
Rules."
19.
Learned counsel representing the respondents
has also relied upon the judgment passed by the Bombay
High Court in Writ Petition No.8298 of 2023, titled, Mr.
Krishna Tukaram Thorave vs. The Union of India and others,
to contend that the instructions issued by the DoPT are not
applicable to Central Government employees and the
relevant para of the judgment reads as under:“8. The method of recruitment, salary and allowances,
discipline and other conditions of service of various
officers of EPFO are to be determined by the Central
Board of Trustees. Thus, the administrative instructions
issued by the DoPT which are usually applicable to the
Central Government employees, are not ipso-facto
applicable to the officials of EPFO. It was not mandatory
on the part of Central Board of Trustees in EPFO to apply
the scheme of grant of NFSG to the officials of EPFO.
Nonetheless, the Central Board of Trustees has adopted
the scheme for grant of NFSG initially with ceiling of 15%
and subsequently with ceiling of 30%, albeit from
different dates than the one decided by DoPT.”
20.
Learned counsel representing the respondents
has further placed reliance upon the judgment passed by this
Court in CWP No.1050 of 2022, titled, Ajay Kumar & Others
vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, wherein it was held
that suspension order is not a punishment. Further the
employee is entitled to subsistence allowance during its
operation and the employee must obey the suspension order.
During the period of suspension order, there is no change in
the service condition of the petitioner.
21.
Learned counsel for the respondents has also
relied upon a three-Judge Bench decision in Balvantrai Ratilal
Patel versus State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 800 to
contend that the order of suspension will not come to an end,
until another order terminating the suspension is passed. She
has vehemently contended that the petitioner can approach
the authority for revocation of the suspension order.
22.
From the above facts, it can be safely concluded
that once there are specific Rules governing the service
conditions of the petitioner, it cannot be said that the
suspension order after 90 days of serving of the charge-sheet
has become non est. Furthermore, once the respondents
have conducted an enquiry and the enquiry report has been
submitted to respondent No.1-Company, the petitioner
cannot be granted any relief inasmuch as the order of
suspension cannot be said to be automatically revoked. The
petitioner if aggrieved by the continuation of his suspension
order, can make a representation to the authorities for its
revocation, especially when the enquiry has been completed.
23.
Consequently, I do not find any merit in the
present petition and the same is accordingly dismissed.
However, it is made clear that the petitioner, if wishes, may
approach respondent No.1-Company, for revocation of the
suspension order, in view of the fact that the enquiry in the
matter is complete. In case, such a representation is made by
the petitioner before respondent No.1-Company, the same
be decided within a period of two weeks, from the date of
receipt of the same, uninfluenced by the observation made in
this judgment. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand
disposed of.
6th May, 2026
(ankit)
( Jiya Lal Bhardwaj )
Judge
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