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2026:HHC:42009
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP(M) No. 1705 of 2026
Reserved on: 25.09.2026
Date of Decision: 29.09.2026
Surender Kumar
…. Petitioner
Versus
State of HP
…. Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioner
:
M/s J.K.Verma and Mayank
Verma, Advocates.
For the Respondent/State
:
Mr
Ajit
Sharma,
Advocate General.
Deputy
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking
regular bail in F.I.R. no. 53 of 2026, dated 02.03.2026, registered
at Police Station Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P., for the
commission of offences punishable under Sections 21, 25 and 29
of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act.
It has been asserted that as per the prosecution, the
police party was checking the traffic on 02.03.2026. They stopped
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:42009
a vehicle bearing registration no. HP 31-9134 at about 01:30 p.m.
The petitioner Surender Kumar was driving the vehicle, and coaccused Rinku was occupying the front seat. The police became
suspicious of the conduct of the occupants. They called Rajesh
Kumar, who came to the spot with another person. The police
checked the vehicle and recovered one black polythene packet
from the back pocket of the driver's seat cover. The police
checked the packet and found 134 grams of heroin in it. The
police arrested the occupants and seized the heroin. The
allegations against the petitioner are false. The petitioner’s mere
presence in the vehicle or his driving the vehicle does not lead to
an inference that he was in possession of the heroin. The FIR was
registered on 02.03.2026. More than 6 months have elapsed since
the registration of the FIR. The trial has not yet started. The
police have filed the charge sheet before the Court, and no
fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in
custody. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions
that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present
petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.
3.
The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the police were checking the vehicles on
2026:HHC:42009
02.03.2026, at Alsu. A car bearing regis-tration No. HP-31-9134,
came from Bilaspur, at about 01:30 p.m. The police stopped the
car and asked the driver to produce the documents. The driver
and the person sitting beside the driver got frightened and
objected to the demand of the police. The police became
suspicious and called Rajesh Kumar, who reached the spot after
some time with Saroj Kumar. The police checked the car in their
presence and recovered one polythene packet containing 134
grams of heroin. The driver identified himself as Surender
Kumar, the present petitioner and the person sitting beside the
driver identified himself as Rinku. The police seized the heroin
and arrested the petitioner and the co-accused. The samples
were taken and one sample was sent to FSL, and as per the result
of analysis, it was found to be a sample of diacetylmorphine. Five
FIRs have been registered against the petitioner, the details of
which are as under:1.
F.I.R. No. 190 of 2022, dated 09.09.2022,
registered at Police Station Sundernagar, for the
commission of an offence punishable under
Section 21 of the NDPS Act.
2.
F.I.R. No. 27 of 2024, dated 18.01.2024,
registered at Police Station Sundernagar, for the
commission of offences punishable under
2026:HHC:42009
Sections 21 and 29 of the NDPS Act.
3.
F.I.R. No. 110 of 2024, dated 21.04.2024,
registered at Police Station Sundarnagar, for the
commission of offences punishable under
Sections 21 and 29 of the NDPS Act.
4.
F.I.R. No. 179 of 2024, dated 14.07.2024,
registered at Police Station Sundernagar, for the
commission of offences punishable under
Sections 21, 27 and 29 of the NDPS Act.
F.I.R. No. 91 of 2025, dated 07.05.2025,
registered at Police Station Sundarnagar, for the
commission of offences punishable under
Sections 21 and 29 of the NDPS Act.
4.
The police have completed the investigation and filed
the charge sheet before the Court. The matter is listed before the
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sundernagar, District Mandi,
H.P. on 29.09.2026. The petitioner would indulge in the
commission of a similar crime in case of his release on bail.
Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
5.
I have heard M/s J.K. Varma and Mayank Varma,
learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned
Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State.
6.
Mr J.K. Varma, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that mere presence in the vehicle is not sufficient to
connect the petitioner to the commission of the crime. The
2026:HHC:42009
quantity of heroin stated to have been found in the car is less
than the commercial quantity, and rigours of Section 37 of the
NDPS Act do not apply to the present case; hence, the petitioner
is entitled to bail as a matter of right. The police have completed
the investigation and filed the charge sheet before the Court. The
petitioner's custodial interrogation is not required. Mere
pendency of criminal cases is no reason to deny bail to a person.
Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the
petitioner be released on bail. He relied upon Gurdeep Singh vs.
State of H.P. bearing Cr.MP(M) No. 127 of 2023, decided on
23.01.2023 in support of his submissions.
7.
Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for
the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner was found
driving the car from which the police had recovered 134 grams of
heroin, which is a huge quantity and could not have been meant
for self-consumption. The consumption of heroin is adversely
affecting society, and no leniency should be shown to the
petitioner. The petitioner has criminal antecedents, and he would
indulge in the commission of a similar offence in case of his
release on bail. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be
dismissed.
2026:HHC:42009
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
9.
The parameters for granting bail were considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC
314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:
(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail
56. In Gudikantis Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1
SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while
elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution
of India in the context of personal liberty of a person
under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be
considered while granting bail, which are extracted as
under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the
vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also
bears upon the issue.
8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice
would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant
jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being.
[Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”
(Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 —
Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]
9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court
considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with
witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the
process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in
this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who
is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record,
particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to
commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to
2026:HHC:42009
habituals, it is part of criminological history that a
thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the
opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of
society. Bail discretion, based on evidence about the
criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise
in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied)
57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4
SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various
aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing
with an application seeking bail. The same may be
extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the
basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the
circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner.
While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the
nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support
thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction
will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing
of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the
accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of
the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the
witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the
public or State and similar other considerations. It has also
to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail
the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for
believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the
court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic
itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the
accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce
prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis
supplied)
58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh,
(2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through
Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion
in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In
highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of
course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as
follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)
2026:HHC:42009
“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but,
however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a
judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order
for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained.
Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is
dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being
dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case
to case. While the placement of the accused in society,
though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding
factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should
always be coupled with other circumstances warranting
the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the
basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more
heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection
of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual
matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied)
59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC
528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is
established that a court considering a bail application
cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and
an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the
court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons
justifying the grant of bail.
60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14
SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that
where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said
order would suffer from the vice of non-application of
mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with
regard to the circumstances under which an order
granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors
which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant
bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere
with an order passed by the High Court granting or
rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally
incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion
judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the
basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this
2026:HHC:42009
Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other
circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while
considering an application for bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable
ground to believe that the accused had committed the
offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if
released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing
of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by
grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxx
62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of
application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise
of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the
accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 :
(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this
Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order
(Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856
and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat
2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused,
observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022)
4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)
“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an
individual is an invaluable right, at the same time, while
considering an application for bail, courts cannot lose sight
of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused
and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly
2026:HHC:42009
when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or
vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material
brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima
facie conclusion. While considering an application for the
grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported
by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to
the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due
consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the
nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if
any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a
conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an
accused.” (emphasis supplied)
10.
Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v.
Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC
261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the
gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests
otherwise. It was observed at page 308:
2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not
jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of
fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or
creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences
or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner
who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not
intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative.
3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely
to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and
must weigh with us when considering the question of jail.
So also, the heinousness of the crime….”
11.
The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
2026:HHC:42009
12.
The status report mentions that the petitioner was
driving the car from which the police had recovered 134 grams of
heroin. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Madan
Lal versus State of H.P. (2003) 7 SCC 465; 2003 SCC (Cri) 1664; 2003
SCC OnLineSC 874, that all the occupants of the vehicle would be
in conscious possession of the contraband. It was observed:
“19. Whether there was conscious possession has to be
determined with reference to the factual backdrop. The
facts which can be culled out from the evidence on record
are that all the accused persons were travelling in a
vehicle, and as noted by the trial court, they were known
to each other, and it has not been explained or shown as to
how they travelled together from the same destination in a
vehicle which was not a public vehicle.
20. Section 20(b) makes possession of contraband articles
an offence. Section 20 appears in Chapter IV of the Act,
which relates to offences for possession of such articles. It
is submitted that to make the possession illicit, there must
be conscious possession.
21. It is highlighted that unless the possession was coupled
with the requisite mental element, i.e., conscious
possession and not mere custody without awareness of the
nature of such possession, Section 20 is not attracted.
22. The expression “possession” is a polymorphous term
that assumes different colours in different contexts. It
may carry different meanings in contextually different
backgrounds. It is impossible, as was observed in the
Supdt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Anil Kumar
Bhunja [(1979) 4 SCC 274: 1979 SCC (Cri) 1038: AIR 1980 SC
52] to work out a completely logical and precise definition
of “possession” uniformly applicable to all situations in
the context of all statutes.
2026:HHC:42009
23. The word “conscious” means awareness of a particular
fact. It is a state of mind which is deliberate or intended.
24. As noted in Gunwantlal v. State of M.P. [(1972) 2 SCC
194: 1972 SCC (Cri) 678: AIR 1972 SC 1756], possession in a
given case need not be physical possession but can be
constructive, having power and control over the article in
the case in question, while the person to whom physical
possession is given holds it subject to that power or
control.
25. The word “possession” means the legal right to
possession (see Heath v. Drown [(1972) 2 All ER 561: 1973 AC
498: (1972) 2 WLR 1306 (HL)] ). In an interesting case, it
was observed that where a person keeps his firearm in his
mother's flat, which is safer than his own home, he must
be considered to be in possession of the same. (See
Sullivan v. Earl of Caithness [(1976) 1 All ER 844; 1976 QB
966; (1976) 2 WLR 361 (QBD)].)
26. Once possession is established, the person who claims
that it was not a conscious possession has to establish it
because how he came to be in possession is within his
special knowledge. Section 35 of the Act gives a statutory
recognition of this position because of the presumption
available in law. Similar is the position in terms of Section
54, where a presumption is also available to be drawn
from possession of illicit articles.
27. In the factual scenario of the present case, not only
possession but conscious possession has been established.
It has not been shown by the accused-appellants that the
possession was not conscious in the logical background of
Sections 35 and 54 of the Act.”
13.
Therefore, prima facie, the petitioner was found in
possession of the heroin.
14.
The Central Government has notified 25 grams as the
small quantity of heroin and 250 grams of heroin as the
2026:HHC:42009
commercial quantity. Thus, the petitioner was found in
possession of more than 5 times the small quantity, which is a
huge quantity and could not have been meant for selfconsumption. There is force in the submission made on behalf of
the State that the consumption of the heroin is adversely
affecting the society and no leniency should be shown to the
petitioner.
15.
It was submitted that the quantity of heroin is less
than commercial quantity and the rigours of Section 37 of the
NDPS Act do not apply to the present case; hence, the petitioner
is entitled to bail as a matter of right. This submission is not
acceptable. It was laid down by this Court in Khushi Ram Gupta v.
State of H.P., 2022 SCC OnLine HP 3779, that the menace of drug
addiction has seriously eroded into the fabric of society and the
release of an accused on bail in NDPS Act cases will send a
negative signal to society. It was observed:
“8. The menace of drug addiction, especially in
adolescents and students, has seriously eroded into the
fabric of society, putting the future generation as well as
the prospects of future nation-building into serious peril.
9. It is not a case where the investigating agency is
clueless in respect of evidence against the petitioner.
Though allegations against the petitioner are yet to be
proved in accordance with the law, it cannot be taken
2026:HHC:42009
singly as a factor to grant bail to the petitioner. Nothing
has been placed on record on behalf of the petitioner to
divulge as to how and in what manner he came in contact
with the persons who were residents of the State of
Himachal Pradesh. Thus, there is sufficient prima facie
material to infer the implication of the petitioner in the
crime. In such circumstances, the release of the petitioner
on bail will send a negative signal in society, which will
definitely be detrimental to its interests.
10. The prima facie involvement of the petitioner in the
dangerous trade of contraband cannot be ignored merely
on account of the fact that he has no past criminal history.
It cannot be guaranteed that there will be re-indulgence
by the petitioner in similar activities, in case he is released
on bail.”
16.
Similarly, it was held in Bunty Yadav v. State of H.P.,
2022 SCC OnLine HP 4996, that bail cannot be claimed as a matter
of right even though the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act do
not apply to a case. Each case has to be adjudged on its own facts.
It was observed:
“6. The quantity involved in the case is 89.89 grams of
heroin and 3.90 grams of MDMA. Such quantity may not
technically fall under the category of commercial quantity;
nevertheless, such quantity cannot be termed to be less by
any stretch of the imagination. The evident nature of
commercial transactions and dealing with the contraband
aggravates the situation for the petitioner. In a case where
Section 37 of the NDPS Act is not applicable, bail cannot be
claimed as a matter of right. The fate depends on the facts
of each and every case.
7. The menace of drug addiction, especially in adolescents
and students, has seriously eroded the fabric of society,
2026:HHC:42009
putting the future generation as well as the prospects of
future nation-building into serious peril.”
17.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Union of India v. Namdeo Ashruba Nakade, SLP (Crl.) 9792/2025,
decided on 07.11.2025, that there is a concerning increase in drug
abuse amongst the youth. It was observed: 8. This Court is of the view that the issue of substance
abuse has emerged as a global public health crisis in the
twenty-first century, affecting every country worldwide,
as drug trafficking and addiction have become pervasive.
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
reported in its 2025 World Drug Report that “As at 2023,
some 316 million people worldwide had used drugs in the
past year, representing an increase over the past decade
that outpaces population growth, which indicates a higher
prevalence of drug use.”
9. In India, there has been a concerning increase in drug
abuse among the youth. Substance abuse not only affects
individuals, families, and communities but also
undermines various aspects of health, including physical,
social, political, and cultural foundations, and mental
well-being. (See: “Bhattacharya S, Menon GS, Garg S,
Grover A, Saleem SM, Kushwaha P. The lingering menace
of drug abuse among the Indian youth–it’s time for
action. Indian J Community Med 2025;50: S9-12,
published on 17th April, 2025”)
10. According to many news reports, India faces a clear
dilemma
between
tackling
the narcotics
crisis
systematically or sacrificing its most valuable resource,
i.e. its young people. The extent of the menace of drug
abuse has also been highlighted by this Court in the case
of Ankush Vipan Kapoor v. National Investigation Agency,
(2025) 5 SCC 155, wherein this Court has observed as
under:
2026:HHC:42009
“9.1 The ills of drug abuse seem to be shadowing the
length and breadth of our country, with the Central
and every State Government fighting against the
menace of substance abuse. The debilitating impact
of the drug trade and drug abuse is an immediate
and serious concern for India. As the globe grapples
with the menace of escalating substance use
disorders (“SUD”) and an ever-accessible drug
market, the consequences leave a generational Page
75 of 84 imprint on public health and even national
security. Article 47 of the Constitution makes it a
duty of the State to regard the raising of the level of
nutrition and the standard of living of its people and
the improvement of public health as among its
primary duties, and in particular, the State shall
endeavour to bring about the prohibition of the
consumption except for medicinal purposes of
intoxicating drinks and of drugs which are injurious
to health. The State has a responsibility to address
the root causes of this predicament and develop
effective intervention strategies to ensure that
India’s younger population, which is particularly
vulnerable to substance abuse, is protected and
saved from such a menace. This is particularly
because substance abuse is linked to social problems
and can contribute to child maltreatment, spousal
violence, and even property crime in a family.”
18.
Hence, the petitioner cannot be released on bail
merely because the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not
apply to his case.
19.
The status report shows that five FIRs have been
registered against the petitioner for the commission of offences
punishable under various provisions of the NDPS Act, which
2026:HHC:42009
means that the petitioner has criminal antecedents. This Court
dealt with the relevance of criminal antecedents while granting
bail in Champa vs. State of H.P.: 2025:HHC:28899 and held that the
criminal antecedents would disentitle an accused from the
concession of bail, especially when the FIR registered against
him related to the commission of a similar offence. This
judgment was unsuccessfully assailed before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in SLP(Criminal) 19120 of 2025 titled Champa Devi
vs. State of H.P., decided on27.11.2025. This position was reiterated
in Shakti Sharma vs. State of H.P. 2026: HHC:33462. Therefore, the
relevance of criminal antecedents cannot be ignored.
20.
In the present case, the registration of the FIR against
the petitioner for the commission of an offence punishable under
the NDPS Act shows that the apprehension of the prosecution is
justified, that the petitioner would indulge in the commission of
a similar offence in case of his release on bail, and the petitioner
is not entitled to bail because of his criminal antecedents.
21.
It was submitted that the petitioner was arrested on
02.03.2026 and more than 6 months have elapsed. The trial has
not commenced, and the petitioner cannot be detained in
2026:HHC:42009
custody indefinitely. This submission will not help the petitioner.
It takes some time to carry out the investigation and preliminary
proceedings before the commencement of Trial. Considering the
nature of the quantity and its ramifications on society, the period
of 6 months cannot be said to be excessive, justifying the grant of
bail to the petitioner. Further, the petitioner has not filed the
copies of the order sheets to demonstrate that the delay is
attributable to the Court or the prosecution and not to him.
Hence, the petitioner cannot be released on bail at this stage.
22.
In Gurdeep Singh (supra), the Co-ordinate Bench of
this Court had granted bail despite the criminal antecedents. It is
difficult to follow the judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench in view
of the binding precedents of the Hon'ble Supreme Court noticed
by this Court in Champa (supra) as affirmed by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court. Thus, not much advantage can be derived from
the cited judgment.
23.
No other point was urged.
24.
In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it
is dismissed. However, this will not prevent the petitioner from
approaching the Court if the Trial is not concluded expeditiously.
2026:HHC:42009
25.
The observations made hereinabove are regarding the
disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on
the merits of the case.
th
September, 2026.
(Ravinder)
( Rakesh Kainthla )
Judge
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