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2026:HHC:25161
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA
CMPMO No. 16/2025
Decided on: 23.06.2026
Sunita
…..Petitioner
Versus
Rachna Devi & ors.
…Respondents
______________________________________________________________
Coram:
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice RomeshVerma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
For the Petitioner:
Mr. Sunny Modgil,
V.C.)
Advocate (through
For the Respondents: Mr. Sanjeev Kumar Suri, Advocate, for
respondents No. 1, 2 and 4.
Romesh Verma, Judge (oral)
The instant petition arises out of judgment, dated
18.12.2024, as passed by the learned District Judge, Una, H.P.,
whereby appeal, as preferred by the plaintiff/petitioner, came to
be dismissed and the order, dated 08.04.2024, as passed by the
learned Senior Civil Judge, Una, HP., dismissing the application
under Order
39 Rules 1 and
2 CPC,
as filed by the
plaintiff/petitioner, was affirmed.
1Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
The facts, as emerge in the instant case, are that
plaintiff/petitioner
filed
injunction restraining
a
suit
for
permanent
prohibitory
the defendants from changing
existing
nature and character by way of raising any sort of construction
in any manner and from ousting
the plaintiff from joint
possession of land measuring 0-16-20 hectares, comprised in
Khewat No. 83, Khatauni No. 93, Khasra Nos. 460, 461, Kitta-2,
as entered in jamabandi for the year 2020-21, situated at Up
Mohal Santokhgarh Swan, Sub Tehsil Mehatpur Basdehra,
District Una, H.P. As per averments, as made in the plaint, the
suit land is joint inter se the parties and the defendants are
legal heirs of one Karma, co-sharer in the suit land, who died
about one year ago and mutation to this effect has yet not been
attested. It was averred that the defendants being very clever,
headstrong and influential persons
were threatening
having no regard for law
to change nature and character by raising
construction over the suit land in an illegal manner, therefore,
the suit was filed against the defendants seeking permanent
prohibitory injunction, as aforesaid.
The plaintiff/petitioner along with the plaint filed an
application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC for grant of ad
interim injunction restraining the defendants from raising
construction over the suit land during the pendency of the civil
suit.
The defendants contested
the suit by filing written
statement, wherein preliminary objections with respect to
maintainability, cause of action, estoppel etc. were raised. On
merits, all the averments, as made in the plaint, were specifically
refuted and denied.
It was averred that
the plaintiff in
connivance with her family members, especially brother Mohan
Lal,
has filed false and frivolous suit against the defendants
since he has already raised his double storey residential house
over the suit land by covering his share in the suit land including
frontal
portion
as
per
his
plaintiff/petitioner has no right
entitlement
and
now
the
to restrain the defendants to
raise their residential house over their share in the suit land. It
is the case of the defendants that they are owners in possession
of half share in the suit land and thus, they prayed for dismissal
of the suit.
was
The application under order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC
duly
contested
by
the
petitioner/plaintiff
by
filing
comprehensive reply.
Learned trial court vide order dated 08.04.2024
dismissed the application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC.
Feeling
dissatisfied,
the
plaintiff/petitioner
approached the learned first appellate court by filing any appeal
under Order 43 Rule 1 read with Section 151 CPC, which too
came to be dismissed vide judgment, dated 18.12.2024, passed
by the learned first appellate Court.
Still feeling aggrieved by the judgment/order, as
passed by the learned Courts below, the plaintiff/petitioner has
approached this court by filing the instant petition under article
227 of the Constitution of India.
Mr.
Sunny
plaintiff/petitioner,
Modgil,
has
learned
contended
counsel
that
the
for
the
impugned
judgment/order, as passed by both the learned Courts below, are
erroneous and thus liable to be quashed and set aside. He has
submitted that the plaintiff has been able to make out a prima
facie case in his favour, therefore, during the pendency of the
suit, the learned courts below ought to have passed status quo
order qua the suit land. He has further submitted that after
accepting the instant petition, the application filed for ad interim
injunction deserves to be allowed.
On the other hand, Mr. Sanjeev K. Suri, Advocate,
learned counsel for the respondents No. 1, 2 and 4,
has
defended the impugned orders. He has submitted that no
interference of any kind is required in the well reasoned and
concurrent judgment/order, as passed by the learned Courts
below, by this Court while exercising power under article 227 of
the Constitution of India.
I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and
have also gone through the material available on record.
Admittedly, in the present case, the parties are co-
sharers and as has been rightly pointed out by the defendants
and held by the learned Courts below that the defendants are
owners in possession of ½ of the share of total suit land. It is
also admitted that brother of the plaintiff/petitioner has raised
double storey construction over the suit land. Once brother of
the plaintiff/ petitioner himself has raised construction over the
suit
land,
now
it
does
not
lie
in
the
mouth
of
the
plaintiff/petitioner to say that till the time partition takes place,
the defendants be restrained
from raising any
kind of
construction.
This Court in Ashok Kapoor vs. Murtu Devi 2016
(1) Shimla Law Cases 207, has laid down exposition of law,
whereby it has been held that mere making of construction or
improvement in the common property does not amount to
ouster. If by the act of the co-owner in possession, the value or
utility of the property is diminished, then a co-owner out of
possession can certainly seek an injunction to prevent the
diminution of the value and utility of the property. It has been
further held that if the acts of the co-owner in possession are
detrimental to the interest of other co- owners, a co-owner out of
possession can seek an injunction to prevent such an act, which
is detrimental to his interest.
From the perusal of the plaint, it is clear that the
plaintiff has nowhere mentioned in the entire body of the plaint
as to which portion of the suit land is best and valuable one.
Merely by stating that the defendants are raising construction
over the best and valuable portion of the suit land will not
furnish any cause of action in favour of the plaintiff.
It is well settled that a co-owner is not entitled to an
injunction restraining another co-owner from exceeding his
rights in the common property absolutely and simply because he
is a co-owner unless any act of the person in possession of the
property amounts to ouster, prejudicial or adverse to the interest
of the co-owner out of possession. Mere making of construction
or improvement in the common property does not amount to
ouster, rather, if by any act of the co-owner in possession, the
value or utility of the property is diminished, then a co-owner out
of possession can certainly seek an injunction to prevent the
diminution of the value and utility of the property. The acts of
the co-owner in possession and a co-owner out of possession can
seek an injunction to prevent such an act which is detrimental to
his interest.
Therefore, a co-sharer cannot be restrained from
raising construction over the joint land unless it is shown that
such an act would constitute prejudice and mere raising of
construction does not amount to any prejudice as has been held
by this Court in Ramesh Kumar vs. Sheetal & others 2021 (1)
Shimla Law Cases 377.
In the instant case, as rightly held by the learned
Courts below that defendants/respondents are in possession of
½ of the total suit land, whereas the plaintiff is having very
meager share, therefore in such circumstances, the plaintiff has
failed to pass triplicate test of prima facie case, balance of
convenience and irreparable loss. Importantly, the brother of the
plaintiff himself has raised double storey construction over the
suit land. The plaintiff cannot be permitted to adopt policy of
pick and choose. Once she chose not to agitate the construction,
as raised by her own brother on the joint land, now she cannot
be
permitted to raise the plea of co-sharer against the
defendants. Once the brother
of the plaintiff has raised
construction over joint land and she chose not to seek any
injunction against him, therefore, the plaintiff is estopped by her
own acts, deed and conduct.
From the strength of the revenue record, it is clear
that it is the defendants, who have got prima facie case in their
favour and balance of convenience also lies in their favour and
in case they are injuncted, they shall suffer huge irreparable
loss.
The learned courts below have rightly exercised the
jurisdiction after taking into consideration the material placed
on record by the respective parties.
Learned counsel for respondents No. 1, 2 and 4 has
cited judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal
No(s).13801 of 2025,
titled as Shri Digant vs M/s P.D.T.
Trading Co. & others,
wherein
the Hon’ble Supreme Court
while dealing with petition under Article 227 of Constitution of
India has laid down parameters. The relevant paragraph thereof
reads as under:22. The scope of High Court’s jurisdiction under Articles
226/227 fell for consideration before a three-Judge Bench
of this Court in Radhey Shyam & another v. Chhabi Nath &
Ors. 1 This Court held that judicial orders of civil courts are
not amenable to a writ of certiorari under Article 226,
though they
may be questioned in the supervisory
jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution. The power under Article 227 is intended to be
used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the
purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and tribunals
within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting
mere errors. The power may be exercised in cases
occasioning grave injustice or failure of justice such as
when (i) the court or tribunal has assumed a jurisdiction
which it does not have, (ii) has failed to exercise a
jurisdiction which it does have, such failure occasioning a
failure of justice, and (iii) the jurisdiction though available is
being exercised in a manner which tantamounts to
overstepping the limits of jurisdiction.”
23. In the case on hand, the appellate court had considered
whether the proceeding in detail the issue as to court was
justified in trial with the case, without further notice to the
defendants,
after
submission
of
pursis
(Exh.42)
by
defendants’ counsel, claiming no instructions. After a
threadbare
analysis
and
taking
into
consideration
surrounding circumstances, the appellate court held that
the trial court had committed no wrong proceeding with the
matter court representing with noticed the the that
defendants matter. The appellate Court noticed that the
advocate representing the defendants had claimed no
instructions but not sought withdrawal of his Vakalatnama
and the matter thereafter remained pending for over three
months till it was decided in March 2015. In between no
effort was made by the defendants to engage another
lawyer. Moreover, the defendants did not come up with a
case that their lawyer’s notice was not served on them
therefore, they could not engage another counsel Besides
that, the record also indicated that the intention of the
defendants was to delay the proceedings because earlier
also the suit had proceeded ex parte against them though,
later, those orders were recalled. Therefore, in our view,
once the appellate court took into consideration all relevant
aspects including the fact that pursis (Exh.42) did not seek
withdrawal of the Vakalatnama, and withdrawal was not
even permitted, there was no such jurisdictional error
which warranted exercise of powers under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India. The High Court without any
justification
procedure
went
consider
the
procedure
prescribed for withdrawal Vakalatnama when neither
withdrawal of Vakalatnama was permitted by the Trial
Court nor the pursis prayed for its withdrawal. In such
circumstances, the entire exercise of the High Court was
misconceived. More so, when the view taken by the
appellate Court that defendant cannot take advantage of
his own wrong was a plausible view based on materials
available on record. Hence, in our view, appellate court’s
order was not amenable to interference in exercise of
jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of
India. The High Court clearly exceeded its jurisdiction
under Article 2278 of the Constitution in interfering with
well reasoned order of the appellate Court.”
Similar exposition of law has been laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in case titled as Garment Craft vs.
Prakash Chand Goel, (2022) 4 SCC 181, wherein in paras 15
and 16, it has been held as under:
“15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are
clearly of the view that the impugned order is contrary to
law and cannot be sustained for several reasons, but
primarily
for
deviation
from
the
limited
jurisdiction
exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India. The High Court exercising supervisory
jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the
determination under
challenge
is based.
Supervisory
jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a
legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be
supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own
decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior
court or tribunal. The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature
of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of
duty or flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental principles
of law or justice. The power under Article 227 is exercised
sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there is no
evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that
no reasonable person can possibly come to such a
conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It is
axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be exercised to
ensure there is no miscarriage of justice.
16. Explaining the scope of jurisdiction under Article 227,
this Court in Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd. has
observed:"6. The scope and ambit of exercise of power and
jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India is examined and explained in a
number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power
under this article involves a duty on the High Court to keep
inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their
authority and to see that they do the duty expected or
required of them in a legal manner. The High Court is not
vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of
hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the
jurisdiction of the subordinate courts or tribunals. Exercise
of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or
tribunals is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty
and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or
justice, where if the High Court does not interfere, a grave
injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the
High Court while acting under this article cannot exercise
its power as an appellate court or substitute its own
judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct
an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record.
The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts
of an inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all
to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable
person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the
court or tribunal has come to.
19. The factum that the counsel for the appellant had
applied for the certified copy would show that the counsel
for the appellant was aware that the ex-parte decree had
been passed on the account of failure to lead defence
evidence. This would not, however, be a good ground and
reason to set aside and substitute the opinion formed by
the trial court that the appellant being incarcerated was
unable to lead evidence and another chance should be
given to the appellant to lead defence evidence. The
discretion exercised by the trial court in granting relief, did
not suffer from an error apparent on the face of the record
or was not a finding so perverse that it was unsupported
by evidence to justify it. There could be some justification
for the respondent to argue that the appellant was possibly
aware of the ex-parte decree and therefore the submission
that the appellant came to know of the ex-parte decree only
on release from jail on 6th May, 2017 is incorrect, but this
would not affect the factually correct explanation of the
appellant that he was incarcerated and could not attend
the civil suit proceedings from 6th October 2015 to 6th May
2017. If it was felt 30 that the application for setting aside
the ex-parte decree was filed belatedly, the court could
have given an opportunity to the appellant to file an
application for condonation of delay and costs could have
been imposed. The facts as known, equally apply as
grounds for condonation of delay. It is always important to
take a holistic and overall view and not get influenced by
aspects which can be explained. Thus, the reasoned
decision of the trial court on elaborate consideration of the
relevant facts did not warrant interference in exercise of the
supervisory
jurisdiction
under
Article
of
the
Constitution.”
Taking into consideration the aforesaid exposition of
law, as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court is of
the
considered
opinion
jurisdictional error
that
there
is
no
perversity
or
in the impugned orders, as passed by the
Courts below.
Consequently,
the present petition being devoid of
any merit is dismissed, so also the pending application(s), if any,
leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
Any expression of opinion, hereinabove, shall have no
bearing on the merits of the case and shall be deemed to have
been made only for the purpose of disposal of instant petition.
23rd June, 2026
(pankaj)
(Romesh Verma)
Judge
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