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2026:HHC:49032
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No. 1253 of 2026
Date of Decision: 5.11.2026.
Sunil Pal
…. Petitioner
Versus
State of HP & Anr.
…. Respondents
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
No.
For the Petitioner
:
M/s Gurdev Singh Thakur and
Parveen Kumar, Advocates.
For Respondent No.1/State
:
Mr Ajit Sharma,
Advocate General.
For Respondent No.2
:
Nemo.
Deputy
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge (Oral)
Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General,
appears and waives service of notice on behalf of the
respondent-State.
2.
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
setting aside the order dated 19.12.2025 passed by the learned
Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Palampur, District Kangra,
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:49032
H.P. (hereinafter referred to as the 'learned Trial Court') in the
complaint titled Baljeet Pathania vs. Sunil Pal, Case No. 136-III of
2022, whereby personal and surety bonds have been cancelled
and forfeited to the State of H.P., and the petitioner has been
ordered to be served by way of non-bailable warrants of arrest,
as well as consequential and subsequent orders passed by the
learned Trial Court.
3.
The photocopies of the order sheet maintained by the
learned Trial Court show that the learned Trial Court had taken
cognisance on 26.04.2022. The notices were issued to the
accused, and he was served for 01.12.2022. He failed to appear
before the Court on the date fixed, and the learned Trial Court
ordered the issuance of bailable warrants in the sum of ₹5,000/with one surety in the like amount. The accused was again
ordered to be summoned by way of bailable warrants of arrest in
the sum of ₹10,000/- on 15.1.2023. The accused surrendered
before the Court on 07.10.2023 and was ordered to be released on
bail.
4.
The statement of one witness was recorded on
30.09.2024. The matter was listed for recording the statement of
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the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(Cr.P.C.) on 28.10.2024, and the accused was absent; however, an
application for exemption was filed, which was allowed.
Subsequently, the accused failed to appear before the Court, and
applications for exemption continued to be filed, which were
allowed. The accused was absent on 22.04.2025, and the Court
ordered the issuance of non-bailable warrants of arrest. The
accused appeared before the Court on 12.08.2025, and he was
admitted to bail. Subsequently, the matter was listed on different
dates and finally on 19.12.2025, when the accused again
absented, and the Court ordered the issuance of non-bailable
warrants of arrest.
5.
Being aggrieved by the order, the petitioner/accused
has approached this Court seeking the cancellation of nonbailable warrants of arrest, asserting that the petitioner is
employed in the Indian Army, and it was very difficult for him to
appear before the Court. The petitioner has an apprehension of
his arrest; therefore, it has been prayed that the present petition
be allowed and the order passed by the learned Trial Court be set
aside.
6.
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Mr Parveen Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that the petitioner could not appear before the Court
because he belongs to the Indian Army. His daughter had
appeared before the Court on 19.12.2025, but her attendance was
not marked. The petitioner is ready to appear before the Court
and join the proceedings. The non-bailable warrants should not
have been issued in the first instance. Hence, he prayed that the
present petition be allowed and the order passed by the learned
Trial Court be set aside. He relied upon Inder Mohan Goswami Vs.
State of Uttranchal and others, Cr. Appeal No. 1392 of 2007 (Arising
out of SLP (Criminal) No. 3658 of 2004, decided on 9.10.2007, Sahib
Singh @ Saab Singh Vs. State of Punjab 2025 NCPHHC 106708,
Pankaj Kumar Vs. State of Haryana 2025:PHHC:155299 and Sarojani
Vs. State of Haryana and another CRA-S-561-2022, decided on
5.4.2022 in support of his submissions.
7.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8.
A perusal of the order sheets maintained by the
learned Trial Court, noticed above, shows that the petitioner is a
persistent defaulter. He had repeatedly absented himself from
2026:HHC:49032
the Court, and his presence had to be secured by issuance of nonbailable warrants of arrest. It was laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Talab Haji Hussain v. Madhukar Purshottam
Mondkar, 1958 SCC OnLine SC 81: 1958 SCR 1226: 1958 CRI LJ 701:
1958 SCJ 672: AIR 1958 SC 376 that a person cannot compromise a
fair trial by absenting from the Court and if he does so, his bail is
to be cancelled, even in a bailable offence. It was observed:
“6. Now, it is obvious that the primary object of criminal
procedure is to ensure a fair trial of accused persons. Every
criminal trial begins with the presumption of innocence in
favour of the accused, and provisions of the Code are so
framed that a criminal trial should begin with and be
throughout governed by this essential presumption, but a
fair trial has naturally two objects in view; it must be fair
to the accused and must also be fair to the prosecution.
The test of fairness in a criminal trial must be judged from
this dual point of view. It is, therefore, of the utmost
importance that, in a criminal trial, witnesses should be
able to give evidence without any inducement or threat,
either from the prosecution or the defence. A criminal trial
must never be so conducted by the prosecution as it would
lead to the conviction of an innocent person; similarly, the
progress of a criminal trial must not be obstructed by the
accused so as to lead to the acquittal of a really guilty
offender. The acquittal of the innocent and the conviction
of the guilty are the objects of a criminal trial, and so there
can be no possible doubt that if any conduct on the part of
an accused person is likely to obstruct a fair trial, there is
occasion for the exercise of the inherent power of the High
Courts to secure the ends of justice. There can be no more
important requirement of the ends of justice than the
uninterrupted progress of a fair trial, and it is for the
2026:HHC:49032
continuance of such a fair trial that the inherent powers of
the High Courts are sought to be invoked by the
prosecution in cases where it is alleged that accused
persons, either by suborning or intimidating witnesses,
are obstructing the smooth progress of a fair trial.
Similarly, if an accused person who is released on bail jumps
bail and attempts to run to a foreign country to escape the
trial, that again would be a case where the exercise of the
inherent power would be justified in order to compel the
accused to submit to a fair trial and not to escape its
consequences by taking advantage of the fact that he has been
released on bail and by absconding to another country. In
other words, if the conduct of the accused person subsequent to
his release on bail puts in jeopardy the progress of a fair trial
itself and if there is no other remedy which can be effectively
used against the accused person, in such a case, the inherent
power of the High Court can be legitimately invoked. In
regard to non-bailable offences, there is no need to invoke
such power because Section 497(5) specifically deals with
such cases. The question which we have to decide in this
case is whether the exercise of inherent power under
Section 561-A against persons accused of bailable offences
who have been released on bail is contrary to or
inconsistent with the provisions of Section 496 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure.” (Emphasis supplied)
9.
It was held by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court
in Nagendra Nath Chakravarti, In re, 1923 SCC OnLine Cal 318: 1924 Cri
LJ 732: AIR 1924 Cal 476 that the primary purpose of granting bail is to
secure the presence of the accused during the Trial. It was observed:
“It is indisputable that bail is not to be withheld merely as
a punishment. The requirements as to bail are to secure
the attendance of the accused at the trial: R. v. Rose [(1898)
18 Cox. 717. The proper test to be applied in the solution of
the question, whether bail should be granted or refused, is
whether it is probable that the party will appear to take his
2026:HHC:49032
trial: Re Robinson [(1854) 23 L.J.Q.B. 286: 2 W.R. 424.], R. v.
Scaife [(1841) 9 Dowling P.C. 553: 5 Jurist 700.]. The test is
applied by reference to the following considerations:
(a) The nature of the accusation: R. v. Barronet
[(1852) 1 E. & B. 1: Dearsley 51.], R. v. Butler [(1861) 14
Cox. 530 : 8 L.R. (Ir.) 39.] ;
(b) The nature of the evidence in support of the
accusation: Re Robinson [(1854) 23 L.J.Q.B. 286: 2 W.R.
424.], R. v. Butler [(1861) 14 Cox. 530 : 8 L.R. (Ir.) 39.] ,
R. v. McCormick; [(1864) 17 Ir. C.L.R. 411.]
(c) The severity of the punishment which conviction
will entail: Re Robinson [(1854) 23 L.J.Q.B. 286: 2 W.R.
424.], and this explains the reluctance of Courts to
grant bail on charges of murder: Re Barthelemy
[(1852) 1 B. & B. 8: Dearsley 60.], R. v. Andrews [(1844)
2 D. & L. 10: 13 L.J.M.C. 113.]. In this connection, we
may recall that in England, bail in treason or felony
is discretionary in the High Court or Courts having
jurisdiction to try the offence: R. v. McCartie [(1859)
11 Ir. C.L.R. 188, 192.], R. v. Platt [(1777) 1 Leach 157.];
on the other hand, bail in misdemeanour is said to be
of right at Common Law: R. v. Spilsbury [[1898] 2 Q.B.
615.]; R. v. Badger [(1843) 4 Q.B. 468, 472: D. & M. 375:
4 St. T.N.S. 1387.]; Re Frost [(1888) 4 T.L.R. 757.]; see
also R. v. Crowe [(1829) 4 C. & P. 251.]; R. v. Beardmore
[(1836) 7 C. & P. 497.] ; R. v. Osborn [(1837) 7 C. & P.
799.] King v. Fortier [(1902) 13 Quebec K.B. 251: 9
Canada Cr. Cas. 191: 1 Ann. Cas. 10]. This distinction is
reflected in sections 496 and 497 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, which respectively deal with the
grant of bail in cases of what are described in the
phraseology of the Indian Legislature as bailable and
non-bailable offences.”
10.
A similar view was taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Sanjay Chandra v. CBI, (2012) 1 SCC 40: (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 26: (2012) 2
2026:HHC:49032
SCC (L&S) 397: 2011 SCC OnLine SC 1502, wherein it was observed at
page 52:
“21. In bail applications, generally, it has been laid down
from the earliest times that the object of bail is to secure
the appearance of the accused person at his trial by a
reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither
punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be
considered a punishment, unless it is required to ensure
that an accused person will stand his trial when called
upon. The courts owe more than verbal respect to the
principle that punishment begins after conviction, and
that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried
and duly found guilty.”
11.
In the present case, the petitioner/accused was
admitted on bail on the condition that he would appear before
the Trial Court on every date of hearing. He defaulted in adhering
to this undertaking, and the learned Trial Court was justified in
issuing non-bailable warrants of arrest to secure his presence.
12.
It was submitted that the petitioner’s daughter was
present, but her attendance was not marked, and NBWs were
ordered to be issued to secure the petitioner’s presence. This
submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Central Bank of India v. Vrajlal
Kapurchand Gandhi, (2003) 6 SCC 573: 2003 SCC OnLine SC 697 that
the statement of facts that transpired during the hearing is
2026:HHC:49032
conclusive and cannot be challenged before another court. It was
observed:
“11. The rival contentions need careful consideration.
There can be a quarrel with the proposition as submitted
by Mr Nariman that if an order records something, a party
cannot be permitted to plead to the contrary, especially in
matters as to whether there was any concession regarding
a point, or whether it was given up at the time of the
hearing.
12. The only course open to a party taking the stand that
an order does not reflect the actual position is to move the
High Court in line with what has been said in State of
Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak [(1982) 2 SCC 463:
1982 SCC (Cri) 478]. In recent decisions, i.e. Bhavnagar
University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. [(2003) 2 SCC 111:
2002 AIR SCW 4939] and Roop Kumar v. Mohan Thedani
[(2003) 3 Scale 611: (2003) 6 SCC 595], the view in the said
case was reiterated. Statements of fact as to what
transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of the
court, are conclusive of the facts so stated, and no one can
contradict such statements by an affidavit or other
evidence. If a party thinks that the happenings in court
have been wrongly recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent
upon the party, while the matter is still fresh in the minds
of the judges, to call the attention of the very judges who
have made the record. That is the only way to have the
record corrected. If no such step is taken, the matter must
necessarily end there. It is not open to a party to contend
before this Court to the contrary. This Court cannot launch
into an enquiry as to what transpired in the High Court. It
is simply not done. Public policy and judicial decorum do
not permit it. Matters of judicial record in that sense are
unquestionable. However, the Court can pass appropriate
orders if a party moves it, contending that the order has
not correctly reflected happenings in court.”
13.
2026:HHC:49032
This position was reiterated in Shankar K. Mandal v.
State of Bihar, (2003) 9 SCC 519: 2003 SCC (L&S) 1145: 2003 SCC
OnLine SC 554, wherein it was observed at page 524:
“11. If really there was no concession, or a different stand
was taken, the only course open to the appellant was to
move the High Court in line with what has been said in
State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak [(1982) 2
SCC 463: 1982 SCC (Cri) 478]. In a recent decision,
Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. [(2003)
2 SCC 111: 2002 AIR SCW 4939], the view in the said case
was reiterated by observing that statements of fact as to
what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment
of the Court, are conclusive of the facts so stated and no
one can contradict such statements by affidavit or other
evidence. If a party thinks that the happenings in court
have been wrongly recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent
upon the party, while the matter is still fresh in the minds
of the Judges, to call the attention of the very Judges who
have made the record. That is the only way to have the
record corrected. If no such step is taken, the matter must
necessarily end there. It is not open to the appellant to
contend before this Court to the contrary.”
14.
In the present case, the petitioner’s remedy is to
approach the learned Trial Court for correction of the order, and
it is impermissible for him to make such submission before this
Court.
15.
It was submitted that the petitioner belongs to the
armed forces and it was difficult for him to attend the Court. This
submission will not help the petitioner. The petitioner could have
2026:HHC:49032
sought exemption from appearance in case of any difficulty, and
it was impermissible for him to be absent from the Court.
16.
The judgment in Inder Mohan (supra) deals with the
issuance of summons when cognisance is taken, and does not
apply to the facts of the present case. The judgments in Sahib
Singh (supra), Pankaj Kumar (supra), and Sarojani (supra) turn
on their own facts and do not take notice of the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Talab Haji Hussain (supra) and cannot
be followed.
17.
The
petitioner
has
invoked
the
extraordinary
jurisdiction of this Court, which is to be exercised sparingly to
prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. It was laid down by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Didigam Bikshapathi v.
State of A.P., (2008) 2 SCC 403; (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 434; 2007 SCC
OnLine SC 1445 that the High Court does not act as a Court of
Appeal or Revision while exercising inherent jurisdiction, but
exercises jurisdiction to do real and substantial justice in
extraordinary situations. It was observed at page 405:
7. “6. … [Section 482] does not confer any new powers on
the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which
the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It
envisages three circumstances under which the inherent
2026:HHC:49032
jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to
an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the
process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of
justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any
inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of
inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing
with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly
arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from
express provisions of law which are necessary for the
proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon
them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression
in the section that merely recognises and preserves the
inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether
civil or criminal, possess, in the absence of any express
provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such
powers as are necessary to do right and to undo a wrong
in the course of administration of justice on the principle
quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine
quo res ipsae esse non potest (when the law gives a person
anything, it gives him that without which it cannot exist).
While exercising powers under the section, the court does
not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent
jurisdiction under the section, though wide, has to be
exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only
when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically
laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex
debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the
administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of
the court exists for the advancement of justice, and if any
attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce
injustice, the court has the power to prevent abuse. It
would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any
action which would result in injustice and prevent the
promotion of justice. In the exercise of its powers, the
court would be justified in quashing any proceeding if it
finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of
the process of the court or quashing of these proceedings
would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no
offence is disclosed by the [report], the court may
2026:HHC:49032
examine the question of fact. When a [report] is sought to
be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to
assess what the [report] has alleged and whether any
offence is made out, even if the allegations are accepted in
toto.
7. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [AIR 1960 SC 866], this
Court summarised some categories of cases where
inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the
proceedings : (AIR para 6)
(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar
against the institution or continuance, e.g. want of
sanction;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information
report or complaint, taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence
alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but
there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence
adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.
8. In dealing with the last [category], it is important to
bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is
no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is
clearly inconsistent with the accusations made and a case
where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may
or may not support the accusations. When exercising
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court
would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the
evidence in question is reliable or not or whether, on a
reasonable appreciation of it, the accusation would not be
sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial
process should not be an instrument of oppression or
needless harassment. The court should be circumspect
and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all
relevant facts and circumstances into consideration
before issuing process, lest it be an instrument in the
hands of a private complainant to unleash a vendetta to
harass any person needlessly. At the same time, the
2026:HHC:49032
section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to
short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden
death. The scope of exercise of power under Section 482
of the Code and the categories of cases where the High
Court may exercise its power under it relating to
cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set
out in some detail by this Court in State of Haryana v.
Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335: 1992 SCC (Cri) 426]. A
note of caution was, however, added that the power
should be exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of
rare cases. The illustrative categories indicated by this
Court are as follows : (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102)
‘102. (1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety,
do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a
case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying the
FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of
the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within
the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support
of the same do not disclose the commission of any
offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute
a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on
the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a
2026:HHC:49032
just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned
(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to
the institution and continuance of the proceedings,
and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code
or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for
the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding
is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to
spite him due to a private and personal grudge.’
9. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High
Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide, and
the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in
its exercise. The court must be careful to see that its
decision in the exercise of this power is based on sound
principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to
stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court, being the
highest court of a State, should normally refrain from
giving a prima facie decision in a case where all the facts
are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has
not been collected and produced before the Court, and the
issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of
magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective
without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast
rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High
Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of
quashing the proceedings at any stage.” [Ed.: State of
Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa, (2002) 3 SCC 89, pp. 94-96,
paras 6-9.]
(See State of Orissa v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo [(2005) 13 SCC
540: (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 272] and Minu Kumari v. State of
Bihar [(2006) 4 SCC 359: (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 310: AIR 2006 SC
1937].)
18.
2026:HHC:49032
The present case does not disclose any abuse of the
process of the Court, and it is not a fit case where the
extraordinary jurisdiction remedy vested in the Court should be
exercised.
19.
Consequently, the present petition fails and is
dismissed.
20.
At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioner prays
for a direction that if the petitioner appears before the learned
Trial Court tomorrow, his bail application be considered.
However, no direction is required to be passed because it is the
jurisdiction vested in the learned Trial Court and is to be
independently exercised by it, unfettered by any directions given
by this Court. Therefore, this prayer cannot be accepted.
21.
A copy of this order be sent to the learned Trial Court
for information.
22.
The observations made hereinabove are regarding the
disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on
the merits of the case.
5th November, 2026
(Chander)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
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