Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
2026:HHC:14414
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No. 1157 of 2025
Reserved on: 31.3.2026
Date of Decision: 05.5.2026.
Sunil Kumar
…. Petitioner
Versus
State of HP & anr.
…. Respondents
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
No.
For the Petitioner
:
Mr Ajay Chandel, Advocate.
For Respondent No.1-State
:
Mr Ajit Sharma,
Advocate General.
For Respondent No.2.
:
Mr Dinesh Thakur, Advocate.
Deputy
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
quashing of FIR No. 117 of 2025, dated 20.11.2025, registered at
Police Station Parwanoo, District Solan, H.P., for the commission
of offences punishable under Sections 126(2) and 117(2) of
Bharatiya
Nyaya
Sanhita,
(BNS)
and
consequential
proceedings arising out of the said FIR based on the compromise
effected between the parties.
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:14414
2.
Heard.
3.
The offence punishable under Section 126(2) of BNS is
compoundable under Section 359(1) of the Bhartiya Nagrik
Surakasha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, without the permission of the
Court, and the offence punishable under Section 117(2) of BNS is
compoundable under Section 359(2) of BNSS with the permission
of the Court.
4.
Therefore, it is apparent that the petitioner has an
alternate remedy of approaching the learned Magistrate for the
composition of the offence.
5.
It was held in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra,
(1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (Cri) 10 that inherent jurisdiction
should not be exercised when a specific remedy exists. It was
observed:
At the outset, the following principles may be noticed in
relation to the exercise of the inherent power of the High
Court, which have been followed ordinarily and generally,
almost invariably, barring a few exceptions:
“(1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there is
a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the
grievance of the aggrieved party;
(2) That it should be exercised very sparingly to
prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise
to secure the ends of justice;
2026:HHC:14414
(3) That it should not be exercised as against the
express bar of law engrafted in any other provision
of the Code.”
6.
It was laid down by the Full Bench of Delhi High Court
in Gopal Dass vs State AIR 1978 Del 138, that the power under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C. (Corresponding to Section 528 of BNSS) is
vested in the Court to make such order as may be necessary to
give effect to any order under the Code, prevent abuse of the
process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
This jurisdiction cannot be exercised when a specific remedy is
available under the other provisions of the Code.
It was
observed: “8. In order to determine the question under
consideration as to what is the scope of the inherent
powers of the High Court becomes relevant. The inherent
powers of the High Court inhere in it because of its being
at the apex of the judicial set-up in a State. The inherent
powers of the High Court, preserved by section 482 of the
Code, are to be exercised in making orders as may be
necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, or to
prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice. Section 482 envisages that
nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the
inherent powers of the High Court exercised by it with
the object of achieving the above said three results. It is
for this reason that section 482 does not prescribe the
contours of the inherent powers of the High Court, which
are wide enough to be exercised in suitable cases to afford
relief to an aggrieved party. While exercising inherent
2026:HHC:14414
powers, it has to be borne in mind that this power cannot
be exercised in regard to matters specifically covered by
the other provisions of the Code. (See R.P. Kapur v. State of
Punjab, AIR 1960 S.C. 866) (1). This principle of law had
been reiterated succinctly by the Supreme Court recently
in Palanippa Gounder v. The State of Tamil Nadu, (1977) 2
SCC 634: AIR 1977 S.C. 1323 (2) therein examining the
scope of section 482, it was observed that a provision
which saves the inherent powers of a Court cannot
override any express provision in the statute which saves
that power. Putting it in another form, the Court observed
that if there is an express provision in a statute governing a
particular subject, there is no scope for invoking or exercising
the inherent powers of the Court because the Court ought to
apply the provisions of the statute which are made advisedly
to govern the particular subject matter.” (Emphasis
supplied)
7.
It was held in Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P.,
(1999) 6 SCC 146: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1076: 1999 SCC OnLine SC 647 that
jurisdiction under section 482 of Cr.P.C. is extraordinary and
should not be exercised when a specific remedy has been
provided under the Code. It was observed:
“2. It appears that, unfortunately, the High Court, by
exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of
the Criminal Procedure Code (for short “the Code”), has
prevented the flow of justice on the alleged contention of
the convicted accused that it was polluted by the so-called
misconduct of the judicial officer. It is true that under
Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent
powers to make such orders as may be necessary to give
effect to any order under the Code or to prevent the abuse
of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice. But the expressions “abuse of the process of law” or
2026:HHC:14414
“to secure the ends of justice” do not confer unlimited
jurisdiction on the High Court, and the alleged abuse of the
process of law or the ends of justice could only be secured in
accordance with law, including procedural law and not
otherwise. Further, inherent powers are like extraordinary
powers to be used sparingly for achieving the object
mentioned in Section 482 of the Code in cases where there is
no express provision empowering the High Court to achieve
the said object. It is well-nigh settled that inherent power is
not to be invoked in respect of any matter covered by specific
provisions of the Code or if its exercise would infringe any
specific provision of the Code. In the present case, the High
Court overlooked the procedural law which empowered
the convicted accused to prefer a statutory appeal against
the conviction of the offence. The High Court has
intervened at an uncalled-for stage and soft-pedalled the
course of justice at a very crucial stage of the trial.
xxxxx
9. In our view, the order passed by the High Court
entertaining the petition of the convicted accused under
Section 482 of the Code is, on the face of it, illegal,
erroneous, and, to say the least, unfortunate. It was
known to the High Court that the trial court passed
proceedings to the effect that final judgment and order
convicting the accused were pronounced by the trial court.
It was also recorded by the trial court that, as the accused
were absent, the Court had issued non-bailable warrants.
In such a situation, instead of directing the accused to
remain present before the Court for resorting to the steps
contemplated by the law for passing the sentence, the
High Court has stayed further proceedings, including the
operation of the non-bailable warrants issued by the trial
court. It is disquieting that the High Court has overlooked the
important legal aspect that the accused has a right of appeal
against the order of conviction purported to have been passed
by the trial court. In such circumstances, the High Court ought
not to have entertained a petition under Section 482 of the
Code and stonewalled the very efficacious alternative remedy
2026:HHC:14414
of appeal as provided in the Code. Merely because the
accused made certain allegations against the trial judge,
the substantive law cannot be bypassed.
8.
It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hamida
v. Rashid, (2008) 1 SCC 474, that the inherent power under Section
482 of Cr.P.C. is to be exercised sparingly and should not be
exercised when an alternative remedy is available. It was
observed:
“7. It is a well-established principle that inherent power
conferred on the High Courts under Section 482 CrPC has
to be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in rare
cases, and that too to correct patent illegalities or when
some miscarriage of justice is done. The content and scope
of power under Section 482 CrPC were examined in
considerable
detail
in Madhu
Limaye v. State
of
Maharashtra [(1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (Cri) 10: AIR 1978
SC 47], and it was held as under : (SCC p. 555, para 8)
The following principles may be stated in relation to
the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court:
(1) that the power is not to be resorted to if there is a
specific provision in the Code for the redress of the
grievance of the aggrieved party;
(2) that it should be exercised very sparingly to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice;
(3) that it should not be exercised as against the
express bar of law engrafted in any other provision
of the Code.
8. In State v. Navjot Sandhu [(2003) 6 SCC 641: 2003 SCC
(Cri) 1545], after a review of a large number of earlier
decisions, it was held as under : (SCC p. 657, para 29)
2026:HHC:14414
“29. … The inherent power is to be used only in cases
where there is an abuse of the process of the court or
where interference is absolutely necessary for securing
the ends of justice. The inherent power must be
exercised very sparingly, as cases which require
interference would be few and far between. The most
common case where inherent jurisdiction is generally
exercised is where criminal proceedings are required to
be quashed because they are initiated illegally,
vexatiously or without jurisdiction. Most of the cases
set out hereinabove fall in this category. It must be
remembered that the inherent power is not to be
resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code or
any other enactment for redress of the grievance of the
aggrieved party. This power should not be exercised
against an express bar of law engrafted in any other
provision of the Criminal Procedure Code. This power
cannot be exercised as against an express bar in some
other enactment.”
9. In Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P. [(1999) 6 SCC 146:
1999 SCC (Cri) 1076], the High Court had entertained a
petition under Section 482 CrPC after an order of
conviction had been passed by the Sessions Judge and
before the sentence had been awarded and further
proceedings in the case had been stayed. In appeal, this
Court set aside the order of the High Court after
reiterating the principle that it is well settled that inherent
power is not to be invoked in respect of any matter
covered by specific provisions of the Code or if its exercise
would infringe any specific provision of the Code. It was
further observed that the High Court overlooked the
procedural law which empowered the convicted accused to
prefer a statutory appeal against conviction of the offence
and intervened at an uncalled-for stage and soft-pedalled
the course of justice at a very crucial stage of the trial. The
order of the High Court was accordingly set aside on the
ground that a petition under Section 482 CrPC could not
have been entertained as the accused had an alternative
2026:HHC:14414
remedy of an appeal as provided in the Code. It is not
necessary to burden this judgment with other decisions of this
Court, as the consistent view throughout has been that a
petition under Section 482 CrPC cannot be entertained if there
is any other specific provision in the Code of Criminal
Procedure for redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party.
10. In the case in hand, the respondents-accused could
apply for bail afresh after the offence had been converted
into one under Section 304 IPC. They deliberately did not
do so and filed a petition under Section 482 CrPC in order
to circumvent the procedure whereunder they would have
been required to surrender, as the bail application could be
entertained and heard only if the accused were in custody.
It is important to note that no order adverse to the
respondents-accused had been passed by any court, nor
was there any miscarriage of justice or any illegality. In
such circumstances, the High Court committed a manifest
error of law in entertaining a petition under Section 482
CrPC and issuing a direction to the subordinate court to
accept the sureties and bail bonds for the offence under
Section 304 IPC. The effect of the order passed by the High
Court is that the accused after getting bail in an offence
under Sections 324, 352 and 506 IPC on the very day on
which they were taken into custody, got an order of bail in
their favour even after the injured had succumbed to his
injuries and the case had been converted into one under
Section 304 IPC without any court examining the case on
merits, as it stood after conversion of the offence. The
procedure laid down for the grant of bail under Section
439 CrPC, though available to the respondents-accused,
having not been availed of, the exercise of power by the
High Court under Section 482 CrPC is clearly illegal, and
the impugned order passed by it has to be set aside.”
(Emphasis supplied)
9.
In the present case, it has been asserted in para-5 of
the petition that the petitioner is left with no other alternative or
2026:HHC:14414
efficacious remedy except to approach the Court by filing the
present petition for the redressal of his grievances. This is an
incorrect statement because the remedy of approaching the
learned Magistrate is available to the petitioner under Section
359 of BNSS. Therefore, there is no reason to exercise the
inherent jurisdiction of this Court.
10.
In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it
is dismissed. However, this order will not prevent the parties
from approaching the learned Trial Court for the composition of
the offences.
11.
The petition stands disposed of, so also the pending
miscellaneous applications, if any.
12.
The observation made herein before shall remain
confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing
whatsoever on the merits of the case.
5th May, 2026
(Chander)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review