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2025:MLHC:965-DB
Serial No. 01
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WA. No. 59 of 2025
Date of Decision: 09.10.2025
Shri. Sunil Kumar Savita,
Son of Shri. Nandu Lal Sharma,
R/o 67 BN, Polo Ground
Shillong, East Khasi Hills,
Meghalaya.
…....Appellant
Vs.
1.
Union of India,
Through the Secretary,
Ministry of Home Affairs,
North-Block, Government of India,
New Delhi- 110001.
2.
Director General,
Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF),
Director General, Block-1, CRPF
CGO Complex, Lodhi Road,
New Delhi-11000.
3.
Inspector General, CRPF
North East Sector, Shillong,
Meghalaya.
.…..Respondents
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Hon’ble Mr. Justice B. Bhattacharjee, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s)
:
Mr. K. Paul, Sr. Adv. with
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Mr. S. Thapa, Adv.
Mr. B. Snaitang, Adv.
Mr. S. Khyriem, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
:
Dr. N. Mozika, DSGI with
Ms. R. Fancon, Adv.
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
Per W. Diengdoh, J:
1.
The appellant was posted as the Commandant, 67 BN CRPF, East
Khasi Hills, Shillong since 31.01.2024. In course of his tenure, he was served
with an order being No. 70/2025-PERS-1/P1DA1-PER-DG dated 28.08.2025,
by which he was transferred to serve at the Recruits Training Centre, Jodhpur,
Rajasthan.
2.
Being aggrieved thereof, the appellant has approached this Court
with a writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 379 of 2025 detailing therein the reasons
why the said order of transfer is not tenable in law and the prayer made is that
a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ be issued to quash the said
transfer order and further for a mandamus to be issued requiring the authority
concerned to retain him till completion of his tenure.
3.
This Court in a Single Bench, after hearing the parties, has, vide
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Judgment and Order dated 09.09.2025 dismissed the said writ petition on the
ground that no case for interference with the impugned transfer order has been
made out. Hence this appeal.
4.
Heard Mr. K. Paul, learned Sr. counsel along with Mr. S. Thapa,
learned counsel for the appellant, who has submitted that the appellant has yet
to complete his regular tenure in the post, but before such period, he was
transferred out, apparently on the ground of administrative exigency, but in the
same breath, the respondent authority has placed on record that the reason for
the said transfer was on account of an inter-personal conflict the appellant had
with the 2nd In Command (2IC) for which a preliminary enquiry was initiated.
5.
It is the further submission of the learned Sr. counsel that the
reasons cited for affecting the said transfer do not qualify as administrative
reasons, as the cause for such transfer was the alleged inter-personal conflict
between the appellant and the 2IC, the same can only be termed as punitive and
stigmatic in nature, without affording any opportunity to the appellant to be
heard in the matter. It is therefore an imposition of punishment without due
process being followed, submits the learned Sr. counsel.
6.
The learned Sr. counsel has also submitted that another aspect of
the matter lost sight of by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order is
that the transfer, though not a harsh posting, nevertheless, the fact that the
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appellant is occupying the post of a Commanding Officer/Head of a Unit, is
now posted to serve under a superior Officer/DIG of a Recruits Training Centre
which amounts to reversion and change of service conditions.
7.
To further elaborate on his contention, the learned Sr. counsel has
led this Court to the provisions of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules,
1964 to say that at Rule 3 under the heading ‘GENERAL’, it is directed that
every Government Servant shall do nothing which is unbecoming of a
Government Servant (clause iii) and that he shall maintain discipline in the
discharge of his duties and be liable to implement the lawful orders duly
communicated to him (clause xix) Violation of any of these rule will render the
employee to be subjected to disciplinary proceedings as laid down under ‘The
Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965’, Rule
11 of which provides for imposition of penalties, both minor and major.
8.
Citing
the
law
in
this
respect,
the
case
of
Somesh Tiwari v. Union of India & Ors, (2009) 2 SCC 592, para 16 was
referred to by the learned Sr. counsel, the same which reads as follows:
“16. Indisputably an order of transfer is an administrative order.
There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that transfer, which is
ordinarily an incident of service should not be interfered with, save
in cases where inter alia mala fide on the part of the authority is
proved. Mala fide is of two kinds – one malice in fact and the
second malice in law. The order in question would attract the
principle of malice in law as it was not based on any factor
germane for passing an order of transfer and based on an irrelevant
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ground i.e. on the allegations made against the appellant in the
anonymous complaint. It is one thing to say that the employer is
entitled to pass an order of transfer in administrative exigencies
but it is another thing to say that the order of transfer is passed by
way of or in lieu of punishment. When an order of transfer is
passed in lieu of punishment, the same is liable to be set aside
being wholly illegal.”
9.
On the contention that the said impugned order of transfer was
issued, reflecting the duplicity of the respondent authority, wherein it was said
that the same was done due to administrative reasons, but was later qualified as
one being the outcome of an inter-personal conflict between the appellant and
the 2IC resulting in a preliminary enquiry, the principle of approbate and
reprobate would then be applied, submits the learned Sr. counsel for which
reliance has been placed in the case of Nagubai Ammal & Ors v. B. Shama
Rao & Ors, 1956(1) SCC 698, para 9.12 to 9.15, para 9.15 of which reads as
follows:
“9.15. The observations of Scrutton. L.J. on which the appellants
rely are as follows: (Verschures Creameries Ltd. v. Hull &
Netherlands Steamship Co. Ltd., (1921) 2 KB 608 (CA), KB pp.
611-12)
“…A plaintiff is not permitted to "approbate and
reprobate". The phrase is apparently borrowed from the Scotch
law, where it is used to express the principle embodied in our
doctrine of election – namely, that no party can accept and reject
the same instrument: Ker v. Wauchope, (1819) 1 Bli PC 1 at p.
21 : 4 ER 1, Douglas-Menzies v. Umphelby, 1908 AC 224 at p.
232 (PC). The doctrine of election is not however confined to
instruments. A person cannot say at one time that a transaction
is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could
only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then tum round
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and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other
advantage. That is to approbate and reprobate the transaction.”
It is clear from the above observations that the maxim that a person
cannot “approbate and reprobate” is only one application of the
doctrine of election, and that its operation must be confined to
reliefs claimed in respect of the same transaction and to the persons
who are parties thereto. The law is thus stated in Halsbury’s Laws
of England, Vol. XIII, p. 454, Para 512:
"On the principle that a person may not approbate and
reprobate, a species of estoppel has arisen which seems to be
intermediate between estoppel by record and estoppel in pais,
and may conveniently be referred to here. Thus a party cannot,
after taking advantage under an order (e.g. payment of costs),
be heard to say that it is invalid and ask to set it aside, or to set
up to the prejudice of persons who have relied upon it a case
inconsistent with that upon which it was founded, nor will he be
allowed to go behind an order made in ignorance of the true
facts to the prejudice of third parties who have acted on it.”
The plaintiff obtained no advantage against the appellants by
pleading in OS No. 92 of 1938-39 that the proceedings in OS No.
100 of 1919-20 were collusive; nor did they acting on those
pleadings acquire rights to the suit properties. Nor is there any
question of election, because the only relief which the plaintiff
claimed in 0S No. 92 of 1938-39 and which he now claims is that
he is entitled to the suit properties. Only, the ground on which that
relief is claimed is different and, it is true, inconsistent. But the
principle of election does not forbid it, and there being no question
of estoppel, the plea that the proceedings in OS No. 100 of 1919-20
are not collusive is open to the plaintiff.”
10.
The learned Sr. counsel has again submitted that under such
circumstances, the impugned order of transfer does not qualify as one issued
for administrative reasons, the case of Dr. A. Jayachitra v. Principal
Secretary, Sports Development Authority of Tamil Nadu, 2020 SCC
OnLine Mad 5635, para 33 was also cited in support of this contention,
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wherein the Madras High Court has held as follows:
“33. In the absence of any administrative requirement or
exigencies, any transfer order issued in such situation and terming
the same as being issued on the ruse of administrative requirement,
may have to ultimately pass the test of judicial review. Merely
because the transfer order is couched in such hackneyed, oft
repeated and routine administrative terminology, unless the reason
setforth in the transfer order when questioned, is established
factually to the satisfaction of this Court, a ritualistic and cliched
expression “administrative reasons” in the transfer order, cannot be
taken at its face value and the relief refused to the affected
individuals. In this case, though the petitioner failed in other fronts
of attack, ultimately, this Court finds that the transfer of the
petitioner is not based on administrative requirement, but, for an
extraneous reason and therefore, the transfer order is liable to be set
aside only on that ground. As stated above, this Court perused the
relevant files and did not discover a modicum of material supporting
the respondent's plea of administrative requirement for transferring
the petitioner to Tiruvannamalai. It is well within the power of the
Court to pierce the veil of the fig leaf behind the transfer order and
to hold that the impugned action of the respondent authority
stemmed from a colourful exercise of power on his part and hence,
liable to be interfered solely on the well established legal premise
namely the transfer is hit by malice in law”.
11.
Per contra, Dr. N. Mozika, learned DSGI assisted by Ms. R. Fancon,
learned counsel appearing for the respondent/Union of India, while refuting the
contention made by the appellant and in support of the impugned judgment, has
reiterated that the impugned transfer order was issued on account of
administrative exigencies and in public interest, more particularly to maintain
discipline and harmony in the 67 BN CRPF.
12.
Admittedly, there is evidence of an inter-personal conflict between
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the appellant as Commandant of the Battalion and the 2IC, Shri Sanjeev Kumar
for which, inspite of counselling by the DIG(Ops/Intelligence & Training),
Northeastern Sector, Guwahati & IG, Northeastern Sector, there is no
improvement in the situation, as such, on the recommendation of the IG,
Northeastern Sector, both the Officers involved are transferred out, submits the
learned DSGI.
13.
Another counter advanced by the learned DSGI is that the
contention of the appellant that the said transfer is punitive in nature and harsh,
carrying with it a stigma on his career record, is unfounded, inasmuch as, a
transfer order is not punitive in nature, but one which is an incident of service
and transfers being carried out in a routine manner, there is no semblance of
penalty attached to it as the reason stated for the said transfer is on account of
administrative reasons. Even the case of Somesh Tiwari (supra) relied upon by
the appellant is not applicable to his case as at para 17 of the same, the Court
has further clarified that as far as the case of the appellant therein is concerned,
there was an anonymous letter of allegations against which was proved untrue
and secondly, he was posted to a harsh station, which is not the case with the
appellant herein, submits the learned DSGI.
14.
The learned DSGI has reiterated that transfer is an incident of
service, and it does not create any right upon the incumbent to seek a particular
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posting at any point of time, further, according to the Transfer Policy vide
Standing Order-05/2022, at para 5 under the heading ‘Tenure of Posting’, it has
been clearly provided that “…any officer may be posted to any Unit or office
at any point of time…”.
15.
The law in this regard is very specific, wherein the Supreme Court
has in a series of judgments held that the scope of judicial review in transfer
matters is very limited, submits the learned DSGI. The case of Pubi Lombi v.
State of Arunachal Pradesh & Ors, (2024) 12 SCC 292, para 15 as well as
the case of Major General J.K. Bansal v. Union of India & Ors, (2005) 7
SCC 227, para 12 and the case of State of U.P & Anr v. Siya Ram & Anr,
(2004) 7 SCC 405, para 5 has been cited to support this contention.
16.
We have perused the impugned judgment and order dated
09.09.2025, and have also taken into consideration the contention raised by the
rival parties herein in support of their respective cause. Facts as indicated
above, involved the order of transfer dated 28.08.2025 passed by the competent
Authority, whereby the appellant, posted as the Commandant 67 BN CRPF,
Shillong, has now been posted to RTC, Jodhpur, Rajasthan. The same was
resisted by way of filing of a writ petition before this Court, the prayer made
therein was then rejected by the learned Single Judge vide the impugned
judgment and order.
2025:MLHC:965-DB
17.
The appellant now coming before this Division Bench on an intra-
court appeal, has assailed the said impugned judgment and order, on the ground
that the same was passed inter alia, without considering the fact that the
impugned order of transfer was issued while the appellant was yet to complete
his tenure of three years in the post, ostensibly in the garb of administrative
reasons, but which, in all probability smacks of punitive action taken against
the appellant, apparently in the face of an alleged preliminary enquiry
conducted on complaint of an inter-personal conflict between the appellant and
his second in command.
18.
The appellant has also stressed that even, if the reason for such
transfer was due to the fact that the preliminary enquiry is going on, yet such
proceedings not made known to him, he is prejudiced, inasmuch as, he could
not put up his defence against any imputation of misconduct or the like against
him, thus rendering the said impugned transfer order punitive in nature and is
therefore illegal.
19.
We are made to understand that the said transfer order was attacked
on the ground that it was borne by malafide, arbitrariness and punitive in nature.
It is therefore necessary for this Court to carefully look into the circumstances
surrounding the same.
20.
The contention of the appellant that the impugned order of transfer
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was bad in law, the same being issued without waiting for the appellant to
complete his present tenure, is negatived by the fact that in the transfer
guidelines as per Standing Order-05/2022 (supra), it has been clearly stated
that, though, the normal tenure of officers under the policy will be 03 years, the
same is subjected to the provision found at para 5(b), wherein it has been
stipulated, inter alia, that in view of administrative requirements, any officer
may be posted to any Unit or office at any point of time(emphasis laid).
21.
As has been reiterated, it is well settled that transfer of an employee
in any Government establishment, including the Armed or Para-Military
Forces, is an incident of service, as such, no vested right is inherent upon the
employee seeking to resist such an action, if directed. To clarify this proposition
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. and others v.
Gobardhan Lal, (2004) 11 SCC 402 at para 7 has observed as follows:
“7.
It is too late in the day for any government servant to
contend that once appointed or posted in a particular place or
position, he should continue in such place or position as long as he
desires. Transfer of an employee is not only an incident inherent in
the terms of appointment but also implicit as an essential condition
of service in the absence of any specific indication to the contra, in
the law governing or conditions of service. Unless the order of
transfer is shown to be an outcome of a mala fide exercise of power
or violative of any statutory provision (an Act or Rule) or passed by
an authority not competent to do so, an order of transfer cannot
lightly be interfered with as a matter of course or routine for any or
every type of grievance sought to be made. Even administrative
guidelines for regulating transfers or containing transfer policies at
best may afford an opportunity to the officer or servant concerned
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to approach their higher authorities for redress but cannot have the
consequence of depriving or denying the competent authority to
transfer a particular officer/servant to any place in public interest
and as is found necessitated by exigencies of service as long as the
official status is not affected adversely and there is no infraction of
any career prospects such as seniority, scale of pay and secured
emoluments. This Court has often reiterated that the order of
transfer made even in transgression of administrative guidelines
cannot also be interfered with, as they do not confer any legally
enforceable rights, unless, as noticed supra, shown to be vitiated by
mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provision.”
22.
In the case of Somesh Tiwari (supra) at para 16 relied upon by the
appellant, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has emphasized on the exception to an
order of transfer in contradistinction to the requirement of administrative
exigency, it being the presence of malafide found in such order which will give
a handle to the courts to interfere with such order. However, the facts of the
case are not applicable to the case of the appellant herein, since his transfer was
apparently issued on grounds of administrative reasons, but in course of
proceedings before this Court, was qualified to be because of the said interpersonal conflict he had with his 2IC, resulting in the said preliminary enquiry
initiated.
23.
On appreciation of the case of the appellant, prima facie, what is
evident is that firstly, his transfer affected before the completion of his tenure
is not beyond the provision of the relevant rules, 5(b) of the guidelines in the
tenure of posting being the said rule, secondly, there are no specific instructions
or order that his rank and pay etc. be reduced by such transfer and thirdly, his
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posting to Jodhpur, Rajasthan cannot be said to be harsh posting, no malafide
in such action is therefore seen.
24.
The fact that he was transferred on account of administrative
reasons, apparently for the authorities to conduct the preliminary enquiry is also
based on sound logic, since a fair enquiry may not be possible to be conducted
in his presence, more so, as he is the head of the Unit or Battalion. It may not
be out of place to say that even the 2IC was also transferred out, though the
appellant would maintain that the same was effectuated due to the expiry of his
tenure, but no such indication is found present in the order of transfer.
25.
It is the opinion of this Court that no formal disciplinary
proceedings have been initiated against the appellant, the provisions of the CCS
(Conduct) Rules, 1964 and the CCS (CCA) Rules 1965 cited by the appellant,
would not come into play at this point of time as far as his case is concerned.
The appellant has also not been able to produce authorities which say that
Government employee or Officer cannot be transfer out in the midst of a
preliminary enquiry involving him.
26.
We have also tested and weighed the authorities relied upon by the
appellant, and found that they are not relevant to the context herein, while the
authorities cited by the respondent/Union of India, though, not discussed in
details, the proposition found therein have been dealt with by this Court herein.
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27.
In view of the above observations, we are unable to agree with the
argument advanced on behalf of the appellant, and we find that the learned
Single Judge has rightly passed the order under the circumstances. The same
deserves no interference by this Court.
28.
In the event, this appeal is found to be devoid of merits, the same is
hereby dismissed as such.
29.
Appeal disposed of. No costs.
(B. Bhattacharjee)
Judge
DARIKORDOR NARY
Date: 2025.10.09 16:52:18 IST
(W. Diengdoh)
Judge
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