Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
2026:HHC:2995
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP(M) No. 2734 & 2735 of 2025
Reserved on: 08.01.2026
Date of Decision: 09.01.2026.
______________________________________
1.
Cr. MP(M) No. 2734 of 2025
Sanjay Kumar @ Chapan
...Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh
...Respondent
_____________________________________
2.
Cr. MP(M) No. 2735 of 2025
Suman Kumari
...Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh
...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioners
:
M/s Rahul and Rajat, Advocates, in
both the petitions.
For the Respondent
:
Mr. Jitender Sharma, Additional
Advocate General, in both the
petitions.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioners have filed the present petition seeking
regular bail in FIR No. 62 of 2025, dated 06.04.2025, registered at
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:2995
Police Station Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P., for the
commission of an offence punishable under Section 20 of the
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS
Act). Since both petitions have arisen out of the same FIR, they
are being taken up together for convenience.
2.
It has been asserted that the petitioners were arrested
on 06.04.2024 and have been in custody since then. As per the
prosecution, 1.246 kg of cannabis was recovered from the house
of the petitioner, Sanjay Kumar @ Chapan. The investigation is
complete, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining
the petitioners in custody. The petitioners were not informed of
the grounds of arrest, which is a violation of their constitutional
right provided under Article 22 of the Constitution of India. Bail is
the rule and jail is the exception. There is no legally admissible
evidence against the petitioners. The petitioners would abide by
the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it
was prayed that the present petitions be allowed and the
petitioners be released on bail.
3.
The petitions are opposed by filing separate status
reports asserting that the police had set up a nakka at Sheela
2026:HHC:2995
Chowk on 06.04.2025. They received secret information at 1:40
AM that Sanjay Kumar @ Chappan was selling charas from his
home, and a huge quantity of charas could be recovered by
searching the house. The police reduced the information into
writing and sent it to the Supervisory Officer. The police
associated Abhishek Anand and Vimoksh Upmanyu, and went to
the house of Sanjay Kumar @ Chapan. Petitioners, Suman Kumari
@ Varsha and Sanjay Kumar @ Chapan, were found in the house.
The police told them about the information and searched the
house. The police recovered a packet kept beneath the mattress,
which was checked, and 1 kg 246 grams of cannabis was found in
it. The police seized the cannabis and arrested the petitioners.
The cannabis was sent to SFSL, and as per the result of analysis, it
was confirmed to be an abstract of cannabis and a sample of
charas. FIR No. 39 of 2018 was registered against the petitioner,
Sanjay Kumar, on 18.03.2018. An order for freezing his property
has been passed by the competent authority. No FIR was
registered against the petitioner, Suman Kumari. Hence, the
status report.
4.
I have heard M/s Rahul Kumar and Rajat, learned
counsel for the petitioners, in both the petitions and Mr Jitender
2026:HHC:2995
Sharma,
Learned
Additional
Advocate
General
for
the
respondent/State.
5.
Mr Rahul Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners,
submitted that the petitioners are innocent and they were falsely
implicated. The grounds of arrest were not communicated to
them, and their arrest is illegal. There is no evidence that the
house from where the recovery was effected belonged to the
petitioners, and mere presence in the house without any further
material is not sufficient to connect the petitioners to the
commission of the crime. He relied upon the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ismail khan Aiyub khan Pathan vs. State
of Gujarat (SC) 2000 (10) SCC 257 in support of his submission.
6.
Mr
Jitender
Kumar
Sharma,
learned
Additional
Advocate General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the
petitioners were found present in the house from where the
recovery was made. Prima facie, their presence in the house would
connect them to the commission of a crime. Burden would shift
upon them to rebut the presumption, and there is no material to
rebut the presumption at this stage. Hence, he prayed that the
present petition be dismissed.
2026:HHC:2995
7.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the record carefully.
8.
The parameters for granting bail were considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC
314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:
(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail
56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1
SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while
elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution
of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under
trial, has laid down the key factors that should be
considered while granting bail, which are extracted as
under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the
vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also
bears upon the issue.
8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice
would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant
jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being.
[Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”
(Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern
Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]
9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court
considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with
witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the
process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in
this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who
is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record,
particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to
commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to
habituals, it is part of criminological history that a
2026:HHC:2995
thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the
opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of
society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the
criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise
in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied)
57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4
SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various
aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing
with an application seeking bail. The same may be
extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the
basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the
circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner.
While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the
nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support
thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction
will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of
the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the
accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of
the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the
witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the
public or State and similar other considerations. It has also
to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail
the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for
believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court
dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself)
as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused
and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie
evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied)
58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh,
(2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through
Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion
in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In
highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of
course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as
follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)
“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but,
however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a
2026:HHC:2995
judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order
for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained.
Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is
dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being
dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case
to case. While the placement of the accused in society,
though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding
factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should always
be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant
of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic
considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is
the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail,
though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the
matter.” (emphasis supplied)
59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC
528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is
established that a court considering a bail application
cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and
an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the
court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons
justifying the grant of bail.
60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14
SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that
where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said
order would suffer from the vice of non-application of
mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with
regard to the circumstances under which an order granting
bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought
to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also
been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere
with an order passed by the High Court granting or
rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally
incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion
judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the
basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this
Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other
2026:HHC:2995
circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while
considering an application for bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable
ground to believe that the accused had committed the
offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if
released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing
of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by
grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxx
62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of
application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise
of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the
accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 :
(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this
Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order
(Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856
and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857)
of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as
follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 :
(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)
“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an
individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while
considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight
of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused
and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly,
when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or
vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material
brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima
facie conclusion. While considering an application for the
2026:HHC:2995
grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by
reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the
vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration
must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the
criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature
of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the
offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis
supplied)
9.
The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
10.
The status report shows that the petitioners were
present in the house at the time of the arrival of the police. The
police knocked at the door, and the petitioners came out of the
house. Therefore, prima facie, the petitioners were able to exercise
control over the articles lying inside the house. It was laid down
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Mohd. Nawaz
Khan, (2021) 10 SCC 100: (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 721: 2021 SCC OnLine SC
1237, that a person is in possession if he is in a position to exercise
control over the article. It was observed at page 111:
25. We shall deal with each of these circumstances in turn.
The respondent has been accused of an offence under
Section 8 of the NDPS Act, which is punishable under
Sections 21, 27-A, 29, 60(3) of the said Act. Section 8 of the
Act prohibits a person from possessing any narcotic drug
or psychotropic substance. The concept of possession
recurs in Sections 20 to 22, which provide for punishment
for offences under the Act. In Madan Lal v. State of
H.P. [Madan Lal v. State of H.P., (2003) 7 SCC 465: 2003 SCC
2026:HHC:2995
(Cri) 1664] this Court held that : (SCC p. 472, paras 19-23 &
26)
“19. Whether there was conscious possession has to be
determined with reference to the factual backdrop. The
facts which can be culled out from the evidence on
record are that all the accused persons were travelling
in a vehicle, and as noted by the trial court, they were
known to each other, and it has not been explained or
shown as to how they travelled together from the same
destination in a vehicle which was not a public vehicle.
20. Section 20(b) makes possession of contraband
articles an offence. Section 20 appears in Chapter IV of
the Act, which relates to offences for possession of such
articles. It is submitted that in order to make the
possession illicit, there must be a conscious possession.
21. It is highlighted that unless the possession was
coupled with the requisite mental element, i.e.
conscious possession and not mere custody without
awareness of the nature of such possession, Section 20
is not attracted.
22. The expression “possession” is a polymorphous
term which assumes different colours in different
contexts. It may carry different meanings in
contextually different backgrounds. It is impossible, as
was observed in Supt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs,
W.B. v. Anil Kumar Bhunja [Supt. & Remembrancer of
Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Anil Kumar Bhunja, (1979) 4 SCC 274:
1979 SCC (Cri) 1038] to work out a completely logical and
precise definition of “possession” uniformly applicable
to all situations in the context of all statutes.
23. The word “conscious” means awareness about a
particular fact. It is a state of mind which is deliberate
or intended.
***
2026:HHC:2995
26. Once possession is established, the person who
claims that it was not a conscious possession has to
establish it because how he came to be in possession is
within his special knowledge. Section 35 of the Act gives
a statutory recognition of this position because of the
presumption available in law. Similar is the position in
terms of Section 54, where also presumption is also
available to be drawn from possession of illicit articles.”
26. What amounts to “conscious possession” was also
considered in Dharampal Singh v. State of Punjab
[Dharampal Singh v. State of Punjab, (2010) 9 SCC 608:
(2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1431], where it was held that the
knowledge of possession of contraband has to be gleaned
from the facts and circumstances of a case. The standard of
conscious possession would be different in the case of a
public transport vehicle with several persons as opposed to
a private vehicle with a few persons known to one another.
In Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan [Mohan Lal v. State of
Rajasthan, (2015) 6 SCC 222: (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 881], this
Court also observed that the term “possession” could
mean physical possession with animus; custody over the
prohibited substances with animus; exercise of dominion
and control as a result of concealment; or personal
knowledge as to the existence of the contraband and the
intention based on this knowledge.
11.
Therefore, the petitioners cannot claim that they were
not in possession when they were able to exercise control over the
substance recovered by the police and the judgment in Ismail
Khan (supra) will not apply to the present case.
12.
It was submitted that there is a discrepancy in the
weight of the charas. The police weighed the charas on the spot
2026:HHC:2995
and found its weight to be 1.246 kilograms. When the substance
was weighed in the presence of a learned Magistrate, its weight
was found to be 1289 grams. The discrepancy in the weight will
make the prosecution’s case doubtful. This submission cannot be
accepted. It was laid down by this Court in Sohan Lal alias Bhau
and others Vs. State of H.P. and others, 2019 STPL 3203 HP, that if
there is a variation in the report of analysis and the certificate
issued under Section 52-A of the ND&PS Act, the certificate will
prevail. It was observed: “10. It would be evidently clear from the aforesaid
exposition of law that the samples drawn and certified by
the learned Magistrate in compliance with sub-sections (2)
and (3) of Section 52-A are primary evidence and,
therefore, had to be taken as true and any contradiction in
such certification with the final report prepared by the
prosecution, the quantity mentioned in the final report
obviously had to give way to the certification so made by
the Court under Section 52-A of the Act ibid.”
13.
Therefore, as per the judgment, the certificate issued
by the learned Judicial Magistrate is the primary evidence, and
any discrepancy in the weight on the spot and before the learned
Magistrate during the proceedings under Section 52-A of the
NDPS Act will not be fatal.
2026:HHC:2995
14.
The status report shows that the petitioners were
found in possession of 1246 grams of charas, and the order of the
learned Magistrate shows that the weight of charas was 1289
grams, which is a commercial quantity. Therefore, the rigours of
Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to the present case.
15.
Section 37 of the NDPS Act provides that in an offence
involving a commercial quantity, the Court should be satisfied
that the accused is not guilty of the commission of an offence and
is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. It reads as
follows:
“37. Offences to be cognisable and non-bailable. –
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)—
(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be
cognisable.
(b) no person accused of an offence punishable for
offences under section 19, section 24, or section 27A
and also for offences involving commercial
quantity, shall be released on bail or his own bond
unless–
(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an
opportunity to oppose the application for such
release, and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the
application, the court is satisfied that there
are reasonable grounds for believing that he is
not guilty of such an offence and that he is not
likely to commit any offence while on bail.
2026:HHC:2995
(2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause
(b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations
under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or
any other law for the time being in force, on granting of
bail.”
16.
This Section was interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Union of India Versus Niyazuddin& Another (2018) 13 SCC
738, and it was held that in the absence of the satisfaction that the
accused is not guilty of an offence and he is not likely to commit
an offence while on bail, he cannot be released. It was observed:
“7. Section 37 of the NDPS Act contains special
provisions with regard to the grant of bail in respect
of certain offences enumerated under the said
Section. They are:
(1) In the case of a person accused of an offence
punishable under Section 19,
(2) Under Section 24,
(3) Under Section 27A and
(4) offences involving a commercial quantity.
8. The accusation in the present case is with regard to
the fourth factor, namely, commercial quantity. Be
that as it may, once the Public Prosecutor opposes the
application for bail to a person accused of the
enumerated offences under Section 37 of the NDPS
Act, in case the court proposes to grant bail to such a
person, two conditions are to be mandatorily satisfied
in addition to the normal requirements under the
provisions of the Cr.P.C. or any other enactment.
2026:HHC:2995
(1) The court must be satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the
person is not guilty of such an offence;
(2) that person is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail.”
17.
This position was reiterated in State of Kerala Versus
Rajesh, AIR 2020 SC 721, wherein it was held:
“19. This Court has laid down broad parameters to be
followed while considering the application for bail moved
by the accused involved in offences under the NDPS Act. In
Union of India vs Ram Samujh and Ors., (1999) 9 SCC 429, it
has been elaborated as under: "7. It is to be borne in mind that the aforesaid
legislative mandate is required to be adhered to and
followed. It should be borne in mind that in a murder
case, the accused commits the murder of one or two
persons, while those persons who are dealing in
narcotic drugs are instrumental in causing death or
in inflicting death-blow to a number of innocent
young victims, who are vulnerable; it causes
deleterious effects and a deadly impact on the
society; they are a hazard to the society; even if they
are released temporarily, in all probability, they
would continue their nefarious activities of
trafficking
and/or
dealing
in
intoxicants
clandestinely. The reason may be the large stake and
illegal profit involved. This Court, dealing with the
contention with regard to punishment under the
NDPS Act, has succinctly observed about the adverse
effect of such activities in Durand Didier vs Chief Secy.
Union Territory of Goa, (1990) 1 SCC 95) as under:
24. With deep concern, we may point out that
the organised activities of the underworld and
the clandestine smuggling of narcotic drugs
and psychotropic substances into this country
2026:HHC:2995
and illegal trafficking in such drugs and
substances have led to drug addiction among a
sizeable section of the public, particularly the
adolescents and students of both sexes and the
menace has assumed serious and alarming
proportions in the recent years. Therefore, in
order to effectively control and eradicate this
proliferating
and
booming
devastating
menace, causing deleterious effects and a
deadly impact on society as a whole,
Parliament, in its wisdom, has made effective
provisions by introducing Act 81 of 1985
specifying
mandatory
minimum
imprisonment and fine.
8. To check the menace of dangerous drugs flooding
the market, Parliament has provided that the person
accused of offences under the NDPS Act should not
be released on bail during trial unless the
mandatory conditions provided in Section 37,
namely,
(i) there are reasonable grounds for believing
that the accused is not guilty of such offence;
and
(ii) that he is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail are satisfied. The High Court has
not given any justifiable reason for not abiding
by the aforesaid mandate while ordering the
release of the respondent accused on bail.
Instead of attempting to take a holistic view of
the harmful socio-economic consequences
and health hazards which would accompany
trafficking illegally in dangerous drugs, the
court should implement the law in the spirit
with which Parliament, after due deliberation,
has amended."
20. The scheme of Section 37 reveals that the exercise of
power to grant bail is not only subject to the limitations
2026:HHC:2995
contained under Section 439 of the CrPC but is also subject
to the limitation placed by Section 37, which commences
with the non-obstante clause. The operative part of the
said section is in the negative form prescribing the
enlargement of bail to any person accused of the
commission of an offence under the Act unless the two
conditions are satisfied. The first condition is that the
prosecution must be given an opportunity to oppose the
application, and the second is that the Court must be
satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing
that he is not guilty of such an offence. If either of these
two conditions is not satisfied, the ban on granting bail
operates.
21. The expression "reasonable grounds" means something
more than prima facie grounds. It contemplates substantial
probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty
of the alleged offence. The reasonable belief contemplated
in the provision requires the existence of such facts and
circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify
satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged
offence. In the case at hand, the High Court seems to have
completely overlooked the underlying object of Section 37
that, in addition to the limitations provided under the
CrPC, or any other law for the time being in force,
regulating the grant of bail, its liberal approach in the
matter of bail under the NDPS Act is indeed uncalled for.”
18.
A similar view was taken in Union of India v. Mohd.
Nawaz Khan, (2021) 10 SCC 100: (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 721: 2021 SCC
OnLine SC 1237, wherein it was observed at page 110:
“21. Under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), the limitations on the
grant of bail for offences punishable under Sections
19, 24 or 27-A and also for offences involving a
commercial quantity are:
2026:HHC:2995
(i) The Prosecutor must be given an opportunity
to oppose the application for bail; and
(ii) There must exist “reasonable grounds to
believe” that (a) the person is not guilty of such
an offence, and (b) he is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail.
22. The standard prescribed for the grant of bail is
“reasonable ground to believe” that the person is not
guilty of the offence. Interpreting the standard of
“reasonable grounds to believe”, a two-judge Bench
of this Court in Shiv Shanker Kesari [Union of India v.
Shiv Shanker Kesari, (2007) 7 SCC 798: (2007) 3 SCC (Cri)
505], held that: (SCC pp. 801-02, paras 7-8 & 10-11)
“7. The expression used in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) is
“reasonable grounds”. The expression means
something more than prima facie grounds. It
connotes substantial probable causes for believing
that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged,
and this reasonable belief contemplated, in turn,
points to the existence of such facts and
circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to
justify the recording of satisfaction that the accused
is not guilty of the offence charged.
8. The word “reasonable” has in law the prima
facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those
circumstances of which the actor, called on to act
reasonably, knows or ought to know. It is
difficult to give an exact definition of the word
“reasonable”.
‘7. … Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edn., p. 2258
states that it would be unreasonable to expect an
exact definition of the word “reasonable”.
Reason varies in its conclusions according to the
idiosyncrasies of the individual and the times
2026:HHC:2995
and circumstances in which he thinks. The
reasoning which built up the old scholastic logic
sounds now like the jingling of a child's toy.’
[See MCD v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar [MCD v.
Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar, (1987) 4 SCC 497], SCC p.
504, para 7 and Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage
Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. [Gujarat
Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors
(Gujarat) (P) Ltd., (1989) 1 SCC 532] ]
***
10. The word “reasonable” signifies “in
accordance with reason”. In the ultimate
analysis, it is a question of fact whether a
particular act is reasonable or not, which
depends on the circumstances in a given
situation. (See Municipal Corpn. of Greater
Mumbai v. Kamla Mills Ltd. [Municipal Corpn. of
Greater Mumbai v. Kamla Mills Ltd. (2003) 6 SCC
315]
11. The court, while considering the application
for bail with reference to Section 37 of the Act, is
not called upon to record a finding of not guilty.
It is for the limited purpose essentially confined
to the question of releasing the accused on bail
that the court is called upon to see if there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the
accused is not guilty and records its satisfaction
about the existence of such grounds. But the
court has not to consider the matter as if it is
pronouncing a judgment of acquittal and
recording a finding of not guilty.” (emphasis
supplied)
23. Based on the above precedent, the test which the
High Court and this Court are required to apply while
2026:HHC:2995
granting bail is whether there are reasonable grounds
to believe that the accused has not committed an
offence and whether he is likely to commit any offence
while on bail. Given the seriousness of offences
punishable under the NDPS Act and in order to curb
the menace of drug trafficking in the country,
stringent parameters for the grant of bail under the
NDPS Act have been prescribed.”
19.
It was held in Union of India v. Ajay Kumar Singh, 2023
SCC OnLine SC 346, that bail cannot be granted without complying
with the requirement of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It was
observed:
4. This apart, it is noticed that the High Court, in
passing the impugned order of bail, had lost sight of
Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which, inter alia, provides
that no person accused of an offence involving
commercial quantity shall be released on bail unless
the twin conditions laid down therein are satisfied,
namely, (i) the public prosecutor has been given an
opportunity to oppose the bail application; and (ii) the
court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that he is not guilty of such an offence and
that he is not likely to commit any such offence while
on bail.
15. For the sake of convenience Section 37(1) is
reproduced hereinbelow:—
“37. Offences to be cognisable and non-bailable.(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (2 of 1974)(a) every offence punishable under this Act
shall be cognisable.
2026:HHC:2995
(b) no person accused of an offence
punishable for offences under section 19 or
section 24 or section 27A, and also for
offences involving commercial quantity, shall
be released on bail or on his own bond unless(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an
opportunity to oppose the application for
such release, and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes
the application, the court is satisfied that
there are reasonable grounds for believing
that he is not guilty of such offence and
that he is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail.”
16. In view of the above provisions, it is implicit that
no person accused of an offence involving trade in a
commercial quantity of narcotics is liable to be
released on bail unless the court is satisfied that there
are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not
guilty of such an offence and that he is not likely to
commit any offence while on bail.
20.
It was held in State of Meghalaya v. Lalrintluanga Sailo,
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1751, that the grant of bail without
considering Section 37 of the NDPS Act is impermissible. It was
observed:
“5. There cannot be any doubt with respect to the position
that, in cases involving the commercial quantity of
narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, while
considering the application of bail, the Court is bound to
ensure the satisfaction of conditions under Section 37(1)(b)
(ii) of the NDPS Act. The said provision reads thus:—
2026:HHC:2995
“37(1)(b)(ii)- where the Public Prosecutor opposes the
application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence
and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on
bail.”
6. While considering the cases under the NDPS Act, one
cannot be oblivious of the objects and reasons for bringing
the said enactment after repealing the then-existing laws
relating to Narcotic drugs. The object and reasons given in
the acts themselves read thus:—
“An act to consolidate and amend the law relating to
narcotic drugs, to make stringent provisions for the control
and regulation of operations relating to narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances, to provide for the forfeiture of
property derived from, or used in, illicit traffic in narcotic
drugs and psychotropic substances, to implement the
provisions of the International Convention on Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and for matters
connected therewith.”
In the decision in Collector of Customs, New Delhi v.
Ahmadalieva Nodira (2004) 3 SCC 549, the three-judge
bench of this Court considered the provisions under
Section 37(1)(b) as also 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act, with
regard to the expression “reasonable grounds” used
therein. This Court held that it means something more
than the prima facie grounds and that it contemplates
substantial and probable causes for believing that the
accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. Furthermore, it
was held that the reasonable belief contemplated in the
provision would require the existence of such facts and
circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify
satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged
offence.
As relates to the twin conditions under Section 37(1)(b)(ii)
of the NDPS Act, viz., that, firstly, there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such
offence and, secondly, he is not likely to commit any
2026:HHC:2995
offence while on bail it was held therein that they are
cumulative and not alternative. Satisfaction of the
existence of those twin conditions had to be based on the
‘reasonable grounds’, as referred to above.
7. In the decision in State of Kerala v. Rajesh (2020) 12 SCC
122, after reiterating the broad parameters laid down by
this Court to be followed while considering an application
for bail moved by an accused involved in offences under the
NDPS Act, in paragraph 18 thereof this Court held that the
scheme of Section 37 of the NDPS Act would reveal that the
exercise of power to grant bail in such cases is not only
subject to the limitations contained under Section 439 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, but also subject to the
limitation placed by Section 37(1)(b)(ii), NDPS Act. Further,
it was held that in case one of the two conditions
thereunder is not satisfied, the ban on granting bail would
operate.
8. Thus, the provisions under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the
NDPS Act and the decisions referred supra reveal the
consistent view of this Court that while considering the
application for bail made by an accused involved in an
offence under the NDPS Act, a liberal approach ignoring the
mandate under Section 37 of the NDPS Act is impermissible.
Recording a finding mandated under Section 37 of the NDPS
Act, which is a sine qua non for granting bail to an accused
under the NDPS Act, cannot be avoided while passing
orders on such applications.”
21.
In the present case, the prosecution has collected
sufficient material to prima facie connect the petitioners with the
commission of the crime. There is nothing on record to show that
the petitioners would not indulge in the commission of an offence
if released on bail. Hence, they have not satisfied the twin
conditions laid down in Section 37 of the ND&PS Act.
2026:HHC:2995
22.
It was submitted that the grounds of arrest were not
communicated to the petitioner, and his arrest is illegal. This
submission is not acceptable. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in
Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2356
that the communication of the grounds of the arrests in all the
offences would apply prospectively from the date of the
pronouncement of the judgment. It was observed:
“58. We are cognizant that there existed no consistent or
binding
requirement
mandating
the
written
communication of the grounds of arrest for all the
offences. Holding as above, in our view, would ensure
implementation of the constitutional rights provided to an
arrestee as engrafted under Article22of theConstitution of
India in an effective manner. Such clarity on obligation
would avoid uncertainty in the administration of criminal
justice. The ends of fairness and legal discipline, therefore,
demand that this procedure, as affirmed above, shall govern
arrests henceforth.” (Emphasis supplied)
23.
This judgment was followed by a co-ordinate bench of
this Court in Kabir Khan vs State 2025:HHC:39246, wherein it was
observed:
“7. In light of the fact that in the said judgment, Hon’ble
Supreme Court has been pleased to clearly hold that as
previously there existed no consistent or binding
requirements mandating written communication of the
grounds of arrest for all the offences, the ends of fairness
and legal discipline, therefore, demand that this procedure
as affirmed shall govern arrests henceforth, this means
2026:HHC:2995
that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to make
directions issued therein prospective.”
24.
It was submitted that the bail is a Rule and Jail is an
exception, and the petitioners are entitled to bail on this
consideration. This submission will not help the petitioners, as
they are prima facie involved in the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 20 of the NDPS Act involving the
commercial quantity. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif, (2024) 11 SCC 372: 2024
SCC OnLine SC 3848 that in cases under the NDPS Act involving
the commercial quantity, the negation of bail is the rule and its
grant an exception. It was observed at page 381:
“Compliance with the mandate under Section 37
9. There has been a consistent and persistent view of
this Court that in the NDPS cases, where the offence is
punishable with a minimum sentence of ten years, the accused shall generally not be released on bail. Negation of
bail is the rule, and its grant is an exception. While considering the application for bail, the court has to bear in mind
the provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which are
mandatory in nature. The recording of findings as mandated in Section 37 is a sine qua non for granting bail to the
accused involved in the offences under the said Act.”
25.
It was submitted that the learned Magistrate had
opened the parcel without breaking the seals, which shows that
the parcel can be tampered with. This submission is not
2026:HHC:2995
acceptable. Usually, the parcel is cut to remove its contents to
keep the original seals intact, and nothing can be made out from
the order of the learned Magistrate at this stage. Further, a
presumption regarding the regularity of the official act exists in
Section 119 of the Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, which will apply
to the present case as well, and it cannot be said at this stage that
there was any tampering with the case property.
26.
No other point was urged.
27.
In view of the above, the present petitions fail, and the
same are dismissed.
28.
The observation made herein before shall remain
confined to the disposal of the instant petitions and will have no
bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.
9th January, 2026.
(Nikita)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review