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2026:HHC:33761
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP(M) No. 1753, 1761, 1765 and 1868
of 2026
Reserved on: 23.9.2026
Decided on: 28.9.2026
1.
Cr.MP(M) No. 1753 of 2026
Shivanshu Dhiman
...Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P.
2.
...Respondent
Cr.MP(M) No. 1761 of 2026
Gaurav Sahota
…. Petitioner
Versus
State of HP
3.
…. Respondent
Cr.MP(M) No. 1765 of 2026
Abhishek Sahota
…. Petitioner
Versus
State of HP
4.
…. Respondent
Cr.MP(M) No. 1868 of 2026
Sudhanshu Rangra
…. Petitioner
Versus
State of HP
…. Respondent
2026:HHC:33761
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
No.
For the Petitioner(s)
:
Mr Lakshay Parihar, Advocate,
for the petitioner in Cr.MP(M)
No.1753 of 2026, Mr Jeevan
Kumar, Advocate, for the
petitioners in Cr.MP(M) Nos.
1761 and 1765 of 2026 and Mr
Atharv Sharma, Advocate, for
the petitioner in Cr. MP(M)
No.1868 of 2026.
For the Respondent/State
:
Mr
Jitender
Sharma,
Additional Advocate General, in
all the petitions.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioners have filed the present petitions
seeking regular bail in FIR No. 57 of 2026, dated 24.05.2026,
registered at Police Station Palampur, District Kangra, H.P., for
the commission of offences punishable under Sections 21, 25,
and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (in
short ‘NDPS Act’). (Since all petitions have arisen out of a common
FIR, therefore, they are being taken up together for disposal).
2.
It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the
police received secret information on 14.05.2026 at 7:04 AM
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:33761
regarding the sale of heroin. The police arrested Priya Devi,
Sumit Kumar, and Ritik Thakur. One person ran away from the
spot. The police recovered 16.06 grams of heroin during the
search. The police also arrested Lakhwinder Singh, from whom
128.08 grams of heroin was recovered. No recovery was effected
from the petitioners. The petitioners are implicated based on the
financial transactions between them and the co-accused. The
ingredients of Sections 21, 25, and 29 of the NDPS Act are not
satisfied. The police have completed the investigation, and no
fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioners in
custody. The petitioners would abide by the terms and conditions
that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present
petitions be allowed and the petitioners be released on bail.
3.
The petitions are opposed by filing status reports,
asserting that the police received secret information on
24.05.2026 at about 7:04 AM that the co-accused Priya was
selling heroin from her home. The information was credible, and
the delay in procuring the search warrant would have led to the
destruction of the heroin. Hence, the information was reduced to
writing and was sent to the Sub-Divisional Police Officer (SDPO),
Palampur. The police joined Narinder Bhat and Sanjeev Kumar
2026:HHC:33761
and went to the house of Priya. The co-accused Priya, Sumit
Kumar, and Ritik Kumar were found in the house. One person ran
away after seeing the police and could not be apprehended. The
police searched the room and recovered 16.06 grams of heroin.
The police seized the heroin and arrested Priya and the coaccused. They revealed the name of the person who had
absconded as Mohit. The police also arrested him. The police
checked the bank account and found financial transactions. The
police sent the heroin for analysis, and it was found to be
diacetylmorphine.
The
petitioner
Shivanshu
Dhiman
had
transferred ₹1,45,000/- to Gourav Sahota and Honey. The
petitioner Sudhanshu Rangra had transferred ₹1,54,282/- and
₹8,500/-to
the
accounts
of
Gourav
Sahota
and
Honey,
respectively. The petitioner Abhishek Sahota had withdrawn
₹50,000/- from the account of Gaurav Sahota on 4.5.2026. The
money was remitted to his account using the scanner provided by
him. The petitioner, Gourav Sahota, was operating a saloon. He
had handed over his ATM card to the co-accused Abhishek
Sahota. ₹22,75,500/- was transferred to his account by various
persons. The petitioners are involved in the drug trade, which is
adversely
affecting
society.
They
would
indulge
in
the
2026:HHC:33761
commission of a similar offence in case of their release on bail.
Therefore, the status report.
4.
I have heard Mr Ajay Sharma, learned Senior
Advocate, assisted by Mr Atharv Sharma, learned counsel for the
petitioner Sudhanshu Dhangra; Mr Jeevan Kumar, learned
counsel for the petitioners Abhishek Sahota and Gourav Sahota;
Mr Lakshya Parihar, learned counsel for the petitioner Shivanshu
Dhiman; and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate
General, for the respondent-State.
5.
Mr Atharv Sharma, Mr Jeevan Kumar, and Mr Lakshya
Parihar, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the
petitioners are innocent. There is no material to connect them to
the commission of the crime except the statements made by the
co-accused and the financial transactions, which are not
sufficient to show their involvement in the commission of the
crime. The investigation is complete, and no fruitful purpose
would be served by detaining the petitioners in custody. The
petitioners would abide by the terms and conditions that the
Court may impose. Hence, he prayed that the present petitions be
allowed and the petitioners be released on bail.
2026:HHC:33761
6.
Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate
General for the respondent-State, submitted that the petitioners
had
financial
transactions
with
the
co-accused
for
the
purchase/sale of heroin. The heroin is adversely affecting the
young generation, and no leniency should be shown to the
petitioners. Hence, they prayed that the present petitions be
dismissed.
7.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the Bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8.
The parameters for granting bail were considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC
314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:
(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail
56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1
SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while
elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution
of India in the context of personal liberty of a person
under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be
considered while granting bail, which are extracted as
under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the
vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also
bears upon the issue.
2026:HHC:33761
8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice
would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant
jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being.
[Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”
(Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 —
Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]
9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court
considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with
witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the
process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in
this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who
is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record,
particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to
commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to
habituals, it is part of criminological history that a
thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the
opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of
society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the
criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise
in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied)
57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4
SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various
aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing
with an application seeking bail. The same may be
extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the
basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the
circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner.
While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the
nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support
thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction
will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing
of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the
accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of
the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the
witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the
public or State and similar other considerations. It has also
to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail
2026:HHC:33761
the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for
believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the
court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic
itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the
accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce
prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis
supplied)
58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh,
(2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through
Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion
in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In
highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of
course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as
follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)
“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but,
however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a
judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order
for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained.
Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is
dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being
dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case
to case. While the placement of the accused in society,
though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding
factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should
always be coupled with other circumstances warranting
the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the
basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more
heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection
of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual
matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied)
59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC
528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is
established that a court considering a bail application
cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and
an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the
court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons
justifying the grant of bail.
2026:HHC:33761
60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14
SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that
where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said
order would suffer from the vice of non-application of
mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with
regard to the circumstances under which an order
granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors
which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant
bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere
with an order passed by the High Court granting or
rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally
incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion
judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the
basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this
Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other
circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while
considering an application for bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable
ground to believe that the accused had committed the
offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if
released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing
of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by
grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxx
2026:HHC:33761
62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of
application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise
of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the
accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 :
(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this
Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order
(Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856
and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat
2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused,
observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022)
4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)
“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an
individual is an invaluable right, at the same time, while
considering an application for bail, courts cannot lose sight
of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused
and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly
when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or
vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material
brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima
facie conclusion. While considering an application for the
grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported
by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to
the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due
consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the
nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if
any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a
conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an
accused.” (emphasis supplied)
9.
Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v.
Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC
261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the
gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests
otherwise. It was observed at page 308:
2026:HHC:33761
2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not
jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of
fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or
creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences
or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner
who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not
intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative.
3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely
to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and
must weigh with us when considering the question of jail.
So also, the heinousness of the crime….”
10.
The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
11.
The status report shows that the police are relying
upon the statements made by the co-accused to connect the
petitioners to the commission of the crime. It was laid down by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v.
State of Gujarat, (2019) 16 SCC 547: (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 361: 2019 SCC
OnLine SC 588 that a statement made by an accused during the
investigation is hit by Section 162 of Cr.P.C. and Section 25 of the
Indian Evidence Act and cannot be used as a piece of evidence. It
was observed at page 568: 44. Such a person, viz., the person who is named in the
FIR, and therefore, the accused in the eyes of the law, can
indeed be questioned, and the statement is taken by the
police officer. A confession that is made to a police officer
would be inadmissible, having regard to Section 25 of the
Evidence Act. A confession, which is vitiated under Section
2026:HHC:33761
24 of the Evidence Act, would also be inadmissible. A
confession, unless it fulfils the test laid down in Pakala
Narayana Swami [Pakala Narayana Swami v. King Emperor,
1939 SCC OnLine PC 1: (1938-39) 66 IA 66: AIR 1939 PC 47]
and as accepted by this Court, may still be used as an
admission under Section 21 of the Evidence Act. This,
however, is subject to the bar of admissibility of a
statement under Section 161 CrPC. Therefore, even if a
statement contains an admission, the statement being one
under Section 161, it would immediately attract the bar
under Section 162 CrPC.”
12.
Similarly, it was held in Surinder Kumar Khanna vs
Intelligence Officer Directorate of Revenue Intelligence 2018 (8) SCC
271 that a confession made by a co-accused cannot be taken as a
substantive piece of evidence against another co-accused and
can only be utilised to lend assurance to the other evidence. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court subsequently held in Tofan Singh Versus
State of Tamil Nadu, 2021 (4) SCC 1, that a confession made to a
police officer during the investigation is hit by Section 25 of the
Indian Evidence Act and is not saved by the provisions of Section
67 of the NDPS Act. Therefore, no advantage can be derived by
the prosecution from the confessional statement made by the
co-accused implicating the petitioner.
13.
A similar situation arose before this Court in Dinesh
Kumar @ Billa Versus State of H.P. 2020 Cri. L.J. 4564, and it was
2026:HHC:33761
held that a confession of the co-accused and the phone calls are
not sufficient to deny bail to a person.
14.
It was laid down by this Court in Saina Devi vs State of
Himachal Pradesh 2022 Law Suit (HP) 211 that where the police
have no material except the call details record and the disclosure
statement of the co-accused, the petitioner cannot be kept in
custody. It was observed: “[16] In the facts of the instant case, the prosecution, for
implicating the petitioner, relies upon firstly the
confessional statement made by accused Dabe Ram and
secondly the CDR details of calls exchanged between the
petitioner and the wife of co-accused Dabe Ram. Taking
into consideration the evidence with respect to the
availability of CDR details involving the phone number of
the petitioner and the mobile phone number of the wife of
co-accused Dabe Ram, this Court had considered the
existence of a prima facie case against the petitioner and
had rejected the bail application as not satisfying the
conditions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act.
[17] Since the existence of CDR details of the accused
person(s) has not been considered as a circumstance
sufficient to hold a prima facie case against the accused
person(s), in Pallulabid Ahmad's case (supra), this Court is
of the view that the petitioner has made out a case for
maintainability of his successive bail application as also
for grant of bail in his favour.
[18] Except for the existence of CDRs and the disclosure
statement of the co-accused, no other material appears to
have been collected against the petitioner. The disclosure
made by the co-accused cannot be read against the
petitioner as per the mandate of the Hon'ble Supreme
2026:HHC:33761
Court in Tofan Singh Vs State of Tamil Nadu, 2021 4 SCC 1.
Further, on the basis of the aforesaid elucidation, the
petitioner is also entitled to the benefit of bail.
15.
The police have also relied upon the financial
transaction to connect the petitioners to the commission of the
crime; however, that is not sufficient. It was laid down by the
Kerala High Court in Amal E vs State of Kerala 2023:KER:39393
that financial transactions are not sufficient to connect the
accused with the commission of a crime. It was observed:
“From the perusal of the case records, it can be seen that,
apart from the aforesaid transactions, there is nothing to
show the involvement of the petitioners. It is true that the
documents indicate the monetary transactions between
the petitioners and some of the accused persons, but the
question that arises is whether the said transactions were
in connection with the sale of Narcotic drugs. To establish
the same, apart from the confession statements of the
accused, there is nothing. However, as it is an aspect to be
established during the trial, I do not intend to enter into
any finding at this stage, but the said aspect is sufficient to
record the satisfaction of the conditions contemplated
under section 37 of the NDPS Act, as the lack of such
materials evokes a reasonable doubt as to the involvement
of the petitioner.”
16.
Therefore, the petitioners cannot be detained in
custody based on the statement made by the co-accused and the
financial transactions.
2026:HHC:33761
17.
It was submitted that the petitioner Abhishek Sahota
has criminal antecedents. and is not entitled to bail on this
consideration. This submission will not help the prosecution.
The criminal antecedents would have been relevant had the
prosecution been able to establish a prima facie case against the
petitioner. However, the police have failed to collect sufficient
material to prima facie connect the petitioner with the
commission of the crime, and he cannot be detained in custody
simply because he has criminal antecedents. It was laid down by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ayub Khan v. State of Rajasthan,
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3763: 2024:INSC:994 that the criminal
antecedents may not be a reason to deny bail to the accused when
no prima facie case is made out against him. It was observed:
“10. The presence of the antecedents of the accused is only
one of the several considerations for deciding the prayer
for bail made by him. In a given case, if the accused makes
out a strong prima facie case, depending upon the fact
situation and period of incarceration, the presence of
antecedents may not be a ground to deny bail. There may
be a case where a Court can grant bail only on the grounds
of long incarceration. The presence of antecedents may
not be relevant in such a case. In a given case, the Court
may grant default bail. Again, the antecedents of the
accused are irrelevant in such a case. Thus, depending
upon the peculiar facts, the Court can grant bail
notwithstanding the existence of the antecedents.”
2026:HHC:33761
18.
Therefore, the petitioner Abhishek Sahota cannot be
detained in custody because he has criminal antecedents.
19.
The police have completed the investigation and filed
the charge sheet before the Court. Hence, no fruitful purpose
would be served by detaining the petitioners in custody.
20.
It was submitted that the petitioners would indulge in
the commission of the crime in case of their release on bail. This
apprehension can be removed by imposing conditions and is not
sufficient to deny bail.
21.
In view of the above, the present petitions are
allowed, and the petitioners are ordered to be released on bail
subject to their furnishing bail bonds in the sum of ₹1,00,000/each with one surety each in the like amount to the satisfaction
of the learned Trial Court. While on bail, the petitioners will abide
by the following conditions: (i)
The petitioners will not intimidate the witnesses,
nor will they influence any evidence in any manner
whatsoever.
(ii)
The petitioners shall attend the trial on each and
every hearing and will not seek unnecessary
adjournments.
(iii)
The petitioners will not leave the present addresses
for a continuous period of seven days without
2026:HHC:33761
furnishing the addresses of the intended visit to the
SHO concerned, the Police Station concerned and
the Trial Court.
22.
(iv)
The petitioners will surrender their passports, if
any, to the Court; and
(v)
The petitioners will furnish their mobile numbers
and social media contacts to the Police and the Court
and will abide by the summons/notices received
from the Police/Court through SMS/ WhatsApp/
Social Media Account. In case of any change in the
mobile numbers or social media accounts, the same
will be intimated to the Police/Court within five days
from the date of the change.
It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of
any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to file
a petition for cancellation of the bail.
23.
The petitions stand accordingly disposed of. A copy of
this order be sent to the Jail Superintendent, Lala Lajpat Rai
Correctional Home, Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P. and
learned Trial Court by FASTER.
24.
The observations made hereinabove are regarding the
disposal of these petitions and will have no bearing whatsoever on
the merits of the case.
28th September, 2026
(Chander)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
CHANDER CHANDER SHEKHAR
2026.09.28
SHEKHAR Date:
16:26:41 +0530
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