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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment reserved on: 21.04.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 01.07.2026
+
W.P.(C) 12661/2019, CM APPL. 51712/2019 & CM APPL.
14905/2021
SUBEDAR MAJOR ASHOK
KUMAR VERMA (RETD)
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Yudhvir Singh Chauhan, Adv.
versus
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE & ANR
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Rajesh Gogna, Ms. Rebina
Rai, Ms. Hibu B. Monio, Ms. Punita Jha and
Mr. Shivam Tiwari, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C.HARI SHANKAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA
JUDGMENT
01.07.2026
%
OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.
1.
The present petition assails the order dated 18.11.2019 passed by
the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi1 in
O.A2. No. 3283/2019, wherein the Petitioner’s O.A. for appointment to
the post of Civilian Assistant Security Officer3 was dismissed.
2.
The Petitioner is a retired Junior Commissioned Officer4 of the
1 “CAT”/ “Tribunal”, hereinafter
2 “O.A” means Original Application
3 “CASO”, hereinafter
4 “JCO”, hereinafter
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Indian Army, who superannuated on 31.12.2016, at approximately 52
years of age.
3.
The Respondents vide notification dated 03.03.2016, invited
applications for filling three (03) posts of CASO, a General Central
Service Group ‘B’ Gazetted, Non-Ministerial post under the Directorate
General of Quality Assurance (DGQA), Ministry of Defence5 to be
filled on deputation/re-employment basis. This notification specifically
mentioned that applicants should be Armed Forces personnel of the
rank of JCO or equivalent, having less than one year of service left or
those to be transferred to the reserve within one year. Furthermore, it
stipulated that if selected before retirement, such personnel would be
continued on re-employment terms upon release from service.
4.
The eligibility conditions also specified that the maximum age
for appointment on deputation would not exceed 56 years as of the
closing date for receipt of applications, and that the appointment would
be governed strictly in accordance with the applicable Recruitment
Rules.
5.
Pursuant to the said notification, the Petitioner applied for the
post of CASO. Subsequently, the Petitioner was called for an interview
vide communication dated 02.05.2018, and appeared before the
Selection Committee on 15.05.2018, which was chaired by the Joint
Secretary (Army)6.
5 “MoD”, hereinafter
6 “JS(Army)” hereinafter
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6.
Upon completion of the selection process, records reveal that
three candidates were selected, including the Petitioner. The records
further indicate that marks were duly awarded, with the Petitioner
securing the highest marks among all selected candidates.
7.
The record reflects that the MoD obtained the approval of the
Additional Secretary for the constitution of the Selection Committee for
recruitment to the post of CASO.
8.
Following the completion of the selection process, the case was
forwarded by MoD (Movement) to MoD (Appointments) for further
necessary action, including the issuance of an offer of appointment to
the selected candidates.
9.
The MoD (Appointments) returned the file, pointing out that pre-
appointment formalities, such as medical examination, police
verification, and verification of educational and experience certificates
of the three recommended candidates, were required to be completed
by the MoD.
10.
Upon receipt of the file, MoD sought clarification from
Appointments Section regarding the competent authority for the
acceptance of the recommendations made by the Selection Committee.
11.
In response, MoD (Appointments), vide their note 81/ante,
referring to Part III of Office Memorandum (OM) No. 34(15)/96-07M
dated 17.05.1996, clarified that matters relating to appointment to
Group ‘B’ posts are ordinarily to be disposed of at the level of the Joint
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Secretary (JS) of the concerned wing. The note further indicated that
since the Selection Committee had been chaired by the JS (Army), it
may be necessary to obtain approval at a higher level, such as the
Additional Secretary, for the acceptance of the recommendations.
12.
Acting upon the said clarification, MoD submitted the file for
approval by the Additional Secretary. However, the Additional
Secretary observed that the “competent authority cannot be altered on
the basis of suggestions” and directed that the relevant rules and
provisions governing the determination of the competent authority be
placed on record.
13.
Subsequently, it was noted that, as per the Recruitment Rules, the
JS (Army) was the appointing authority for the post of CASO.
However, considering that the JS (Army) had chaired the Selection
Committee, a question arose as to whether the same authority could
both recommend and approve the selection.
14.
MoD(Appointments) reiterated that there was no express rule
mandating approval by a higher authority in such circumstances, though
it was administratively suggested that approval may be sought at a level
above the Chairperson of the Selection Committee.
15.
Consequently, the Additional Secretary concluded that the JS
(Army) was the competent authority under the applicable framework to
approve the recommendations of the Selection Committee, and the file
was accordingly placed before JS(Army) for final consideration.
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16.
It is evident from the record that the issue regarding the
identification of the competent authority remained unresolved from
May 2018 to February 2019, during which period the file continued to
circulate between the concerned departments without finality.
17.
In this background the JS(Army), upon considering the matter,
recorded the following on 27.02.2019:
“In view of the time elapsed in the instant case, it would be
preferable to start the process afresh, ab initio.
Accordingly, we may not proceed in the instant matter and initiate
action afresh in a transparent manner by giving wide publicity and
equal opportunity to all potential candidates.”
18.
As a result, the decision to cancel the said vacancy was published
in Employment News 14-20 September 2019. The same has been
reproduced herewith for reference :
“Employment News 14-20 September 2019
No. 15(06)/CASO/2019-D(Mov)
Government of India
Ministry of Defence
1 D(Mov)
RECRTUIMENT CANCELLATION NOTICE
This has reference to the recruitment advertisement for the post of
Civilian Assistant Security Officer published in the Employment
News dated 02-08 April 2016, The aforesaid recruitment process
stands cancelled due to administrative reasons.
1023/11/0008/1920
EN 24/62”
19.
Consequent to the aforesaid decision, the recruitment process
initiated under the notification dated 03.03.2016 was cancelled, and
steps were taken to initiate a fresh recruitment process. A fresh vacancy
circular for the same post was thereafter published.
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20.
The Petitioner, upon seeking information through a Right to
Information7 application dated 18.03.2019, was informed, vide letter
dated 23.04.2019, that the recruitment process for the post of CASO
had been cancelled by the competent authority.
21.
Aggrieved by the cancellation, the Petitioner made further
representations under the RTI Act and obtained documents which
revealed that the selection process had been duly conducted and
finalized, but was annulled on administrative grounds.
22.
Consequently, the petitioner approached the CAT challenging
the cancellation of the earlier recruitment process and the issuance of
the fresh notification.
23.
The Tribunal, upon considering the record, observed that
although the selection process had progressed substantially, there
existed uncertainty within the administrative process, particularly
regarding the identification of the competent authority for approval of
the Selection Committee’s recommendations.
24.
The Tribunal further held that such administrative decision to
cancel the earlier process and restart the recruitment could not be
interfered with, particularly in view of the delay and the circumstances
surrounding the decision-making process.
7 “RTI” hereinafter
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25.
It was held that, although the Petitioner had participated in the
selection process and had been selected, he did not acquire a “vested
right” to appointment merely on that basis.
26.
On the above reasoning, the Tribunal concluded that no case for
interference was made out and accordingly dismissed the O.A.
Aggrieved by the dismissal, the Petitioner has now approached this
Court by way of the present writ petition.
SUBMISSIONS BEFORE THIS COURT
27.
Learned Counsel for the Petitioner, Mr. Yudhvir Singh Chauhan,
submitted that the Tribunal erred in dismissing the O.A. in limine,
without issuing notice to the Respondents. It was contended that the
CAT’S reliance on Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India8 to deny all
relief was erroneous, especially when the CAT itself acknowledged that
the Petitioner had a “legitimate expectation” of being appointed. This
expectation was verbally confirmed but an Under Secretary of MoD,
and the Petitioner had, in reliance on this confirmation, forfeited other
employment opportunities.
28.
Further, the learned Counsel submitted that the Petitioner cannot
be made to suffer for the administrative negligence of the Respondents.
The Petitioner had appeared in the interview in good faith, and the entire
selection process had been duly completed. Applications were invited,
candidates were shortlisted, interviews were conducted, and a final
8 (1991)3 SCC 47
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merit list was prepared, wherein the Petitioner secured the highest
marks by a substantial margin. In support of this submission, reliance
was place on S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan9 to contend that procedural
lapses or omissions on the part of the State cannot be foisted upon an
aspirant who has fulfilled all requirements.
29.
Finally the learned Counsel contended that the fresh vacancy
circular issued, which requires candidates to be “in service” or to apply
“through the Commanding Officer”, is ultra vires the Recruitment
Rules10 and cannot override the statutory framework.
30.
It was further submitted that the fresh vacancy circular issued in
September 2019 is, in all material respects, ad verbatim identical to the
earlier circular dated 03.03.2016, including the eligibility criteria,
qualifications, and experience requirements. The issuance of a fresh
notification, without any substantive alteration in the criteria, clearly
demonstrates non-application of mind and an arbitrary exercise of
power.
31.
In light of the above submissions, the learned Counsel prayed
that the order passed by the CAT be set aside, and the cancellation
notification/notice published in Employment News for the period 1420 September 2019, along with the order/noting of the JS (Army) dated
27.02.2019, whereby a fresh recruitment process was ordered to be
initiated, be quashed.
9 (1981) 1 SCC 622
10 Army and Directorate General Quality Assurance (Civilian Assistant Security Officers) Recruitment
Rules,2010
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32.
Per Contra, learned Counsel for the Respondents, Mr. Rajesh
Gogna, submitted that the recruitment process for filling the three posts
of CASO was validly cancelled by the Competent Authority on
administrative grounds.
33.
It was further submitted that once the recruitment process was
cancelled, the entire selection process, including any merit list prepared
thereunder, ceased to have any legal effect. No candidate, including the
Petitioner, can claim any right arising from a process that has been
lawfully annulled.
34.
The learned Counsel also emphasized that a cancellation notice
was duly published, thereby ensuring transparency and providing
public notice of the decision. Consequently, the selections made under
the earlier process cannot be treated as subsisting or enforceable in law.
35.
Further, the learned Counsel submitted that the eligibility criteria
for application to the post of CASO, as provided under the Recruitment
Rules, clearly stipulate that eligible candidates must either be in service
or within one year period from the date of retirement. In the present
case, the Petitioner retired from service on 31.12.2016, and thus does
not fall within the prescribed eligibility window under the Rules at the
time of the fresh recruitment process. Therefore, the Petitioner fails to
satisfy the essential eligibility criteria and is consequently disentitled
from participating in the fresh recruitment process.
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FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
36.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
material on record, it is undisputed that the Petitioner participated in the
selection process and was placed first in the order of merit. However, it
is equally undisputed that no appointment order was issued in favour of
the Petitioner or any other candidate.
37.
The legal position in this regard is well settled. In Shankarsan
Dash (supra) , the Supreme Court held that inclusion in a select list
does not confer any indefeasible right to appointment, and the State is
not bound to fill the vacancies. The mere inclusion of a candidate in a
select list does not create a right to be appointed.
38.
This principle has been consistently reaffirmed in a catena of
decisions. In Employees State Insurance Corporation v. Dr. Vinay
Kumar11, the Supreme Court reiterated the cardinal principle that, in the
case of direct recruitment, a candidate who has applied does not have a
legal right to insist that the recruitment process be carried to its logical
end. Even inclusion in the select list may not confirm such a right.
However, this is distinguishable from holding that the employer is free
to act in an arbitrary manner.
39.
It is also settled law that appointment can never be claimed as a
matter of right and must conform to the constitutional mandate of
equality and the applicable recruitment rules. An appointment can only
11 (2022) 18 SCC 358
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be made in accordance with the statutory provisions governing
recruitment and the applicable legal framework.
40.
In the present case, the selection process did not culminate in the
issuance of any appointment order. As such, the Petitioner cannot claim
any vested or enforceable right to appointment. The absence of a formal
appointment order renders the claim of the Petitioner legally untenable.
41.
The materials on record reveal that the recruitment process
remained pending for a substantial period owing to administrative
uncertainty concerning the identification of the competent authority for
approval of the Selection Committee’s recommendations. The delay in
finalizing the process is evident from the movement of the file between
various
departments,
including
MoD
(Movement),
MoD
(Appointments), the office of the JS(Army), and the Additional
Secretary, all reflecting divergent views on the issue of competence.
42.
Ultimately, on 27.02.2019, the JS (Army) recorded that, in view
of the time elapsed, it would be preferable to start the process afresh,
ab initio, to ensure transparency and equal opportunity. This formed the
basis for the cancellation of the recruitment process, which was initiated
in March 2016 but remained inconclusive for nearly three years.
43.
This decision cannot be deemed arbitrary or biased. The
recruitment process, initiated in March 2016, had remained unresolved
for a prolong period, and such a delay can legitimately justify the
reconsideration of the process itself. Prolonged administrative delays
may call for a fresh start to ensure that the recruitment process is
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conducted in a fair, transparent, and efficient manner.
44.
In State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha12, the
Supreme Court held that the State is not bound to fill vacancies even
after the preparation of a select list and may decide not to proceed
further for valid reasons, including administrative or policy
considerations. This principle applies squarely to the present case,
where administrative uncertainty and delays played a pivotal role in the
decision to cancel the process.
45.
More recently, in State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha13, the
Supreme Court upheld the cancellation of a recruitment process and
reiterated that the Government retains the discretion to annul a selection
where it forms a bona fide view that cancellation is necessary to ensure
fairness and integrity in public employment. The decision to cancel the
recruitment process in the present case aligns with this principle.
46.
Thus, it can be concluded that the Selection Committee possesses
the authority to cancel a recruitment process, provided that the decision
is made bona fide and not tainted by mala fide intentions. In this case,
the cancellation was based on administrative considerations such as
delay and procedural uncertainty, rather than allegations of irregularity
or mala fide actions.
47.
It is also significant to note that the Respondents did not abandon
the recruitment process altogether. A fresh notification was issued in
(1974) 3 SCC 220
13 2025 SCC OnLine SC 523
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September 2019 for the same posts, with substantially identical
eligibility conditions. The issuance of the fresh notification reflects the
Respondents’ intention to proceed with the recruitment process in a fair
and transparent manner, in accordance with the applicable rules.
48.
The issuance of a subsequent advertisement, with identical
eligibility criteria, demonstrates that the Respondents did not seek to
arbitrarily deny appointment but rather aimed to restart the recruitment
process afresh, taking into account the prolonged delay and
administrative issues that has arisen. The decision to restart the
recruitment process is a matter of administrative policy and cannot, by
itself, be deemed arbitrary.
49.
The Petitioner has invoked the doctrine of legitimate expectation,
relying on his selection and an alleged verbal assurance. While a
candidate may have an expectation of fair consideration, such an
expectation does not crystallise into an enforceable right to
appointment. The Court must balance individual expectations against
the larger requirement of ensuring fairness and integrity in public
recruitment. Mere participation in the selection process, or even being
selected, does not confer an enforceable right to appointment.
50.
The alleged verbal assurance, in the absence of a formal
appointment order, cannot override the settled legal position. The law
consistently holds that only a formal offer of appointment, in
accordance with the applicable recruitment rules, confers any legal right
to appointment.
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51.
Moreover the Courts are not bound to interfere with
administrative decisions in public recruitment processes, unless it is
shown to be arbitrary, mala fide, or based on extraneous considerations.
In this regard Para 39 of Arabinda Rabha (supra) merits reproduction:
39.
It cannot be gainsaid that the factors of “when”, “which”,
“what”, “who” and “how” that are associated with a
recruitment/selection process is the prerogative of the recruiting
authority and the selectors; however, at the same time, the process
has to be conducted consistent with statutory provisions governing
the same, if any, as well as principles of absolute fairness and
complete non-arbitrariness. Though it is true that the law does not
postulate a fetter on the authority of the employer State and it is
within the domain of the Government when to initiate a process of
recruitment for public employment, either according to recruitment
rules or even in the absence thereof, it is for the Government of the
day to decide in which manner it proposes to conduct
selection, what would be the various stages the candidates aspiring
for appointment have to pass through in order to be placed in the
select list, who would be the selectors, and how weightage is to be
given to each of the testing methods, a great deal of credence is lent
to a process if it is fairly and transparently conducted in accordance
with rules, whatever be its source, without the slightest hint of any
bias or favouritism or nepotism. Normally, it is not for the courts to
interfere unless the process smacks of mala fides. However, the right
to be considered for public employment being a fundamental right,
it would be safe and prudent to have recruitment rules to govern the
process of selection so that the best possible talent is appointed in
public service. Obviously, assessing the merit of the candidates
aspiring for public employment on the basis of a prescribed
standard would not only provide a level playing field for each of
them, the excellence of any institution to which the appointment is to
be made would depend directly on the proficiency of its
members/staff and that would, in turn, depend on the quality and
merit of those who offer themselves for selection and ultimately get
selected, necessitating the selection to be conducted without any
hidden taint or masked mala fides. Last but not the least, having
regard to present times when corruption has been held to be a walk
of life by certain responsible citizens of the country, it would have
been desirable if the process of recruitment of 104 Constables were
conducted after framing of recruitment rules and also prescribing a
written examination to keep the process absolutely above board.”
52.
In the present case, the decision to cancel the recruitment process
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is supported by discernible reasons, taken at the appropriate level, and
followed by the issuance of a fresh notification. No mala fides or
arbitrariness has been alleged by the Petitioner, nor has it been
demonstrated.
53.
Thus, in view of the foregoing discussion, this Court records the
following findings:
i.
The Petitioner did not acquire any vested or enforceable
right to appointment in the absence of the issuance of an
appointment order;
ii.
The Respondents possessed the authority to cancel the
recruitment process for valid administrative reasons;
iii.
The cancellation was based on relevant considerations,
including the lapse of time and administrative uncertainty, and is
neither arbitrary nor mala fide;
iv.
The issuance of a fresh notification demonstrates that the
decision was taken to ensure fairness and transparency in public
recruitment;
v.
The impugned order of CAT does not suffer from any
illegality or perversity warranting interference.
54.
This Court is mindful of the fact that the Petitioner, having
participated in the selection process and having topped the merit list,
would have legitimately expected that the process would culminate in
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an appointment. It is indeed unfortunate that despite having undergone
the rigours of selection, the Petitioner could not be appointed on
account of the subsequent administrative decision to cancel the
recruitment process. However, where the competent authority, for valid
and bona fide reasons, decides to cancel the recruitment process and
initiate the same afresh, no enforceable right accrues to the candidate
merely on the basis of his participation or placement in the select list.
In such circumstances, while the hardship faced by the Petitioner is
acknowledged, the same cannot be a ground to grant relief contrary to
law.
55.
In view of the foregoing discussion and findings, the present
petition is dismissed as being devoid of merit.
56.
Accordingly, the impugned order dated 18.11.2019 passed by the
CAT in O.A. No. 3283/2019 is upheld.
57.
There shall be no order as to costs. Pending applications, if any,
shall stand disposed of.
OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.
C.HARI SHANKAR, J.
JULY 1, 2026/AT/gunn
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