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2026:JHHC:28669-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
First Appeal No. 133 of 2022
----Stuti Sarah, aged about 27 years, w/o Johnson Kachhap, d/o Sandeep
Stephen Lal, resident of Qrs. No.2116, Sector-IV/D, P.O & P.S-SectorIV, Bokaro Steel City, District-Bokaro, Jharkhand.
.......…Respondent/Appellant
Versus
Johnson Kachhap, S/o Dr. Simon Peter Kachhap, resident of Qrs. No.31,
Sector-1/C, P.O-Sector-I, P.S-B.S City, District-Bokaro, Jharkhand.
......... Petitioner/ Respondent
------CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP KUMAR SRIVASTAVA
------For the Appellant
: Mr. Mukesh Kumar, Advocate
For the Respondent : Ms. Sarweshwari Kumari, Advocate
-----C.A.V on 17.08.2026
Pronounced on 23/09/2026
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
1.
The instant appeal under section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act,
1984 is directed against the judgment dated 14.09.2022 and the decree
signed on 21.09.2022 passed in Original Suit No.546 of 2019 by the
learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Bokaro (in short, learned Family
Judge) whereby and whereunder the petition filed under section 32 of
Divorce Act, 1869 for restitution of conjugal rights by the respondenthusband against the appellant-wife, has been allowed.
Factual Matrix
2.
The brief facts of the case as pleaded in the plaint having been
recorded by the learned Family Judge, needs to be referred herein as:
(i)
The respondent-wife (appellant herein) and petitionerhusband (respondent herein) got married with each other
on 28.12.2018 as per Christian rites and custom at Bokaro.
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(ii)
After marriage, they lived together as husband and wife.
After three (03) months of their marriage, the respondent/
appellant herein started quarreling with him saying that
she does not want to live with him and she wants to live at
her parents’ home.
(iii)
It is alleged that the appellant-wife frequented to her
parents’ home without any information. She went to her
parents’ home on 31.08.2019 without any information. At
that time, she was pregnant of five (05) months.
(iv)
Thereafter, petitioner-husband (respondent herein), his
mother and his sister went to bring her back, but she
refused rather stated abusing and insulting them and
threatened them of dire consequences. Further, her father
stated that he will get his daughter (appellant herein)
married again with another, so he will not send his
daughter (appellant herein) with them.
(v)
In spite of that, several times petitioner/husband went to
bring respondent/appellant wife back but could not
succeed. He also tried to contact with her on phone, but he
found her mobile number switched off.
(vi)
After that on 27.11.2019 petitioner/husband had given a
written application before the Officer-in-Charge, Mahila
P.S., Sector-I, Bokaro and the Police tried to settle their
disputes but in vain.
(vii) Thereafter, finding no option, petitioner/husband has filed
the case for restitution of conjugal rights before the learned
Family Court wherein prayer has been made to direct the
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respondent/wife (appellant herein) to join the society of
the petitioner and lead their conjugal life.
3.
In pursuance to issuance of notice by the learned Family Court,
the appellant-wife appeared in the Original Suit before the learned Family
Court and filed written statement stating therein that the instant suit of the
Petitioner/husband is not maintainable either in law or in facts. The same
has been filed on false and fabricated grounds. After two days of marriage,
the Petitioner and his father started torturing her for demand of additional
dowry. Moreover, when she was pregnant, was tortured by the Petitioner
and his parents. Due to non-fulfillment of demand of dowry, she was left
in her matrimonial home in the month of August 2019, when she was
pregnant of 05 months. Thereafter, she had filed a complaint on 03.01.2020
against the Petitioner and his father for demand of dowry, which was sent
by the C.J.M., Bokaro to B.S. City Police Station for lodging FIR. The
Petitioner only with a view to save his skin, in anticipation, has filed the
suit of restitution of conjugal right before the learned Family Court. It has
further been stated that before institution of B.S. City P.S. Case No. 23 of
2020, her father had already made complaint to Superintendent of Police,
Bokaro on 05.12.2019. After obtaining anticipatory bail, the Petitioner
started threatening her, her parents and witnesses. He started abusing and
giving threats through mobile phone, whatsApp and facebook, which has
been reported through online complaint being Cyber Crime Incident dated
24.08.2020. She also lodged an online FIR on 03.09.2020 being Complaint
Number 112651. The Petitioner started sending threatening and abusive
messages through one BR-CALERT, which is used for sending bulk SMS
and the same is purchased by subscriber from his service provider. The
Petitioner/respondent herein came to her house, threatened her grand3
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father of dire consequences and fled away and entire incident is recorded
in CCTV. So, it is not safe for her and her 15 months baby to live with the
Petitioner and his family members.
On the aforesaid ground, the appellant-wife has prayed that the
original suit being Original Suit No.546 of 2019 for restitution of conjugal
rights is fit to be dismissed.
4.
Learned Family Judge, after institution of the said case taking
into consideration of the pleadings of the parties, after scrutinizing the
evidence adduced on behalf of both the parties, oral as well as
documentary, has allowed the suit for restitution of conjugal rights which
is under challenge by the appellant-wife by filing the instant appeal.
Submission of behalf of the appellant-wife:
5.
Mr. Mukesh Kumar, the learned counsel appearing for the
appellant-wife has taken the following grounds:
(i) There is an error in the impugned judgment, since,
each and every aspect of the matter has not been taken
into consideration based upon the evidences produced by
the appellant-wife.
(ii) The appellant-wife has been treated with cruelty by
the respondent-husband which has also come in the
evidence of the appellant-wife during trial, but the
learned Family Judge has not taken into consideration of
the factum of cruelty and has passed the order impugned
for restitution of conjugal rights in favour of petitioner
husband/ respondent herein, as such impugned order is
perverse in nature.
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(iii) It has been contended that the appellant-wife has
been meted out with cruelty as also she has been
compelled to leave the matrimonial house due to cruel
behaviour of the respondent-husband and his family
members when she was pregnant, but the same has not
been taken into consideration by the learned Family
Judge.
(iv) It has been contended that the learned Family Judge
has failed to appreciate the evidences adduced on behalf
of the appellant-wife as in the trial, the evidence has
come that it was the respondent-husband who has treated
the appellant-wife with mental torture and demand of
dowry and even neglected her even by knowing the fact
that she was pregnant, but this fact has not been
considered by the learned Family Judge.
(v) The learned Family Judge has not appreciated the
fact that the appellant-wife wanted to lead a happy
conjugal life with the respondent-husband but it was the
respondent-husband who has treated the appellant-wife
with cruelty and tortured her for demand of dowry and
thus, compelled her to leave her matrimonial home.
(vi) The learned Family Judge has not appreciated the
fact that the respondent-husband who treated the
appellant-wife with mental torture has instituted the suit
for restitution of conjugal rights in anticipation only to
save his skin in the criminal case lodged against him
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under the Dowry Prohibition Act by the appellant-wife
and not to restitute the conjugal right.
(vii) It has further been submitted that the respondenthusband filed the suit for restitution of conjugal rights
solely to protect himself from the criminal case lodged
by the appellant-wife against him and his family
members. This is evident from the fact that after
obtaining the decree for restitution of conjugal rights, the
respondent-husband made no attempt to execute it in his
favour, and has already solemnized a second marriage.
(viii) It has further been submitted, on the strength of the
supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the appellant,
that the respondent-husband has already solemnized a
second marriage and that a male child has also been born
out of the said wedlock. According to the appellant, the
aforesaid circumstances clearly demonstrate that the
respondent-husband instituted the suit for restitution of
conjugal rights merely as an eyewash and without any
genuine intention of resuming matrimonial cohabitation.
6.
The learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has
submitted that the impugned judgment and decree said to be perverse,
therefore, needs interference.
Submission of behalf of the respondent-husband:
7.
Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-
husband has taken the following grounds:
(i)
There is no error in the impugned judgement as the
learned Family Judge has considered the entire issue
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and on the basis of evidence laid by both the parties
has passed the order impugned.
(ii)
The allegation against the respondent-husband is that
he had treated the appellant-wife with cruelty due to
non-fulfillment of demand of dowry and driven her
out of the matrimonial home but the learned Family
Court, after taking into consideration the oral and
documentary evidence, has found that the appellantwife has failed to prove the said allegation and has
rightly allowed the suit for restitution of conjugal
rights.
(iii)
The learned counsel for the respondent-husband has
further submitted that while passing the judgment for
restitution of conjugal rights the learned Family
Judge has taken into consideration that the
respondent-husband has tried his level best to lead a
happy conjugal life with the respondent-wife but it
was the appellant-wife who had filed a false criminal
against him and his family members under the dowry
prohibition Act which she has failed to prove by
adducing evidence.
(iv)
It has also been submitted that the learned Family
Court after taking into consideration the material
available on record has found that the conduct of the
respondent-husband has been towards salvaging the
institution of marriage and for the said purpose he
has instituted the suit for restitution of conjugal
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rights, therefore, the impugned judgment requires no
interference.
(v)
It has been contended that the learned Family Judge
after taking into consideration the evidence adduced
on behalf of the parties has come to a conclusion that
there is nothing on record to show that the appellantwife feels unsafe in the company of her husband and
on the pretext of the aforesaid categorical finding of
the Family Court, the impugned judgment requires
no interference.
8.
Learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has
submitted that the impugned judgment cannot be said to suffer from an
error.
Analysis:
9.
We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties,
gone through the impugned judgment, as also the testimony of the
witnesses, the materials available on record and the documents exhibited
therein.
10.
It needs to mention herein that while hearing the matter, it has
been informed by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant-wife that
the respondent-husband has solemnized a second marriage. This Court,
considering the situation to be irreversible after solemnization of second
marriage by the respondent-husband, has decided to adjudicate the issue
involved by passing the judgment of dissolution of marriage on the issue
of alimony and, therefore, a direction was passed vide order dated
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19.02.2026 upon both the parties to file affidavit showing the details of the
income and other properties.
11.
It appears from the record that the appellant-wife has filed
affidavit in pursuance to the order dated 19.02.2026 but no affidavit has
been filed by the respondent-husband in terms thereof.
12.
This Court in absence of any individual affidavit filed on behalf
of the respondent-husband thought it proper to decide the matter on the
point of restitution of conjugal rights only and, accordingly, the judgment
has been reserved after concluding argument on behalf of the parties vide
order dated 17.08.2026 and today the same is being delivered by way of
this judgment.
13.
This Court, before entering into the illegality and propriety of the
impugned judgment, first needs to refer herein the purport and intent of the
provision of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act. Sub-section (1) to
section 19 of the Family Courts Act provides that an appeal shall lie from
every judgment or order not being an interlocutory order of a Family Court
to the High Court "both on facts and on law". Therefore, section 19 of the
Family Courts Act is parallel to section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
the scope of which has been dealt with by the Hon'ble Apex Court in catena
of judgments.
14.
The law is well settled that the High Court in a First Appeal can
examine every question of law and fact which arises in the facts of the case
and has powers to affirm, reverse or modify the judgment under question.
In Jagdish Singh v. Madhuri Devi, (2008) 10 SCC 497 the Hon'ble
Supreme Court observed that it is lawful for the High Court acting as the
First Appellate Court to enter into not only questions of law but questions
of fact as well and the appellate Court therefore can reappraise,
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reappreciate and review the entire evidence and can come to its own
conclusion. For ready reference, the relevant paragraph of the said
judgment is being quoted as under: "It is no doubt true that the High Court was exercising power as the
first appellate court and hence it was open to the Court to enter into not
only questions of law but questions of fact as well. It is settled law that
an appeal is a continuation of suit. An appeal thus is a rehearing of the
main matter and the appellate court can reappraise, reappreciate and
review the entire evidence--oral as well as documentary--and can come
to its own conclusion."
15.
Further, it needs to refer herein that under section 3 of the Indian
Evidence Act a fact is said to be proved when the Court either believes it
to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man under the
circumstances would proceed on the supposition that such fact really
exists. Therefore, the normal rule of preponderance of probability is the
rule which governs the civil proceedings like this.
16.
The expression "preponderance of probability" is not capable of
exact definition nor can there be any strait-jacket formula or a weighing
machine to find out which side the balance is tilted. The preponderance of
probability would imply a positive element about possibility of existence
of a fact. This means a higher degree of probability of happening of
something and existence of a fact.
17.
In "A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur" (2005) 2 SCC 22 the
Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that the concept, a proof beyond the
shadow of doubt, is to be applied to criminal trials and not to civil matters
and certainly not to matters of such delicate personal relationship as those
of husband and wife.
18.
Since this Court is exercising the power of appeal as referred
hereinabove and as per the settled position of law which require the
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consideration of the appellate Court is that the order/judgment passed by
the appropriate Forum, if suffers from perversity, the same is to be taken
as a ground for its reversal.
19.
It needs to refer herein that the interpretation of the word
"perverse" as has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex Court which
means that there is no evidence or erroneous consideration of the evidence.
The Hon'ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Anr. vs. State [Represented by
the Public Prosecutor] and Anr., (2009) 10 SCC 206 while elaborately
discussing the word perverse has held that it is, no doubt, true that if a
finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or
by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so
outrageously defies logic as so to suffer from the vice of irrationality
incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm
in law. Relevant paragraphs, i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27 of the said
judgment reads as under:
“24. The expression “perverse” has been dealt with in a number of
cases. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [(2001) 1 SCC 501] this Court
observed that the expression “perverse” means that the findings of the
subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on
record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural
irregularity.
25. In Parry's (Calcutta) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. [AIR
1966 Cal 31] the Court observed that “perverse finding” means a
finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether
against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE [1994
Supp (3) SCC 665 : AIR 1994 SC 1341] the Court observed that this is
not a case where it can be said that the findings of the authorities are
based on no evidence or that they are so perverse that no reasonable
person would have arrived at those findings.
26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR 1977 Kant 58] the
Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading
and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough [(1878) 1 LR 1r 331]
the Court observed that a “perverse verdict” may probably be defined
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as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether
against the evidence.
In Godfrey v. Godfrey [106 NW 814] the Court defined “perverse” as
turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away
or deviating from what is right, proper, correct, etc.
27. The expression “perverse” has been defined by various
dictionaries in the following manner:
1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English, 6th
Edn.
“Perverse.—Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way
that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable.”
2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, International
Edn.
Perverse.—Deliberately departing from what is normal and
reasonable.
3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn.
Perverse.—Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the
direction of the judge on a point of law.
4. The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English
Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edn.)
Perverse.—Purposely deviating from accepted or expected
behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant.
5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn.
“Perverse.—A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is
not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the
evidence.”
20.
From the aforesaid, it is evident that if any order made in
conscious violation of pleading and law then it will come under the
purview of perverse order. Further "perverse verdict" may probably be
defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is
altogether against the evidence.
21.
Thus, "perversity" refers to a finding or decision so unreasonable
or irrational that no reasonable person acting judicially could have reached
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it. It signifies a gross and unreasonable assessment of evidence or law by
a court.
22.
Further, Perversity is a high threshold for intervention,
distinguishing it from a mere error of fact or law. The "safest approach on
perversity is the classic approach on the reasonable man's inference on the
facts but inadequacy of evidence or a different reading of evidence is not
perversity”, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by
the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Damodar Lal v. Sohan Devi, (2016)
14 SCC 197.
23.
In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled position of law this Court
is now adverting to the impugned judgment wherefrom it is evident that
the learned Family Judge while deciding the lis has formulated altogether
four issues, for ready reference the same are being quoted hereinbelow:
(i) Is this suit maintainable in its present form?
(ii) Whether the petitioner has valid cause of action for the suit?
(iii) Whether the petitioner has been able to prove that the
respondent has withdrawn herself from the society of the petitioner
without any reasonable cause?
(iv) Whether the petitioner is entitled to get the relief as prayed for?
24.
This Court is now adverting to the impugned order/judgment by
which prayer for restitution of conjugal rights has been allowed by the
learned Family Court.
25.
The petitioner/husband (respondent herein) in support of his
case, has examined four witnesses including himself as P.W1. In addition
to that the following documentary evidences have been adduced on behalf
of the petitioner-husband:
(i)
Ext. 1-Certified copy of plaint of Cr. Misc. Case No.3943 of 2019.
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(ii)
Ext.1/1-Certified copy of order sheet dated 02.12.2019 of Cr. Misc.
Case No.3943 of 2019.
(iii)
Marked X- Photo copy of application dated 27.11.2019 given to
Officer-in-charge, Sector-I City P.S, B.S. City, and
(iv)
Marked X/1- Xerox copy of medical certificate of S.P Kachhap
dated 12.09.2021 issued by BGH.
26.
On the other hand, the appellant-wife has examined three
witnesses including herself as RW1 in support of her contention. She has
also adduced the following documentary evidence:
(i)
Marked Y-Three sheet computer generated credit card statement of
HDFC Bank.
27.
The learned Family Judge has taken into consideration the issue
nos. (iii) & (iv) as the main issues, i.e., Whether the petitioner/husband
has been able to prove that the respondent/wife has withdrawn herself
from the society of the petitioner without any reasonable cause and
whether the petitioner is entitled to get the relief as prayed for as these are
the crux of the litigation.
28.
Thereafter, the learned Family Judge has considered the evidence
adduced on behalf of the parties for deciding the issues involved in
Original Suit No.546 of 2019.
29.
This Court in order to appreciate the aforesaid rival submission
before entering into the legality and propriety of the impugned judgment
needs to discuss herein the relevant part of the evidences adduced on
behalf of the appellant-wife and the respondent-husband wherein the
learned Family Judge had arrived at a conclusion to pass the decree for
restitution of conjugal rights.
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30.
During the trial, the respondent-husband himself has been
examined as PW1 before learned Family Court. PW-1 has stated that his
marriage with the respondent was solemnized on 28.12.2018 as per
Christian rites and custom at Bokaro. He has further stated that out of their
wedlock, one female baby child was born on 03.12.2019, who is presently
living with the respondent. After marriage, they lived together peacefully
for 2-3 months as husband and wife. Thereafter, the respondent started
quarrelling with him by saying that she does not want to live with him,
rather she wants to live at her parents’ home. PW1 has stated that without
informing him, the respondent used to go to her parents’ home. PW1 has
further stated that even mother of the respondent always used to come to
his house and took the respondent with her without his consent or the
consent of his parents. He has stated that on 29.08.2019 his father was
admitted in BGH and on 31.08.2019 without informing them, his wife
(respondent) went to her parents’ home. At that time, she was pregnant
for five months.
PW-1 has further stated that on 03.09.2019, he along with his
mother, namely, Renuka Kachhap and sister, namely, Filomina Kachhap
went to his in-laws’ house, where the respondent and her family members
abused them and even, she was not ready to return to her matrimonial
home. The father of the respondent said that they would arrange second
marriage of the respondent with another person. On several occasions, he
tried to bring her back but all went in vain. Even she denied to talk with
him and kept her mobile phone switched off. He has further stated that
during pregnancy of his wife (respondent), he used to take her to Sidhi
Maternity Clinic, Sector-IV, Bokaro. He has stated that on 27.11.2019, he
gave a written complaint to Mahila P.S., Bokaro, where Police tried to
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reconcile the matter, but the respondent did not appear, rather her parents
appeared and denied to send the respondent to her matrimonial home. He
has also given an information vide petition No. 3943 of 2019 on
02.12.2019 before learned C.J.M., Bokaro. He has stated that he is ready
to keep his wife with him and due to that reason, he has filed the suit for
restitution of conjugal rights. There is no case pending between them,
apart from this case.
During his cross-examination, he denied that he used to abuse
parents of the respondent or used to assault the respondent. He has stated
that at the time of marriage, he was working in a private company on
contract but at present he is unemployed. He denied the suggestion that in
lieu of demand of dowry, he had subjected the respondent with cruelty
and torture and in August 2019, he left her to her parents’ home. He also
denied that he used to threaten the respondent and her parents over phone.
He has admitted that after delivery of baby girl, his wife has filed a
criminal case against him and his family members for mental torture. He
has further denied the suggestion that the respondent does not want to live
with him as he used to torture her.
31.
PW-2 Simon Peter Kachhap is the father of the petitioner. PW2
has stated the same facts as stated by PW-1 (Petitioner) in his
examination-in-chief filed on oath. PW2 has stated that nothing was given
at the time of marriage by the parents of the respondent. He has denied
that when the respondent was pregnant, the petitioner has left her to her
parents’ home. He has admitted that he is one of the accused in a case
filed u/s 498A IPC by his daughter-in-law (respondent) after birth of baby
child. He denied the case of the respondent.
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32.
PW-3 Renuka Kachhap is the mother of the petitioner. She has
stated the same facts as stated by PWs 1 and 2 in their respective
examination-in-chief filed on oath. PW3 has stated that the respondent has
not filed any case against them. She has stated that when the respondent
was pregnant of five months, she has left her matrimonial home. She has
denied that to screen themselves from criminal case threatened to be filed
by the respondent, her son (Petitioner) has filed this case.
33.
PW-4 Tuhin Shekhar knows both the parties. PW4 has also stated
the same facts as stated by PWs 1, 2 and 3 in their respective examinationin-chief filed on oath. PW4 has stated that he has attended marriage
ceremony of the parties.
During his cross-examination, PW4 has stated that he does not
know whether this case was filed after or before birth of baby child of the
parties.
He has admitted that he along with the petitioner went in
September 2019 to the house of the respondent for her bidai. He has stated
that he studied with the petitioner (respondent herein) in Pentacostal
Assembly School. At present, the petitioner is unemployed. He denied the
suggestion that the petitioner used to torture the respondent for dowry
demand. He has denied that he was not aware that Stuti (appellant herein)
had told Johnson (respondent herein) that they would file a case regarding
the torture inflicted by them after the delivery.
34.
Per contra, the respondent while examining herself as RW 1 has
stated that her marriage was solemnized with the petitioner (respondent
herein) on 28.12.2018 as per Christian rites and custom and at the time of
marriage, her parents had given gold jewelleries worth Rs.15,00,000/-.
RW1 has further stated that their engagement ceremony was held on
03.06.2018. Even at that time, her parents had given gold jewelleries and
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a diamond right was gifted to the petitioner. She has stated that just after
2-3 days of marriage, her husband and father-in-law started teasing her for
dowry. When she was pregnant, her husband and father-in-law were
demanding Rs.10,00,000/- for starting a school in Purulia. As she cannot
fulfill the said demand, her husband had left her in her parents’ home on
31.08.2019. She has stated that she told to her husband that after delivery
of baby, she will made a complaint against him. On 03.12.2010, she gave
birth to a female child. She has stated that her husband used to threaten her
on phone and her father-in-law demanded Rs.10 lakh from her parents over
phone. On 02.12.2019, her husband has filed this case to screen himself
from any criminal case, which would be filed against them by her. RW1
has stated that she had filed a complaint case against the petitioner in which
he was granted bail by Hon’ble High Court and thereafter he used to
threaten her and her parents over phone. RW1 stated that due to the cruel
acts of the petitioner and his parents, she apprehends danger to her life at
their hands.
During her cross examination, RW1 has stated that she could not
produce any document in the Court in support of her claim that gift worth
Rs.15,00,000/- were given by her parents to the petitioner and his family
members. She could not recall whether she has filed any document in
support of giving gold jewelleries to the petitioner by them. Neither she
could recall about job of her father-in-law nor she can say about living
standard of her in- laws. She has stated that she stayed in her matrimonial
home for about 08 months. She has admitted that at the time of her
pregnancy, her treatment was going on when she was staying in her
matrimonial home but she could not remember the name of the doctor who
treated her. She has admitted that she is well educated and she has
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completed her graduation. She has stated that lastly, she returned to her
parents’ home on 31.08.2019. She cannot recall whether her father-in-law
was admitted in BGH on 29.08.2019 and on 31.08.2019. She has admitted
that they have not paid Rs. 10,00,000/- as demanded by her husband and
father-in-law for running a school. She has stated that she is having no
knowledge whether her father-in-law is running a School at Purulia. She
has filed a petition for cancellation of bail of her husband, which was
disposed of by the Hon'ble High Court. She has denied the suggestion that
she came to her parents’ house on 31.08.2019 when her father-in-law was
admitted in B.G.H and her husband and in-laws were there to look after
him. She has denied the suggestion that from 31.08.2019 till date of
evidence, her husband tried his level best to keep her with him but she does
not want to live with him.
35.
RW-2 Sandeep Stephen Lal is the father of the respondent/wife
(appellant herein). RW2 has stated the same facts as stated by RW-1 in
her examination-in-chief filed on oath and further states that at the time
of engagement of the parties, there were about 100 guests. At the time of
marriage, he was informed that the petitioner is an Engineer and working
in a private company. He has stated that once the petitioner had pressed
neck of the respondent. RW2 has stated that on 03.12.2019 her daughter
(the appellant herein) gave birth to a female child and all the expenses for
their maintenance were incurred by him. He has stated that the petitioner
has demanded Rs.10 lakhs from him and his sister-in-law over phone.
RW2 has stated that her daughter apprehends danger to her life as well
life of her female child at the hands of the petitioner.
During his cross-examination, RW2 has stated that he could not say
in detail what was purchased from jewellery shop and cloth shop. He
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cannot file any document in support of gold jewelleries given by them to
the petitioner. They have not filed any case regarding demand of
Rs.10,00,000/-. His Samdhi retired from the post of General Manager,
perhaps in the year 2019-20. He does not know that his Samdhi is having
a School in Purulia. He has denied that he had given Rs.10 lakhs to the
father of the petitioner for opening a school. He has stated that he has no
objection, if his daughter wants to return to her in-law’s house. He has
stated that there is no criminal case filed against the petitioner and his
father earlier to this case. He denied the suggestion that when his Samdhi
was admitted in BGH, his wife (mother of the respondent) brought her
back to their house. He has denied the suggestion that during pregnancy
of his daughter, her inlaws had cared her and treated her regularly. He has
denied the suggestion that the petitioner wants to keep her daughter with
him but they have not wanted to do so.
36.
RW-3 Shrila Lal is the mother of the respondent. RW3 has stated
the same facts as stated by RWs' 1 and 2 in their respective examinationin-chief filed on oath. RW3 has stated that she is Principal of D.Y. Patil
International School. At the time of marriage, father of the petitioner was
General Manager in BSL. Gold and silver jewelleries worth
Rs.15,00,000/- were given but she has not filed any document in support
of the claim. She has speculated that price of gold and silver jewelleries
is Rs.15,00,000/-. She has not filed any document in support of her claim
that they had given Diamond Ring at the time of engagement to the
petitioner.
During her cross-examination, RW3 has denied the suggestion that
she does not know whether Holy Christ School belongs to father of the
petitioner is running in Purulia or not. She has admitted that she went to
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her daughter's matrimonial home in August 2019, when the respondent
was carrying her five months pregnancy. She was informed by her
daughter that she is going for regular medical checkup. Her son-in-law
(petitioner) never visited to see the respondent or female child. She has
admitted that on 27.11.2019 the petitioner had filed a petition before
Mahila P.S., Bokaro whereafter she and her husband went to Mahila P.S.
but she cannot say whether petition filed by her daughter under the
provision of Dowry Prohibition Act was dismissed or not. She has
admitted that after getting permission from the Hon’ble High Court, the
petitioner (respondent herein) once visited her house to meet his wife and
female child. She has denied the suggestion that the petitioner wants to
keep his wife and daughter with all dignity. She has denied the suggestion
that the petitioner ever visited to her house with his mother and sister but
she did not open the door of the house and they never wanted to send the
respondent back to her matrimonial home. She has denied the suggestion
that on 31.08.2019 when the father of the petitioner was admitted at BGH
and the petitioner and his family members were there to look after him, in
absence of them the respondent came to her maike.
37.
Thus, from the aforesaid factual aspect it is evident that the
marriage between the appellant-wife and the respondent-husband was
solemnized on 28.12.2018 according to Christian rites. Out of the
wedlock, a female child was born on 03.12.2019.
38.
The appellant-wife alleged that soon after marriage she was
subjected to mental torture and harassment for dowry demand. When she
was five months pregnant, she was compelled to leave her matrimonial
home. She lodged complaints under Section 498A IPC, and also reported
threats and abuse through electronic communication.
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39.
The respondent-husband, on the other hand, instituted the suit for
restitution of conjugal rights, asserting that the appellant had withdrawn
from his society without reasonable cause.
40.
The learned Family Judge framed four issues, the core being
whether the appellant-wife had withdrawn from the society of the
respondent-husband without reasonable cause, and whether the
respondent was entitled to restitution of conjugal rights.
41.
Upon appreciation of evidence, the Family Court decreed
restitution in favour of the husband, holding that no evidence regarding
the alleged dowry demands by the petitioner/husband were proved by the
respondent/appellant/wife.
42.
Against the aforesaid finding of the learned Family Court, the
instant appeal has been preferred by the respondent/appellant-wife, inter
alia, on the ground that the learned Family Court failed to properly
appreciate the evidence relating to the mental torture allegedly inflicted
upon the appellant on account of the unlawful demand for dowry made by
the respondent-husband and his father. It has further been urged that the
appellant was compelled to leave her matrimonial home during pregnancy
owing to the harassment and cruelty meted out to her. It is also the case of
the appellant that the suit was instituted only in anticipation by the
respondent husband solely with a view to shielding himself from the future
criminal prosecution initiated by her under Section 498-A of the Indian
Penal Code. Further ground has been taken about subsequent conduct of
the husband, including solemnization of his second marriage, which
demonstrates absence of his bona fide intention to resume conjugal life.
43.
Per contra, the respondent-husband has contended that the
appellant-wife had withdrawn from his society without any reasonable
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cause and that no demand for dowry was ever made by him. It has,
therefore, been submitted that, upon consideration of the aforesaid facts
and circumstances, the learned Family Court rightly adjudicated the lis
and passed a decree for restitution of conjugal rights against the appellantwife.
44.
In the backdrop of the aforesaid factual aspects, the following
issues arise for consideration by this Court in the instant appeal:
(i) Whether the appellant-wife withdrew from the society of the
respondent-husband without reasonable cause.
(ii) Whether the decree of restitution of conjugal rights was justified
in law and on facts.
(iii) Whether the impugned judgment suffers from perversity
warranting interference.
45.
Since all the aforesaid issues are intrinsically interconnected and
interrelated, they are being taken up together for adjudication.
46.
At this juncture, it would be apt to discuss herein the object and
scope of decree of restitution. The object of restitution decree was to bring
about cohabitation between the estranged parties so that they could live
together in the matrimonial home in amity. The leading idea of Section 32
of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 was to preserve the marriage. For ready
reference, Section 32 of the Act 1869 is being referred as under:
32. Petition for restitution of conjugal rights.—
When either the husband or the wife has, without reasonable excuse,
withdrawn from the society of the other, either wife, or husband may
apply, by petition to the District Court for restitution of conjugal rights,
and the Court, on being satisfied of the truth of the statements made in
such petition, and that there is no legal ground why the application
should not be granted, may decree restitution of conjugal rights
accordingly.
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47.
From perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is evident that if either
the husband or the wife has, without reasonable excuse, withdrawn from
the society of the other, the aggrieved party may apply, before the court
concerned, for restitution of conjugal rights and the court, on being
satisfied of the truth of the statements made in such petition and further
taking into consideration the legal ground that why the application should
not be granted, may decree restitution of conjugal rights accordingly.
48.
It needs to refer herein that conjugal rights may be viewed in its
proper perspective by keeping in mind the dictionary meaning of the
expression "Conjugal" wherein the meaning of 'Conjugal' as "of or
pertaining to marriage or to husband and wife in their relations to each
other" is given (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd Edn. Vol. I page
371).
49.
In the Dictionary of English Law, 1959 Edn. at page 453, Earl
Jowitt defines 'conjugal rights' thus:
"The right which husband and wife have to each other's society and
marital intercourse. The suit for restitution of conjugal rights is a
matrimonial suit, cognizable in the Divorce Court, which is brought
whenever either the husband or the wife lives separate from the other
without any sufficient reason, in which case the court will decree
restitution of conjugal rights (Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950, s. 15), but
will not enforce it by attachment, substituting however for attachment,
if the wife be the petitioner, an order for periodical payments by the
husband to the wife (s.22). Conjugal rights cannot be enforced by the
act of either party, and a husband cannot seize and detain his wife by
force (R.V. Jackson [1891] 1 Q.B. 671)".
50.
In India it may be borne in mind that conjugal rights, i.e., right
of the husband or the wife to the society of the other spouse is not merely
creature of the statute. Such a right is inherent in the very institution of
marriage itself. Thus, the restitution of conjugal rights is often regarded
as a matrimonial remedy. The remedy of restitution of conjugal rights is
2026:JHHC:28669-DB
a positive remedy that requires both parties to the marriage to live together
and cohabit. Thus, the requirements of the provision of restitution of
conjugal rights are the following:
(i)
The withdrawal by the respondent from the society of the petitioner.
(ii)
The withdrawal is without any reasonable cause or excuse or lawful
ground.
(iii)
There should be no other legal ground for refusal of the relief.
(iv)
The court should be satisfied about the truth of the statement made
in the petition.
51.
Thus, the Court will grant a decree for restitution of conjugal
rights when one spouse has withdrawn from the other's society without
reasonable excuse. This means if a husband or wife leaves the marital
home or refuses to live with their spouse without a justifiable reason, the
other spouse can petition the court for this remedy. The Court, if satisfied
with the truth of the petition and finding no legal barrier, may order the
withdrawing spouse to return and resume cohabitation.
52.
In the backdrop of the settled position, this Court is now
re-adverting to the factual aspect of the instant case wherefrom it is
evident from the testimony and evidence available on record that the
respondent husband had alleged that the appellant/wife has withdrawn
herself from the marital obligation without any reasonable excuse.
53.
In contrary to the aforesaid, R.W.-1 is the respondent (appellant
herein) herself deposed in her examination-in-chief that just after 2-3 days
of marriage, her husband and father-in-law started teasing her for dowry.
When she was pregnant, her husband and father-in-law were demanding
Rs.10,00,000/- for starting a school in Purulia. As she cannot fulfill the
said demand, her husband had left her in her parents’ home on
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31.08.2019. She has stated that she told to her husband that after delivery
of baby, she will made a complaint against him. On 03.12.2019 she gave
birth to a female child. She has stated that her husband used to threaten
her on phone and her father-in-law demanded Rs.10 lakh from her parents
over phone. On 02.12.2019, her husband (respondent herein) has filed the
case in anticipation to screen himself from any criminal case, which would
be filed against them by this witness.
She has denied the suggestion that she came to her parents’ house
on 31.08.2019 when her father-in-law was admitted in B.G.H and her
husband and in-laws were there to look after him. She has denied the
suggestion that from 31.08.2019 till date of evidence, her husband tried
his level best to keep her with him but she does not want to live with him.
54.
The aforesaid testimony of R.W.1 has fully been substantiated
by the statement of RW.2, i.e., father of the appellant wherein he has
stated that once the petitioner had pressed neck of the respondent and on
03.12.2019 her daughter (the appellant herein) gave birth to a female child
and all the expenses for their maintenance were incurred by him. This
witness has categorically substantiated the fact that the petitioner/
husband has demanded Rs.10 lakhs from him and his sister-in-law over
phone. Further he denied the suggestion that when his Samdhi was
admitted in BGH, his wife (mother of the respondent) brought her back to
their house.
55.
From the evidence of RW-1 (the appellant-wife) and RW-2 (her
father), a consistent and credible narrative emerges. The appellant-wife
was subjected to harassment and repeated demands of Rs.10,00,000/- by
her husband and father-in-law, even during her pregnancy. She was
abandoned at her parental home on 31.08.2019 and thereafter threatened
2026:JHHC:28669-DB
over phone calls. Her testimony that the restitution suit was filed merely
to shield the husband from impending criminal proceedings is
corroborated by her father, who further confirmed physical assault and the
dowry demand.
56.
Further, P.W.2 father of the petitioner/husband has admitted that
he is one of the accused in a case filed u/s 498A IPC by his daughter-inlaw (respondent) after birth of baby child. Thus, filing of the case by the
appellant under Section 498-A has already been admitted. Further during
pendency of the instant appeal by way of filing supplementary affidavit
the appellant has put forth the factum of solemnization of second marriage
by the respondent/husband with another lady and from said wedlock one
male child is born. It needs to refer herein that in rebuttal of the aforesaid
factual aspect no affidavit has been filed by the respondent/ husband.
57.
Taken together, these depositions it appears that the
appellant-wife’s withdrawal from the matrimonial home was not
voluntary but compelled by cruelty, mental torture and unlawful dowry
demands. The evidence demonstrates that she had reasonable cause to live
apart, and the husband’s suit for restitution of conjugal rights lacks the
genuine intent to resume conjugal life.
58.
Now this Court is adverting to impugned judgment in order to
find out that ‘whether the impugned judgment is suffering from the
element of perversity or not’.
59.
From the impugned judgment, it appears that the learned Family
Court has not properly considered the entire aspect, rather the reliance has
been placed upon the selective part of the deposition of witnesses and has
picked the part of deposition in isolation and accordingly the learned
2026:JHHC:28669-DB
Family Court had passed the order of restitution of the conjugal rights in
favour of the respondent-husband.
60.
At this juncture, it needs to refer herein that a husband can file a
petition for restitution of conjugal rights if his wife has withdrawn from
his society without reasonable excuse, seeking a court order for her to
resume living with him. The court may grant the decree if it is satisfied
the petition's claims are true and there is no legal ground to refuse it. This
remedy serves as a way for the aggrieved spouse to seek the restoration of
the right to cohabit with the other spouse.
61.
But, in the instant case, it is apparent from the impugned
judgment that the learned Family Court has not given proper finding on
the issue that whether the appellant wife has withdrawn from society of
the respondent husband without reasonable excuse or she was compelled
to withdrawn from the society of the husband, rather, the learned Family
Court has placed its reliance on the part of the deposition of PW.1 in
isolation, which is contrary to settled position of law that evidence should
be taken as whole and not in piecemeal.
62.
There is no dispute that section 32 of the Act entitles a spouse to
restitution of conjugal rights if the other spouse without reasonable cause
withdraws from his or her society but where conduct of a spouse falls
short of cruelty or any other matrimonial offence but it is harsh and
unbearable, it may justify a spouse in leaving the other. Further apart from
the question of physical cruelty, torture or assault by any member of the
family if the circumstances are such that it is not possible for the wife to
live as a wife with self-respect and dignity in the house of the husband.
Indeed, she is entitled to separate maintenance and residence
2026:JHHC:28669-DB
63.
Thus, it appears from the materials on record and, more
particularly, the case put up by the appellant-wife before this Court that
she was being compelled to leave her matrimonial house. It is evident
from oral evidences that this is not a case in which it could be said that
the appellant wife left her matrimonial home on her own will and without
any compulsion. It is more than clear having regard to the evidence on
record that the wife was not comfortable at her matrimonial home on
account of various instances of mental torture and dowry demand. If on
account of all such problems, one fine day if she decided to walk out of
her matrimonial home, could it be said that the husband straightway is
entitled to have a decree for restitution of conjugal rights.
64.
Thus, the requirement under the law in the case of adjudication
of the issue is that the adjudication is to be based upon the consideration
of the evidence and, particularly, in the case of restitution of conjugal
rights, it is primary duty of the learned Family Judge to look into the
evidence of the spouse as to whether she or he intends to live with the
partners or not, peacefully and with all dignity. If one of the spouses utters
that she or he cannot live together due to the reason as stated by the spouse
in his/her evidence, the Court cannot compel such party to live together
compromising with the dignity and subjected to mental torture.
65.
In the present case, it is manifest that the learned Family Court
failed to undertake a holistic appraisal of the evidence adduced by the
appellant-wife. The testimony of RW-1, the appellant corroborated by
RW-2, clearly establishes repeated demands of dowry ₹10,00,000, acts of
mental torture and abandonment of appellant during pregnancy. These
depositions demonstrate that the appellant-wife had reasonable cause to
withdraw from the society of the respondent-husband. By disregarding
2026:JHHC:28669-DB
these material aspects and focusing narrowly on the husband’s assertions,
the Family Court overlooked these vital aspects. Further, the Family Court
erred in discarding this evidence merely on the ground of absence of
documentary proof of dowry articles. In matrimonial disputes, direct oral
testimony of the victim carries substantial evidentiary weight, particularly
when corroborated by family members.
66.
Further, the appellant wife cannot, therefore, be compelled to
resume matrimonial life with the respondent/husband, in the face of such
mental torture and demand of dowry. Moreover, herein the couple have
been living separately since 2019 and, thereafter, restitution would not be
justified or feasible. Further, as referred and discussed hereinabove, the
severe allegation has been alleged by the appellant/wife against the
respondent/husband.
67.
Thus, upon careful consideration of the pleadings, testimonies,
and documentary evidence, this Court finds that the decree of restitution
of conjugal rights was passed without due deliberation of the factual
matrix and without fair evaluation of the allegations of mental torture and
dowry demand. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the appellant-wife had sufficient and reasonable
cause to withdraw from the society of the respondent-husband. The decree
of restitution of conjugal rights passed by the Family Court suffers from
perversity and illegality.
68.
Thus, from the perusal of the impugned order, it is evident that
the learned Family Judge while allowing the appeal in favour of the
husband/petitioner (respondent herein) has not appreciated properly the
factual aspect as well as settled proposition of law related to the restitution
of conjugal right and further without applying the test of reasonableness,
2026:JHHC:28669-DB
has passed the order of restitution of conjugal rights, the impugned
judgment, therefore, suffers from perversity and non-consideration of
vital evidence, and necessarily warrants interference by this Court.
69.
The upshot of the whole discussion, therefore, is that this appeal
succeeds and the impugned judgment dated 14.09.2022 and the decree
signed on 21.09.2022 passed in Original Suit No.546 of 2019 by the
learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Bokaro are, hereby, quashed and
set aside.
70.
Pending Interlocutory Application, if any, stands disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
I Agree.
(Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.)
(Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.)
Sudhir
Dated:23/09/2026
Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi
AFR
Uploaded on 24/09/2026.
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