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Serial No.01
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
MC (WA) No.2/2023 in
WA No.26/2023
Heard on: 22.08.2023
Date of Judgment: 23.08.2023
State of Meghalaya
Vs.
Brightstarwell Marbaniang & ors
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjib Banerjee, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Applicant/Appellant :
For the Respondents
:
Mr. A. Kumar, Advocate-General with
Mr. A.S. Pandey, GA
Ms. S. Ain, GA
Ms. S. Laloo, GA
Ms. A. Thungwa, GA
Ms. S. Shyam, GA
Mr. H.R. Nath, Adv with
Ms. B. Sun, Adv
Ms. P. Marak, Adv
i)
Whether approved for
reporting in Law journals etc.:
Yes
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
JUDGMENT
Hon’ble, the Chief Justice:
In view of the good grounds shown, the delay of about 25 days
in preferring the appeal is condoned and the appeal is taken up for
immediate consideration.
2.
The issue in this appeal pertains to an amendment effected by
the State government to the set of executive guidelines that it has issued
to educational institutions to which it grants financial aid.
3.
At the outset, it must be appreciated that even though the
guidelines are in the form of a set of rules and have been amended by a
formal publication in the official gazette on April 8, 2021, the
guidelines are not issued under any specific law and, as such, such
guidelines may not have any statutory force. Yet the guidelines are
effective; in the sense that an educational institution seeking grant-inaid may not avail of such facility if it does not conform to the
guidelines; or, any infraction of its part to adhere to the guidelines may
entail the government stopping the grant-in-aid.
4.
By a notification of March 23, 2021, Rules 6 and 7 of the
original Rules regarding the conduct and discipline of employees of
aided educational institutions in the State were somewhat tweaked.
5.
Prior to the issuance of such publication, Rules 6 and 7 provided
as follows:
“6. No employee shall offer himself as a candidate for election
to a Legislative Body or for holding office of any political
organisation except in accordance with provisions of Rule 7:
Provided that an employee may seek election as an independent
candidate of a panchayat with the previous approval of the
managing committee as the case may be but he shall not be
entitled to accept any office there under except in accordance
with the provision of Rule 7.
“7. Any employee desiring to seek election to Legislative Body
or to hold office of any Political Organisation or Local Bodies
shall be on compulsory leave without pay from the date of filing
his nomination till the announcement of the result by the proper
authority and shall be eligible to rejoin his post immediately. In
case he is elected, he shall be on compulsory leave without pay
from the date of filing his nomination till the termination of his
office to which he is elected. Such elected employee shall be
allowed to retain a lien on his post for a period not exceeding the
full term of the elected body to which the employee is so
elected. In the event of such employee joining the post against
which he had a lien the interim period of absence on compulsory
leave will count for notional increment benefits of pay from the
date of such re-joining.”
6.
By the notification of March 23, 2021, Rule 7 was completely
omitted, the proviso to Rule 6 was also omitted and the words “except
in accordance with provisions of Rule 7” appearing at the end of the
substantive part of Rule 6 were done away with. Thus, modified Rule 6
of the said Rules, after the notification of March 23, 2021, provided as
follows:
“6. No employee shall offer himself as a candidate for election
to a Legislative Body or for holding office of any political
organisation.”
7.
Several assistant professors in government-aided colleges in the
State challenged the amendment on the ground that they had been willynilly disallowed from holding office in any political organisation or
offering their candidature in any election to a public body. The writ
court perceived the prayer before it to be for restoration of the old
provisions so as to allow the writ petitioners to engage in political
activities and contest in elections to legislative and public bodies as well
as to posts in political organisations. The writ petition was allowed but
the discussion in the impugned judgment of December 5, 2022 revolves
around the concept of “office of profit” which is found in Articles
102(1) and 191(1) of the Constitution. The essence of the judgment is
captured in the following paragraph:
“20. Therefore as per the discussions made hereinabove and
taking into account the settled legal position, the petitioners in
the considered view of this Court, are not found to hold an
Office of Profit, and if, they satisfy the other conditions as laid
down in Articles 102(1) and 191(1), cannot be debarred by the
rules as amended from contesting in elections or holding
political office. Further the contention that the government
exercises deep and pervasive control over the services of the
petitioners and the institutions has not been borne out by the
materials on record.”
8.
The State is in appeal. As to the impugned judgment, the State
asserts that the entire discussion therein is not germane to the legal issue
that presented itself. According to the State, the challenge in the writ
petition was to the amendment and not to the original provisions as they
stood. Indeed, the State points out that the writ court itself perceived the
writ petitioners’ prayer to be for the restoration of the provisions to how
they stood prior to the notification of March 23, 2021.
9.
On the contrary, the appellant contends that what ought to have
been considered by the writ court was whether the government had the
authority to regulate the conduct of teachers in government-aided
private colleges and the writ court completely failed to recognise such
aspect of the matter or the effect of the impugned amendment.
10.
Apart from the State’s authority to regulate the conduct of
teachers in government-aided private colleges, the State also submits
that if it had the authority to make the rules in the first place it must be
deemed to have due authority to amend the same. On this aspect, the
State emphasises that even though it is not required to justify the matter
of policy behind the amendment, the whole purpose was to insulate
government-aided private colleges from political activities so that
teachers could concentrate on imparting education and not indulge in
politics.
11.
A further ground that is canvassed by the State is that Article
226 of the Constitution could not have been invoked in such a situation
as the matter related to an arrangement between the government on the
one hand and institutions to which it granted aid for promoting
education on the other. Finally, it is the State’s contention that no
disqualification to contest in any election to a legislative or public body
or disqualification to indulge in political activities has been imposed by
the impugned amendment. The State says that a teacher in an aided
private college not finding the arrangement between the college and the
government best fitted for such teacher was free to leave the post for the
undesirable condition not to be applicable to such teacher. The
submission in such regard appears to be that the condition imposed by
the amendment applies to the post and not to the person and, to such
extent, the State is well within its rights to impose conditions as to the
circumstances in which it would grant aid to a private college.
12.
In support of the State’s principal limb of contention to the
effect that it has complete authority to regulate the conduct of teachers
in private institutions to which it would grant aid, the appellant relies on
a judgment reported at (1965) 1 SCR 890 (State of Assam v. Ajit Kumar
Sarma). In such case, Rule 7 of the similar rules in the then undivided
Assam fell for consideration and such rule was similar to Rule 7 of the
Meghalaya Rules except as to the date of rejoining. In the Assam Rules
of 1961, the relevant provision provided that even if a teacher filed his
nomination and lost, whether in any election or for any office of any
political party, he “shall be on compulsory leave without pay from the
date of the filing of his nomination till the end of the next academic
session …” In original Rule 7 of the Meghalaya Rules, the relevant
condition was “shall be on compulsory leave without pay from the date
of filing his nomination till the announcement of the result by the proper
authority and shall be eligible to rejoin his post immediately.” Thus, in
the old Assam Rules despite a teacher in a government-aided college
losing the election, whether to a legislative or public body or to the
office of any political organisation, he had to wait till the next academic
session before he could rejoin. In the Meghalaya Rules prior to the
March 23, 2021 notification, such teacher could join immediately upon
losing the election. The judgment in Ajit Kumar Sarma turned on such
aspect of the matter. The relevant teacher lost the election and sought to
immediately rejoin his post which the governing body of the relevant
private college permitted. However, the resolution passed by the
governing body of the private college was forwarded to the State
government for its approval. The State government responded by
indicating that the relevant teacher and others of his ilk could not be
permitted to rejoin “immediately” and had to wait till the end of the
academic session to rejoin their posts.
13.
Upon the governing body of the aided private college informing
the teacher accordingly, such teacher assailed the government decision
by instituting proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution before
the Gauhati High Court which issued a writ against the State. The
Supreme Court found that the State government had acted in terms of
the relevant rules and also held that the rules for the purpose of granting
aid were merely executive instructions and no writ petition could have
been filed in respect thereof. However, the issue was not conclusively
answered as would be evident from paragraph 14 of the report:
“14. Then we come to the question whether a writ could have
been issued against the Governing Body of the College. We find
however that there is no appeal by the College against the order
of the High Court issuing a writ against it. In these
circumstances we do not think that we can interfere with the
order of the High Court insofar as it is against the Governing
Body of the College. At the same time we should like to make it
clear that we should not be taken to have approved of the order
of the High Court against the Governing Body of the College in
circumstances like the present and that matter may have to be
considered in a case where it properly arises.”
14.
The State next relies on a judgment reported at (1977) 4 SCC 94
(Cyril E. Fernandes v. Sr. Maria Lydia). According to the State, such
judgment relied on the dictum in Ajit Kumar Sarma.
15.
However, even though the judgment in Cyril E. Fernandes
referred to Ajit Kumar Sarma since the State in that case had not
preferred any appeal, the Supreme Court did not go into the question as
to the enforceability of the grant-in-aid code as would appear from a
passage at page 97 of the report quoted later.
16.
In Cyril E. Fernandes, the appellant was a teacher in a
government-aided private school in Goa. A student made some
allegations against the appellant which was inquired into by the
principal of the school, who was the first respondent before the
Supreme Court. After making such inquiry, the principal sought
permission from the government of the Union Territory to terminate the
services of the appellant without assigning any reasons and upon
payment of compensation due in such circumstances under the rules.
The government approved the decision and the appellant’s services
were terminated. Subsequently, the government of the Union Territory
issued a telegram to the principal to keep the proposed termination in
abeyance since the proposed termination was upon receiving a
complaint and such a scenario required an inquiry into the alleged
misconduct. The principal challenged the government’s volte face
before the court of the Judicial Commissioner, where the concerned
teacher was impleaded as a proper party. The Judicial Commissioner
held that the termination was under a valid provision and the approval
given by the government was perfectly in order and it could not be
subsequently superseded or revoked.
17.
The government of the Union Territory, which suffered the
order, did not prefer an appeal. The appeal before the Supreme Court
was by the concerned teacher. In such circumstances, after referring to a
passage from Ajit Kumar Sarma, the Supreme Court observed as
follows at page 97 of the report:
“On the authority of State of Assam v. Ajit Kumar Sharma it is
clear that the appellant is not directly concerned with the
question whether the rules in the grant-in-aid code conferred on
the management of the school an enforceable right against the
Government which is entirely a matter between the management
and the Government. The appellant who has no say in the matter
cannot challenge the finding on the point. The question as to the
enforceability of the grant-in-aid code does not thus arise in this
appeal and we express no opinion on it. The scope of the appeal
must therefore be limited to what directly concerns the appellant
in the impugned judgment…”
18.
The appellant also places a judgment of the Kerala High Court
reported at 2021 SCC OnLine Ker 1095 (Moosa v. State of Kerala). A
petition in public interest was filed before the Kerala High Court for
declaring that the teaching staff of aided schools are not entitled to
contest in the election to local bodies, including the State Legislative
Assembly and Parliament. The High Court held, at paragraph 185 of the
report, that a teacher in an aided educational institution in the State of
Kerala “in terms of the provisions of the Kerala Education Act, 1958
and the rules framed thereunder is a person holding an “office of profit”,
under the Government of the State of Kerala”. Thus, the Kerala High
Court clearly held that since teachers in government-aided schools
received their salaries wholly or substantially from the grant provided to
the relevant institution by the State, they would be holding “office of
profit” as the expression has been used in Articles 102 and 191 of the
Constitution.
19.
In a sense, the Kerala judgment is contrary to the view
expressed in the judgment impugned herein; but, as aforesaid, such
consideration may not be relevant in the present circumstances since
whether or not teachers in government-aided private colleges in the
State held or hold an “office of profit” has not been changed as a
consequence of the amendment brought about by the notification of
March 23, 2021. The effect of the amendment is to altogether disentitle
a teacher in an aided private college from offering his candidature for
election to any local or legislative body or for any office of a political
organisation.
20.
The appellant graciously points out that the Kerala judgment is
pending consideration in an appeal before the Supreme Court.
21.
On the aspect as to whether the right to vote and, consequently,
the right to offer one’s candidature for a legislative or local body is a
constitutional right or not, the State has referred to the recent
Constitution Bench judgment on the constitution of the Election
Commission reported at (2023) 6 SCC 161 (Anoop Baranwal v. Union
of India). The State has relied on the Election Commission judgment,
since a judgment reported at (2016) 2 SCC 445 (Rajbala v. State of
Haryana) was copiously placed before the Single Bench by the writ
petitioners for the proposition that the right to vote and the right to
contest the election to a legislative or local body were recognised
therein to be a constitutional right.
22.
In the Election Commission case, the Constitution Bench noticed
the observation in Rajbala that the right to vote was a constitutional
right, but the Constitution Bench did not address the issue since it found
that in a previous Constitution Bench judgment reported at (2006) 7
SCC 1 (Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India), a contrary view had been
expressed. There is no denying that in Kuldip Nayar, at paragraph 361
of the report, the petitioners interpreted the majority view in the
judgment reported at (2003) 4 SCC 399 (PUCL v. Union of India) to be
that the right to vote was a constitutional right and also a facet of
fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The
argument was repelled in Kuldip Nayar at paragraph 362 of the report:
“362. We do not agree with the above submission. It is clear
that a fine distinction was drawn between the right to vote and
the freedom of voting as a species of freedom of expression,
while reiterating the view in Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal [(1982)
1 SCC 691], that a right to elect, fundamental though it is to
democracy, is neither a fundamental right nor a common law
right, but pure and simple, a statutory right.”
23.
It may do well to deal with the final argument of the State first:
that the disqualification, so to say, attaches to the post and not to the
person and a teacher in a government-aided private college is free to
quit his post to contest in any election to a legislative or public body or
to take up any office in a political organisation.
24.
The matter touches upon the right to livelihood of a citizen.
Technically, the State is right in asserting that the concerned teacher in a
government-aided private college may resign and the condition imposed
by the executive guidelines would no longer apply to him or her. In
reality, however, a constitutional court must be conscious of how
difficult it is to get employment and, that too, in the poorly-paid
education sector. If a middle-aged career lecturer or professor has to
quit his hard-earned job to pursue his right to contest the election to a
legislative or public body or to an office of a political organisation, he
virtually signs a death warrant for himself and his dependants. For, if he
loses, there is no coming back; and, he may be too old to be eligible to
obtain a new position.
25.
It is true that the relevant condition is a part of the grant-in-aid
code that is an arrangement between the government and the private
college which obtains the grant, but the effect of such condition is so
onerous that, for all practical purposes, a teacher in a government-aided
college has hardly a choice. It is a kind of Hobson’s choice, that is to
say, no meaningful choice at all. The matter must be realistically viewed
from such perspective.
26.
While it may be perfectly justified for a State government to
ensure that the teachers in the private colleges to which it grants aid
only concentrate on their teaching activities and not indulge in any
politics in class or on the campus, the altogether barring of a person
occupying such position of a teacher from contesting any election to any
legislative or public body or office of any political organisation appears
to be far too draconian, unreasonable and unconscionable. At any rate,
no State government has any authority to disqualify a person from
contesting any election to a legislative body. It is the sole prerogative of
Parliament to do so as would be evident from Articles 102 and 191 of
the Constitution pertaining to Parliament and Legislative Assemblies,
respectively:
“102. Disqualifications for membership.– (1) A person
shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a
member of either House of Parliament–
(a)
if he holds any office of profit under the Government
of India or the Government of any State, other than
an office declared by Parliament by law not to
disqualify its holder;
(b)
if he is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a
competent court;
(c)
if he is an undischarged insolvent;
(d)
if he is not a citizen of India, or has voluntarily
acquired the citizenship of a foreign State, or is
under any acknowledgement of allegiance or
adherence to a foreign State;
(e)
if he is so disqualified by or under any law made by
Parliament.
Explanation.– For the purposes of this clause a person shall
not be deemed to hold an office of profit under the
Government of India or the Government of any State by
reason only that he is a Minister either for the Union or for
such State.
(2) A person shall be disqualified for being a member of
either House of Parliament if he is so disqualified under the
Tenth Schedule.”
“191. Disqualifications for membership.– (1) A person
shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a
member of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative
Council of a State–
(a)
if he holds any office of profit under the Government
of India or the Government of any State specified in
the First Schedule, other than an office declared by
the Legislature of the State by law not to disqualify
its holder;
(b)
if he is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a
competent court;
(c)
if he is an undischarged insolvent;
(d)
if he is not a citizen of India, or has voluntarily
acquired the citizenship of a foreign State, or is
under any acknowledgement of allegiance or
adherence to a foreign State;
(e)
if he is so disqualified by or under any law made by
Parliament.
Explanation.– For the purposes of this clause a person shall
not be deemed to hold an office of profit under the
Government of India or the Government of any State
specified in the First Schedule by reason only that he is a
Minister either for the Union or for such State.
(2) A person shall be disqualified for being a member of
the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State
if he is so disqualified under the Tenth Schedule.”
27.
As to the distinction sought to be made by the State between the
disqualification applying to a post and such disqualification not
applying to any person, it may only be said that in the constitutional
scheme of things, it is only Parliament which has the authority in such
regard. And, if the State has no authority to prescribe any ground for
disqualification under any law, it can scarcely do so by an executive
fiat. In any event, the provisions for disqualification in Articles 102 and
191 of the Constitution make no distinction between a position and a
person and the argument of the State on such count is clearly a case of
seeking to make a distinction without a difference.
28.
There is no doubt, as Ajit Kumar Sarma instructs, that even
though the grant-in-aid code may not be statutory, the State is entitled to
impose certain conditions on an educational institution to which it
grants aid. However, the issue that has arisen here was not considered in
that case. Even in Cyril E. Fernandes, the issue did not pertain to a
disqualification being attached to the post of a teacher in a governmentaided school.
29.
Though Ajit Kumar Sarma expressed some reservation as to the
invocation of the writ jurisdiction by a teacher to assail a condition in
the grant-in-aid code, more recent judicial pronouncements of the
highest court have widened the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution.
Further, in the present case, it cannot be said that the writ petitioners
were not affected by the impugned amendment or that the lack of
authority of the State or its arbitrariness or unreasonableness in
imposing conditions that affect teachers would still not entitle the
teachers to invoke the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
in such regard. At any rate, in view of the last five words of Article 226
inasmuch as it says “and for any other purpose”, it cannot be lost sight
of that as long as there is a public element to the lis carried under such
provision or a government action which is assailed, the writ court must
be seen to have the authority to entertain the complaint.
30.
The judgments in Ajit Kumar Sarma and Cyril E. Fernandes are
distinguishable on facts as the impugned government actions in those
two cases were assessed on the terms of the grant-in-aid codes that
governed them. In neither case did the Court have to consider the
disqualification of such magnitude as introduced by the notification of
March 23, 2021 which has been challenged in the present proceedings.
31.
It is needless to enter into a debate as to whether the right to
vote and, whether consequently or otherwise, the right to contest
elections to any legislative or public body is an inherent right or a
constitutional right or a mere legal right, as long as it is recognised as a
right. However, it may only be said that once the Preamble to the
Constitution declares the State to be both democratic and a republic
there is a promise held out therein that, subject to what may be
prescribed by any procedure established by law, any citizen of this
country would be entitled to both vote and contest elections to
legislative and public bodies.
32.
Though it may be banal in going into the etymology of the word
“democracy” and its Greek origin, democracy in the modern day is
popularly understood in the words of Abraham Lincoln from his
Gettysburg address of 1863 where he referred to “government of the
people, by the people, for the people”. Both the principles of “of the
people” and “by the people” encompass the wider concept of the right
to participate in the formation of government by both having a right to
vote and a right to contest in the larger sense of word that the concept of
democracy conveys. Doubtless, such rights may be curtailed; but that
must be under due authority of law.
33.
Again, as this great nation was also conceived in liberty and
dedicated to the proposition that all men and women are created equal,
the right of a State government to interdict a citizen’s right to contest
the election to any legislative or public body or office in a political party
by making a vanishing distinction between a position and a person must
be guarded against.
34.
Thus, for reasons entirely different than as indicated in the
impugned judgment, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned
notification of March 23, 2021 is set aside, restoring the position to as it
stood immediately prior thereto. The amendment introduced by the
notification is found to be in excess of the authority available to the
State government and otherwise onerous, unconscionable and
unreasonable. The impact of the amendment on the individual teachers
is so overwhelming to the extent it curtails a fundamental legal right and
the only choice available to the teacher is, effectively, to give up his
livelihood, that the distinction between the post and the person is
illusory.
35.
WA No.26 of 2023 is disposed of accordingly.
36.
MC (WA) No.2 of 2023 is disposed of.
37.
There will, however, be no order as to costs.
(Sanjib Banerjee)
Chief Justice
I agree.
(W. Diengdoh)
Judge
Meghalaya
23.08.2023
“Lam DR-PS”
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