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2025:MLHC:981-DB
Serial No. 01
Daily List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WA No. 36 of 2023
Date of order: 15.10.2025
1.
State of Meghalaya represented by the Secretary to the government
of Meghalaya, District Council Affairs Department.
2.
The Deputy Commissioner, East Khasi Hills District, Meghalaya.
3.
The Sub-divisional Officer Sohra (C) Sub Division, Sohra, East
Khasi Hills District, Meghalaya.
…Appellants
- versus -
1.
Hima Mawlong Sirdarship, Sohra Civil Sub-Division, East Khasi
Hills District, Meghalaya.
2. Shri Stephanson Laloo, son of K. Kharbamon, resident of Nongduh
Village, Sirdar of Hima Mawlong Sirdarship, Sohra,
Civil Sub-Division, East Khasi Hills District.
…Respondents.
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Soumen Sen, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Mr. Justice B. Bhattacharjee, Judge
Appearance:
For the Appellants
: Mr A. Kumar, AG with
Mr S. Sengupta, Addl Sr GA
Mr A.H. Kharwanlang, Addl Sr GA
Mrs S. Laloo, GA
For the Respondents : Mr H.L. Shangreiso, Sr Adv. with
Mr T. Dkhar, Adv.
i)
Whether approved for
reporting in Law journals etc.:
Yes/No
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
2025:MLHC:981-DB
JUDGMENT: (per the Hon’ble, the Chief Justice) (Oral)
We have heard the learned counsel for the parties extensively.
2.
The genesis of the writ petition is an order passed by the Deputy
Commissioner, East Khasi Hills District, Shillong on 28.06.2016
whereby a direction was given to the Sub-Divisional Officer to depute a
Magistrate for dismantling the toll gate at Itchamati, East Khasi Hills run
by the writ petitioner by collecting toll fees at the rate of ₹200/- per truck
of coal/limestone/boulder. The said impugned order was issued based on
a judgment passed in WP(C) No. 18 of 2016 on 03.05.2016. We have
meticulously read the order dated 03.05.2016 which formed the basis of
the impugned order dated 28.06.2016. The judgment referred to by the
authority concerned is in the matter of Sdangyoo L. Dkhar v. State of
Meghalaya1.
3.
In the said writ petition, it was alleged by the writ petitioner that
he was appointed as an agent by the Khasi Hills Autonomous District
Council (‘the KHADC’ or the ‘Council’ hereafter) for setting up and
operating the so called “KHADC’s Mineral Transport Challan Check
Point/Royalty Check”.
2016 SCC OnLine Megh 78: AIR 2017 Megh 4
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4.
The case of the petitioner in WP (C) No.18 of 2016 appears to be
that he applied under the notification dated 10.12.2015 issued by the
KHADC and upon he being found suitable he was appointed as an agent
for checking the mineral transport challan/royalty challan from all
minerals laden vehicle originating from Council’s territory for a period
of three years by the order dated 15.01.2016, as issued by the Secretary
to the Executive Committee of the KHADC and subsequently a public
notice was also issued by the Secretary for information of all the
concerned. However, despite his appointment and given a right to set up
check posts, the Deputy Commissioner, West Khasi Hills District,
Nongstoin has interfered with his work and this interference has caused
immense prejudice to the right of the writ petitioner therein to discharge
his duties as an agent of KHADC that was approved by the Secretary. The
writ petitioner has also averred that he was not collecting the royalty but
merely verifying the royalty challans from the coal laden trucks within
the territory of the KHADC and when the royalty challan is found
correct/genuine, he would simply put counter stamp/seal of the KHADC
showing that the coal laden truck concerned has duly paid the royalty to
the respondent State.
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5.
The contesting respondents in the affidavit-in-opposition
essentially has questioned the authority of KHADC to appoint and install
any such agent like the writ petitioner. According to the contesting
respondents, the order issued by the Secretary to the Executive
Committee of the KHADC dated 15.01.2016 appointing the writ
petitioner as the Council’s agent for checking of mineral transport
challan/royalty challan from all mineral laden vehicle originating from
Council’s territory and allowing him to collect the verification fee which
is confiscatory in nature was not sanctioned by the provision of the sixth
Schedule to the Constitution of India.
6.
After considering the relevant provisions as well as the
notification, the learned single judge was of the opinion that the District
Council like the KHADC has to act within the parameters of the
principles forming the basic structure of the Constitution including the
fundamental rights in Part-III of the Constitution and in respect of
prospecting and mining operation and the matters related thereto are to
be governed by the law applicable for the purpose including the Mines
and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957. It was held that
it is difficult to find a direct right with the Council to grant any licence or
lease or to prohibit the movement of excavated minerals. Moreover, it
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remains trite that any exaction of money in terms of tax or fees could only
be under the specific authority of law. It was on the basis of such finding,
the writ petition was dismissed. In an appeal preferred by Sdangyoo L.
Dkhar, an agent appointed for checking of royalty challans under the
KHADC, Shillong, the Hon’ble Division Bench affirmed the judgment
of the learned single judge. The said judgment was reported in 2016 SCC
OnLine Megh 78: AIR 2017 Megh 4. It appears from the judgment of
the Division Bench that the arguments of the appellant that KHADC can
appoint the writ petitioner as an agent in terms of Rule 12 of the Assam
(and Meghalaya) Autonomous Districts (Constitution of District
Councils) Rules, 1951 was not accepted as Rule 12 would clearly show
that the Executive Committee of the KHADC can appoint officers and
staff for the purpose of regulation and the said rule does not provide for
appointment of an agent and that too to recover the verification fees.
7.
It would thus appear from the judgments of the learned single
judge as well as the Division Bench that the writ petition was dismissed
on the ground that KHADC could not appoint an agent to set up a parallel
check post over the minerals carrying vehicles and charge verification
fees.
2025:MLHC:981-DB
8.
However, the present writ petition is on a different footing as the
writ petitioners have alleged that customary right of the writ petitioner
No.2 to collect toll fees has been infringed by the said impugned order.
In the instant case the writ petitioner No. 1 claims to be the institution of
Hima Mawlong Sirdarship consisting of seven villages and recognised as
independent Khasi State prior to the enforcement of the Constitution of
India and the writ petitioner No. 2 is the duly elected Sirdar/Chief of the
said Hima Mawlong Sirdarship under the provisions of “United Khasi
Jaintia Hills Autonomous District (Administration and Election of Sirdar
of Mawlong) Act, 1960 [in short “the Act, 1960)”. It is alleged in the writ
petition that the administration of the traditional institution of Hima
Mawlong Sirdarship has been run and managed by the elected chief and
his Durbar with the assistance of the myntris/elders as well as the
headman of seven villages exercising both executive, legislative and
judicial functions as per the decade old customary practices and social
usages bequeathed by the ancestor. After the independence of India, the
status of the Hima Mawlong Sirdarship as well as the customary practices
and social usages are well recognised and safeguarded under the Sixth
Schedule to the Constitution of India.
2025:MLHC:981-DB
9.
The writ petitioner has referred to an order passed by the Gauhati
High Court in WP(C) SH No. 18 of 2013 to contend that in terms of the
order passed therein on 19.02.2013, the law enforcing agency was
restrained from interfering with the right of the writ petitioner from
collecting the customary toll as per the age-old custom and tradition.
Moreover, the amount collected is purely for running the administration
of the institution discharging both executive and judicial function as per
the customary practices and enactment made by the Khasi Hills
Autonomous District.
10.
It is clearly discernible from the averments made in the present
writ petition that the basis of the writ petition is for enforcement of the
customary rights which the writ petitioners claim to have been enjoying
for decades and protected under the Constitution of India.
11.
We have carefully read the writ petition. In the writ petition, the
writ petitioner is seeking for recognition and enforcement of the
customary rights which according to the writ petitioner would include the
writ petitioner No.2 to establish check post and collect toll. The writ
petitioner claim to have been enjoying such right for decades and the right
to carry on such customary right is protected under the Constitution of
India. The subject-matter of challenge in Sdangyoo L. Dkhar (supra) is
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different from the issue raised in the writ petition. The judgment of
Sdangyoo L. Dkhar could not have been relied upon and referred to by
the authority concerned in directing the appointment of the Magistrate for
the purpose of regulating vehicular movement carrying minerals and also
for dismantling of the toll plaza. The issue of customary rights to set up
check post and collect toll fees was not the issue in Sdangyoo L. Dkhar
(supra). An attempt was made by the appellants before the learned single
judge to supply grounds not mentioned in the impugned order in
justification of the action taken by the appellants against the writ
petitioner. It is trite law as clearly enunciated in Mohinder Singh Gill &
anr v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & ors2 that the
validity of an impugned order has to be judged on the basis of the reasons
mentioned in the said order and it cannot be supplemented by fresh
reasons in the shape of an affidavit or otherwise. The said view was
reiterated in State of Punjab v. Bandeep Singh & ors3 that forming the
law laid down in Mohinder Singh Gill at paragraph 4 it was held “There
can be no gainsaying that every decision of an administrative or
executive nature must be a composite and self-sustaining one, in that it
(1978) 1 SCC 405
(2016) 1 SCC 724
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should contain all the reasons which prevailed on the official taking the
decision to arrive at his conclusion. It is beyond cavil that any authority
cannot be permitted to travel beyond the stand adopted and expressed by
it in the impugned action…” In view thereof, we are of the view that the
said impugned order issued by the authority based on the said judgment
as the basis for denying the right of the writ petitioners to set up check
posts and collect tolls on the basis of customary rights claimed to have
been enjoying for decades was clearly erroneous.
12.
India was described by the great Indologist Vincent Arthur Smith
as an “ethnological museum” having regard to existence of diverse
cultures and languages and existence of tribes having their cultural
identity and aspirations. It was indeed a difficult task for the Constituent
Assembly to frame a balanced constitution which were to acknowledge
and recognise the aspirations and wishes of the people of India in which
the tribes play an important role.
13.
The Constituent Assembly was aware of the special status to
tribals of the North-Eastern States as would be evident from the
Constituent Assembly debates. The Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of
India was included upon consideration of the report of the Advisory
Committee assisted by the sub-committee in providing a proper
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constitutional set up for the tribes of the Northeast. It seems that adequate
measure of self-government for the tribals to make them feel that the new
emerging nation is not going to interfere with their cultural, ethos and
traditions as empathically put forward by Nichols Roy one of the
members of the sub-committee constituted for this purpose was debated
and considered while finalizing the draft Constitution.
14.
The Sixth Schedule after much debate by the Constituent
Assembly was adopted in 1950 as would be evident from Articles 244(2)
and 275(1) of the Constitution of India. Article 244A was inserted by the
Constitution (22nd amendment) Act, 1969 which empowers the
Parliament to form an autonomous State within the State of Assam
comprising of all or any other tribal areas of Assam under the Sixth
Schedule and create a body to function as a legislature for the autonomous
State or Council of Ministers or both. The State of Meghalaya was
constituted as an autonomous State by the Assam Reorganisation
(Meghalaya) Act, 1969 enacted in exercise of powers under the said
Article. Subsequently, the State of Meghalaya was elevated to the status
of a full-fledged State by the North-Eastern Areas (Reorganisation) Act,
1971. The Sixth Schedule of the Constitution deals with the provisions as
to the administration of tribal areas in the State of Assam, Meghalaya,
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Tripura and Mizoram has undergone amendment on ten occasions. The
tribal areas under the Sixth Schedule as in 1960 consists of United Khasi
and Jaintia Hills District (Part A Entry I) and Garo Hills District (Part A
Entry II). In 1969, the State of Meghalaya was constituted as an
autonomous State within the State of Assam comprising the United
Khasi-Jaintia Hills District and the Garo Hills District by the Assam
Reorganisation (Meghalaya) Act, 1969. The tribal areas under the Sixth
Schedule as on 2022 consists of Khasi Hills District, Jaintia Hills District
and Garo Hills District under Part II of paragraph 20 of the Sixth
Schedule.
15.
The claim of the writ petitioners is based on customary rights. The
setting up of check posts and collection of tolls according to the writ
petitioners have been in existence for a considerable period of time and
prior to coming into force of the Constitution of India and by virtue of
Article 13(2), this customary right is preserved. The meaning of the word
custom appearing in Section 3 was considered by a Division Bench of the
Gauhati High Court in Ewanlangki-E Rymbai v. Jaintia Hills District
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Council4 of the Act. The Division Bench speaking through Naolakar, CJ.,
(as his Lordship then was) held thus under:
“A custom is a particular rule that has existed either actually or
presumptively from time immemorial, and has obtained the
force of law in a particular locality, although contrary to or not
consistent with the general common law of the realm. A custom
to be valid must have four essential attributes. First, it must be
immemorial; secondly, it must be reasonable; thirdly, it must
have continued without interruption since its immemorial origin;
and fourthly, it must be certain in respect of its nature generally,
as well as in respect of the locality where it is alleged to obtain
and the persons whom it is alleged to affect.”
16.
However, at this stage it is neither necessary nor desirable for us
to go into such questions as we are of the opinion that the impugned order
is not sustainable as it was on a complete misreading of the judgment in
Sdangyoo L. Dkhar (supra).
17.
The said judgment has to be read contextually. Accordingly, the
order of the learned single judge does not call for any interference.
However, we feel that it was not necessary for us in deciding the matter
as to whether the writ petitioners were able to establish a customary right
for setting up check posts and collecting tolls. In deciding the writ petition
in our view, it was not necessary to go into the question as to whether the
petitioner has any customary right to set up check post and collect toll.
2003 (3) GLT 66
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18.
In disposing of the appeal, we make it clear that we affirm the
order of the learned single judge on the limited issue that the basis of the
impugned order is erroneous and any observation as regards customary
right made by the learned single judge in favour of the writ petitioners in
setting aside the impugned order shall not operate as res judicata in any
future proceedings between the parties and the said questions are left
open and may be decided if the practice being followed in this regard by
the writ petitioners is sought to be disturbed or interfered with by the
appellants. Prima facie they have been enjoying such rights at the time
when the impugned order was issued. In the event the appellants decide
to interfere with the rights of the writ petitioners in establishing check
posts and collecting fees, reasons should be disclosed and sufficient
opportunity of hearing should be given to the writ petitioners before
taking any punitive measures.
19.
The appeal is disposed of with the aforesaid observations.
(B. Bhattacharjee)
Judge
LIZ KHARBHIH
Date: 2025.10.16 16:30:33 IST
(Soumen Sen)
Chief Justice
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