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SUSHIL SHARMA
Page |1
Date: 2023.10.30 16:48:45 +05'30'
SHAMURAILATPAM
SUSHIL SHARMA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR
AT IMPHAL
M.C. (Rev. Pet.) No.6 of 2023
Ref:- Rev. Petn. No.7 of 2023
1. The State of Manipur represented by the Secretary
(Power), Government of Manipur, P.O. & P.S. –
Imphal, Pin No. – 795001.
2. The Chief Engineer (Power), Electricity Department,
Government of Manipur, P.O. & P.S.- Imphal, Pin No.
795001.
3. The
Administrative
Officer
(Power)
Imphal,
Government of Manipur, P.O. & P.S. – Imphal, Pin No.
795001.
4. The Manipur State Power Distribution Company Ltd.
through
its
Managing
Director,
Government
of
Manipur, P.O. & P.S.- Imphal, Pin No. 795001.
5. The Manipur State Power Company Ltd., through its
Managing Director, Government of Manipur, P.O. &
P.S.- Imphal, Pin No. 795001.
6. The Chief Secretary (DP), Government of Manipur,
P.O. & P.S. – Imphal, Pin No. 795001.
… APPLICANTS
-VERSUS1.
Kabrabam Sanjoy Singh, aged about 39 years, S/O (L)
K. Kameshor Singh who is Ex-Head Lineman in the
Electricity Department, Government of Manipur of
MC(Review Pet.) No. 6 of 2023 (Ref:- Review Pet. No. 7 of 2023)
Page |2
Uripok Sorbol Thingel Kabrabam Leikai, P.O. & P.S.
Imphal, Imphal West District, Manipur.
2.
Lentinhao Kom, aged about 33 years, S/O (L) Khomjir
Kom who is Ex-JCC in the Electricity Department,
Government of Manipur of Leimakhong, Sadar Hills,
P.O.
Mantripukhri,
P.S.
Gamnom
Sapormeina,
Kangpokpi District (Now Senapati District), Manipur.
… RESPONDENTS
BEFORE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE M.V. MURALIDARAN
For the Applicants
::
Mr. S. Nepolean, GA
For the Respondents
::
.
Date of Hearing and
reserving Judgment & Order ::
13.10.2023
Date of Judgment & Order
30.10.2023
::
Mr. S. Rupachandra, Sr. Adv.
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
(CAV)
Heard
Mr.
S.
Nepolean,
learned
Government
Advocate for the applicants and Mr. S. Rupachandra, the learned
senior counsel for the respondents.
2.
This miscellaneous case has been filed by the
applicants under Section 5 of the Limitation Act read with Rule 4 of
Chapter IX of the High Court of Manipur Rules, 2019 to condone
the delay of 425 days in filing the review application.
MC(Review Pet.) No. 6 of 2023 (Ref:- Review Pet. No. 7 of 2023)
Page |3
3.
Mr. S. Nepolean, the learned Government Advocate
for the applicants submitted that soon after the receipt of the copy
of the order dated 8.12.2021 passed in the writ petition, the
Administrative Department processed the same for consideration
for appointment of the writ petitioners under the die-in-harness
scheme.
In the process, the related file was referred to the
Department of Personnel for its views.
By the note dated
14.12.2022, the Department of Personnel returned the file by
referring to the Office Memorandum dated 6.6.2007 and also
requested the Administrative Department to take necessary action
for reviewing the order dated 8.12.2021. Thereafter, the file was
processed for filing a review application against the order dated
8.12.2021 and while processing the file, a delay of 463 days
occurred.
After deducting the statutory period and the period
taken for obtaining the certified copy, there is a delay of 425 days
in filing the review application.
4.
The learned Government Advocate would submit that
the said delay is neither wilful nor wanton nor deliberate. If the
said delay is not condoned, the applicants would put to irreparable
loss and damage. Since the State is the applicants, the Court
should take a lenient view as the State represents collective cause
of the community.
Further, the applicants have a chance to
MC(Review Pet.) No. 6 of 2023 (Ref:- Review Pet. No. 7 of 2023)
Page |4
succeed in the review application.
Thus, a prayer is made to
condone the delay of 425 days in filing the review application.
5.
Refuting the submissions of the learned Government
Advocate, Mr. S. Rupachandra, the learned senior counsel for the
respondents submitted that the Department of Personnel took
more than nine months without whispering anything for reviewing
the order stating that the related Office Memorandum was
published on 9.7.2007.
In fact, there is no mention in the
miscellaneous case when the alleged publication was discovered.
The Department of Personnel is not a party to the writ and they
have never spelt out anything about it. The publication of Office
Memorandum stated by the applicants is not applicable to the
case of the respondents to the extent that the dates of applications
submitted which are to be treated invalid was mentioned as
applications submitted in between 15.6.2006 and 31.12.2006,
whereas the respondents have submitted their applications on
7.11.2002 and 26.2.2008 respectively.
No sufficient cause is
shown for condoning the delay. On merits also, the applicants
have no case for seeking review of the order dated 8.12.2021.
Thus, a prayer has been made to dismiss the miscellaneous case.
MC(Review Pet.) No. 6 of 2023 (Ref:- Review Pet. No. 7 of 2023)
Page |5
6.
This Court considered the rival submissions and also
perused the materials available on record.
7.
The applicants have filed the present miscellaneous
case seeking to condone the delay of 425 days in filing the review
application against the order dated 8.12.2021 passed in W.P.(C)
No.1145 of 2018 on the ground that during the process of the file,
the
delay
occurred.
According
to
the
applicants,
the
Administrative Department processed the order dated 8.12.2021
for appointment of the respondents under die-in-harness scheme.
In the said process, the file was referred to the Department of
Personnel and the Department of Personnel after examining the
file retuned the same stating that the finding of the High Court was
mainly on the ground that the Office Memorandum dated 6.6.2007
was not notified for the knowledge of the general public. The
Department
of
Personnel
further
stated
that
the
Office
Memorandum was published on 9.6.2007 in the local dailies and,
as such, the Administrative Department may take necessary
action for filing review application. Accordingly, the Administrative
Department decided to file the review application against the order
dated 8.12.2021.
MC(Review Pet.) No. 6 of 2023 (Ref:- Review Pet. No. 7 of 2023)
Page |6
8.
On the other hand, the respondents contended that
the Department of Personnel took nearly nine months’ time to
return the file. Moreover, the Department of Personnel is not a
party to the writ petition and any opinion/view to be obtained from
the Department of Personnel by the Administrative Department is
an internal correspondence and the delay caused during the
internal correspondence cannot be the sufficient cause for
condoning the delay.
9.
The applicants have explained the reasons for the
delay in the present miscellaneous case as under:
8.12.2021
Judgment and order under
review passed by this
Court.
13.12.2021
Order of the Court dated
8.12.2021 was intimated by
the office of the learned
Advocate-General.
21.12.2021
Department
of
Administration put up the
file to the Section Officer
and in turn the Section
Officer put up the file to the
Under Secretary.
The
Under Secretary marked
the file to the Section
Officer with a note to put up
the file along with records.
23.12.2021
Section Officer has put up
the file along with relevant
file to the Under Secretary.
MC(Review Pet.) No. 6 of 2023 (Ref:- Review Pet. No. 7 of 2023)
Page |7
Thereafter, the file was
processed on different
dates
i.e.
31.12.2021,
27.1.2022,
16.2.2022,
28.2.2022. On 4.3.20022,
it was proposed to refer the
file to the Department of
Personnel for taking up
further necessary action.
On 7.3.2022, the file was
referred to the Department
of Personnel.
14.12.2022
The Deputy Secretary,
Department of Personnel
put up a note stating that
the proposal of Power
Department
for
appointment of the two
petitioners were examined
in DP’s file and decided to
request
the
Power
Department
to
take
necessary
action
for
reviewing the order dated
8.12.2021.
19.12.2022
File put up to the Section
Officer (Power) for approval
along with draft letter to the
Government
Advocate
(High Court) for filing
review petition.
22.12.2022
The Secretary (Power)
approved the same and
Government Advocate was
requested
for
taking
necessary action for filing
the review petition.
10.01.2023
Government
Advocate
(High Court) informed the
Deputy Secretary (Power)
MC(Review Pet.) No. 6 of 2023 (Ref:- Review Pet. No. 7 of 2023)
Page |8
09.02.2023
10.
for furnishing the certified
copy of the order dated
8.12.2021.
File was processed for
obtaining the certified copy
of
the
order
dated
8.12.2021.
14.03.2023
Fair copy of the review
petition sent to the Joint
Secretary
(Power)
for
signature.
17.03.2023
Review Petition filed
The learned counsel for the respondents submitted
that the State has not shown any acceptable explanation for the
delay and the State ought to have acted with reasonable diligence
in prosecuting the review application.
11.
Application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act
is to be construed liberally so as to do substantial justice to the
parties. In the present miscellaneous case, the applicants have
stated the cause for the delay, which is the sufficient cause.
12.
The question as to what would be held to be
“sufficient cause” while considering the application for condonation
of delay came up for consideration in the case
Esha
Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar
MC(Review Pet.) No. 6 of 2023 (Ref:- Review Pet. No. 7 of 2023)
Page |9
Academy and others, (2013) 12 SCC 649, wherein upon
considering the obligation of the Court while dealing with an
application for condonation of delay and the approach to be
adopted while considering the grounds for condonation, the
principles to be applied were summarized by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court as under:
"21. From the aforesaid authorities the
principles that can broadly be culled out
are:
21.1. (i) There should be a liberal,
pragmatic,
justice-oriented,
nonpedantic approach while dealing with an
application for condonation of delay, for
the courts are not supposed to legalise
injustice but are obliged to remove
injustice.
21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause”
should be understood in their proper
spirit, philosophy and purpose regard
being had to the fact that these terms
are basically elastic and are to be
applied in proper perspective to the
obtaining fact-situation.
21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being
paramount and pivotal the technical
considerations should not be given
undue and uncalled for emphasis.
21.4. (iv) No presumption can be
attached to deliberate causation of
delay but, gross negligence on the part
of the counsel or litigant is to be taken
note of.
21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to
a party seeking condonation of delay is
a significant and relevant fact.
21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that
adherence to strict proof should not
MC(Review Pet.) No. 6 of 2023 (Ref:- Review Pet. No. 7 of 2023)
P a g e | 10
affect public justice and cause public
mischief because the courts are
required to be vigilant so that in the
ultimate eventuate there is no real
failure of justice.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal
approach has to encapsulate the
conception of reasonableness and it
cannot be allowed a totally unfettered
free play.
21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between
inordinate delay and a delay of short
duration or few days, for to the former
doctrine of prejudice is attracted
whereas to the latter it may not be
attracted. That apart, the first one
warrants strict approach whereas the
second calls for a liberal delineation.
21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and
attitude of a party relating to its inaction
or negligence are relevant factors to be
taken into consideration. It is so as the
fundamental principle is that the courts
are required to weigh the scale of
balance of justice in respect of both
parties and the said principle cannot be
given a total go by in the name of liberal
approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is
concocted or the grounds urged in the
application are fanciful, the courts
should be vigilant not to expose the
other side unnecessarily to face such a
litigation.
21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that
no one gets away with fraud,
misrepresentation or interpolation by
taking recourse to the technicalities of
law of limitation.
21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are
to be carefully scrutinised and the
approach should be based on the
paradigm of judicial discretion which is
MC(Review Pet.) No. 6 of 2023 (Ref:- Review Pet. No. 7 of 2023)
P a g e | 11
founded on objective reasoning and not
on individual perception.
21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body
or an entity representing a collective
cause should be given some acceptable
latitude.
13.
In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and
another v. Katiji and others, (1987) 2 CC 107,
Supreme Court held:
"3. The legislature has conferred the
power to condone delay by enacting
Section 5 [ Any appeal or any
application, other than an application
under any of the provisions of Order XXI
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,
may be admitted after the prescribed
period if the appellant or the applicant
satisfies the court that he had sufficient
cause for not preferring the appeal or
making the application within such
period.] of the Indian Limitation Act of
1963 in order to enable the courts to do
substantial justice to parties by
disposing of matters on ”merits”. The
expression “sufficient cause” employed
by the legislature is adequately elastic
to enable the courts to apply the law in a
meaningful manner which subserves the
ends of justice — that being the lifepurpose for the existence of the
institution of courts. It is common
knowledge that this Court has been
making a justifiably liberal approach in
matters instituted in this Court. But the
message does not appear to have
percolated down to all the other courts
in the hierarchy. And such a liberal
MC(Review Pet.) No. 6 of 2023 (Ref:- Review Pet. No. 7 of 2023)
the Hon’ble
P a g e | 12
approach is adopted on principle as it is
realized that:
“1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to
benefit by lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can
result in a meritorious matter
being thrown out at the very
threshold and cause of justice
being defeated. As against this
when delay is condoned the
highest that can happen is that a
cause would be decided on
merits after hearing the parties.
3. “Every day's delay must be
explained” does not mean that a
pedantic approach should be
made. Why not every hour's
delay, every second's delay? The
doctrine must be applied in a
rational common sense pragmatic
manner.
4. When substantial justice and
technical considerations are pitted
against each other, cause of
substantial justice deserves to be
preferred for the other side cannot
claim to have vested right in
injustice being done because of a
non-deliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is
occasioned deliberately, or on
account of culpable negligence, or
on account of mala fides. A litigant
does not stand to benefit by
resorting to delay. In fact he runs a
serious risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is
respected not on account of its
power to legalize injustice on
technical grounds but because it is
capable of removing injustice and is
expected to do so.
MC(Review Pet.) No. 6 of 2023 (Ref:- Review Pet. No. 7 of 2023)
P a g e | 13
Making a justice-oriented approach from
this perspective, there was sufficient
cause for condoning the delay in the
institution of the appeal. The fact that it
was the “State” which was seeking
condonation and not a private party was
altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of
equality before law demands that all
litigants, including the State as a litigant,
are accorded the same treatment and
the law is administered in an evenhanded manner. There is no warrant for
according a step-motherly treatment
when the “State” is the applicant praying
for condonation of delay. In fact
experience shows that on account of an
impersonal machinery (no one in charge
of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the
judgment sought to be subjected to
appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic
methodology imbued with the notemaking, file-pushing and passing-onthe-buck ethos, delay on its part is less
difficult to understand though more
difficult to approve. In any event, the
State which represents the collective
cause of the community, does not
deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The
courts therefore have to be informed
with the spirit and philosophy of the
provision in the course of the
interpretation
of
the
expression
“sufficient cause”. So also the same
approach has to be evidenced in its
application to matters at hand with the
end in view to do even-handed justice
on merits in preference to the approach
which scuttles a decision on merits.
Turning to the facts of the matter giving
rise to the present appeal, we are
satisfied that sufficient cause exists for
the delay. The order of the High Court
dismissing the appeal before it as timebarred, is therefore, set aside. Delay is
MC(Review Pet.) No. 6 of 2023 (Ref:- Review Pet. No. 7 of 2023)
P a g e | 14
condoned. And the matter is remitted to
the High Court. The High Court will now
dispose of the appeal on merits after
affording reasonable opportunity of
hearing to both the sides.”
(emphasis supplied)
In State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO and others,
14.
(2005) 3 SCC 752, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held thus:
“15. It is axiomatic that decisions are
taken by officers/agencies proverbially at a
slow pace and encumbered process of
pushing the files from table to table and
keeping it on the table for considerable time
causing delay — intentional or otherwise —
is
a
routine.
Considerable
delay
of
procedural red tape in the process of their
making decision is a common feature.
Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not
impermissible. If the appeals brought by the
State are lost for such default no person is
individually affected but what in the ultimate
analysis suffers, is public interest. The
expression
“sufficient
cause”
should,
therefore, be considered with pragmatism in
a justice-oriented approach rather than the
technical detection of sufficient cause for
explaining every day's delay. The factors
which are peculiar to and characteristic of
the
functioning
of
the
MC(Review Pet.) No. 6 of 2023 (Ref:- Review Pet. No. 7 of 2023)
governmental
P a g e | 15
conditions would be cognizant to and
requires adoption of pragmatic approach in
justice-oriented process. The court should
decide the matters on merits unless the
case
is
hopelessly
without
merit.
No
separate standards to determine the cause
laid by the State vis-à-vis private litigant
could be laid to prove strict standards of
sufficient
cause.
The
Government
at
appropriate level should constitute legal
cells to examine the cases whether any
legal principles are involved for decision by
the
courts
or
whether
cases
require
adjustment and should authorise the officers
to take a decision or give appropriate
permission for settlement. In the event of
decision to file appeal, needed prompt
action should be pursued by the officer
responsible to file the appeal and he should
be made personally responsible for lapses,
if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on
the same footing as an individual. The
individual would always be quick in taking
the decision whether he would pursue the
remedy by way of an appeal or application
since he is a person legally injured while the
State is an impersonal machinery working
through its officers or servants.”
MC(Review Pet.) No. 6 of 2023 (Ref:- Review Pet. No. 7 of 2023)
P a g e | 16
15.
Refusal to condone the delay would result in denying
the State in preferring the review application against the order
dated 8.12.2021. There is no presumption that delay in
approaching the Court is always deliberate.
As held by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, the word “sufficient cause” under Section
5 of the Limitation Act should receive liberal construction so as to
advance substantial justice.
16.
The applicants are not to gain by delay. The reasons
are spelt out in the present miscellaneous case. It is trite that if the
technical considerations and cause for substantial justice are
pitted against each other, the cause for substantial justice has to
be sub-served.
17.
Applying the aforesaid principles to the case on
hand, it would be seen that the present miscellaneous case
seeking condonation of delay spelt out the reasons for the delay in
filing the review application and the reasons specified in that
regard could not be held to be insufficient and no want of bona
fides could have been imputed to the State. In the given facts and
circumstances of the case, this Court is of the view that liberal
approach has to be adopted in the present case and the delay has
been sufficiently explained by the applicants by giving adequate
MC(Review Pet.) No. 6 of 2023 (Ref:- Review Pet. No. 7 of 2023)
P a g e | 17
reasons.
The present miscellaneous case ought not to be
rejected on some hyper technical reasoning, as contended by the
respondents. That apart, the applicants have shown sufficient
cause for the delay.
18.
For all the reasons stated above and having satisfied
with the explanation for the delay, this Court is inclined to condone
the delay of 425 days in filing the review application.
19.
In the result, MC (Rev. Pet.) No.6 of 2023 in Review
Petition No.7 of 2023 is allowed.
JUDGE
FR/NFR
Sushil
MC(Review Pet.) No. 6 of 2023 (Ref:- Review Pet. No. 7 of 2023)
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