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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
I.A. No. 2792 of 2026
In / And
L.P.A. No. 117 of 2026
1. State of Jharkhand.
2. The Chief Secretary, Government of Jharkhand, Project Bhawan,
P.O. Jagannathpur, P.S Dhurwa, District Ranchi, Jharkhand.
3. Home Secretary, Government of Jharkhand, Project Bhawan, P.O.
Jagannathpur, P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi, Jharkhand.
4. Finance Secretary, Government of Jharkhand, Project Bhawan, P.O.
Jagannathpur, P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi, Jharkhand.
5. Director General -cum- Inspector General of Police, Jharkhand,
Ranchi, Police Head Quarter, P.O. Jagannathpur, P.S. Dhurwa,
District Ranchi, Jharkhand.
6. Deputy Inspector of Police (Personnel), Jharkhand, Ranchi, Police
Head Quarter, P.O. Jagannathpur, P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi,
Jharkhand.
….. Appellants/Respondents
Versus
Jharkhand Police Mens Association, through its State President,
Narendra Kumar, son of Sri Rudra Dev Singh, having its registered
Central Office at, Line Tank Road, Old Police Line, P.O. G.P.O., P.S.
Kotwali, District Ranchi, Jharkhand.
...
Respondent/Petitioner
--------CORAM:
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
--------For the Appellants:
Mr Kumar Rahul Kamlesh, A.C. to S.C.-IV
For the Respondent:
Mr Diwakar Upadhyay, Advocate
--------02/Dated: 16.06.2026
1.
Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2.
This I.A. seeks condonation of delay of 449 days in filing an
appeal against learned Single Judge’s order dated 16.08.2024
disposing of W.P. (S) No. 3793 of 2019.
3.
In paragraph 4 of the I.A., it is vaguely stated that after receipt of a
copy of the order, a proposal to take an appropriate decision was
forwarded by the Dy. S.P. (Legal), Police Headquarters, Ranchi.
This was followed by the file being sent to the I.G. (Personnel) for
the Home Department's opinion.
4.
In paragraph 5, it is stated that thereafter, the matter was
deliberated with the authorities of the Home Department, and on
10.12.2024, the Under Secretary (Home) requested the Police
Headquarters to send a clear proposal. Accordingly, a fresh
proposal was prepared and sent to the Department for providing
necessary directions.
5.
In paragraph 6, it is pleaded that the matter was further deliberated
with the Finance Department and thereafter, in the light of the
Finance Department’s opinion dated 08.07.2025, the Under
Secretary (Home) was directed to obtain legal opinion on the issue
of appealing the learned Single Judge’s order. After obtaining
some opinions, the matter was placed before the competent
authority for approval. After approval was granted, the matter was
sent to the learned Advocate General again to seek an opinion on
whether an appeal should be filed.
6.
Then, considerable time was spent finalising the memo of appeal
and filing the same after a delay of 449 days.
7.
Thus, the delay is attributed to the movement of files from table to
table, officer to officer and authority to authority. All this is despite
full knowledge that the period of limitation to file the appeal is
only 30 days. Such routine bureaucratic excuses cannot constitute
sufficient cause.
8.
In paragraph 8 of the I.A., it is pleaded that the appellants are
government functionaries with several layers of decision-making,
which consume time, causing delay in preferring the appeal in
question. After that, certain decisions are quoted, with respect,
completely out of context. Finally, it is pleaded that important
questions of law and facts are involved in the appeal, and it would
be in the interest of justice if the matter is heard on the merits.
Pleadings are vague, unverifiable and in any event, do not make
out a case of sufficient cause. If the issue was indeed important,
the Government could not have filed the appeal after a 449-day
delay, citing routine administrative excuses.
9.
Time and again, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has rejected
arguments about granting the State and its functionaries any
special indulgence based upon its claim of being an impersonal
agency or because several layers of decision-making may be
involved.
10. In Postmaster General and Others v. Living Media India Limited
and Another, reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court held that delay cannot be condoned where the Government
Department or the persons concerned have not shown diligence in
prosecuting the matter and taking appropriate steps. The Court
held that, in the absence of a plausible and acceptable explanation,
delay cannot be condoned mechanically merely because the
Government or a wing of the Government seeks condonation. The
claim of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic
methodology of making several noting cannot be invariably
accepted in view of modern technologies being used and available.
It was reiterated that the law of limitation undoubtedly binds
everybody, including the Government.
11. In Union of India & Anr. Vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D)
through his LR, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held that even the length of the delay is a
relevant factor that the Court must consider when dealing with
applications for condonation of delay. The Court noted that, from
the tenor or approach of the appellants, it appeared that they
wished to fix their own period of limitation for instituting
proceedings for which the law has prescribed a period of
limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost the right to have the
matter considered on the merits because of his own inaction for a
long time, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay, and in
such circumstances the party cannot be heard to plead that
substantial justice deserves to be preferred against technical
considerations.
12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also held that when considering a plea
for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of
the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona
fides of the explanation offered by the parties seeking condonation.
It is only if sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the
opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may
bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning
the delay. Further, the question of limitation is not merely a
technical consideration.
13. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public
policy and principles of equity. The ‘Sword of Damocles’ cannot
be kept hanging over the head of the respondent for an indefinite
period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the
appellants. The Court noted that in a plethora of decisions, it has
been said that the delay should not be excused as a matter of
generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice
to the opposite party. Where the appellants failed to demonstrate
that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter, the
delay cannot be condoned. If it is found that the delay in filing the
appeal has arisen due to the party's own negligence and casual
attitude, the delay cannot be condoned on the grounds of doing
substantial justice.
14. In Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board &
Ors., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court conveyed an emphatic message to all the High
Courts that delay should not be condoned on frivolous and
superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made
out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted
with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is
a handmaid to justice, as is famously said but courts, and more
particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the
procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the
bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own
lackadaisical attitude.
15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High Courts ought not
give a legitimising effect to such a callous attitude of the State
authorities or their instrumentalities and should remain extra
cautious if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State
authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and
lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the
apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in
situations of perpetual litigation, wherein the fruits of their decrees
or favourable orders are frustrated at the later stages.
16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that limitation
periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to
attain finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what
worries is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to
contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and neverexhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed
of at the very threshold, because, say, if a party litigating against
the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation
of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for
another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet
again. As courts of conscience, Courts are obligated to ensure that
a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice. No litigant
should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be
permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law.
17. The above principles clearly apply to the facts and circumstances
of the present case, and, based on them, no case is made out for
condoning the delay. The averments in the I.A. are mostly excuses.
A detailed analysis of such excuses shows that the facts pleaded
therein are unverifiable. Even if they are accepted at face value,
they show that the file was sent to different authorities solely to lay
the groundwork for seeking condonation of the delay.
18. From the number of cases before us, we are constrained to note
that the State seems to have adopted a modus operandi of simply
filing an appeal way beyond the prescribed period of limitation or
keeping the appeals pending by often not clearing office
objections, so that the parties are forced to file contempt petitions
complaining about non-implementation. In such
contempt
petitions, a plea is invariably raised that an appeal is already
pending and that the hearing on the contempt petition must be
deferred until then. Thus, even in the absence of interim relief from
the appeal court, this objective is achieved by filing such belated
appeals.
19. The bare statements that the delay is not intentional and that bona
fides are involved, or that there is merit in the appeal, therefore,
cannot be accepted at face value. Learned counsel for the
respondent points out that even in this case, though the learned
Single Judge’s order was passed on 16.08.2024, to date, there is no
compliance, thereby forcing the respondent to file a contempt
petition.
20. For all the above reasons and by following the decisions of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, referred to above, we dismiss this I.A.,
this time, without imposing any costs.
Consequently, the
accompanying appeal and the IAs therein will not survive and are
disposed of.
(M. S. Sonak, C.J.)
(Rajesh Shankar, J.)
June 16, 2026
N.A.F.R.
Manoj/Sharda/Cp.2
Uploaded on 20.06.2026
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