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LegalFirms.in Judgments · legalfirms.in/judgments/state-of-jharkhand-vs-jharkhand-police-mens-association-through-its-state-president-narendra-kumar-20260616/ · Printed 19 Nov 2026
Civil

State of Jharkhand vs Jharkhand Police Mens Association Through Its State President Narendra Kumar

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Court
Jharkhand High Court
Date
16 June 2026
Case No.
LPA 117/2026
Result
Disposed
Bench
Justice, Rajesh Shankar
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20. For all the above reasons and by following the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, referred to above, we dismiss this I.A., this time, without imposing any costs. Consequently, the accompanying appeal and the IAs therein will not survive and are disposed of. (M. S. Sonak, C.J.) (Rajesh Shankar, J.) June 16, 2026 Manoj/Sharda/Cp.2 Uploaded on 20.06.2026

Full Judgment Text

Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs, CC BY 4.0). The court's own copy is the authoritative text.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI I.A. No. 2792 of 2026 In / And L.P.A. No. 117 of 2026 1. State of Jharkhand. 2. The Chief Secretary, Government of Jharkhand, Project Bhawan, P.O. Jagannathpur, P.S Dhurwa, District Ranchi, Jharkhand. 3. Home Secretary, Government of Jharkhand, Project Bhawan, P.O. Jagannathpur, P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi, Jharkhand. 4. Finance Secretary, Government of Jharkhand, Project Bhawan, P.O. Jagannathpur, P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi, Jharkhand. 5. Director General -cum- Inspector General of Police, Jharkhand, Ranchi, Police Head Quarter, P.O. Jagannathpur, P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi, Jharkhand. 6. Deputy Inspector of Police (Personnel), Jharkhand, Ranchi, Police Head Quarter, P.O. Jagannathpur, P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi, Jharkhand. ….. Appellants/Respondents Versus Jharkhand Police Mens Association, through its State President, Narendra Kumar, son of Sri Rudra Dev Singh, having its registered Central Office at, Line Tank Road, Old Police Line, P.O. G.P.O., P.S. Kotwali, District Ranchi, Jharkhand. ... Respondent/Petitioner --------CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR --------For the Appellants: Mr Kumar Rahul Kamlesh, A.C. to S.C.-IV For the Respondent: Mr Diwakar Upadhyay, Advocate --------02/Dated: 16.06.2026 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. This I.A. seeks condonation of delay of 449 days in filing an appeal against learned Single Judge’s order dated 16.08.2024 disposing of W.P. (S) No. 3793 of 2019. 3. In paragraph 4 of the I.A., it is vaguely stated that after receipt of a copy of the order, a proposal to take an appropriate decision was forwarded by the Dy. S.P. (Legal), Police Headquarters, Ranchi. This was followed by the file being sent to the I.G. (Personnel) for the Home Department's opinion. 4. In paragraph 5, it is stated that thereafter, the matter was deliberated with the authorities of the Home Department, and on 10.12.2024, the Under Secretary (Home) requested the Police Headquarters to send a clear proposal. Accordingly, a fresh proposal was prepared and sent to the Department for providing necessary directions. 5. In paragraph 6, it is pleaded that the matter was further deliberated with the Finance Department and thereafter, in the light of the Finance Department’s opinion dated 08.07.2025, the Under Secretary (Home) was directed to obtain legal opinion on the issue of appealing the learned Single Judge’s order. After obtaining some opinions, the matter was placed before the competent authority for approval. After approval was granted, the matter was sent to the learned Advocate General again to seek an opinion on whether an appeal should be filed. 6. Then, considerable time was spent finalising the memo of appeal and filing the same after a delay of 449 days. 7. Thus, the delay is attributed to the movement of files from table to table, officer to officer and authority to authority. All this is despite full knowledge that the period of limitation to file the appeal is only 30 days. Such routine bureaucratic excuses cannot constitute sufficient cause. 8. In paragraph 8 of the I.A., it is pleaded that the appellants are government functionaries with several layers of decision-making, which consume time, causing delay in preferring the appeal in question. After that, certain decisions are quoted, with respect, completely out of context. Finally, it is pleaded that important questions of law and facts are involved in the appeal, and it would be in the interest of justice if the matter is heard on the merits. Pleadings are vague, unverifiable and in any event, do not make out a case of sufficient cause. If the issue was indeed important, the Government could not have filed the appeal after a 449-day delay, citing routine administrative excuses. 9. Time and again, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has rejected arguments about granting the State and its functionaries any special indulgence based upon its claim of being an impersonal agency or because several layers of decision-making may be involved. 10. In Postmaster General and Others v. Living Media India Limited and Another, reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that delay cannot be condoned where the Government Department or the persons concerned have not shown diligence in prosecuting the matter and taking appropriate steps. The Court held that, in the absence of a plausible and acceptable explanation, delay cannot be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government seeks condonation. The claim of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several noting cannot be invariably accepted in view of modern technologies being used and available. It was reiterated that the law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government. 11. In Union of India & Anr. Vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his LR, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that even the length of the delay is a relevant factor that the Court must consider when dealing with applications for condonation of delay. The Court noted that, from the tenor or approach of the appellants, it appeared that they wished to fix their own period of limitation for instituting proceedings for which the law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost the right to have the matter considered on the merits because of his own inaction for a long time, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay, and in such circumstances the party cannot be heard to plead that substantial justice deserves to be preferred against technical considerations. 12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also held that when considering a plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the parties seeking condonation. It is only if sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. Further, the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. 13. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. The ‘Sword of Damocles’ cannot be kept hanging over the head of the respondent for an indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. The Court noted that in a plethora of decisions, it has been said that the delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. Where the appellants failed to demonstrate that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter, the delay cannot be condoned. If it is found that the delay in filing the appeal has arisen due to the party's own negligence and casual attitude, the delay cannot be condoned on the grounds of doing substantial justice. 14. In Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon’ble Supreme Court conveyed an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delay should not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said but courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude. 15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High Courts ought not give a legitimising effect to such a callous attitude of the State authorities or their instrumentalities and should remain extra cautious if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigation, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at the later stages. 16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and neverexhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say, if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, Courts are obligated to ensure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law. 17. The above principles clearly apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case, and, based on them, no case is made out for condoning the delay. The averments in the I.A. are mostly excuses. A detailed analysis of such excuses shows that the facts pleaded therein are unverifiable. Even if they are accepted at face value, they show that the file was sent to different authorities solely to lay the groundwork for seeking condonation of the delay. 18. From the number of cases before us, we are constrained to note that the State seems to have adopted a modus operandi of simply filing an appeal way beyond the prescribed period of limitation or keeping the appeals pending by often not clearing office objections, so that the parties are forced to file contempt petitions complaining about non-implementation. In such contempt petitions, a plea is invariably raised that an appeal is already pending and that the hearing on the contempt petition must be deferred until then. Thus, even in the absence of interim relief from the appeal court, this objective is achieved by filing such belated appeals. 19. The bare statements that the delay is not intentional and that bona fides are involved, or that there is merit in the appeal, therefore, cannot be accepted at face value. Learned counsel for the respondent points out that even in this case, though the learned Single Judge’s order was passed on 16.08.2024, to date, there is no compliance, thereby forcing the respondent to file a contempt petition. 20. For all the above reasons and by following the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, referred to above, we dismiss this I.A., this time, without imposing any costs. Consequently, the accompanying appeal and the IAs therein will not survive and are disposed of. (M. S. Sonak, C.J.) (Rajesh Shankar, J.) June 16, 2026 N.A.F.R. Manoj/Sharda/Cp.2 Uploaded on 20.06.2026

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