The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
17. I.A. No. 16053 of 2025 is liable to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed without any order for costs.
18. Consequently, the accompanying appeal and the application(s) (if any) therein will not survive and are disposed of. (M.S. Sonak, C.J.) (Rajesh Shankar, J.) June 16, 2026 APK/VK Uploaded on
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The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
2026:JHHC:17467-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No. 798 of 2025
With
I.A. No. 16053 of 2025
State of Jharkhand, through Director Higher Technical Education and
Kaushal Vikash Department (Higher Education Directorate) 3rd floor
Yojna Bhawan, Nepal House, Doranda, Post Office and Police Station
Doranda, District Ranchi (Jharkhand).
…
Versus
1.
…
…
Appellant
Nawal Kishore Prasad Shrivastava, son of Late Kundan Prasad
Shrivastava, resident of Merawal, Sindur, P.O. & P.S. Hazaribagh, District
Hazaribagh (Jharkhand).
2.
Vinoba Bhave University, through its Registrar, Hazaribagh, P.O. &
P.S. Hazaribagh, District Hazaribagh (Jharkhand).
3.
Finance Officer, Vinoba Bhave University, Hazaribagh, P.O. & P.S.
Hazaribagh, District Hazaribagh (Jharkhand).
… …
… Respondents
--------CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
--------For the Appellant:
Mr. Vineet Prakash, A.C. to S.C.-IV
For Resp. No.1:
Mr. Rajeev Kumar, Advocate
For Resp. Nos. 2 & 3: Mr. Mithilesh Singh, Advocate
Mr. Vishal Kumar Rai, Advocate
--------02/Dated: 16.06.2026
1.
Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2.
I.A. No. 16053 of 2025 seeks condonation of delay of 371 days in
filing Appeal against the learned Single Judge’s judgment and order dated
13.08.2024 disposing of W.P.(S) No. 5655 of 2019.
3.
We have perused the averments in paragraph 3 and 4 of the I.A.
and we are satisfied that they do not constitute sufficient cause for
condoning the delay. The averments suggest the movement of files from
table to table and from officers to officers. Similar reasons have been held
by us as not constituting any sufficient cause.
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4.
In paragraph 5 it is pleaded that “time taken in decision making
process as mentioned in the preceding paragraph of the present
application were due to inter-departmental communications and opinion
which required to be obtained in view of established standard operating
procedure among the Government functionaries and the same was not
deliberate”.
5.
As noted in our order dated 16.06.2026 disposing of I.A. No. 15524
of 2025 in L.P.A. No. 766 of 2025, the Standard Operating Procedures
vaguely referred to in paragraph 5 are nothing but excuses for not acting
diligently and preferring the appeals within the prescribed period of
limitation or at least within reasonable period thereafter.
6.
Paragraph 6, an equally untenable reason has been stated for
urging special consideration to appeals instituted by the Government and
the Government functionaries. Paragraph 6 is transcribed below for the
convenience of reference: “6.
That it is humbly stated and submitted that since the
appellants are government functionaries having several
layers of decision-making process, it took some time in
completing the same. Further, sometime was consumed in
obtaining legal opinion on the point of preferring appeal.
7.
Based upon the above pleadings, we are afraid that no case
whatsoever has been made out for condoning the inordinate delay of 371
days. This is a case of utter lethargy, tardiness and indolence to borrow
the phrases used by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of
Odisha and Others vs Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High
School, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 191.
8.
In the above case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has referred to the
distinction between ‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’ proffered as a ground
for condonation of delay. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also referred to
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its earlier decisions, in which it is held that there is a point beyond which
even the Courts cannot help a litigant, even if the litigant is the
Government, which is itself under the shackles of bureaucratic
indifference. Since the law of limitation binds everybody, beyond a
particular point, no indulgence can be shown, even to the Government,
which functions through an impersonal machinery.
9.
In Postmaster General and Others v. Living Media India
Limited and Another, reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that delay cannot be condoned where the
Government Department or the persons concerned have not shown
diligence in prosecuting the matter and taking appropriate steps. The
Court held that, in the absence of a plausible and acceptable explanation,
delay cannot be condoned mechanically merely because the Government
or a wing of the Government seeks condonation. The claim of impersonal
machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several
notes cannot be invariably accepted in view of modern technologies being
used and available. It was reiterated that the law of limitation undoubtedly
binds everybody, including the Government.
10.
In Union of India & Anr. Vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D)
through his LR, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that even the length of the delay is a relevant factor
that the Court must consider when dealing with applications for
condonation of delay. The Court noted that, from the tenor or approach of
the appellants, it appeared that they sought to fix their own period of
limitation for instituting proceedings for which the law has prescribed a
period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost the right to have
the matter considered on the merits because of his own inaction for a long
time, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay, and in such
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circumstances the party cannot be heard to plead that substantial justice
deserves to be preferred against technical considerations.
11.
The Court also held that when considering a plea for condonation
of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The
court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation
offered by the parties seeking condonation. It is only if sufficient cause
assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally
balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the
purpose of condoning the delay. Further, the question of limitation is not
merely a technical consideration.
12.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the rules of limitation are
based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity.
The ‘Sword of Damocles’ cannot be kept hanging over the head of the
respondent for an indefinite period to be determined at the whims and
fancies of the appellants. The Court noted that in a plethora of decisions,
it has been said that the delay should not be excused as a matter of
generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the
opposite party. Where the appellants failed to demonstrate that they were
reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter, the delay cannot be
condoned. If it is found that the delay in filing the appeal has arisen due to
the party's own negligence and casual attitude, the delay cannot be
condoned on the grounds of doing substantial justice.
13.
In Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board &
Ors., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court conveyed an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delay
should not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a
proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery
is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all
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throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said but
courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate
the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the
bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical
attitude.
14.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High Courts ought not
give a legitimising effect to such a callous attitude of the State authorities
or their instrumentalities and should remain extra cautious if the party
seeking condonation of delay is a State authority. They should not
become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts
ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant.
Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigation, wherein the
fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at the later
stages.
15.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that limitation
periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain
for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries is the
plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an
enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia.
Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because,
say, if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to
contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it
reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant
listless yet again. As courts of conscience, Courts are obligated to ensure
that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice. No litigant
should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be
permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law.
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16.
Applying the above principles to the gross facts and circumstances
of the present case, we are satisfied that no case has been made for
condonation of the delay of 371 days in instituting the instant appeal.
17.
I.A. No. 16053 of 2025 is liable to be dismissed and is hereby
dismissed without any order for costs.
18.
Consequently,
the
accompanying
appeal
and
the
application(s) (if any) therein will not survive and are disposed of.
(M.S. Sonak, C.J.)
(Rajesh Shankar, J.)
June 16, 2026
N.A.F.R.
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22.06.2026
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