The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
21. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a broad scope for the lis to attain finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation and leaves such a litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, Courts are obligated to ensure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post in search of justice. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, let alone be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law.
22. Applying the above principles to the gross facts of the present case, we are satisfied that no case is made out for condonation of delay. Accordingly, this I.A. is dismissed.
23. The accompanying appeal will not survive and is also disposed of. If there are any IAs pending in this appeal, even they will not survive and are hereby disposed of.
24. There shall be no order as to costs. (M. S. Sonak, C.J.) (Manoj Prasad, J.) November 03, 2026 M.Kr./Sharda/Cp.2 Uploaded on 06.11.2026
Full Judgment Text
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CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
I.A. No. 13853 of 2025
In / And
L.P.A. No. 51 of 2026
1. State of Jharkhand through Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, P.O. &
P.S. Ranchi, District - Ranchi-834001.
2. Khas Mahal Officer, Ranchi, P.O. & P.S. Ranchi, District - Ranchi834001.
3. Circle Officer, Ranchi, P.O. & P.S. Ranchi, District - Ranchi834001.
4. District Sub Registrar, Ranchi, P.O. & P.S. Ranchi, District –
Ranchi-834001.
….. Respondents/Appellants
Versus
Utpal Chakravarty, S/O Late Arun Prakash Chakravarty, Aged about62 years, Resident of Flat No. 411, Vallobh Sadan Peace Road, Lalpur,
Ranchi, P.O. & P.S. Lalpur, District: Ranchi-834001.
...
Petitioner/Respondent
--------CORAM:
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ PRASAD
--------For the Appellants:
Mr Ashok Kumar Yadav, Sr. S.C.-I
Mr Abhijeet Anand, A.C. to Sr. S.C.-I
For the Respondent:
Mr Navin Kumar, Advocate
Mr Suraj Verma, Advocate
--------04/Dated: 03.11.2026
Per M. S. Sonak, C.J.
1.
Heard Mr Ashok Kumar Yadav who appears with Mr Abhijeet
Anand for the applicants and Mr Navin Kumar, the learned
counsel who appears with Mr Suraj Kumar Verma for the
respondent.
2.
I.A. No. 13853 of 2025 seeks condonation of delay of 188 days in
filing the accompanying appeal against the learned Single Judge’s
judgment and order dated 20.02.2025 in W.P. (C) No. 6667 of
2023.
3.
Paragraph 4 of the I.A. refers to the impugned judgment and order
passed on 20.02.2025. Paragraph 5 vaguely states that after the
pronouncement of the judgment and order on 20.02.2025, the
respondent
approached
the
concerned
department
for
implementation. At that stage, the file was put up before the
Officers
for
further
action,
but
“due
to
administrative
complexities”, implementation was delayed.
4.
Paragraph 5 proceeds on the misconceived premise that the
appellant-State is required to implement this Court’s orders only
after the successful petitioner approaches the State seeking
implementation. Here again, no particulars are provided as to when
the original petitioner approached the State Government for
implementation. A vague statement is made about “administrative
complexities”.
The
administrative
complexities
relate
to
implementation of the order, not to an appeal.
5.
Paragraph 6 refers to forwarding the file to the “concerned
officer” on 24.07.2025, i.e. almost five months after the impugned
order was passed. Paragraph 7 refers to the file’s movement from
the concerned Officer to the Circle Officer. Paragraph 8 refers to
the movement of the file from the Circle Officer to the Additional
Collector. Paragraph 9 refers to the movement of the file from the
Additional Collector to the Deputy Commissioner. Paragraph 10
then says that on 02.09.2025, a letter was sent to the Deputy
Commissioner to proceed with the filing of the LPA through the
Sr. S.C.-I. Paragraph 11 admits that the appeal was filed after
delay of 215 days though, now the Registry has computed the
delay at 188 days.
6.
Finally, paragraph 12 says that “due to aforesaid administrative
complexities and procedural requirements” the delay has occurred
and that such delay was “due to circumstances beyond the control
of the petitioners (sic) involving complex administrative processes,
inter-departmental coordination, financial calculations and legal
consultations”.
7.
Time and again such excuses have been held not to constitute
sufficient cause. Still, repeatedly, the State insists on filing such
IAs seeking condonation of delay by citing the very same reasons.
Apart from the fact that such reasons are unverifiable, we are not
prepared to accept that such reasons can be styled as
“circumstances beyond the control” of the appellants.
8.
The appellants are firmly convinced that the law of limitation
prescribed by Parliament does not apply to them and under no
circumstances can they expedite their so-called complex
administrative
processes,
inter-departmental
coordination,
financial calculations and legal consultations.
9.
The Officers who file such applications seem not to care for the
laws of this land but are obsessed with their so-called
administrative procedures. Considering the spate of such
applications and the almost uniform averments of this kind
(possibly a result of cut and paste), we get the impression that
there is not even any truth in the circumstances portrayed, but the
circumstances are simply pleaded with a view to protect the
officials, who have been utterly lethargic in taking effective steps
to file appeals.
10. Mr Yadav submitted that this is a case of government property. If
this is so, then the government officials should have been more
diligent and not conducted the matter with such negligence.
Invariably, though such submissions are made, we hardly find any
case where any action is taken against the negligent officials. Even
where the Courts direct action, our experience is that no
responsibility is fixed on any officer or, if fixing of responsibility
is unavoidable, such officials are let off with a very minor penalty,
if at all. Never do we find that any entries are made in the
confidential rolls of such officials. All this suggests that the
reasons cited are not genuine but are only excuses to protect the
officials and nothing further.
11. Otherwise, it is difficult for us to comprehend how, despite several
decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court, such
unverifiable and mostly ungenuine reasons are cited as a matter of
course to seek condonation of delay.
12. In State of Odisha and Others vs. Managing Committee of
Namatara Girls High School, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 191, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court explained the distinction between
“explanation” and “excuse” proffered as a ground for condonation
of delay. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that excuses are
different from explanations and that, based on excuses, delay
cannot be condoned. After referring to its earlier decisions, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held that there is a point beyond which
even the Courts cannot help a litigant, even if the litigant is the
Government, which is itself shackled by bureaucratic indifference.
Since the law of limitation binds everybody, beyond a particular
point no indulgence can be shown, even to the Government, which
functions through an impersonal machinery.
13. Mr Yadav then contended that the appellant has a good case on
merits and therefore the delay should be condoned.
14. In the first place, it is difficult to accept Mr Yadav’s contention
about the appellant having a good case on merits. On perusal of the
impugned order, it is apparent that the learned Single Judge’s order
contains no error warranting interference with the exercise of
Letters Patent Jurisdiction, given the law laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in R. Saravanan v. Periyar University, 2026
INSC 1136.
15. Secondly, in Union of India & Anr. Vs. Jahangir Byramji
Jeejeebhoy (D), through his LR, 2024 SCC Online SC 489, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held that, at the stage of deciding an
application for condonation of delay, the Court should not advert
to the merits of the matter. The Hon’ble Supreme Court clarified
that limitation is not merely a technical consideration, since the
rules of limitation are based on sound public policy and equity.
16. Thirdly, on perusing the learned Single Judge’s impugned order,
we find that the learned Single Judge has recorded a finding of fact
that the respondent herein has been in possession of the suit
property for a considerable period, as evidenced by the municipal
khatiyan and the mutation order. The learned Single Judge has also
clarified that, where there is a bona fide dispute of title, it is always
open to the State Government to file a civil suit for declaration of
title. This implies that the State Government cannot, by merely
changing the revenue entries, force the party in settled possession,
backed by the revenue entries for a considerable period, to
approach the civil court.
17. In Postmaster General and Others Vs. In Living Media India
Limited and Another, (2012)3 SCC 563, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court held that delay cannot be condoned where the Government
Department or the persons concerned have not shown diligence in
pursuing the matter and taking appropriate steps. The Court held
that, without a plausible and acceptable explanation, the delay
cannot be condoned mechanically merely because the Government
or a wing of the Government seeks condonation. The claim of
impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of
making several notings cannot be accepted as a matter of course,
given the modern technologies available. It was reiterated that the
law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the
Government.
18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the “Sword of
Damocles” cannot be kept hanging over the respondent’s head
indefinitely, at the appellants’ whim and fancy. Therefore, delay
should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Substantial justice
should not prejudice the opposite party. Where the appellants
failed to demonstrate reasonable diligence in prosecuting the
matter, the delay cannot be condoned. If it is found that delay in
filing the appeal arose from the party's own negligence and casual
attitude, the delay cannot be condoned on the ground of doing
substantial justice. In this matter, due to the delay, one of the
original petitioners expired without receiving any benefits under
the impugned order.
19. In Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board &
Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
conveyed an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delay
should not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds
unless a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, in which the
State machinery is able to establish that it acted in good faith and
remained vigilant throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice,
as is famously said, but courts, and more particularly the
constitutional courts, ought not to obviate procedure for a litigating
State agency, which also equally suffers the bars of limitation in
pursuing litigation due to its own lackadaisical attitude.
20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High Courts ought not to
lend legitimacy to such a callous attitude by State authorities or
their instrumentalities and should remain particularly cautious
when the party seeking condonation of delay is a State authority.
They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy.
The constitutional courts ought to be mindful of the apathy and
distress of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in
situations of perpetual litigation, wherein the fruits of their decrees
or favourable orders are frustrated at a later stage.
21. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that limitation
periods are prescribed to maintain a broad scope for the lis to attain
finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries is
the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against
an enormous State and its elaborate and never-exhausting
paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the
very threshold, because, if a party litigating against the State, for
whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in
appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round
of litigation and leaves such a litigant listless yet again. As courts
of conscience, Courts are obligated to ensure that a litigant is not
sent from pillar to post in search of justice. No litigant should be
permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, let alone be permitted by
the courts to misuse the process of law.
22. Applying the above principles to the gross facts of the present
case, we are satisfied that no case is made out for condonation of
delay. Accordingly, this I.A. is dismissed.
23. The accompanying appeal will not survive and is also disposed of.
If there are any IAs pending in this appeal, even they will not
survive and are hereby disposed of.
24. There shall be no order as to costs.
(M. S. Sonak, C.J.)
(Manoj Prasad, J.)
November 03, 2026
N.A.F.R.
M.Kr./Sharda/Cp.2
Uploaded on 06.11.2026
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