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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Criminal Appeal No.13 of 2026
Date of Decision: 18.03.2026
__________________________________________________________________________
State of Himachal Pradesh
…...Appellant
Versus
Yashpal
…....Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?
For the petitioner:
Mr. Rajan Kahol & Mr. Vishal Panwar, Additional
Advocates General with Mr. Ravi Chauhan & Mr.
Anish Banshtu, Deputy Advocates General.
For the respondent:
Mr. R.P. Singh, Advocate.
___________________________________________________________________________
Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral)
Cr.MP(M) No.2880 of 2025
Heard. Leave to appeal granted. Application stands disposed of.
Criminal Appeal No.13 of 2026
2.
Instant criminal appeal filed under Section 419 of Bharatiya
Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, lays challenge to judgment of acquittal
dated 10.07.2025 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court
No.III, Una, District Una, Himachal Pradesh, in Case Registration No.12239
of 2013, under Sections 279, 337, 304-A & 201 of Indian Penal Code and
Section 187 of Motor Vehicles Act, whereby learned Court below held the
respondent-accused (hereinafter referred to as ‘accused’) not guilty of his
having committed offences punishable under the aforesaid provisions.
3.
Precisely, the grouse of the appellant/State, as has been
highlighted in the grounds of appeal and further canvassed by Mr. Vishal
Panwar, learned Additional Advocate General representing the appellantState, is that learned Court below, while passing impugned judgment of
acquittal, failed to appreciate the evidence in its right perspective, as a
result thereof, findings detrimental to the prosecution has come to the fore.
While making this Court peruse evidence adduced on record by the
prosecution to prove its case, Mr. Panwar vehemently argued that sister of
the complainant died in the accident on account of rash and negligent
driving of the accused, who otherwise fled from the spot after the alleged
incident. While referring to the statement of PW-10, Mr. Panwar attempted
to argue that learned Court below wrongly arrived at a conclusion that
prosecution was unable to prove identity of the driver as well as vehicle
involved in the accident. He states that as per statement given by the
aforesaid witness and the daily log sheet Ext.PW-10/A, the vehicle involved
in the accident was being driven by the accused.
4.
To the contrary, Mr. R.P. Singh, learned counsel for the
accused, while supporting the impugned judgment of acquittal recorded by
the learned Court below, vehemently argued that no evidence worth
credence ever came to be led on record to prove factum of driving of
offending vehicle by the accused. While referring to the statement given by
PW-10 as well as daily log sheet Ext.PW-10/A, Mr. Singh argued that afore
witness nowhere stated that vehicle alleged to have caused accident
belonged to his company and the same was being driven by the accused,
rather he categorically stated that at about 05:00 p.m., vehicle had
returned to the base camp, which is at a distance of about 36 Kms from the
place of accident. He stated that otherwise also, as per case of the
prosecution, accident happened at 05:00 p.m., if it is so, in no eventuality,
accused can be said to have reached base camp, which is at a distance of
about 36 Kms, within a minute.
5.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
material available on record vis-a-vis reasoning assigned in the impugned
judgment of acquittal recorded by the learned Court below, this Court sees
no illegality or infirmity in the same, as such, no interference is called for.
Though prosecution, in the case at hand, examined as many as 11
witnesses to prove its case, but statements of PW-1, PW-2, PW-3 and
PW-10 are relevant for proper adjudication of the case at hand. As per the
case of the prosecution, on 28.10.2012 at about 5:00 p.m., near place
Lathiani, the accused, while driving a vehicle/tipper bearing registration
No. HP-72-1292 at a high speed and in a rash and negligent manner, hit
the complainant’s motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-20B-6629, as a
result thereof, complainant and his pillion rider, namely Ms. Arpana, fell
down on the road and suffered multiple injuries. Pillion rider succumbed to
her injuries. It is also alleged that the accused, after causing the accident,
fled from the spot without providing any medical assistance to the injured
person. Complainant, while examining himself as PW-1, deposed that he
subsequently came to know that the number of the offending tipper was
HP-72-1292, however, he failed to render explanation as to why such
information was not given to the police at the first instance and from whom
he had learnt that the accident was caused by the tipper bearing
registration No. HP-72-1292. Since it is not in dispute that at the time of
lodging complaint, complainant had not mentioned the number of the
vehicle that allegedly hit his motorcycle, coupled with the fact that while
deposing before learned trial Court, he failed to disclose the source from
whom he learnt that his motorcycle was hit by tipper bearing registration
No. HP-72-1292, version put-forth by him with regard to involvement of
aforesaid tipper rightly came to be discarded by the learned Court below.
6.
Spot witness, PW-2, also did not mention the registration
number of the offending vehicle in his examination-in-chief, rather, he
stated that the driver of the tipper had fled from the spot along with the
vehicle. In his cross-examination, PW-2 attempted to argue that he had
informed the police about the registration number of the tipper, but
aforesaid version put-forth by him rightly came to be discarded for the two
reasons. First, he had not stated this fact in his examination-in-chief.
Second, this fact was never recorded by the police during the investigation.
7.
Prosecution, with a view to prove its case, placed heavy reliance
upon the statement of PW-10 Anil Sharma, Deputy Manager of C&C
Construction Ltd., who produced the daily log sheet Ext.PW-10/A and the
driver’s
address
Ext.PW-10/B.
However,
having
carefully
perused
statement made by aforesaid witness, this Court is not persuaded to agree
with Mr. Vishal Panwar, learned Additional Advocate General, that with the
examination of aforesaid witness, prosecution proved beyond reasonable
doubt that offending tipper was involved in the accident and at the relevant
time, was being driven by the accused. Afore witness, in his crossexamination, admitted that the log sheet is closed upon the driver’s return
to the base camp of the company located at Village Samurkala. He further
admitted that on 28.10.2012 at about 5:00 p.m., the accused had returned
to the base camp, which fact is otherwise recorded in the log sheet. He also
admitted that distance between the accident site at Lathiani and the
company base camp at Samurkala is about 36 Kms. This witness nowhere
specifically stated factum with regard to involvement of the offending
vehicle in the accident as well as it being driven by the accused.
If the
version put-forth by the aforesaid witness is presumed to be correct, it
creates a serious doubt about the correctness of story put-forth by the
prosecution. Admittedly accident occurred at Lathiani and base camp of
C&C Construction Ltd. is at Samurkala and distance between both the
aforesaid stations is 36 Kms. As per the case of the prosecution, accident
occurred at 05:00 p.m. on the date of alleged incident, whereas the log
sheet produced by PW-10 clearly reveals that on that date, vehicle shown to
be involved in the accident had reached base camp by 05:00 p.m. It is
highly impossible that accused, after his having hit the complainant’s
motorcycle, reached the base camp at Samurkala within a minute because
as per log sheet, vehicle being driven by the accused was already parked in
the base camp at 05:00 p.m. In the case at hand, none of the prosecution
witnesses had actually seen the accused driving the vehicle. None of the
prosecution witnesses had an occasion to see the registration number of
the vehicle. It is admitted case of the parties that at the time of his making
statement under Section 154 Cr.P.C, complainant nowhere disclosed
factum with regard to involvement of tipper in the accident, rather at that
juncture, he only disclosed that tipper came in a high speed and after
hitting his motorcycle, driver fled from the spot.
8.
PW-2, in his examination-in-chief, nowhere stated anything
specific with regard to involvement of offending vehicle and it was being
driven by the accused, but in his cross-examination, he attempted to state
that he had disclosed the number of the vehicle to the police, but such
statement of him made in his cross-examination is totally contrary to the
police record.
9.
To invoke Section 279 of the Indian Penal Code, the
prosecution is under an obligation to prove the identity of the accused, as
well as that he was driving the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner so as
to endanger human life. However, in the instant case, identity of the driver
i.e. accused, has not been established beyond reasonable doubt, as such,
no illegality can be said to have been committed by the learned Court
below, while acquitting the accused for his having allegedly committed
offences under Sections 279, 337, 304-A & 201 of Indian Penal Code and
Section 187 of Motor Vehicles Act.
10.
Having scanned the entire evidence adduced on record by the
prosecution, this Court is persuaded to agree with the findings returned by
learned
trial
Court
that
there
are
material
contradictions
and
inconsistencies in prosecution evidence and not much reliance can be
placed upon the prosecution witnesses while ascertaining guilt, if any, of
the accused.
11.
In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by
Hon’ble Apex Court in C. Magesh and others versus State of Karnataka
(2010) 5 Supreme Court Cases 645, wherein it has been held as under:“45.
It may be mentioned herein that in criminal jurisprudence,
evidence has to be evaluated on the touchstone of consistency.
Needless to emphasis, consistency is the keyword for upholding the
conviction of an accused. In this regard it is to be noted that this Court
in the case titled Surja Singh v. State of U.P. (2008)16 SCC 686:
2008(11) SCR 286 has held:-( SCC p.704, para 14)
“14. The evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency
and the inherent probability of the story; consistency with the
account of other witness is held to be creditworthy;..the
probative value of such evidence becomes eligible to be put into
the scales for a cumulative evaluation.”
46.
In a criminal trial, evidence of the eye witness requires a careful
assessment and must be evaluated for its creditability. Since the
fundamental aspect of criminal jurisprudence rests upon the stated
principle that “ no man is guilty until proven so,” hence utmost caution
is required to be exercised in dealing with situation where there are
multiple testimonies and equally large number of witnesses testifying
before the Court. There must be a string that should join the evidence
of all the witnesses and thereby satisfying the test of consistence in
evidence amongst all the witnesses.”
12.
It is well settled that prosecution has to stand on its own legs
and accused is not obliged to disprove the allegations made against him,
rather prosecution is required to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt
and any doubt arising therefrom must give benefit to the accused. In the
case at hand, prosecution failed to establish even the identity of the person
driving the offending vehicle, what to talk about rash and negligent driving,
if any, by the accused. So far as circumstantial evidence i.e. spot map,
photographs are concerned, same may not be of much help to the case of
the prosecution, especially when it has failed to lead reliable, direct and
corroborative evidence regarding the identity of driver. Similarly, medical
evidence adduced on record may not be of much relevance. Though medical
evidence adduced on record indicates that complainant as well as deceased
Ms. Arpana suffered injuries in the accident, but once identity of the
offending vehicle as well as driver has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, not much heed could have been otherwise paid to aforesaid medical
evidence by the learned Court below, as such, same rightly came to be
ignored.
13.
Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Chandrappa and Others Vs.
State of Karnataka (2007) 4 Supreme Court Cases 415, laid down the
general principle regarding power of Appellate Court, while dealing with the
appeal against order of acquittal. In afore judgment, Hon’ble Apex Court
held that while deciding appeal, Appellate Court, must keep in mind that in
case of acquittal, that there is double presumption in favour of the accused.
Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the
fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be
presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of
law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption
of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the
trial court.
14.
If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the
evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of
acquittal recorded by the trial court.
Relevant paras of the afore judgment read as under:“41. Recently, in Kallu v. State of M.P. [(2006) 10 SCC 313 : (2006) 3 SCC
(Cri) 546 : AIR 2006 SC 831] this Court stated : (SCC pp. 317-18, para 8)
“8. While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of the
appellate court is no less than the power exercised while hearing
appeals against conviction. In both types of appeals, the power exists
to review the entire evidence. However, one significant difference is
that an order of acquittal will not be interfered with, by an appellate
court, where the judgment of the trial court is based on evidence and
the view taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse the
decision of the trial court merely because a different view is possible.
The appellate court will also bear in mind that there is a presumption
of innocence in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to
get the benefit of any doubt. Further if it decides to interfere, it should
assign reasons for differing with the decision of the trial court.”
42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general
principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an
appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:
(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and
reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation,
restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate
court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on
questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling
reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”,
“distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to
curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against
acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of
language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to
interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review
the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of
acquittal,
there
is
double
presumption
in
favour
of
the
accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him
under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every
person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by
a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his
acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced,
reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the
evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding
of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”
15.
Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made herein
above as well as law taken into consideration, this Court finds no illegality
or infirmity in the impugned judgment of acquittal passed by the learned
trial Court, which appears to have been passed on the proper appreciation
of facts as well as law on the point, as such, same is upheld. Accordingly,
present appeal fails and dismissed alongwith pending applications, if any.
March 18, 2026
(sunil)
(Sandeep Sharma),
Judge
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