Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
RSA No. 183 of 2026
Date of decision: 29.07.2026
State of H.P. and others
...Appellants.
Versus
Ram Lal and & others
...Respondents.
Coram:
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
For the appellants
:
Mr.
Diwakar
Dev
Sharma,
Additional Advocate General.
For the respondents
:
Mr.
Manish
Kumar
Gupta,
Advocate, for respondents No.1 to 5
& 7 to 12.
Romesh Verma, Judge (Oral):
The present appeal arises out of the judgment and
decree, dated 22.8.2024, as passed by the learned District
Judge, Bilaspur, H.P. in Civil Appeal No. 29/13 of 2019,
whereby the appeal preferred by the present appellants/
defendants has been dismissed and the judgment and decree
dated 30.03.2019, as passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge,
Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, H.P. in Civil Suit No. 131/1 of
2015, titled as Ram Lal and others vs. State of H.P. & others,
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
-2has
been
affirmed,
plaintiffs/respondents
whereby
for
the
suit
filed
by
the
possession
and
mandatory
the
are
that
the
possession
and
injunction was partly decreed.
2.
Brief
facts
plaintiffs/respondents
of
filed
a
suit
case
for
mandatory injunction on 29.09.2015 on the ground that the
land comprised in khata/khatoni No. 1/1, khasra Nos. 79 and
93, kita 2, measuring 17.09 bighas and khata khatauni No.
14/16, khasra No. 93/1, measuring 07-08 bighas, situated at
Mauja Gounhta, Sub Tehsil Namhol, District Bilaspur, H.P. is
recorded in the ownership and possession of the plaintiffs.
3.
It is averred by the plaintiffs that in the year 1986,
defendant No.3 and Department of PWD planned to construct
Rajgarh-Sai-Trivenighat road, which was constructed in the
year 2003-2004 and in the year 2011-2012.
The defendants
occupied the suit land of the plaintiffs without their implied and
express consent. The said construction of road was raised at
the back of the plaintiffs and no permission was sought from
them.
The construction of the road was opposed by the
plaintiffs and they even approached the concerned authorities
especially defendant No.3, Executive Engineer, Division No.2,
Bilaspur, H.P. but the authorities forcibly constructed the road
-3in order to prejudice the rights of the plaintiffs. On account of
the unscientific construction, the defendants destroyed the
entire land of the plaintiff rendering it waste land and the
adjoining land of plaintiffs was also damaged and made useless.
Though, the plaintiffs approached the official of the defendants
from time to time to assess and make the compensation of the
land occupied but no action was taken by the authorities. The
acts of the defendants qua forcible and illegal occupation of the
suit land without the consent of the plaintiffs are wrong and
illegal.
Therefore, it was prayed that the plaintiffs have not
been compensated for the land occupied by the defendants, as
such, they are entitled to have possession of the suit land by
way of decree for possession along with mandatory injunction.
4.
The suit was contested by the defendants/State by
raising
preliminary
objections
maintainability and limitation etc.
with
respect
to
the
It was averred by the
defendants that the people of village Gounhta-Sai-Nodwa
allowed the construction work of the road without any protest.
No proposal for acquisition of the land was received because the
road was demanded by the villagers. On the belated stage, the
plaintiffs approached the Court to get compensation after
availing the facilities of the road. Since the road was
-4constructed about 20 years ago, therefore, the suit is liable to
dismissed.
It was averred in the written statement that no
unscientific method was adopted while constructing the road.
However, the facilities of transportation was provided to the
locals including the plaintiffs irrespective of any expenditure
incurred by the plaintiffs. The road was constructed on a
popular demand of the local villagers as well as the plaintiffs.
Therefore, the defendants prayed for dismissal of the suit, as
preferred by the plaintiffs.
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial
Court on 05.10.2016 framed the following issues:“1.
Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for relief of
possession of land comprised under khata/ khatoni
No. 1/1, khasra No. 79, 93 measuring 17-09 bighas
and khata khatauni No. 14/16, khasra No. 93/1,
measuring 07-08 bighas, situated at mauja Gouhta,
Sub Tehsil Namhol, District Bilaspur, H.P., as
prayed?
…OPP
2.
Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for relief of
mandatory injunction as prayed?
…OPP
3.
Whether the suit is not maintainable as alleged?
…OPD.
4.
Whether the suit of the plaintiffs is liable to be
dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, as
alleged?
..OPD.
5.
Whether the plaintiffs are estopped form filing the
present suit on account of their act and conduct, as
alleged?
…OPD
6.
Relief.”
-56.
Learned
Senior Civil Judge,
Bilaspur
vide
its
judgment and decree dated 30.03.2019 partly decreed the suit
filed by the plaintiffs for possession in respect of the suit land.
7.
Feeling dissatisfied defendants preferred an appeal
under Section 96 of the CPC in the Court of learned District
Judge, Bilaspur, on 31.10.2019. The learned First Appellate
Court vide its judgment and decree, dated 22.8.2024, dismissed
the appeal as preferred by the defendants.
8.
Still feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid judgments
and decrees, the appellants/defendants have approached this
Court by way of the present regular second appeal.
9.
It is contended by Mr. Diwakar Dev Sharma, learned
Additional Advocate General appearing for the State that the
impugned judgments and decrees, as passed by the learned
courts below, are wrong, erroneous and are liable to be
quashed and set aside. He submits that the findings returned
by the learned Courts below are not sustainable. Therefore,
after accepting the present appeal, the suit as filed by the
plaintiffs be dismissed.
10.
On the other hand, Mr. Manish Kumar Gupta,
learned counsel representing the respondents has defended the
judgments and decrees as passed by the learned courts below.
-6He submits that the land of the respondents was utilized for the
construction of the road in question, therefore, in view of the
mandate as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, whereby
it has been repeatedly held that no person can be deprived of
his property without following the due process of law, therefore,
the impugned judgments and decrees call for no interference.
He further submits that while invoking the provisions under
Section 100 of the CPC, this Court will not interfere in the
findings of fact, as returned by the learned Courts below.
11.
I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and
have also gone through the record carefully.
12.
With the consent of the parties, the case is finally
heard at admission stage on the following substantial question
of law:“Whether the findings as returned by the learned Courts
below are both against the oral as well as documentary
evidence placed on record and are the result of complete
misreading of material on record and thus suffer from
perversity?”
13.
The case of the plaintiffs before the learned trial
Court was that they are owners in possession of the suit land
bearing khata/khatoni No. 1/1, khasra Nos. 79 and 93
measuring 17-09 bighas, situated at Mauja Gounhta, Sub
Tehsil Namhol, District Bilaspur, H.P. It was the case of the
-7plaintiffs that the road was constructed over the suit land in
between
the
years
2003-2004
and
2011-2012.
The
construction of the road was vehemently opposed by the
plaintiffs on the spot. However, the officials of the defendants
did not accede to their request and they constructed the road
without the implied and express consent of the plaintiffs. No
permission of the plaintiffs was sought by the defendants while
utilizing the land of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs came to know
about the wrongful and illegal acts and the occupation of
defendants over the suit land only on 15.09.2014, when they
procured
the
revenue
records
as
till
then,
they
were
approaching time and again to the officials of the defendants to
make compensation on account of utilization of the suit land
but no action was taken.
It is the case of the plaintiffs that
since the defendants have failed to either acquire the suit land
or to pay the compensation in accordance with law or to deliver
the possession of the suit land, therefore, the plaintiffs are
entitled for decree for possession and mandatory injunction.
14.
The learned trial Court partly decreed the suit, as
filed by the plaintiffs by passing a decree for possession of the
suit land in favour of the plaintiffs.
As far as the prayer for
-8mandatory injunction, seeking direction to acquire the suit land
is concerned, the same was declined by the learned trial Court.
15.
The only defence which has been taken by the
defendants/appellants in their written statement is that the
suit as instituted has been filed at a belated stage and that the
road was constructed with the consent of the plaintiffs and
other co-villagers as such, the suit, as filed by the plaintiffs is
not maintainable. It is the case of the defendants that the road
was constructed on the demand of the villagers including the
plaintiffs and while raising the construction, no objection of any
kind was raised by anybody. The road was constructed with
the consent of the villagers and there was no pressure or force
on the part of the defendants while doing so.
Therefore, the
defendants prayed for dismissal of the suit, as filed by the
plaintiffs.
16.
In order to corroborate its case, the plaintiffs
examined Shyam Lal as PW-1. He has filed his affidavit by way
of Ext. PW-1/A. In his deposition, he has stated that he is an
agriculturist and he filed the suit regarding the suit land
comprised in khata/khatoni No. 1/1, khasra Nos. 79 and 93
measuring 17-09 bighas, situated at Mauja Gounhta, Sub
Tehsil Namhol, District Bilaspur, H.P.
He reiterated all the
-9averments, as made in the plaint and submitted that the
defendants raised the construction of the road from the suit
land without their consent and while doing so, on account of
unscientific excavation and construction, they destroyed the
entire land rendering it waste for utilization.
Though, the
plaintiffs were approaching and requesting the officials of the
defendants to assess and make compensation of the land, but
no action was taken. He came to know about the wrong and
illegal acts of the defendants on 15.09.2014, when they
procured the copy of revenue record. It has been deposed by
PW-1 that the defendants had paid the compensation to the
persons, whose lands were acquired by the State, but in the
case of the plaintiffs the defendants have failed to act upon. In
cross examination, PW-1 has specifically denied that when the
road was being constructed
in the year 1993-94, the said
construction was not opposed by the plaintiffs.
He further
denied that the road was constructed on the popular demand of
the villagers including the plaintiffs. He denied the suggestion
that the road was not constructed forcibly by the defendants.
He denied the suggestion that they never approached the
officials of the defendants to acquire their land. He specifically
stated that he does not know that the road has been
-10constructed under the NABARD Scheme by the defendants. He
admitted that the road was metalled in the year 2012. He
denied the suggestion that the present suit has been filed by
the plaintiffs in order to extract money from the defendants.
17.
PW-2, Kanshi Ram, filed his affidavit Ext. PW-2/A.
He has also reiterated the averments as made in the plaint. He
deposed that the defendants occupied the suit land at the back
of the plaintiffs and without their consent and permission.
While raising the construction of the road, no permission was
sought by the defendants. Though, the construction of the road
was vehemently opposed by the plaintiffs but the defendants
forcibly constructed the road under the pressure of the officials.
The suit land has been utilized without the consent and
permission of the plaintiffs and also by not paying the
compensation. He stated that the defendants had already paid
compensation to some of the villagers, whose land was acquired
by the State.
He denied the suggestion in his cross-
examination that the road was constructed on the demand of
the villagers.
He denied that the road was not constructed
forcibly by the officials of the defendants. He denied that no
damage occurred to the land of the plaintiffs. He admitted that
-11the construction of the road started in the year 1993-94 and it
was metalled in the year 2012.
18.
PW-3, Hem Raj, has filed his affidavit Ext. PW-3/A.
He also deposed on the same lines, as was done by PWs 1 and
2.
He supported the case of the plaintiffs.
In his cross-
examination, he denied that the road was constructed on the
asking of the villagers including the plaintiffs. He denied that
the road was not constructed forcibly by the officials of the
defendants. He admitted that the road was metalled in the year
2012.
19.
In order to rebut the evidence, as led by the
plaintiffs, the defendants examined DW-1, Ramesh Kumar,
Executive Engineer and his affidavit has been placed on record
as DW-1/A.
In his statement, he stated that the road was
constructed by the department in the year 1994 under the
State budget.
The plaintiffs and their predecessor-in-interest
were themselves interested in the construction of the road and
it is only at their asking that the road was constructed. At the
time of the construction of the road, the plaintiffs did not raise
any demand for compensation.
The suit land is situated in
between k.m. 1/00 to 4/00 from Namhol side. The metaling of
the road was completed by the department in the year 2012
-12itself and vehicles started plying since 2010 on kuchha road.
The plaintiffs never objected or sought compensation for the
land so utilized for alignment of the present road. The plaintiffs
and their predecessor-in-interest allowed the construction of
the said road. DW-1 stated that the plaintiffs never approached
the authorities for acquisition of the land.
He stated that
neither the plaintiffs nor the other villagers raised any objection
or sought any compensation till date from the defendants. The
road was constructed on the demand of the plaintiffs and local
villagers.
No cause of action arose to the plaintiffs on
02.05.2015, whereas, the road was constructed about 20 years
ago.
20.
In cross-examination, DW-1 admitted that he has
not brought any document to substantiate that the road was
constructed on public demand. Self stated that the road was
constructed on public demand.
He admitted that he cannot
place on record any permission, as granted by the villagers.
Self stated that verbal consent was given by the villagers. He
admitted that the road was metalled in the year 2012.
He
admitted that document Ext. DW-1/F was issued by their office
and in column No.10 of the same, the names of the villagers
have been mentioned to whom the compensation on account of
-13compulsory acquisition was paid by the defendants. He stated
that the road was constructed with the consent of the villagers.
21.
The plaintiffs have placed on record copy of
jamabandi for the year 2004-05, Ext. PW-1/B and Ex. PW1/D
which shows the plaintiffs to be owner in possession of suit
land alongwith other. Ext. PW-1/C is the copy of Aks Latha,
placed on record by the plaintiffs. Ext. PW-1/F is the notice, as
issued to the defendants/appellants. Copy of postal receipt has
been placed on record as Ext. PW-1/G.
The Executive
Engineer, Bilaspur responded to the said notice by sending
reply on 30.05.2015. Ext. PW-1/H is the details of information
applied under RTI Act, whereby the details of the land acquired
by the State for the construction of the road has been
mentioned.
In column No.10 of the same, the names of the
villagers have been mentioned to whom the amount of
compensation was paid by the defendants. The said information
reveals that qua the construction of the very same road amount
of compensation was paid to certain persons.
22.
The plaintiffs have been able to plead and prove that
they are owners in possession of the suit land. The defendants
raised construction of the road without their implied and
express consent. Therefore, the plaintiffs were constrained to
-14file the suit for possession and mandatory injunction.
Though,
the relief of mandatory injunction was denied to the plaintiffs,
however, decree for possession has been granted on the basis of
the title.
The learned trial Court after appreciating the oral as
well as documentary evidence placed on record rightly came to
the conclusion that the plaintiffs being the owners of the suit
land are entitled for possession as neither the suit land has
been acquired nor amount of compensation has been paid to
the plaintiffs.
23.
It is well settled principle of law that no person can
be deprived of his properties save and except without adopting
due process of law. The Court of the first instance as also the
First Appellate Court have concurrently held that the land of
the plaintiffs/respondents was utilized for construction of
Rajgarh-Sai-Trivenighat
link
road
without
payment
of
compensation to them. No dispute has been raised as to such
findings of fact. It has only been contended on behalf of the
defendants/State that the suit has been filed by the plaintiffs
after a considerable period and the same was time barred. In
alternative,
it
was
contended
that
since
the
plaintiffs/respondents remained silent for such a long period,
they were estopped from raising the stale claim. Principle of
-15acquiescence has also been sought to be applied against the
plaintiffs/respondents
on
the
premise
that
the
plaintiffs/respondents were aware about the construction of
road and the road was constructed with their implied consent
and now they cannot, turn around to raise objections against
the construction of road.
24.
The defendants/appellants are constituents of a
welfare State. It is well settled that the welfare State cannot
claim adverse possession against its citizens. Thus, the suit on
the basis of title cannot be said to be time barred, which right
could only be defeated by proof of perfection of title by way of
adverse possession by the other.
25.
Admittedly, the plaintiffs are the title holders of the
suit land. Being owners of the suit property they can file suit at
any stage until and unless the said right is defeated by
defendants/appellants by perfection of title by way of adverse
possession. Being the owners of the suit land, the plaintiffs are
well within their right to file a suit for possession and
mandatory injunction since the land was utilized for the
construction of the road in question without due process of law
including the payment of compensation.
-1626.
Admittedly, the appellants/defendants were not in
possession of any document to show that the plaintiffs had
consented for construction of road through their suit lands.
When specifically asked this question from the learned
Additional Advocate General, he is unable to answer the query
of
the
Court.
No
documents
have
been
appended
to
demonstrate that the plaintiffs have orally consented for the
construction of the road in question.
27.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in Vidya Devi vs. State of
Himachal Pradesh & others (2020) 2 SCC 569 has held that
no person can be forcibly dispossessed of his property without
any legal sanction and without following the due process of law
and depriving payment of just and fair compensation. The State
being a welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot
arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the
Constitution. The Court has held as follows:
“12. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties and
perused the record. 12.1. The Appellant was forcibly
expropriated of her property in 1967, when the right to
property was a fundamental right guaranteed by Article
31 in Part III of the Constitution. Vidaya Devi vs The State
Of Himachal Pradesh on 8 January, 2020 Article 31
guaranteed the right to private property 1, which could not
be deprived without due process of law and upon just and
fair compensation.
-1712.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental
right by the Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act,
1978, however, it continued to be a human right 2 in a
welfare State, and a Constitutional right under Article 300
A of the Constitution. Article 300 A provides that no
person shall be deprived of his property save by authority
of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his
property
except
in
accordance
with
the
procedure
established by law. The obligation to pay compensation,
though not expressly included in Article 300 A, can be
inferred in that Article The State of West Bengal v. Subodh
Gopal Bose and Ors. AIR 1954 SC 92. 2 Tukaram Kana
Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors. (2013) 1 SCC 353.
12.3. To forcibly dispossess a person of his private
property, without following due process of law, would be
violative of a human right, as also the constitutional right
under Article 300 A of the Constitution. Reliance is placed
on the judgment in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd.
v. Darius Shapur Chenai4, wherein this Court held that:
“ 6. … Having regard to the provisions contained in
Article 300A of the Constitution, the State in
exercise of its power of "eminent domain" may
interfere with the right of property of a person by
acquiring the same but the same must be for a
public
purpose
and
reasonable
compensation
therefor must be paid.” (emphasis supplied)
12.4 In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy5, this
Court held that:
“21. If the right of property is a human right as also
a constitutional right, the same cannot be taken
away except in accordance with law. Article 300A
of
the
Constitution
protects
such
right.
The
-18provisions of the Act seeking to divest such right,
keeping in view of the provisions of Article 300A of
the
Constitution
of
India,
must
be
strictly
construed.” (emphasis supplied) 4 (2005) 7 SCC
627.
12.5 In Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. State of
U.P. & Ors., this Court recognized the right to property as
a basic human right in the following words:
“30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by
different political thinkers that some amount of
property
right
is
an
indispensable
safeguard
against tyranny and economic oppression of the
Government. Jefferson was of the view that liberty
cannot long subsist without the support of property.
"Property must be secured, else liberty cannot subsist"
was the opinion of John Adams. Indeed the view that
property itself is the seed bed which must be conserved if
other constitutional values are to flourish is the consensus
among political thinkers and jurists.” (emphasis supplied)
12.6 In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat,7
this Court held as follows :
“48. …In other words, Article 300A only limits the
powers of the State that no person shall be
deprived of his property save by authority of law.
There has to be no deprivation without any sanction
of law. Deprivation by any other mode is not
acquisition or taking possession under Article 300A.
In other words, if there is no law, there is no
deprivation.” (emphasis supplied) 10.3. In this case,
the
Appellant
could
not
have
been
forcibly
dispossessed of her property without any legal
-19sanction, and without following due process of law,
there is no deprivation.”
12.6 In this case, the Appellant could not have been
forcibly dispossessed of her property without any legal
sanction, and without following due process of law, and
depriving her 6 (2011) 9 SCC 354. 7 (1995) Supp. 1 SCC
596. payment of just compensation, being a fundamental
right on the date of forcible dispossession in 1967.
12.8. The contention of the State that the Appellant or her
predecessors had “orally” consented to the acquisition is
completely baseless. We find complete lack of authority
and legal sanction in compulsorily divesting the Appellant
of her property by the State.
12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law,
the State could not have deprived a citizen of their
property without the sanction of law. Reliance is placed
on the judgment of this Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi &
Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors. wherein it was held that the State
must
comply
with
the
procedure
for
acquisition,
requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. The
State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law
cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided
by the Constitution.
12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar
held that the right to property is now considered to be not
only a constitutional or statutory right, but also a human
right. 8 (2013) 1 SCC 353. Human rights have been
considered in the realm of individual rights such as right
to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human
rights have gained a multi− faceted dimension.
12.11. We are surprised by the plea taken by the State
before the High Court, that since it has been in continuous
-20possession of the land for over 42 years, it would
tantamount to “adverse” possession. The State being a
welfare State, cannot be permitted to take the plea of
adverse possession, which allows a trespasser i.e. a
person guilty of a tort, or even a crime, to gain legal title
over such property for over 12 years. The State cannot be
permitted to perfect its title over the land by invoking the
doctrine of adverse possession to grab the property of its
own citizens, as has been done in the present case.
12.12. The contention advanced by the State of delay and
laches of the Appellant in moving the Court is also liable
to be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a
case
of
a
continuing
cause
of
action,
or
if
the
circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court.
Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion,
which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in
the facts and circumstances of a case. It will depend upon
the breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy
claimed, and when and how the delay arose. There is no
period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise
their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice.
12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so
compelling, a constitutional Court would exercise its
jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not defeat
it.
12.14. In Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. &
Ors.,10 this Court while dealing with a similar fact
situation, held as follows : “There are authorities which
state that delay and laches extinguish the right to put
forth a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to service
jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong done to
them decades ago, recovery of statutory dues, claim for
-21educational facilities and other categories of similar cases,
etc. Though, it is true that there are a few authorities that
lay down that delay and laches debar a citizen from
seeking remedy, even if his fundamental right has been
violated, under Article 9 P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of
T.N. (1975) 1 SCC 152. 10 (2013) 1 SCC 353. 32 or 226 of
the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a different
scenario altogether. Functionaries of the State took over
possession of the land belonging to the Appellants without
any
sanction
of
law.
The
Appellants
had
asked
repeatedly for grant of the benefit of compensation. The
State must either comply with the procedure laid down for
acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible
statutory mode.” (emphasis supplied)
13. In the present case, the Appellant being an illiterate
person, who is a widow coming from a rural area has
been deprived of her private property by the State without
resorting to the procedure prescribed by law. The
Appellant has been divested of her right to property
without being paid any compensation whatsoever for over
half a century. The cause of action in the present case is a
continuing one, since the Appellant was compulsorily
expropriated of her property in 1967 without legal
sanction or following due process of law. The present case
is one where the demand for justice is so compelling since
the State has admitted that the land was taken over
without
initiating
acquisition
proceedings,
or
any
procedure known to law. We exercise our extraordinary
jurisdiction
under
Articles
and
of
the
Constitution, and direct the State to pay compensation to
the appellant.
-2228.
To the similar effect, the Hon’ble Apex Court in
(2022) 7 SCC 508 titled as Sukh Dutt Ratra and another vs.
State of H.P. and others has held as under:
“14. It is the cardinal principle of the rule of law, that
nobody can be deprived of liberty or property without due
process, or authorization of law. The recognition of this
dates back to the 1700s to the decision of the King’s
Bench in Entick v. Carrington17 and by this court in Wazir
Chand v. The State of Himachal Pradesh18. Further, in
several judgments, this court has repeatedly held that
rather than enjoying a wider bandwidth of lenience, the
State often has a higher responsibility in demonstrating
that it has acted within the confines of legality, and
therefore, not tarnished the basic principle of the rule of
law.
15. When it comes to the subject of private property, this
court has upheld the high threshold of legality that must
be met, to dispossess an individual of their property, and
even more so when done by the State. In Bishandas v.
State of Punjab19 this court rejected the contention that
the petitioners in the case were trespassers and could be
removed by an executive order, and instead concluded
that the executive action taken by the State and its
officers, was destructive of the basic principle of the rule
of law. This court, in another case - State of Uttar Pradesh
and Ors. v. Dharmander Prasad Singh and Ors. 20, held:
“A lessor, with the best of title, has no right to resume
possession extra-judicially by use of force, from a lessee,
even after the expiry or earlier termination of the lease by
forfeiture or otherwise. The use of the expression 're-entry'
in the lease-deed does not authorise extrajudicial methods
-23to resume possession. Under law, the possession of a
lessee, even after the expiry or its earlier termination is
juridical
possession
and
forcible
dispossession
is
prohibited; a lessee cannot be dispossessed otherwise
than in due course of law. In the present case, the fact
that the lessor is the State does not place it in any higher
or better position. On the contrary, it is under an
additional inhibition stemming from the requirement that
all actions of Government and Governmental authorities
should have a 'legal pedigree'”.
16. Given the important protection extended to an
individual vis-a-vis their private property (embodied
earlier in Article 31, and now as a constitutional right in
Article 300-A), and the high threshold the State must meet
while acquiring land, the question remains – can the
State, merely on the ground of delay and laches, evade its
legal responsibility towards those from whom private
property has been expropriated? In these facts and
circumstances, we find this conclusion to be unacceptable,
and warranting intervention on the grounds of equity and
fairness.
17. When seen holistically, it is apparent that the State’s
actions, or lack thereof, have in fact compounded the
injustice meted out to the appellants and compelled them
to approach this court, albeit belatedly. The initiation of
acquisition proceedings initially in the 1990s occurred
only at the behest of the High Court. Even after such
judicial intervention, the State continued to only extend
the benefit of the court’s directions to those who
specifically
approached
the
courts.
The
State’s
lackadaisical conduct is discernible from this action of
initiating acquisition proceedings selectively, only in
-24respect to the lands of those writ petitioners who had
approached the court in earlier proceedings, and not other
land owners, pursuant to the orders dated 23.04.2007 (in
CWP No. 1192/2004) and 20.12.2013 (in CWP No.
1356/2010) respectively. In this manner, at every stage,
the State sought to shirk its responsibility of acquiring
land required for public use in the manner prescribed by
law.
18. There is a welter of precedents on delay and laches
which conclude either way – as contended by both sides
in the present dispute – however, the specific factual
matrix compels this court to weigh in favour of the
appellant-land owners. The State cannot shield itself
behind the ground of delay and laches in such a situation;
there cannot be a ‘limitation’ to doing justice. This court in
a much earlier case - Maharashtra State Road Transport
Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, held:
‘11…..."Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of
Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine.
Where it would be practically unjust to give a
remedy, either because the party has, by his
conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded
as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his
conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not
waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a
situation in which it would not be reasonable to
place him if the remedy were afterwards to be
asserted in either of these cases, lapse of time and
delay are most material.
But in every case, if an argument against
relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded
upon
mere
delay,
that
delay
of
course
not
-25amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the
validity of that defence must be tried upon
principles
substantially
equitable.
Two
circumstances, always important in such cases,
are, the length of the delay and the nature of the
acts done during the interval, which might affect
either party and cause a balance of justice or
injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far
as relates to the remedy."
19. The facts of the present case reveal that the
State has, in a clandestine and arbitrary manner,
actively tried to limit disbursal of compensation as
required by law, only to those for which it was
specifically prodded by the courts, rather than to all
those who are entitled. This arbitrary action, which
is also violative of the appellants’ prevailing Article
31 right (at the time of cause of action), undoubtedly
warranted consideration, and intervention by the
High Court, under its Article 226 jurisdiction. This
court, in Manohar (supra) - a similar case where the
name of the aggrieved had been deleted from
revenue records leading to his dispossession from
the land without payment of compensation – held:
6“Having
heard
the
learned
counsel
for
the
appellants, we are satisfied that the case projected
before the court by the appellants is utterly
untenable and not worthy of emanating from any
State which professes the least regard to being a
welfare State. When we pointed out to the learned
counsel that, at this stage at least, the State should
be gracious enough to accept its mistake and
promptly pay the compensation to the respondent,
-26the State has taken an intractable attitude and
persisted in opposing what appears to be a just and
reasonable claim of the respondent.
Ours is a constitutional democracy and the
rights available to the citizens are declared by the
Constitution. Although Article 19(1)(f) was deleted
by the Forty-fourth Amendment to the Constitution,
Article 300-A has been placed in the Constitution,
which reads as follows: “300-A. Persons not to be
deprived of property save by authority of law.—No
person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law.” 8.This is a case where we find
utter lack of legal authority for deprivation of the
respondent's property by the appellants who are
State authorities. In our view, this case was an
eminently fit one for exercising the writ jurisdiction
of the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution…
20. Again, in Tukaram Kana Joshi (supra) while
dealing with a similar fact situation, this court held
as follows: (SCC p. 359 para11)
“11“There are authorities which state that delay
and laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim.
Most
of
these
authorities
pertain
to
service
jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong
done to them decades ago, recovery of statutory
dues, claim for educational facilities and other
categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true
that there are a few authorities that lay down that
delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking
remedy, even if his fundamental right has been
violated, under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution,
-27the case at hand deals with a different scenario
altogether. The functionaries of the State took over
possession of the land belonging to the appellants
without any sanction of law. The appellants had
asked repeatedly for grant of the benefit of
compensation. The State must either comply with
the
procedure
laid
down
for
acquisition,
or
requisition, or any other permissible statutory
mode.”
21. Having considered the pleadings filed, this
court finds that the contentions raised by the State,
do not inspire confidence and deserve to be
rejected. The State has merely averred to the
appellants’ alleged verbal consent or the lack of
objection, but has not placed any material on record
to substantiate this plea. Further, the State was
unable to produce any evidence indicating that the
land of the appellants had been taken over or
acquired in the manner known to law, or that they
had ever paid any compensation. It is pertinent to
note that this was the State’s position, and
subsequent findings of the High Court in 2007 as
well, in the other writ proceedings.”
29.
The learned Courts below have rightly appreciated
the oral as well as documentary evidence placed on record and
have rightly come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs are
entitled
for
defendants.
grant
of
decree
for possession
against
the
-2830.
The Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that no
person can be deprived of his properties without adopting due
process of law, therefore, under such circumstances, plea as set
up by the appellants-State is not tenable in the facts and
circumstances of the case. Once they have utilized the land of
the villagers without adopting due process of law, now the plea
as raised by the present appellants is not permissible, that too,
at the stage of Regular Second Appeal.
31.
DW-1 has admitted in his deposition that qua the
construction of similar road certain persons have been paid the
amount of compensation.
The defendants have adopted the
policy of pick and choose which is not permissible in the eyes of
law. Once the defendants have chosen to pay the compensation
to similar situated persons, in that event, the plaintiffs cannot
be discriminated.
However, in the present case, decree for
possession has been passed in favour of the plaintiffs.
Therefore, the said finding does not call for any interference by
this Court.
32.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with scope
of interference under Section 100 in Hero Vinoth (minor) vs.
Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 has held as under:
“18. It has been noted time and again that without insisting
for the statement of such a substantial question of law in the
-29memorandum of appeal and formulating the same at the
time of admission, the High Courts have been issuing notices
and generally deciding the second appeals without adhering
to the procedure prescribed under Section 100 of the CPC. It
has further been found in a number of cases that no efforts
are made to distinguish between a question of law and a
substantial question of law. In exercise of the powers under
this section in several cases, the findings of fact of the first
appellate court are found to have been disturbed. It has to
be kept in mind that the right of appeal is neither a natural
nor an inherent right attached to the litigation. Being a
substantive statutory right, it has to be regulated in
accordance with law in force at the relevant time. The
conditions mentioned in the section must be strictly fulfilled
before a second appeal can be maintained and no court has
the power to add or to enlarge those grounds. The second
appeal cannot be decided on merely equitable grounds. The
concurrent findings of facts will not be disturbed by the High
Court in exercise of the powers under this section. Further, a
substantial question of law has to be distinguished from a
substantial question of fact. This Court in Sir Chunilal V.
Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd. (AIR
1962 SC 1314) held that : "The proper test for determining
whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial
would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public
importance or whether it directly and substantially affects
the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open
question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this
Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is
not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative
views. If the question is settled by the highest court or the
general principles to be applied in determining the question
are well settled and there is a mere question of applying
-30those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd
the question would not be a substantial question of law.
" 19. It is not within the domain of the High Court to
investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived
at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate court. It
is true that the lower appellate court should not ordinarily
reject witnesses accepted by the trial court in respect of
credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses
accepted by the trial court, the same is no ground for
interference in second appeal when it is found that the
appellate court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so.
In a case where from a given set of circumstances two
inferences of fact are possible, one drawn by the lower
appellate court will not be interfered by the High Court in
second appeal.
Adopting any other approach is not
permissible. The High Court will, however, interfere where it
is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate
court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory
provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the
basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was
based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at by ignoring
material evidence.
20. to 22 xx xx xx xx
23. To be "substantial" a question of law must be debatable,
not previously settled by law of the land or a binding
precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision
of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of
the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law
"involving in the case" there must be first a foundation for it
laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from
the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts
and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a
just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point
raised for the first time before the High Court is not a
-31question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the
matter.
It
will,
therefore,
depend
on
the
facts
and
circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a
substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the
paramount overall consideration being the need for striking
a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to
do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding
prolongation in the life of any lis.”
33.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Annamalai vs.
Vasanthi, 2025 INSC 1267, has held as follows:“16. Whether D-1 and D-2 were able to discharge the
aforesaid burden is a question of fact which had to be
determined by a court of fact after appreciating the evidence
available on record. Under CPC, a first appellate court is the
final court of fact. No doubt, a second appellate court
exercising power(s) under Section 100 CPC can interfere
with a finding of fact on limited grounds, such as, (a) where
the finding is based on inadmissible evidence; (b) where it is
in ignorance of relevant admissible evidence; (c) where it is
based on misreading of evidence; and (d) where it is
perverse. But that is not the case here.
17. In the case on hand, the first appellate court, in
paragraph 29 of its judgment, accepted the endorsement
(Ext. A-2) made on the back of a registered document (Exb.
A-1) after considering the oral evidence led by the plaintiffappellant
and
the
circumstance
that
signature(s)/
thumbmark of D-1 and D-2 were not disputed, though
claimed as one obtained on a blank paper. The reasoning of
the first appellate court in paragraph 29 of its judgment was
not addressed by the High Court. In fact, the High Court, in
one line, on a flimsy defense of use of a signed blank paper,
observed that genuineness of Ext. A-2 is not proved. In our
-32view, the High Court fell in error here. While exercising
powers under Section 100 CPC, it ought not to have
interfered with the finding of fact returned by the first
appellate court on this aspect; more so, when the first
appellate court had drawn its conclusion after appreciating
the evidence available on record as also the circumstance
that signature(s)/thumbmark(s) appearing on the document
(Exb.A2) were not disputed. Otherwise also, while disturbing
the finding of the first appellate court, the High Court did not
hold that the finding returned by the first appellate court is
based on a misreading of evidence, or is in ignorance of
relevant evidence, or is perverse. Thus, there existed no
occasion for the High Court, exercising power under Section
100 CPC, to interfere with the finding of the first appellate
court regarding payment of additional Rs. 1,95,000 to D-1
and D-2 over and above the sale consideration fixed for the
transaction. 18. Once the finding regarding payment of
additional sum of Rs.1,95,000 to D-1 and D-2 recorded by
the first appellate court is sustained, there appears no
logical reason to hold that the plaintiff (Annamalai) was not
ready and willing to perform its part under the contract
particularly when Rs. 4,70,000, out of total consideration of
Rs. 4,80,000, was already paid and, over and above that,
additional sum of Rs.1,95,000 was paid in lieu of demand
made by D-1 & D-2. This we say so, because an opinion
regarding plaintiff’s readiness and willingness to perform its
part under the contract is to be formed on the entirety of
proven facts and circumstances of a case including conduct
of the parties. The test is that the person claiming
performance must satisfy conscience of the court that he has
treated the contract subsisting with preparedness to fulfill
his obligation and accept performance when the time for
performance arrives.”
-3334.
No other point was raised by the learned counsel for
the parties.
35.
Both the Courts below have rightly appreciated the
point in controversy after considering the oral as well as
documentary evidence placed on record. The substantial
question of law is answered accordingly.
36.
In view of above, the present appeal being devoid of
any merit deserves to be dismissed. Ordered accordingly.
Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
(Romesh Verma)
Judge
29th July, 2026.
(Guleria)
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review