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2026:HHC:38364
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA.
FAO (OS) No. 19 of 2026
Date of decision: 09.09.2026
State of H. P. & Anr.
…Appellants
Versus
Smt. Bhawani Devi
…Respondent
Coram
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice G. S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice.
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bipin C. Negi, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?
For the Petitioner:
Mr.
Rakesh
Dhaulta,
Advocate General.
Additional
G. S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice (Oral)
CMP(M) No. 1476 of 2026
Keeping
in
view
the
averments
made
in
the
application, duly supported by the affidavit of the officialrespondents, the delay of 320 days in filing the appeal is
condoned. Application stands disposed of.
Appeal be registered.
FAO(OS) No. 19 of 2026
2.
The State is aggrieved by the allowing of the
application filed under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (for short the ‘Act’), whereby, full wages last drawn
i.e. full pay to the workman during the pendency of the writ
petition was granted, keeping in view the provisions of Section
17-B of the Act.
2026:HHC:38364
3.
The grievance of the State is as such that the
directions were issued to pay full wages from the date of filing of
the writ petition and not from the date of the application, which
was filed and, thus, reference is made to the provisions of
Section 17-B of the Act.
4.
We are of the considered opinion that the issue
stands squarely covered against the State in a similar matter
being FAO(OS) No. 05 of 2025, titled as State of H.P. & Anr.
vs. Bir Singh, decided on 18.07.2026, whereby the same issue
was subject matter of consideration.
5.
The brief facts are that the award as such was
passed on 25.11.2017 and the State had chosen not to file writ
petition against the said award till 13.10.2020 and, therefore, the
workman apparently was handicapped to file the application
under Section 17-B of the Act. The writ petition was apparently
listed on 07.12.2020 and notice was directed to be issued on
09.12.2020. The service upon the workman apparently could not
be completed and the counsel put in appearance only on
13.06.2022. The application under Section 17-B of the Act which
had been filed on 07.03.2022 was also listed on the said date
and the counsel for the State had taken three weeks’ time to file
reply to the application.
6.
It is, thus, apparent that the filing of the application
under Section 17-B of the Act could not have been done on
2026:HHC:38364
account of delay in filing of the writ petition. The moment, the
service was effected, the application under Section 17-B of the
Act, which was actually prepared on 01.11.2021, signed and
verified by way of affidavit at Jogindernagar was then filed by the
counsel on putting in appearance on having been served. In the
application itself, it was mentioned that the joining report had
also been submitted on 26.02.2018 in terms of the award dated
25.11.2017 and the applicant had not been re-instated.
7.
A perusal of the writ petition would go on to show
that the State had dedicated paragraph 15 to explain how the
delay took place in filing the writ petition and in fact, apparently,
the matter was pending on and off and reference is also made
that there was no decision to file LPA and apparently, the
decision had somewhere been taken in the year 2020. The State
had apparently took its sweet time to file writ petition, as
noticed, on 13.10.2020. Apparently, the workman had been
placed in a precarious position due to the non -filing of the writ
petition.
8.
In reply filed to the application filed under Section
17-B of the Act, the State does not refer to the fact or deny the
fact that the joining report as such was given and, therefore, the
State on its own, did not take work from the employee, but chose
and sat back for a period of three years causing prejudice to the
2026:HHC:38364
employee as such, who was divested of the right to file
application under Section 17-B of the Act.
9.
The said issue has been dilated by us in Bir Singh’s
case supra, while placing reliance upon various judgments that
once there is no valid reason for filing the writ petition, the
workman cannot be put at a dis-advantage and prejudice,
therefore, right of wages would thus start from the filing of the
writ petition, rather, we had upheld the right from the date of
passing of the award as directed by the learned Single Judge.
Relevant portion of the judgment reads as under:“22. It is in such circumstances that we have now to
deal with the issues in the appeal, as to whether the
State could take advantage of its own wrong having
chosen not to file the writ petition within a reasonable
time and having only filed the writ petition on
30.12.2021, after four years from the date of passing of
the Award dated 21.11.2017, and whether it could
preclude the workman from getting the benefits of the
application filed under Section 17-B of the ID Act, 1947.
23. We are of the considered opinion that the beneficial
aspect of the legislation cannot be lost sight of. Its
purpose and intent is to ensure that the award is
implemented without delay. Therefore, the employer
must firstly avail of their remedy at the earliest and
cannot take advantage of delaying tactics to the
detriment of the poor employee. The employees having
fought an uphill battle against the State to secure
reinstatement and having succeeded in their pursuit of
justice, cannot be denied the fruits of the litigation,
especially when the State had successfully delayed the
filing of the petition by four years and subsequently
2026:HHC:38364
had obtained a stay order on 03.01.2022, leading to the
employee expeditiously filing an application, which was
prepared on 04.04.2022 and filed on 20.05.2022.
24. The objects and reasons for enacting the provisions
of Section 17-B of the ID Act, 1947 reads as under:“When the Labour Courts pass award of
reinstatement, these are often contested by an
employer in the Supreme Court or High Court. It
was felt that the delay in the implementation of
the award causes hardship to the workman
concerned. It was, therefore, proposed to provide
the payment
of wages last drawn by the
workman concerned, under certain conditions,
from the date of the award till the case is finally
decided in the Supreme Court or High Courts.”
25. It was in such circumstances that Section 17-B of
the ID Act, 1947, was incorporated into the Statute
Book by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982
w.e.f. 21.08.1984 and it reads as under:
“17-B. Payment of full wages to workman
pending proceedings in higher courts-Where
in any case a Labour Court, Tribunal or National
Tribunal by its award directs reinstatement of any
workman and the employer prefers any
proceedings against such award in a High Court or
the Supreme Court, the employer shall be liable to
pay such workman, during the period of pendency
of such proceedings in the High Court or the
Supreme Court, full wages last drawn by him,
inclusive
of
any
maintenance
allowance
admissible to him under any rule if the workman
had not been employed in any establishment
during such period and an affidavit by such
workman had been filed to that effect in such
Court;
Provided that where it is proved to the satisfaction
of the High Court or the Supreme Court that such
workman had been employed and had been
receiving adequate remuneration during any such
period or part thereof, the Court shall order that
no wages shall be payable under this section for
such period or part, as the case may be.”
26. From a reading of the Objects and Reasons of
Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes (ID) Act, 1947, it
2026:HHC:38364
is clear that delays in the implementation of an award
caused hardship to the workman concerned so to
mitigate this, a provision was made for the payment of
interim relief equal to the last drawn wages from the
date of the award. Under the substantive part of
Section 17-B, this benefit of full wages last drawn is
made mandatory upon the filing of an affidavit stating
that the workman is not employed. This liability arises
when an award directs reinstatement and the employer
challenges the award in the High Court or the Supreme
Court, and the proceedings remain pending in those
higher Courts. The proviso states that if the workman
was employed and received adequate remuneration
during any such period or part thereof, no wages shall
be payable for that period or part, as the case may be.
Therefore, the quantification is left to the concerned
Court, solely to ensure that the benefit is denied only in
cases of actual employment period.
27. In the first case of Dena Bank (supra), decided in
the year 1999, the Apex Court had dealt with the issue
of "full wages last drawn" under Section 17-B of the ID
Act, 1947. Relying on the Statement of Objects and
Reasons, the Court had concluded that this benefit was
intended
to
relieve
the
hardship
caused
to
the
workman on account of delays in implementing the
order. Consequently, it was held that the object
underlying the provision was to relieve the workman’s
hardship to a certain extent. Such payments cannot be
recovered or refunded in any manner, even if the
Award was set aside. Therefore, the workman was
entitled to the full wages last drawn, and not any
revised wages that may have been given to similarly
situated workmen.
28. In the second case of Dena Bank (supra), decided in
the year 2001, the primary issues were whether the
employer was liable to pay full salary from the date of
2026:HHC:38364
filing of the writ petition or whether the salary was to
be paid at par with other employees working on the
same post, and whether the workman was entitled to
regular pay-scale instead of the Rs.900/- per month, he
last drew as wages. Resultantly, it was held that the
relevant provisions empowered the Courts to grant
more just and equitable interim benefits based on the
facts of the case, and that such excess amounts would
be liable to be refunded, if the writ petition was
allowed, however, there could be no recovery of the
actual wages last drawn. The relevant part reads as
under:“12. We have mentioned above that the import
of Section 17-B admits of no doubt that
Parliament intended that the workman should get
the last drawn wages from the date of the award
till the challenge to the award is finally decided
which is in accord with the Statement of the
objects and reasons of the Industrial Disputes
(Amendment) Act, 1982 by which Section 17- B
was inserted in the Act. We have also pointed out
above that Section 17-B does not preclude the
High Courts or this Court from granting better
benefits more just and equitable on the facts of a
case -- than contemplated by that provision to a
workman. By interim order the High Court did not
grant relief in terms of Section 17-B, nay, there is
no reference to that section in the orders of the
High Court, therefore, in this case the question of
payment of full wages last drawn to the
respondent does not arise. In the light of the
above discussion the power of the High Court to
pass the impugned order cannot but be upheld so
the respondent is entitled to his salary in terms of
the said order.
13. It must, however, be pointed out that while
pasing an interlocutory order the interests of the
employer should not be lost sight of. Even though
the amount paid by the employer under Section
17-B to the workman cannot be directed to be
refunded in the event he loses the case in the writ
petition (see Dena Bank case) any amount over
and above the sum payable under the said
provision, has to be refunded by him. It will,
therefore, be in the interests of justice to ensure,
2026:HHC:38364
if the facts of the case so justify, that payment of
any amount over an above the amount payable
under Section 17-B to him, is ordered to be paid
on such terms and conditions as would enable the
employer to recover the same.
14. It is brought to our notice that pursuant to the
orders of the High Court under challenge the
appellant had paid the amount to the respondent.
It is clarified that if the appellant succeeds in the
writ petition, it will be entitled to recover the
difference of amount (i.e. amount paid under the
impugned order less the amount payable under
Section 17-B of the Act) from the respondent in
accordance with law.”
29. Counsel for the respondent-workman has rightly
placed reliance upon the Division Bench judgment of
the Delhi High Court in Santosh Kumari (supra). In that
case, the Court had considered whether the entitlement
under Section 17-B of 17 the ID Act, 1947, should run
from the date of the Award or from the date of the
application. The employer had contested this on the
grounds
of
belated
filing
of
the
application.
Consequently, it was held that it was obligatory for a
workman to explain any delay and file an affidavit and
workman cannot claim the benefits of Section 17-B for
several years in arrears without an explanation, as it
would be impossible for an employer to establish
whether the workman was gainfully employed during
that delayed period. Therefore, the Division Bench in
various
cases
had
accordingly
granted
benefits,
choosing not to interfere, if there was no delay in filing
the application, but choosing to interfere when there
was an unexplained delay.
30. The said view was thereafter followed in Surender
Kumar’s case (supra) ten years later. In that case, it
was held that the entitlement to wages under Section
17-B
hinges
on
whether
the
workman
remained
unemployed since his termination, and that this benefit
must be granted from the date of the Award. Therefore,
2026:HHC:38364
even if an application is filed belatedly, the workman
can still be given the said benefit while placing reliance
upon the provisions of the second case of Dena Bank
(supra). Resultantly, it was held that the words of the
statute must be understood in their natural and
ordinary grammatical sense unless such a conclusion
leads to absurdity.
31. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, since the
Award had been passed on 31.08.2019, and the State
had taken four and a half months to file the writ
petition
and
the
workman
filed
his
applications
immediately after a period of nine months from his first
appearance in the Court. Consequently, it was held that
the delay in filing the application could not work to the
detriment of the workman. The relevant portion reads
as under:”12. A perusal of the above-mentioned judgment
shows that the general rule is that the workman is
entitled to the benefits under Section 17-B of the
Act from the date of passing of award unless it is
shown that the workman has been indolent and
negligent in not pursuing the relief under Section
17-B of the Act and has filed his application under
Section 17-B of the Act after considerable delay or
at his whim and fancy.
13. In view of the above, the law is clear that
ordinarily the payment of wages under Section 17B of the Act would be from the date of passing of
award and only in cases of undue delay on the
part of the workman in approaching the Court, the
payment can be directed to be made from the
date of filing of application under Section 17-B of
the Act.
14. As stated earlier, the Apex Court in Dena Bank
(supra) has held that the Statement of Objects
and Reasons for inserting Section 17-B of the Act
is to ensure that the workman does not continue
to live in penury and await the final outcome of
the challenge to the award of reinstatement. Once
the award of reinstatement has been passed, the
employer should reinstate the workman. The
employer cannot be permitted to keep the
workman in limbo just by challenging the award
2026:HHC:38364
and even if the employer fails to get a stay of the
award, the employer cannot be permitted to not
allow the workman from working and at the same
time he also cannot be permitted not to pay
wages to the workman as this would go against
the purpose of inserting Section 17-B of the Act.”
32. The Full Bench of the Kerala High Court took a
similar view in The South Indian Workers Congress Vs.
Sree Sankara University of Sanskrit (2010) 3 SCT 846.
The Court held that an unemployed workman was
entitled to receive wages under Section 17-B of the
Industrial Disputes Act from the date when the writ
petition was instituted, provided the workman satisfied
the Court by filing an affidavit stating that he had been
unemployed since that date. In that case, the industrial
award was passed in favour of the workman on
14.11.2005. The application under Section 17-B was
allowed despite a delay in filing, against which the
proceedings had been preferred. Resultantly, it was
held that the workman was entitled to receive wages
from an anterior date prior to the institution of the
proceedings initiated by the employer, to give proper
effect to the words employed by the Legislature. It was
accordingly held that the court only needed to be
satisfied by the filing an affidavit stating that the
workman was unemployed from the date when the
proceedings
were
instituted.
The
reference
was
answered accordingly.
33. Thus, keeping in view the overall perspective, and
the fact that the Statement of Objects and Reasons
provided that the purpose was to ensure payment of
the wages last drawn due to delays in implementing
the Award, it would not lie in the mouth of the
appellant-State to object.
The State delayed filing of
the writ petition for a period of four years, despite the
petitioner having submitted his joining report on
2026:HHC:38364
18.01.2018 well within three months of the Award
passed in his favour on 21.11.2017. The appellantsState had taken its sweet time as such in filing the writ
petition on 30.12.2021, had obtained a stay on
03.01.2022. Consequently, it cannot now argue that the
payment of the last drawn wages, under Section 17-B
of the Industrial Disputes Act, should only be granted
from the date the application and affidavits were filed.
The State cannot rely on a strict interpretation of the
Section to escape this liability, especially since it failed
to explain satisfactorily the delay in filing the writ
petition in any manner.”
10.
Accordingly, the matter is squarely covered against
the State and there is no valid reason to issue notice to the
workman. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed in view of the
above reasons.
(G. S. Sandhawalia)
Chief Justice
9th September, 2026
(sanjeev)
(Bipin C. Negi)
Judge
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