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( 2026:HHC:14389 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA
CMP(M) No. 2122 of 2025.
Decided on :29th April, 2026.
State of H.P. & Ors.
Pammi Devi & Ors.
...Petitioners.
Versus
....Respondents.
Coram:
The Hon’ble Mr. Romesh Verma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
For the Petitioners:
Mr. Diwakar Dev Sharma, Addl. A.G.
For the Respondents:
Mr. Neeraj Gupta, Senior Advocate
with Mr. Ajeet Jaswal, Advocate.
Romesh Verma, Judge (Oral).
The present application has been filed for condonation
of
delay
in
filing
the
regular
second
appeal.
The
plaintiffs/respondents preferred a suit in the Court of learned Civil
Judge, Chachiot at Gohar, District Mandi, H.P. on 19.11.2016 for
declaration, possession and permanent prohibitory injunction
against the State and the private respondents.
Learned trial
Court dismissed the suit preferred by the present respondents on
13.01.2023.
Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
2.
( 2026:HHC:14389 )
Feeling dissatisfied, the plaintiff preferred an appeal in
the Court of learned Additional District Judge-1, Mandi, District
Mandi, H.P. on 10.04.2023. The learned first appellate court vide
its judgment and decree dated 26.03.2024 accepted the appeal
and decreed the suit filed by the plaintiff holding the plaintiff and
proforma defendants No. 5 to 8 to be owner in possession of the
suit land which was
granted as Nautor land under Antodaya
Scheme and entries in revenue record showing the suit land in the
ownership of State of H.P., and in possession of Forest department
are declared as null and void, not binding on the rights of plaintiff
and proforma defendants No. 5 to 8 and further the defendants
are permanently prohibited from dispossessing the plaintiff and
defendants Nos. 5 to 8 from the suit land.
3.
Feeling dissatisfied, the State has filed the present
regular second appeal before this Court.
The State/appellants
filed the appeal on 21.08.2025.
4.
In the application, it has been averred that the appeal
against the impugned judgment could not be filed within time
before this Court due to the reason that after the receipt of
( 2026:HHC:14389 )
certified copy of the impugned judgment and decree, the matter
was dealt by the office of District Attorney and thereafter the case
file was sent to Principal Secretary (Revenue) to the Government of
Himachal Pradesh and the Law department.
That the opinion of
the law department was received in the matter and directions to
file appeal was received from the government.
It has been
averred that the delay was neither intentional nor willful but time
was consumed in obtaining the required opinion and permissions
from the higher authorities for filing the appeal. That the certified
copy of the impugned judgment and decree was applied on
26.03.2024 and the same was attested on 10.04.2024 and received
on 12.04.2024.
The final opinion for filing appeal was prepared
on 25.04.2024 and was sent to the defendants.
5.
AS per applicants, the matter was examined by the law
department on 20.06.2024 which opined that the impugned
judgment has to be assailed in the appeal and the same has been
received
in the office on 29.06.2024, through Additional Chief
Secretary (Revenue) to the Govt. of Himachal Pradesh vide letter
dated 24.06.2024.
That after receipt of the opinion from the
( 2026:HHC:14389 )
government, it was forwarded to the office of District Attorney,
Mandi on
16.07.2024, but due to clerical mistake it has been
wrongly mentioned in the letter that the order passed by the
learned Court is just and proper.
Thereafter, District Attorney,
Mandi has again forwarded the case file to the office of deponent
i.e. Collector, Mandi on 22.07.2024 and informed that the findings
are contrary to the opinion of law department. Again the matter
was put up by the dealing assistant on 21.08.2024 through E-office
and in the meanwhile the file along with entire record was
inadvertently misplaced due to rush of work and when the file was
again traced on 04.04.2025, the same was forwarded to the office
of Principal Secretary (Revenue) for filing the appeal vide letter
dated 07.04.2025. That the Principal Secretary to the Govt. of H.P.
vide letter dated 22.05.2025 has directed the applicant to file
appeal before this Court and thereafter District Attorney, Mandi
was directed on 19.06.2025 to prepare the appeal. It has been
prayed that the delay of 407 days
condoned.
in filing the appeal be
6.
( 2026:HHC:14389 )
Reply to the said application has been filed by the
private respondents by denying all the averments as made in the
application.
It has been stated in the reply that there is no
reasonable and plausible explanation for condonation of delay
and that the story has been concocted by the applicants in order
to avail undue and unfair advantage. It has been stated in the
reply
that
the
application
itself
apparently
demonstrates
administrative lethargy and administrative inefficiency, therefore,
the same itself estopped the applicants from seeking discretionary
relief from this court. It has been stated in the reply that since
there is huge delay of more than 407 days in filing the appeal,
which remains unexplained by the applicants, therefore, in view of
the mandate laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the application
deserves to be dismissed.
7.
On
31.03.2026,
the
case
was
taken
up
for
consideration and after hearing the same for some time, the
applicant-State was directed to file supplementary affidavit in
order to explain the reasons for the delay in filing the appeal. The
supplementary affidavit have been filed, whereby, the averments
( 2026:HHC:14389 )
as made in the application have been reiterated stressing on the
fact that the original file along with the entire record was
inadvertently misplaced due to rush of work and the same was
located on 04.04.2025 and thereafter the case was forwarded to
the office of Principal Secretary (Revenue) to the Government of
H.P.
for filing of the appeal.
(Revenue) to the Govt. of H.P.
That the Principal Secretary
vide communication dated
22.05.2025 directed the applicant to file the instant appeal.
8.
It is contented by Mr. Diwakar Dev Sharma, learned
Additional Advocate General that the delay in filing the appeal is
neither intentional nor willful, rather it is for the reasons as
described in the application, therefore, after condoning the delay
the appeal be taken up for consideration.
9.
On the other hand, Mr. Neeraj Gupta, Senior Advocate
assisted by Mr. Ajeet Jaswal, learned counsel for the respondents
has vehemently opposed the application by submitting that there
is huge delay of 407 days in filing the appeal, which cannot be
condoned in the absence of plausible explanation to be given in
the application.
10.
( 2026:HHC:14389 )
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and also
gone through the case file.
11.
Generally, the courts have adopted a very liberal ap-
proach in construing the phrase ‘sufficient cause’ used in Section 5
of the Limitation Act in order to condone the delay to enable the
courts to do substantial justice and to apply law in a meaningful
manner which subserves the ends of justice. Notwithstanding the
above, howsoever, liberal approach is adopted in condoning the
delay, existence of ‘sufficient cause’ for not filing the appeal in
time, is a condition precedent for exercising the discretionary
power to condone the delay.
12.
The phrases ‘liberal approach’,
‘justice-oriented
approach’ and cause for the advancement of
‘substantial justice’
cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow
stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and
re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It must
always be borne in mind that whil construing ‘sufficient cause’ in
deciding application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, that on
the
expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing an
appeal,
( 2026:HHC:14389 )
substantive right in favour of a decree-holder accrues
and this right ought not to be lightly disturbed.
13.
The Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that even
after sufficient cause has been shown by a party for not
filing an
appeal within time, the said party is not entitled to the
condonation of delay as excusing the delay is the discretionary
jurisdiction vested with the court. The court, despite establishment
of a ‘sufficient cause’ for various reasons, may refuse to condone
the delay depending upon the bona fides of the party. The liberal
approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not
be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The concept of
‘liberal approach’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial
law of limitation. It is a well settled principle of law that the
limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be
applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes.
14.
The Court has no power to extend the period of
limitation on equitable grounds.
Where a case has been pre-
sented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain
the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an
adequate and enough
( 2026:HHC:14389 )
reason which prevented him to approach
the court within limitation. No court could be justified in condoning such an
inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatso-
ever.
15.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in Pathapati Subba Reddy
(died) by LRs. & others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA), Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.31248 of 2018, has laid down the parameters for condonation of delay in following manner:
“12.
In view of the above provision, the appeal which is
preferred after the expiry of the limitation is
liable to be
dismissed. The use of the word ‘shall’ in the aforesaid
provision connotes that the dismissal is mandatory subject
to the exceptions. Section 3 of the Act is peremptory and had
to be given effect to even though no objection regarding
limitation is taken by the other side or referred to in the
pleadings. In other words, it casts an obligation upon the
court to dismiss an appeal which is presented beyond
limitation. This is the general law of limitation. The exceptions are carved out under Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the
Limitation Act but we are concerned only with the
exception contained in Section 5 which empowers the courts
to admit an appeal even if it is preferred after the prescribed
period provided the proposed appellant gives ‘sufficient
cause’ for not preferring the appeal within the period
prescribed. In other words, the courts are conferred with
( 2026:HHC:14389 )
discretionary powers to admit an appeal even after the
expiry of the prescribed period provided the proposed
appellant is able to establish ‘sufficient cause’ for not filing it
within time. The said power to condone the delay or to
admit the appeal
preferred after the expiry of time is
discretionary in
nature and may not be exercised even if
sufficient cause is shown based upon host of other factors
such as negligence, failure to exercise due diligence etc.
13.
It is very elementary and well understood that
courts should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in
dealing with the applications for condonation of the delay in
filing appeals and rather follow a pragmatic line to advance
substantial justice.
14 to 20 xx xx xx xx
21.
In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra
Pradesh & Ors.6, where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the
applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that
the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a
reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have
exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed
manner. The liberal approach in
considering sufficiency of
cause for delay should not be allowed to override
substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the
concepts such as ‘liberal
approach’, ‘justice-oriented
approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to
jettison the substantial law of limitation.
22. xx xx xx
23.
( 2026:HHC:14389 )
In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition
Officer8, this Court held that the discretion to condone the
delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts
and circumstances of each case. The expression ‘sufficient
cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot
be liberally
interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of
bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even
though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties
but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed
under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply
the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the
delay on equitable grounds.
24. It would be beneficial to quote paragraph 12 of the
aforesaid decision which clinches the issue of the manner in
which equilibrium has to be maintained
between adopting
liberal approach and in implementing the statute as it
stands, Paragraph 12 reads as under:
“12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of
limita-
tion may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be
applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes.
The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation
on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory
provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore
that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may
cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but
the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect
to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which
( 2026:HHC:14389 )
means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands
at-
tracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held
that, “inconvenience is not” a
decisive factor to be con-
sidered while interpreting a statute.”
16.
Similarly, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Shivamma (dead)
by LRs vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 11794
of 2025, decided on 12th September, 2025,
has held that
irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a
private person, the provisions of law applicable are the same and
as such same consideration that is shown by courts to a private
party when he claims the protection of Section 5 of the Limitation
Act should be adopted towards the State. The expression “sufficient cause” cannot be construed too liberally, merely because the
party is the Government and the courts are not bound to accept
readily whatever has been stated on behalf of the State to explain
the delay.
17.
Hon’ble Apex Court deprecated condonation of delay
in filing appeal therein that was occasioned not by any
unavoidable circumstance, but by the sheer inefficiency and
ineptitude of the Government pleaders concerned, merely be-
( 2026:HHC:14389 )
cause the party seeking condonation happened to be the State. In
doing so, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that concepts such
as “liberal approach”, “justice oriented approach”,
“substantial
justice” cannot be employed to thwart the substantial law of
limitation, particularly in cases where the court concludes that
there is no justification for the delay. The distinction between the
State or any instrumentalities vis-a-vis a private individual, for the
purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, should be understood
in its proper context and true spirit.
Hon’ble Apex Court further
observed that the State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be
put on the same footing as a private party for the purposes of
condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
18.
The Hon’ble Apex Court while passing the judgment
has given a clear message to
the
State
and
all
its
instrumentalities that a leisurely and lethargic approach cannot
continue for all times to come. The State and all public authorities
to constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal
principles are involved in the decision by the courts, if not then
endeavour should be made towards arriving at a settlement
( 2026:HHC:14389 )
instead, rather than re-agitating the belated causes before the
courts. Differential treatment cannot continue for all times to
come.
19.
The Hon’ble Apex Court after setting aside the
judgment passed by the High Court
whereby the delay was
condoned, dismissed the application for condonation of delay by
imposing additional costs of Rs.25,000/- on the respondents in the
said case.
It has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that
limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for
the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial
time, what worries is the plight of a litigant with limited means,
who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and
never-exhausting paraphernalia.
Such litigations deserve to be
disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a party litigating
against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the
condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens
the lis for another round of litigation and leaves such litigant
listless yet again.
20.
( 2026:HHC:14389 )
The said exposition of law has been reiterated in
var-
ious judgments by the Hon’ble Apex Court. In the present case,
the applicant-State has filed an application to make out a case for
condonation of delay.
From the perusal of the application, it re-
veals that cryptic and deceptive averments were made in order to
condone the delay.
In para-2 of the application, it has been
averred that the matter was dealt by office of the applicant and
thereafter the case file was sent to Principal Secretary (Revenue) to
the Govt. of H.P. and law department. The opinion of law department was received in the matter and directions to file the appeal
was received from the government/competent authorities. Thereafter, it has been again averred that the file went through different channels and then again in para-8, it has been averred that the
file was submitted to the office of Principal Secretary (Revenue), to
the Govt. of H.P., who gave his note for filing of the appeal vide its
letter dated 22.05.2025. Such excuses have been taken by the applicant in order to defeat the right of the defendants/non-applicants and to justify the condonation of delay in filing the present
appeal.
21.
( 2026:HHC:14389 )
It has been observed by the courts that in every case
the State is taking excuse that the file got misplaced due to rush of
work. Such explanation and the averment cannot be accepted
without any reasonable and probable cause. The applicants could
not satisfy this Court to come to the conclusion that the delay in
filing the present appeal is not willful or intentional, rather the
application and the supplementary affidavit reveal that the story
as projected by the State for condonation of delay is not plausible
or correct.
22.
Consequently,
in
view
of
above,
the
present
application being devoid of any merit deserves to be dismissed
and the same is accordingly dismissed.
29th April, 2026.
(jai)
(Romesh Verma)
Judge
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