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2026:HHC:33304
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
RSA No.
:
272 of 2025
Decided on :
07.08.2026
State of H.P. and others
…Appellants
Versus
Hem Singh and others
…Respondents
Coram
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
For the appellants
:
Mr. Rohit Sharma and Ms.
Ranjana
Patial,
Deputy
Advocates General.
For the respondents
:
Mr. Tek Chand, Advocate.
Virender Singh, Judge. (Oral)
By way of the instant Regular Second Appeal,
the appellants have called in question the judgment and
decree, dated 4th August, 2025, passed by the Court of
learned Additional District Judge, Sarkaghat, District
Mandi, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as ‘the First Appellate
Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:33304
Court’) in Civil Appeal No. 38 of 2023, titled as The State of
H.P. and others versus Hem Singh and others.
2.
By virtue of judgment and decree, dated 4 th
August, 2025, the learned First Appellate Court has
dismissed the appeal, preferred by the appellants herein
against the judgment and decree, dated 26 th September,
2023, passed by the Court of learned Senior Civil Judge,
Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P., in Civil Suit No. 293 of
2016, titled as Chuhar Singh (since dead) through his LRs
and others versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others.
3.
The learned trial Court, vide aforesaid judgment
and decree, dated 26th September, 2023, has decreed the
suit of the respondents herein, filed for declaration with
consequential
relief
for
mandatory
injunction,
under
Sections 38 and 39 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.
4.
For the sake of convenience, parties to the
present appeal are, hereinafter, referred to, in the same
manner, in which, they were referred to, by the learned
trial Court.
5.
Brief facts, as borne out from the record, may
be summed up, as under:
5.1.
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Plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration with
consequential relief for mandatory injunction, on the
ground, that plaintiff No. 1-Chuhar Singh, alongwith one
Mohan alias Mohan Singh, son of Mangtoo; and Dalip
Singh, son of Mohan Singh alias Mohan, son of Mangtoo,
was owner in possession of the land, comprised in Khewat
Khatauni No. 7 min/22, Khasra Nos. 128 min, 129 min,
126 min and 132 min, prior to settlement.
5.2.
According to the plaintiffs, the settlement, in
the area, took place in the year 1967-68 and subsequently,
new khata khatauni and khasra numbers were framed and
in the settlement, the khasra numbers of the aforesaid
land were changed to Khasra Nos. 463 and 490, land
measuring 00-17-08 hectares, of khata khatauni No. 7
min/22, situated in Village Ratoli, Ill. Bera, Tehsil
Sarkaghat.
5.3.
It has been averred in the plaint that during the
settlement and even before that, the entry of Gair Mumkin
sadak was made in the revenue record. According to the
plaintiffs, although, the State of Himachal Pradesh,
through Public Works Department (B&R) had encroached
upon
the
aforesaid
land,
2026:HHC:33304
for
the
purpose
of
the
construction of the road, which, though was constructed,
however, no compensation was paid to the plaintiffs.
5.4.
It has been averred in the plaint that again, the
consolidation took place in the area and the khata
khatauni and khasra numbers were again changed, as per
Mishal Hakiyat Bhuatrikaran 1991-92 and new khata
khatauni of the land are 17 min/19 min, khasra No. 273,
land
measuring
00-09-74
hectares
and
292,
land
measuring 0-17-08 hectares, in Village Ratoli (hereinafter
referred to as ‘the suit land’).
5.5.
As per the case set up by the plaintiffs,
defendant No. 3-Land Acquisition Officer/Collector, Mandi,
issued notice, under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act,
on 16th September, 2008, for acquiring the suit land of the
plaintiffs, alongwith other co-sharers and other estate right
holders, for the construction/accreditation/improvement
of Data road Project Una–Aghar–Barsar-Jahoo–BhamblaKalkhar and Ner Chowk. The suit land is stated to have
been measured by the revenue staff, in the presence of the
State
Government
employees
and
the
employees
of
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Himachal Pradesh Public Works Department (B&R) and
the Land Acquisition Officer/Collector.
The notification,
under Sections 6 and 7 of the Land Acquisition Act, was
issued, as per the negotiations, on 11th April, 2008. The
negotiated rates were proved by the defendants No. 1 and 2
and ₹ 45,000/- per biswa, in lump-sum, in pursuance of
the negotiated/settlement ward No. 30, dated 26th March,
2009.
5.6.
It the further case of the plaintiffs that plaintiff
No. 1 is entitled to half of the compensation, which was
assessed on 26th March, 2009, vide award No. 30, i.e., out
of total compensation of ₹ 19,00,124/- and the remaining
half is of plaintiffs No. 2 to 4.
5.7.
It has also been averred by the plaintiffs that
there is no dispute with regard to the acquisition of land,
but, the compensation was withheld by the defendants,
under the pretext, that the land was earlier acquired and
the compensation was paid, but, in fact, no compensation
has been paid to the plaintiffs.
5.8.
It has further been averred that the plaintiffs
and co-sharers have approached this Court, by filing Civil
2026:HHC:33304
Writ Petition No. 5064 of 2010 and this Court, while
holding that highly disputed questions of facts are involved
in the matter, which are required to be decided by the Civil
Court, the petitioners were allowed to withdraw the
petition, with liberty to file the Civil Suit, before the
appropriate Court.
5.9.
As such, the plaintiffs filed the present suit,
before the learned trial Court, seeking the following relief:
“It is, therefore, prayed that keeping in view
the submissions made above a decree for
declaration to the effect that the plaintiffs are
entitled for the compensation of suit land i.e.
khasra Nos. 273, 292 alongwith interest @
15% per annum from the date of award with
consequential relief for mandatory injunction
directing the Defendants to make the
payment of Rs. 19,00,124/- with interest @
15% with effect from the date of award i.e.
26-3-2009 till the payment and/or any other
relief which the Learned Court deems fit
under the circumstances of the case may
kindly be awarded in favour of the plaintiffs
and against the Defendants and justice be
done.”
6.
The suit was contested by the defendants, by
filing the written statement and the preliminary objections,
that the suit of the plaintiffs is legally and factually not
maintainable in its present form and context; that the
plaintiffs have no cause of action against the defendants;
2026:HHC:33304
that the suit of the plaintiffs is barred by limitation for
delay; that the plaintiffs have suppressed the material facts
from the perusal of the Hon’ble Court; that the suit is bad
for non-joinder and mis-joinder of necessary parties; and
that the suit is liable to be dismissed with special costs
under Section 35(A) of the CPC; have been taken.
6.1.
On
merits,
it
has
been
averred
by
the
defendants that compensation to the tune of ₹ 3,02,596/for khasra No. 273 was paid to plaintiff-Chuhar Singh on
26th March, 2009, for the widening purpose of road,
namely, super highway Jahu to Kalkhar.
6.2.
It has further been submitted that the suit land
initially
was
acquired
in
the
year
1958-60
and
compensation of ₹ 547.49 was paid to the predecessor of
the plaintiffs. According to the defendants, even, ₹ 109.74
are lying deposited in Treasury, in the name of Ganga and
others (forefathers), which are yet not withdrawn.
The
revenue entries and registration of mutation have not been
denied by the defendants.
6.3.
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It has also been averred by the defendants that
a wrong and false suit has been filed on the basis of miscalculation.
6.4.
On the basis of the above facts, a prayer has
been made by the defendants, before the learned trial
Court, to dismiss the suit, filed by the plaintiffs.
7.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following
issues came to be framed, by the learned trial Court, on
11th January, 2019:
1.
Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for
compensation qua the suit land to the
extent of ₹ 19,00,124/- along with
interest @ 15 per cent with effect from
26.03.2009, as alleged? OPP
2.
Whether suit is not within limitation, as
alleged? OPD
3.
Whether plaintiffs have no cause of action
to file the present suit? OPD
4.
Whether the plaintiffs have suppressed
the material facts from this Court, is so,
its effect? OPD
Whether suit is bad for non-joinder of
necessary parties, as alleged? OPD
5.
6.
8.
Relief.
Thereafter, the parties were directed to adduce
the evidence. After closure of the evidence, upon hearing
2026:HHC:33304
learned counsel for the parties, the learned trial Court,
decreed the suit of the plaintiffs, as aforesaid.
9.
The said judgment and decree, passed by the
learned trial Court, has unsuccessfully been challenged by
the defendants, by filing the appeal before the learned First
Appellate Court.
10.
Being aggrieved from the judgment and decree,
passed by the learned First Appellate Court, the present
Regular Second Appeal has been filed by the defendants,
before this Court.
The appeal has been sought to be
admitted on the following proposed substantial questions
of law:
“1.Whether
the
suit
is
decreed
for
compensation when plaintiff in his evidence
admits that land was acquired before his birth
and persons to whom payments were made
were the forefathers of plaintiffs?
2. Whether copies of register of payment of
compensation qua acquisition of 50 year old
acquisition proves that land was acquired and
compensation was paid to the then owners?
3. Whether silence and inaction of the then
owners and thereafter their legal heirs for 50
years by not claiming compensation proved
that compensation was paid and land was
acquired?”
11.
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It has been contended by Mr. Rohit Sharma,
learned Deputy Advocate General, that the judgments and
decrees, passed by both the Courts below, are erroneous
and liable to be quashed and set aside.
In support of his
contention, the learned Deputy Advocate General has
argued that both the Courts below have not appreciated
the real point in controversy and have wrongly decreed the
suit, filed by the plaintiffs.
12.
As per his further submissions, both the
Courts below have not taken into consideration the fact
that the amount of compensation stands already paid to
the claimants-plaintiffs.
13.
Per contra, Mr. Tek Chand, learned counsel
appearing for the defendants-respondents, has supported
the judgments and decrees, passed by the Courts below
and has submitted that
in view of the mandate, as laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, no person can be
deprived of his property, without following the due process
of law.
14.
He has also argued that the State has dragged
the plaintiffs into uncalled for litigation, for more than 30
2026:HHC:33304
years and that, although, the land of the plaintiffs was
utilized way back, however, the amount of compensation
has not been paid to them so far.
15.
Heard.
16.
With the consent of the parties, the appeal is
being taken up for hearing, at admission stage.
17.
Admittedly,
the
plaintiffs,
has
utilized
been
suit
by
land,
owned
by
the
the
State,
for
the
construction of road, Una-Aghar-Barsar-Jahoo-BhamblaKalkhar-Nerchowk. It has also been admitted that the suit
land has been utilized and the acquisition process was
started by the competent authority. It has been submitted
that though, the acquisition proceedings were started, but,
the amount of compensation was not paid by the
authorities. As such, the plaintiffs were constrained to
approach
this
Court
for
payment
of
amount
of
compensation, however, this Court, while observing that
since, highly disputed questions of facts are involved in the
case, disposed of the said petition, as having been
withdrawn, by the plaintiffs, with liberty to file civil suit
before the competent court of law.
18.
The
learned
2026:HHC:33304
trial
Court
has
taken
into
consideration the oral, as well as, documentary evidence
on record and came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs
are entitled for a sum of ₹ 12,94,932/-, alongwith simple
interest @ 6% per annum from 22nd July, 2008, till the
realization of whole amount, from the defendants.
The
judgment and decree, passed by the learned trial Court,
has been upheld by the learned First Appellate Court.
19.
The bone of contention of the learned Deputy
Advocate General, appearing for the appellants-defendants,
is that the claim, filed by the plaintiffs was stale and highly
belated. The said contention does not hold water, as, the
defendants are the constituents of the welfare State. It is
well settled that the welfare State cannot claim adverse
possession against its citizens. Thus, a suit, on the basis of
title, cannot be said to be time barred, which right could
only be defeated by proof of perfection by way of adverse
possession by the other.
20.
Admittedly, the plaintiffs are the title holders of
the suit property. Being owners of the suit land, they can
file a suit, at any stage, until and unless, their right is
2026:HHC:33304
defeated by the defendants through the perfection of title,
by way of adverse possession. Hence, the plaintiffs were
well within their right to file a suit for declaration and
mandatory injunction, since, the suit land was utilized by
the State, for construction of the road in issue, without
adopting due process of law, including payment of
compensation.
21.
Moreover,
the
defendants
were
not
in
possession of any document to show that the plaintiffs had
consented for the construction of the road through the suit
land.
Furthermore,
there
is
nothing
on
record
to
substantiate the claim of the defendants that the plaintiffs
had provided either express or implied consent, for
construction of the road.
22.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vidya Devi
versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others, reported
in (2020) 2 Supreme Court Cases 569, has held that no
person can be forcibly dispossess of his property without
any legal sanction; without following the due process of law
and
depriving
him
the
payment
of
just
and
fair
compensation.
2026:HHC:33304
Relevant paras 12.1 and 12.2 of the
judgment, are reproduced, as under:
“12.1. The Appellant was forcibly expropriated
of her property in 1967, when the right to
property was a fundamental right guaranteed
by Article 31 in Part III of the Constitution.
Article 31 guaranteed the right to private
property, which could not be deprived without
due process of law and upon just and fair
compensation.
12.2. The right to property ceased to be a
fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty
Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it
continued to be a human right in a welfare
State, and a Constitutional right under Article
300 A of the Constitution. Article 300 A
provides that no person shall be deprived of
his property save by authority of law. The
State cannot dispossess a citizen of his
property except in accordance with the
procedure established by law. The obligation
to pay compensation, though not expressly
included in Article 300 A, can be inferred in
that Article.”
23.
Similar view has been taken by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, in Sukh Dutt Ratra and another versus
State of H.P. and others, reported in (2022) 7 Supreme
Court Cases 508.
24.
Even otherwise, the defendants-appellants are
before this Court, in Regular Second Appeal, against the
concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below and the
concurrent findings can only be interfered with, if the
2026:HHC:33304
findings, so recorded, by the learned trial Court and
affirmed by the learned First Appellate Court, are suffering
from ‘perversity’.
25.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Govindaraju
versus Mariamman, reported in (2005) 2 Supreme Court
Cases 500, has elaborately discussed the term ‘perverse’.
Relevant paragraphs 16 to 19 of the judgment, are
reproduced, as under:“16. As per settled law, the scope of exercise of
the jurisdiction by the High Court in Second
Appeal under Section 100 is limited to the
substantial questions of law framed at the time of
admission of the appeal or additional substantial
questions of law framed at a later date after
recording reasons for the same. It was observed in
Santosh Hazari's case (supra) that a point of law
which admits of no two opinions may be a
proposition of law but cannot be a substantial
question of law. To be a 'substantial' question of
law must be debatable, not previously settled by
law of the land or a binding precedent and
answer to the same will have a material bearing
as to the rights of the parties before the Court. As
to what would be the question of law "involving in
the case", it was observed that to be a question of
law 'involving in the case' there must be first a
foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the
question should emerge from the sustainable
findings of fact arrived at by the court of facts and
it must be necessary to decide that question of
law for a just and proper decision between the
parties.
17.
After perusal of the findings recorded by
the courts below and the High Court, we are of the
opinion that the questions of law framed at the
time of admission of the appeal were not
questions of substance arising from the findings
2026:HHC:33304
record\ed by the courts of fact. The court of fact
recorded the finding that the title in the suit
property did not pass to Veeramuthu Moopanar
and the sale deed dated 1.7.1940 executed by
him in favour of his two daughters was a nominal
and a sham transaction. The court of fact had also
come to the conclusion that there was a divorce
between
Thayarammal
and
Sengamalai
Moopanar under custom and the respondent
herein had failed to prove that Ganapathy
Moopanar was the son of Sengamalai Moopanar
from his first wife. After recording this finding of
fact, the court of fact held that since Ganapathy
Moopanar was not proved to be the son of
Sengamalai Moopanar and that a divorce had
taken
place
between
Thayarammal
and
Sengamalai Moopanar, Ganapathy Moopanar
could not succeed to the estate of Thayarammal
being the heir of her husband under Section 15(1)
(b) of the Act. That in the absence of any direct
heir, the property of Thayarammal reverted back
to the heirs of her father i.e. the family members of
the brother of her father. The sale effected by
Ganapathy Moopanar in favour of the respondent
did not convey any title as Ganapathy Moopanar
was not proved to be the owner of the property.
18.
The High Court on re-appreciation of
evidence recorded a finding to the contrary and
held that the marriage between Thayarammal
and Sengamalai Moopanar had not been
dissolved. It further held that Ganapathy
Moopanar was the son of Sengamalai Moopanar
from his previous wife. That the sale executed by
Veeramuthu Moopanar dated 1.7.1940 in favour
of his two daughters was not a nominal and sham
transaction. That it conveyed a valid title of the
suit property to his two daughters. As the
daughters had not inherited the property but
purchased the same from their father, they
became the absolute owners of the same.
Thayarammal had inherited the share of her
sister after her death. As Thayarammal had died
issueless and had a step-son Ganapathy
Moopanar from her husband, Ganapathy
Moopanar inherited the suit property being the
heir of her husband under Section 15(1)(b) of the
Act and succeeded to the estate of Thayarammal.
2026:HHC:33304
That Ganapathy Moopanar had a conveyable title
in the suit property and the sale made by him in
favour of the respondent was valid and decreed
the suit. This was done on re-appreciation of
evidence present on record. Questions of law
which had been framed at the time of admission
and were referred and reproduced in the
judgment were not adverted to while deciding the
appeal. No finding was recorded on those
questions. After reproducing the questions of law,
the learned Single Judge did not advert to either
of them or record findings on them. The learned
Single Judge proceeded to decide the appeal
thereafter as if after framing the questions of law
the High Court gets the jurisdiction to reappreciate the evidence and come to a conclusion
other than the one recorded by the courts of fact.
As observed by this Court in Santosh Hazari's
case (supra) for the question of law to be involved
in the case, first a foundation for it has to be laid
in the pleadings and the question should emerge
from the sustainable findings of facts arrived at
by the court of fact and it must be necessary to
decide that question of law for a just and proper
decision of the case. In the present case, the
learned Single Judge proceeded to re-appreciate
the evidence and on re-appreciating the same, set
aside the findings referred to above on facts. On
reversal of the findings referred to above on facts,
the High Court came to the conclusion that
Ganapathy Moopanar would inherit the property
under Section 15(1)(b) being the heir of the
husband of Thayarammal and not under Section
15(2)(a) under which property was to revert back
to the heirs of her father. The questions of law
which were framed at the time of admission of the
appeal were not decided by the High Court.
19.
Even if the High Court was of the view that
the findings of fact recorded by the courts below
were wrong, in our opinion, these findings of fact
could not be disturbed without coming to the
conclusion that the findings recorded were
perverse i.e. based on misreading of evidence or
based on no evidence. The High Court did not
come to such a conclusion. The learned Singh
Judge also did not come to the conclusion that the
2026:HHC:33304
appeal involved other substantial questions of law
or formulate the same.
26.
In
Arulvelu
and
another
versus
represented by the Public Prosecutor &
State
another,
reported in (2009) 10 Supreme Court Cases 206, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has again elaborately discussed
the term ‘perverse findings’. Relevant paragraphs 24 to 30
of the judgment, are reproduced, as under:“24. The expression `perverse' has been dealt
with in number of cases. In Gaya Din (Dead)
through LRs. & Others v. Hanuman Prasad
(Dead) through LRs. & Others (2001) 1 SCC 501
this Court observed that the expression
`perverse' means that the findings of the
subordinate authority are not supported by the
evidence brought on record or they are against
the law or suffer from the vice of procedural
irregularity.
25. In Parry's (Calcutta ) Employees' Union v.
Parry & Co. Ltd. & Others AIR 1966 Cal. 31, the
Court observed that `perverse finding' means a
finding which is not only against the weight of
evidence but is altogether against the evidence
itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE, the
Court observed that this is not a case where it
can be said that the findings of the authorities
are based on no evidence or that they are so
perverse that no reasonable person would have
arrived at those findings.
26. In M. S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma &
Another AIR 1977 Kar. 58, the Court observed
that any order made in conscious violation of
pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett
v. Gough, the Court observed that a perverse
verdict may probably be defined as one that is
not only against the weight of evidence but is
altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v.
Godfrey, the Court defined `perverse' as turned
2026:HHC:33304
the wrong way, not right; distorted from the
right; turned away or deviating from what is
right, proper, correct etc.
27. The expression "perverse" has been defined
by various dictionaries in the following manner:
1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of
Current English Sixth Edition
“Perverse
–
Showing
deliberate
determination to behave in a way that
most people think is wrong, unacceptable
or unreasonable.”
2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary
English – International Edition
“Perverse – Deliberately departing from
what is normal and reasonable.”
3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English 1998 Edition
“Perverse – Law (of a verdict) against the
weight of evidence or the direction of the
judge on a point of law.”
4. New Webster's Dictionary of the English
Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition)
“Perverse – Purposely deviating from
accepted or expected behavior or opinion;
wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or
petulant.”
5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words &
Phrases, Fourth Edition
“Perverse – A perverse verdict may
probably be defined as one that is not only
against the weight of evidence but is
altogether against the evidence.”
28. In Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of
U.P. (2003) 1 SCC 761, the Court observed thus:
"We are of the opinion that the trial court
was quite justified in acquitting the
appellants of the charges as the view
taken by it was reasonable one and the
order of acquittal cannot be said to be
perverse. It is well settled that appellate
court would not be justified in interfering
2026:HHC:33304
with the order of acquittal unless the same
is found to be perverse. In the present
case, the High Court has committed an
error in interfering with the order of
acquittal of the appellants recorded by the
trial court as the same did not suffer from
the vice of perversity."
29. In Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner
of Police & Others (1999) 2 SCC 10, the
Court while dealing with the scope of
Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution
observed as under:
"9. Normally the High Court and this
Court would not interfere with the
findings of fact recorded at the
domestic enquiry but if the finding of
"guilt" is based on no evidence, it
would be a perverse finding and
would be amenable to judicial
scrutiny.
10. A broad distinction has, therefore,
to be maintained between the
decisions which are perverse and
those which are not. If a decision is
arrived at on no evidence or evidence
which is thoroughly unreliable and no
reasonable person would act upon it,
the order would be perverse. But if
there is some evidence on record which
is acceptable and which could be
relied upon, howsoever compendious it
may be, the conclusions would not be
treated as perverse and the findings
would not be interfered with."
30. The meaning of `perverse' has been
examined in H. B. Gandhi, Excise and
Taxation Officer-cum- Assessing Authority,
Karnal & Others v. Gopi Nath & Sons &
Others 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312, this Court
observed as under:
"7. In the present case, the stage at and
the points on which the challenge to the
assessment in judicial review was
raised and entertained was not
appropriate. In our opinion, the High
2026:HHC:33304
Court was in error in constituting itself
into a court of appeal against the
assessment. While it was open to the
respondent to have raised and for the
High Court to have considered whether
the denial of relief under the proviso to
Section 39(5) was proper or not, it was
not open to the High Court re-appreciate
the primary or perceptive facts which
were otherwise within the domain of
the fact-finding authority under the
statute. The question whether the
transactions were or were not sales
exigible to sales tax constituted an
exercise in recording secondary or
inferential facts based on primary facts
found by the statutory authorities. But
what was assailed in review was, in
substance, the correctness – as
distinguished
from
the
legal
permissibility – of the primary or
perceptive facts themselves. It is, no
doubt, true that if a finding of fact is
arrived at by ignoring or excluding
relevant material or by taking into
consideration irrelevant material or if
the finding so outrageously defies logic
as to suffer from the vice of irrationality
incurring the blame of being perverse,
then, the finding is rendered infirm in
law."
27.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajasthan State
Transport Corporation & Another versus Bajrang Lal,
reported in 2014(3) Shim.LC 1472, has held that the High
Court may entertain second appeal even, on the question
of facts, where, the factual findings are found to be
perverse.
Meaning thereby, if this Court comes to the
conclusion that the findings are perverse, then only, the
2026:HHC:33304
concurrent findings, recorded by both the Courts below,
can be interfered with.
28.
No other point has been urged or argued.
29.
From the stand as taken by the parties, as
considered by the learned trial Court, as well as, affirmed
by the learned First Appellate Court, and in view of the
discussion made above, this Court is of the opinion that
the Courts below have rightly appreciated the point in
controversy
after
considering
the
oral,
as
well
as,
documentary evidence, placed on record.
30.
Viewed thus, no question of law, much less,
substantial question of law arises, in the present case.
Hence, the present appeal, being devoid of any merit, is
liable to be dismissed and is dismissed accordingly.
31.
Pending miscellaneous applications are also
disposed of accordingly.
32.
Decree sheet be prepared accordingly.
33.
Send down the record.
( Virender Singh )
Judge
August 07, 2026
( rajni )
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