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2026:HHC:40036
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA
CARBA Nos. 10 & 11 of 2025
Reserved on: 21.08.2026
Pronounced on: 18.09.2026
Uploaded on : 18.09.2026
__________________________________________________
State of Himachal Pradesh
...Appellant(s)
Versus
BMD Pvt. Ltd.
…Respondent(s)
__________________________________________________
Coram:
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice.
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Jiya Lal Bhardwaj, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
Yes.
__________________________________________________
For the Appellant(s):
Mr. Vinay Kuthiala, Senior Advocate
with Ms. Vandana Kuthiala, Mr. Diwan
Singh Negi, Advocates, in both the
appeals.
For the Respondent(s): Mr. Ankush Dass Sood, Senior
Advocate with Mr. Abhishek Dulta,
Advocate, for the respondent in
CARBA No. 10 of 2025.
Mr. Manish Kumar and Mr. Vishal
Verma, Advocates for the respondent
in CARBA No. 11 of 2025.
G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice
This judgment shall dispose of two appeals filed
by the State of Himachal Pradesh against the common
Whether the reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
judgment passed by the learned Single Judge, in CARBC Nos.
16 & 17 of 2025, both titled State of Himachal Pradesh Vs.
BMD Private Limited, whereby the petitions were dismissed,
challenging the common ex-parte award dated 29.04.2023,
passed by the learned Arbitrator in the two claim petitions filed
by the respondent herein, which were upheld.
2.
The primary reason that prevailed with the learned
Single Judge in upholding the award was that on an earlier
occasion, the State as such had opted to invoke the provisions
of Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
(for short ‘the Act’) by filing Arbitration Case Nos.5 & 6 of 2020,
which were dismissed by the learned Single Judge of this Court
vide order dated 02.06.2022, wherein the challenge to the
appointment of Justice S.N. Jha, (Retired) Chief Justice of the
High Courts of Rajasthan and Jammu & Kashmir, had
apparently been rejected and those findings as such had
attained finality, as the State did not lay any further challenge
thereto.
Having submitted to the jurisdiction of the learned
Arbitrator, it could not challenge the award ex-parte passed in
proceedings under Section 34 of the Act. Accordingly, it was
held by the learned Single Judge that an application under
Sections 13(2) and 13(3) of the Act having been filed and the
necessary challenge to the appointment of the learned
Arbitrator having not been raised therein and the fact that the
learned Arbitrator had awaited for the outcome of the
application filed under Section 11(6) of the Act and thereafter
went on to adjudicate and decide the arbitration claims which
were not contested by the State by putting in appearance, at
that stage barred them to raise challenge to the award by raking
up again the plea that the appointment of the learned Arbitrator
was not in consonance with the arbitration clause. The
proceedings while deciding the application under Section 11(6)
of the Act were held to be judicial in nature, though the
appointment might
have been
an administrative act.
The
learned Single Judge thus came to conclusion that once the
application for appointment of an Arbitrator under Section 11(6)
of the Act had been rejected by another learned Single Judge,
the State was estopped as such from raising a challenge,
having chosen not to appear before the learned Arbitrator after
dismissal of its application under Section 11(6) of the Act and
raising objections with regard to the constitution of the Arbitral
Tribunal.
3.
It is thus the case of the learned Counsel for the
State that the unilateral appointment of the Arbitrator by the
respondent-Contractor would go to the root of the matter and
the learned Single Judge has thus erred in not setting aside the
award in question, keeping in view the fact that the Arbitration
Act as such provides for an interplay of equal treatment of
parties and party autonomy.
It is thus submitted that party
autonomy makes the arbitration agreement an essential feature
of the proceedings and would also apply to the issue of the
choice of the Arbitrator, which is the core principle of the Act in
question.
Any violation of the same amounts to unilateral
nomination and having raised objection to the same, and having
brought it to the notice of the Arbitrator by filing the requisite
application under Section 13 of the Act, the Arbitrator was
under a bounden duty as such to rule on the same, rather than
decide the arbitration case on merits. It is accordingly submitted
that the learned Single Judge was not right in holding that the
application filed before the Arbitrator as such did not contain the
requisite objections of the unilateral appointment and nonconsent of the appointment by the State.
4.
The application should have been read in its totality
rather than just focusing on the
prayer clause, which the
learned Single Judge has erred in doing so. Thus, the
contention is that once the appointment is quashed, as the
Tribunal lacks the jurisdiction as the principle of coram non
judice would come into play. Such objection could be taken at
any stage, including in proceedings under Section 34 of the Act
and, now under Section 37 of the Act, as it goes to the root of
the matter. Once the Arbitrator lacks the jurisdiction to make
the award on merits, the very appointment of the Arbitrator
becomes the subject matter of challenge. It is also contended
that the contractor could not approbate and reprobate, having
raised the challenge before the learned Single Judge under
Section 11(6) of the Act that the appointment was not bad and
could be challenged by taking recourse to the proceedings
under Section 34 of the Act, having objected to the appointment
of an independent Arbitrator on the ground that an Arbitrator
had already been appointed unilaterally and it now could not
argue that the proceedings under Section 34 of the Act were
not maintainable.
5.
Reliance was placed by the learned Counsel for
the appellant on the judgments passed by the Apex Court in
Newton Engineering and Chemicals Ltd. Vs. Indian Oil
Corporation Ltd., (2013) 4 SCC 44, Walter Bau AG v.
Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai, (2015) 3 SCC
800,
Bharat
Broadband
Network
Limited
vs
United
Telecoms Limited, 2019 (5) SCC 755, Bhadra International
(India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Airport Authority of India, 2026 SCC
OnLine SC 7, Suzuki Parasrampuria Suitings Pvt. Ltd. v.
Official Liquidator of Mahendra Petrochemicals Ltd. (2018)
10 SCC 707, to contend that there was an apparent error as
such and the learned Single Judge had failed to appreciate the
same. He accordingly contended that the appointment, being
apparently void and unilateral, was not permissible and prayed
that the same be set aside, while placing reliance upon the
judgment of the Apex Court in Re: Interplay Between
Arbitration
Agreements
under
the
Arbitration
and
Conciliation Act, 1996 and the Indian Stamp Act, 1899
(2024) 6 SCC 1. It was accordingly contended that even having
not submitted to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, but having
raised the objections under Section 13(2) of the Act, the
Arbitrator was under bounden duty to decide the same, even if
the State did not put in appearance. Therefore, falling back on
the judgment of the Apex Court in Rajasthan State Road
Transport Corporation & others v. Zakir Hussain, (2005) 7
SCC 447, it was argued that there was a lack of inherent
jurisdiction and the award passed by the learned Arbitrator was
objected to, and the same had wrongly been upheld by the
learned Single Judge.
6.
Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the
Apex Court in Suzuki Parasrampuria Suitings Pvt. Ltd. v.
Official Liquidator of Mahendra Petrochemicals Ltd, (2018)
10 SCC 707, to contend that a party cannot approbate and
reprobate and take inconsistent stands, while referring to the
view taken by the learned Single Judge under Section 11(6) of
the Act.
7.
Mr. Ankush Dass Sood, learned Senior Counsel,
on the other hand, assisted by Mr. Manish Kumar, Advocate, for
the respondent-Contractor has submitted that having failed to
put in appearance before the learned Arbitrator and having not
pressed the application under Section 13 of the Act, it is not
permissible for the State as such now to object.
It is
accordingly contended that notice having been served on
19.12.2019,
for
representative,
preliminary
hearing
and
authorized
namely Shri Shanti Swaroop Bhatti, Legal
Consultant, having put in appearance, the application should
have been pressed before the Arbitrator. The State could not
turn its back and watch the proceedings from behind the
curtain. It is contended that in the said application also, prayer
clause was only to the effect that the matter was sub judice and
however, the findings recorded on 02.06.2022 by another
Single Bench were against it and these were not challenged.
The learned Single Judge was thus well justified in respecting
the judgment passed by the other Co-ordinate Bench as not to
take a different view.
8.
Reference was made to the list of dates referred to
by the learned Arbitrator, showing that various opportunities
were given, paper publication was also done, and the sittings
were held and only thereafter
the award was passed.
Resultantly, reliance was placed upon Section 4 of the Act that
there was a waiver of right to object.
9.
Reliance was placed upon the judgment in Quippo
Construction Equipment Ltd. v. Janardan Nirman Pvt. Ltd.,
(2020) 18 SCC 277, to contend that there is no challenge to
the order dated 02.06.2022. While placing reliance upon the
judgment in Gayatri Project Ltd. v. M.P. Road Development
Corpn. Ltd., (2025) 10 SCC 750 and AC Chokshi Share
Broker Private Limited vs. Jatin Pratap Desai & another,
(2025) 5 SCC 321, it was contended that the State now could
not raise any objection having not participated in the
proceedings.
The judgment in Bhadra’s case, (supra) was
distinguished on the ground that it concerned a sole Arbitrator
under Section 12 of the Act.
10.
The State having submitted to the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal and, therefore, it could not contend that the award
would not be binding upon it, or that the sole Arbitrator, not
having been appointed under Section 11(6) of the Act, had no
jurisdiction, rendering the appointment void ab initio and nonest in the eyes of law.
11.
The following issues arise for consideration:
(i)
Whether the unilateral appointment of the
Arbitrator of the respondent-contractor would
confer jurisdiction on
continue
the said Arbitrator to
proceedings, since the State had
never consented to his appointment and in light
of the non-decision of the application filed under
Section 13(3) of the Act?
(ii)
Whether
the
respondent-Contractor
strongly
opposed
the
appointment
having
of
an
independent Arbitrator in the proceedings under
Section 11(6) of the Act at the instance of the
State after the unilateral appointment and having
taken the objection that the appointment could
be challenged under Section 34 of the Act, could
now object to the arguments and proceedings
under Sections 34 & 37 of the Act that they
would not be maintainable against the unilateral
appointment and non-decision of the objections
raised against the unilateral appointment of the
Arbitrator himself?
(iii)
Whether the objections to the appointment of the
sole Arbitrator in the application under Section
34 of the Act, could be raised on the said ground
having got a decision against itself by the
appellant-State and having allowed the said
decision to become final.
Factual Matrix:
12.
The brief background of the case as such
necessary to appreciate the legal controversy, as summarized
above, is that the Contractor as such was issued a letter of
allotment by the State through its Director, Directorate of
Energy, Himachal Pradesh, on 04.05.2011 for execution of
Dancho Hydro Electric Project (12 MW) and Malana-III (30
MW) Hydro Electric Project. A pre-implementation Agreement
was executed on 26.05.2011 (Annexure C-6). As per Clause
53 thereof, any dispute arising at any time between the parties
was to be resolved by way of mutual negotiations, failing which
the matter was to be referred to the Arbitrator appointed as per
the provisions of Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996.
The
relevant clause reads as under:“53. Any difference and/or disputes arising at
any time between the parties out of this PIA/IA or
Interpretation thereof shall be endeavoured to be
resolved by the parties hereto by mutual
negotiations failing which the matter shall be
referred to the Arbitrator to be appointed as per
the provisions of the Arbitration & Conciliation
Act, 1996. However, all disputes shall be settled
within the jurisdiction of Courts of Himachal
Pradesh.”
13.
The Detailed Project Report was submitted on
26.08.2013 (Annexure C-16) in terms of the Agreement dated
26.05.2011, however on 21.01.2019 (Annexure C-18), a
request was made for the surrender of the project and refund of
100% upfront premium amounting to a total of Rs. 8.40 crore
due to uncertainty in the implementation of the above projects,
alongwith interest thereon at market rates. Apparently, the said
request was not accepted and upon the proposal being put up
before the Cabinet, the Cabinet Memorandum (CMM) on
08.08.2019 decided to cancel the allotment of both projects.
Resultantly, a formal letter dated 03.10.2019 (Annexure C-19)
cancelling the allotment and terminating the pre-implementation
agreements was issued on account of the failure to sign the
implemention agreement within the prescribed period alongwith
the forfeiture of the upfront premium, and the projects stood
forfeited to the Government without any liability on the
Government.
14.
On 30.10.2019 (Annexure C-20), a legal notice
was served upon the State for refund of the amounts which had
been paid towards the upfront premium, requesting that the
said notice be treated
as a notice invoking arbitration and
proposing name of a sole member as an Arbitrator, namely,
Justice S.N. Jha (Retd. Chief Justice), while reserving its right
to institute appropriate proceedings at the risk and cost of the
noticee-State. Resultantly, it was mentioned that if necessary
steps were not taken within 30 days from the receipt of the
notice, the contractor would be constrained to take appropriate
steps in accordance with law for the appointment and
constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal through a court of law. The
relevant portion of the said notice reads as under:“15. That in case you the Noticee do not refund
the aforesaid amount, then you may please treat
the present notice to be an arbitration invoking
notice as provided in clause 53 of the PreImplementation Agreement dated 26.05.2011.
Consequently, Our Client through us proposes
for a Sole Member Arbitral Tribunal consisting of
Hon'ble Mr. Justice S. N. Jha (Retd. Chief
Justice of High Court of Rajasthan & Jammu &
Kashmir).
16. That take notice, in the event of your failure
in concurring and agreeing to the aforesaid
proposal made by Our Client within a period of
30 days from the date of receipt of this notice,
Our client shall be constrained to take
appropriate steps in accordance with law in
getting appointment and constitution of the
Arbitral Tribunal through the Court of Law
entirely at your risk and costs.”
15.
No action having been taken by the State, letter
dated 07/09.12.2019 (Annexure C-21) was addressed to the
nominated Arbitrator, with a copy forwarded to the State of
Himachal Pradesh, requesting him to preside as an Arbitrator
and adjudicate the dispute between the parties to the Preimplementation Agreement dated 31.10.2019 without taking
recourse to the appointment to be validated through any Court
of law. The relevant portion of the said letter reads as under:“Thereafter, our Client had approached the
Respondent to release the sum deposited as
upfront premium for investigation via legal notice
dated 30.10.2019 (Enclosed herewith as
Encl.2). It is in furtherance to the
aforementioned notice and the subsequent
failure of the Respondent to refund the called up
amount that our Client deems fit to initiate
arbitration proceedings as per Clause 53 of the
said Agreement.
In the above background as no proceeding is
initiated or pending before any court of law. We,
therefore, by this letter request upon you to
kindly preside as the Sole Arbitrator and
adjudicate the dispute between the parties to
the Pre Implementation Agreement Dated
31.10.2019 and fix up a date directing parties to
appear before you in order to initiate the
arbitration proceedings.”
16.
State on 13.12.2019 (Annexure P-1) responded to
both to the legal notice dated 30.10.2019 and the letter dated
07.12.2019 and intimating the contractor that neither it gives its
consent to the appointment of the Arbitrator nor it should be
taken as implied consent on its behalf and requested the
respondent-claimant-contractor to act in accordance with the
relevant provisions of the Act. The said letter reads as under:“This is in reference to your letter dated
07.12.2019 to Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.N Jha
(Former Chief Justice of High Court of Rajasthan
& J&K) copy of which is endorsed to this office
alongwith legal notice dated 30.10.2019
regarding Dhancho Hydro Electric Project
(12MW) in Chamba District of Himachal
Pradesh.
In this regard, I am directed to intimate that
neither this office has given its consent to the
name of Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.N Jha (Former
Chief Justice of High Court of Rajasthan &J&K)
as Sole Arbitrator in this matter as proposed by
you nor it should be taken as implied consent on
behalf of this office. As such, you are requested
to act according to relevant provisions of
Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 (as
amended time to time) in this matter.”
17.
On 19.12.2019 (Annexure C-22), the parties were
put to notice by the Arbitrator that he had fixed the date of
hearing on 21.01.2020 to decide the modalities of arbitration
and the parties were directed to appear in person through their
authorized representatives.
18.
Thereafter on 30.12.2019 (Annexure C-23), the
respondent was put to notice that the State was proceeding to
approach this Court against the unilateral appointment since the
Arbitrator had fixed the hearing for 21.01.2020. The relevant
portion of the said letter reads as under:“1. That on 26.05.2011, Pre-Implementation
Agreement (PIA) was signed between GoHP
and respondent for execution of Dhancho HEP
in Chamba District (12MW) of Himachal
Pradesh.
2. That vide letter dated: 26.08.2013 DPR
submitted by you with Directorate of Energy as
per the terms of PIA.
3. That you failed to sign the Implementation
Agreement (IA) within the time period allowed in
the PIA. Consequently the project was
terminated & up-front premium of Rs. 2.40 Crore
was forfeited by GoHP.
4. That a legal notice dated: 30.10.2019, was
received from you for the refund of up-front
premium of Rs. 2.40 Crore on the ground that
the project has become unviable. That it was
also asserted in that notice that in case amount
of up-front premium was not refunded then the
legal notice be treated as notice invoking
arbitration by proposing the name of Hon'ble
Justice S.N.Jha (Retired Chief Justice).
5. That we have also received a copy of letter
dated: 07.12.2019 from Munish Kumar &
associates, Advocates authorized by you, to
Hon'ble Justice S.N.Jha (Retired Chief Justice),
unilaterally requesting Hon'ble Justice S.N.Jha
(Retired Chief Justice) to preside as sole
arbitrator and adjudicate the dispute between the
parties to the PIA dated: 26.05.2011.
6. That vide letter dated: 13.12.2019, it was
intimated on behalf of GoHP that neither
Directorate of Energy has consented to the
name of Hon'ble Justice S.N.Jha (Retired Chief
Justice) as sole arbitrator in this matter as
proposed by you nor it should be taken as
implied consent on behalf of this office. That the
copy of this letter was also sent to Hon'ble
Justice S.N.Jha (Retired Chief Justice) as well
as to your counsel. However, letter dated:
13.12.2019 was ignored by all concerned
persons.
7. That a notice dated: 19.12.2019 from Hon'ble
Justice S.N.Jha (Retired Chief Justice) was
received by this office, wherein Hon'ble Justice
S.N.Jha (Retired Chief Justice) informed that he
has been appointed as sole arbitrator by you &
further informed that 21.01.2020 is fixed for
preliminary hearing to be held at 2:00 PM in his
office at C/41(Lower Ground Floor), Jangpura
Extension) New Delhi-110014.
That in view of above, this office is left with no
other option but to approach Hon'ble High Court
of H.P. against the unilateral appointment of
arbitrator made by you & also for appointment of
independent & impartial arbitrator by Hon'ble
High Court of H.P.”
19.
Resultantly, two Arbitration Cases No. 5 & 6 of
2020 were filed for appointment of an Arbitrator on 31.12.2019,
mentioning the necessary facts that the Arbitrator had been
appointed without consent and that he was continuing with the
proceedings, giving rise to a justifiable doubt with regard to
independence or impartiality. The relevant objections taken in
the petition under Section 11(6) of the Act read as under:“11. That the Respondent has not followed
the procedure laid down in the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act 1996 (as amended from
time to time) and has unilaterally appointed
Hon'ble Justice S.N. Jha retired Chief
Justice as Sole-Arbitrator without the
consent of the Petitioner and contrary to the
provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act
1996. Its also apparent that the respondent
failed to resolve the alleged dispute by
mutual negotiations as per clause 53 of PIA
before invoking arbitration proceedings by
appointing sole Arbitrator without the
consent of the petitioner.
12. That the petitioner never consented for the
appointment of aforesaid arbitrator and disputed
his appointment and despite the fact that the
petitioner never accepted him as arbitrator, he is
still continuing his proceedings giving rise to a
justifiable doubt with regard to his independence
or impartiality.
13. That the petitioner craves the indulgence of
this Hon’ble Court that an arbitrator from Shimla
or from the adjoining place may kindly be
appointed as it will save a lot of public
exchequer money and also the official man
power as the public money is involved in the
present case.
14. That the respondent had followed a
procedure for appointment of arbitrator which is
unknown to law and the procedure which they
have adopted is neither prescribed in the
arbitration agreement nor in any other law.”
20.
On notice being issued on 10.01.2020 by the Court
and in the meantime, an application was filed by the State
under Section 13(2) and 13(3) of the Act before the Arbitrator
highlighting the issue of unilateral appointment and non-consent
as well as the fact that this Court had been approached for
appointment of an Arbitrator and requesting that in the
meantime, further proceedings be closed. Reference was also
made to the notice received by the Arbitrator, whereby the date
had been fixed on 21.01.2020, for preliminary hearing . The
contents of the application dated 21.01.2020 read as under:“APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 13(3) READ
WITH SECTION 13(2) OF THE ARBITRATION
AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996 FOR CLOSURE
OF THE ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS.
Respectfully Showeth
1. That the aforesaid proceedings are pending
before this Hon'ble Arbitrator and fixed for today
i.e. 21.01.2020. It is further submitted that the
Arbitrator has been nominated by the Non
applicant/Claimant himself unilaterally, whereas
the Applicant/Respondent has objected for the
same.
2. That the applicant vide its Communication
dated 13.12.2019, has conveyed to the Nonapplicant that Applicant has never consented for
the appointment of the Arbitrator and it should
not be taken as implied consent on behalf of the
Applicant/Respondent. The copy of this letter
was also forwarded to your goodself through
registered AD.
3. That the applicant has already approached
the Hon'ble Chief Justice of High Court of
Himachal Pradesh, vide Arbitration Case No. 5
of 2020 titled State of HP through Director,
Directorate of Energy Versus M/s BMD Pvt. Ltd.
through its Vice President, for the appointment of
the independent and impartial Arbitrator and the
matter was listed before the Hon'ble Court on
10.01.2020 and following order was passed
"Notice to the respondent, returnable within Six
weeks, on taking steps within one week. The
certified copy of order is enclosed for kind
perusal of this Hon'ble Arbitral Tribunal.
4. That the matter is sub-judice before the
Hon'ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh. Hence,
it would not be appropriate for your good-self to
conduct further proceedings in the aforesaid
matter, till the final decision of the Hon'ble Court.
5. That we have received a notice dated
19.12.2019 from your good self, whereby it has
been informed that 21.01.2020 is fixed for
preliminary hearing, to be held at 2:00 PM at
your office at Lower Ground Floor, Jangpura
Extension, New Delhi-110014.
It is, therefore, humbly prayed that this
application may kindly be allowed and keeping in
view the fact that the matter is sub-judice before
the Hon'ble High Court of H.P, further
proceedings
in this matter may kindly be
closed.”
21.
As per the minutes of the arbitration proceedings,
held on 21.01.2020, the learned Arbitrator had come to the
conclusion that prima-facie the appointment was valid, but it
was necessary to await the fate of the petition filed under
Section 11 of the Act, accepting the argument that the
respondent has given up his right to contest that the
appointment of the Arbitrator was valid and had forfeited its
right.
The relevant part of the minutes of the arbitration
proceedings dated 21.01.2020 read as under:“Arbitration proceedings were initiated against
the Government of Himachal Pradesh ("Go. H.P"
for short), the matter was scheduled for
21.01.2010 in front of the sole arbitrator Hon'ble
Mr. Justice S. N. Jha (Retd. Chief Justice of the
High Court of Rajasthan & Jammu & Kashmir).
That on the scheduled date, the Representative
of the Himachal Pradesh Government Shri.
Shanti Swaroop Bhatti was present for the
arbitration proceedings. At the very outset the
Representative of the Government moved an
application under Section 13 (3) read with
section 13(2) of the Arbitration & Conciliation
Act, 1996 as amended by Arbitration and
Conciliation, Act, 2015 (Hereinafter referred to
as the "Act") annexing therewith a copy of order
dated. 10.01.2020 passed by the Hon'ble High
Court of Himachal Pradesh issuing notice in a
petition under Section 11 of the Act for
appointment of arbitrator by the Government.
The aforementioned Petition is numbered as
Arbitration Case No. 5/2020 and titled as State
of Himachal Pradesh Vs. M/s BMD Pvt. Ltd.
Submissions by the counsel for the Government
of Himachal Pradesh were as follows:
1. That the claimant did not try to amicably settle
the dispute between the parties.
2. That the claimant did not give the
Respondent an opportunity to mutually
decide/recommend an arbitrator to adjudicate
the dispute between the parties.
Contentions of Mr. Manish Kumar, Advocate for
the Claimant were as follows:
1. That there is no specific stay by the High
Court on the arbitration proceedings initiated by
the Claimant.
2. That the Respondent has forfeited its right to
appoint an arbitrator as recommended by the
claimant by not replying to the notice dated
30.10.2019.
3. That the Claimant had given ample
opportunity to the Respondent to settle the
matter.
4. That pursuant to the ignorance of the
Respondent, the Respondent has given up the
right to contend the appointment of the
arbitrator.
5. That the Petition filed by the GoHP does not
disclose any ground rendering the appointment
of the Ld. Arbitrator as invalid.
OBSERVATIONS MADE BY THE SOLE
ARBITRATOR (Order dated. 21.01.2020 is
Awaited). That prima facie the appointment of
the arbitrator is valid, but it is in the best interest
of the parties that the fate of the petition filed
under Section 11 of the Act by the government
be decided first. In the meanwhile, the Claimant
shall file a reply to the Application filed by the
Respondent. Further it was observed by the Ld.
Arbitrator, since the case filed by the
Government is returnable in 6 weeks the
present arbitration proceedings be posted on a
date after 6 weeks.”
22.
Before the learned Single Judge, in the matter
under Section 11(6) of the Act was hotly contested, wherein the
plea taken was that an application had been filed under Section
13(3) of the Act, which was pending adjudication and, therefore,
the said Court had no jurisdiction. It was further pleaded that
having failed to appoint an Arbitrator within 30 days, the
appointment was to be made on the application of the party.
Resultantly, the learned Single Judge came to the conclusion
that once the parties had invoked arbitration proceedings and
an Arbitrator had been appointed, the application under Section
11(6) of the Act would not be maintainable and the order
passed in the petition under Section 13 of the Act could be
challenged by way of petition under Section 34 of the Act.
23.
It is pertinent to notice that the said defence as
such had been taken by the respondent itself, while opposing
the appointment of an independent Arbitrator under Section
11(6) of the Act by this Court. Resultantly, the petitions had
been dismissed on 02.06.2022 on the ground that the State had
itself subjected to the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator, it could not
approach this Court for appointment of an Arbitrator, which was
not permissible. The relevant part of the said order reads as
under:“11. Mr. Manish Kumar and Mr. Vishal Verma,
learned counsel for the respondent, while
referring to reply filed by respondent, vehemently
argued that once petitioner approached
arbitrator in application under S. 13(3) and
13(2)of the Act, laying therein challenge to
appointment of arbitrator, it is estopped from
filing the petition at hand, seeking appointment
of an arbitrator. He argued that till the time
application filed under S. 13(3) is decided by the
arbitrator, present petition under S.11(6) cannot
be entertained. He further submitted that order if
any passed under S. 13(3) can be laid challenge
by aggrieved party under S.34 of Act but
definitely not under S.11(6) of Act, which
empowers Hon'ble Chief Justice to appoint
arbitrator in terms of agreement if any arrived
inter se parties. He argued that when petitioner
itself by way of an application under S.13(3) has
prayed for termination of mandate of the
arbitrator, which is pending adjudication, present
application deserves outright dismissal being not
maintainable at this stage. While inviting
attention of this Court to S.11(4) and 11(5) of the
Act, learned counsel for the respondent argued
that since the petitioner failed to respond within a
period of thirty days, from the date of receipt of
notice from the respondent with regard to
appointment of arbitrator, appointment is
required to be made on application of parties as
per provisions contained in Sub-section (4),
which clearly provides that if a party fails to
appoint an arbitrator, within 30 days on receipt of
other party, appointment shall be made on the
application of the party. In support of his
submission, learned counsel for the respondent
placed reliance upon judgment rendered by
Hon'ble Apex Court in SP Singla Construction v.
State of Himachal Pradesh (2019) 2 SCC 488
and Perkins Eastman Architects. Besides above,
learned counsel for the respondent also invited
attention of this court to latest judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court in Swadesh Kumar Agarwal
v. Dinesh Kumar Agarwal, Civil Appeal Nos.
2935-2938 of 2022, decided on 5.5.2022,
whereby Hon'ble Apex Court placing reliance
upon its earlier judgment in SP Construction
supra, reiterated that application under S.11 (6)
of the act is not maintainable if party seeking
appointment of arbitrator has subjected itself to
jurisdiction of the arbitrator by filing application
under S.13(3) of the Act, praying therein for
termination of mandate of the arbitrator.
12 to 23.
x x x x x x x x x x
24. Learned counsel for the respondent while
relying upon aforesaid judgment stated that no
such ground came to be urged in application
under S. 11(6) as such, this judgment is of no
help to the case of the petitioner. Hon'ble Apex
Court in S.P. Singla supra held that when if any
party is dissatisfied or aggrieved by the
appointment of arbitrator in terms of the
agreement by other party/parties, his remedy
would be by way of petition under Section 13 of
the 18 of 1996 Act, and, thereafter while
challenging the award under Section 34 of the
1996 Act…………...
25. x x x x x x x
x x x
26. Hon'ble Apex Court in S.P. Singla, while
placing reliance upon earlier judgment passed in
Antrix Corporation Limited v. Devas Multimedia
Private Ltd. (2014) 11 SCC 560, reiterated that
where the parties fail to act in terms of the
procedure agreed upon by them, provisions of
sub-section (6) of S.11 of the Act can be
invoked by any of the parties, praying therein for
appointment of arbitrator. However, where in
terms of the agreement, arbitration clause has
already been invoked by one of the parties
thereto, provisions of sub-section (6) of S.11
cannot be invoked and in that case, the
aggrieved party has remedy to file petition under
S.13 of the Act before arbitrator laying therein
challenge to the appointment of arbitrator by the
other party in terms of the agreement. Order
passed in the petition under S.13 thereafter can
be laid further challenge by way of petition
under S.34 of the Act.
27 to 34. x x x x x x x x x x x
35. S.13(2) provides that a party who intends to
challenge appointment of an arbitrator shall,
within fifteen days after becoming aware of the
constitution of the arbitral tribunal or after
becoming aware of any circumstances referred
to in sub-section(3) of section 12 shall send a
written statement of the reasons for the
challenge to the arbitral tribunal. In the case at
hand, on one hand, the petitioner subjected
itself to the jurisdiction of the learned arbitrator
by way of an application under S.13 of the Act,
praying therein for termination of the mandate of
the arbitrator and, on the other hand,
approached this Court in the instant
proceedings, under S. 11 of the Act, praying
therein for appointment of another arbitrator,
which is not permissible, as has been discussed
in detail herein above.
36. Consequently, in view of detailed discussion
made herein above as well as law taken into
consideration, this court does not find present
petitions under S.11(6) of the Act to be
maintainable and the same are accordingly
dismissed. All pending applications in both the
petitions stand disposed of. Interim directions, if
any, also stand vacated.”
24.
On the dismissal of the said petition, the
respondent, through its Counsel, had requested the Arbitrator
on 14.06.2022 to proceed with the matter since there was no
stay order and informed them of the date when its next sitting
was taking place. The Arbitrator accordingly fixed the sitting of
the Tribunal on 23.07.2022 vide a communication on
23.06.2022 by way of video conferencing and directed the
claimant to file the statement of claim. Resultantly, the
respondent, filed its statement of claim in July 2022.
25.
The State chose not to appear on 23.07.2022 and
the Tribunal as such had given an opportunity to file the
statement of defence, while fixing the next date of hearing as
06.09.2022.
While fixing a sum of Rs. 13,60,668/- as the
Arbitrator’s fees, it directed that a sum of Rs. 5.00 lakh each,
be paid online, on account, towards the Arbitrator’s fees.
Thereafter, on 06.09.2022, due to the absence as such of the
State, one more opportunity was given to the State to submit its
statement of defence, and it was recorded that the claimant had
paid Rs.5.00 lakh. The matter was adjourned to 10.10.2022.
26.
The sitting was held virtually and on account of
non-appearance ex-parte, paper publication was also directed.
The same was accordingly complied with and the matter was
fixed for 07.11.2022, on which date, the ex-parte proceedings
were initiated, taking note of the fact
that despite service
having been effected, there was a deliberate absence. The
respondent-claimant was required to pay the fees of the State
share as well under the relevant provisions of Section 38 of the
Act and a sum of Rs. 8,60,668/- was directed to be paid before
10.12.2022.
27.
Necessary evidence as such was led by way of an
affidavit of the authorized representative and the matter was
then fixed for final arguments and the sitting was to be held at
Shimla. Resultantly, on 04.02.2023, the arguments were heard
and the award was reserved. Thereafter, the award came to be
passed on 29.04.2023.
28.
In the award itself while recording the chronology
of events, the learned Arbitrator has recorded that the appellant
had not filed any response denying the claim or objecting to the
arbitration in Paragraph 2. Though, it is not disputed that way
back on 20.01.2020, an application under Section 13(2) of the
Act had been filed which had already been noticed by the
learned Arbitrator in its order dated 21.01.2022, which has been
reproduced in para 16 above.
29.
Eventually, the claim petitions were allowed and
following amounts were awarded by way of one consolidated
award on the two separate claims:
“12.1 Accordingly, award is passed in favour of
the claimant and against the respondent, for
payment of Rs.8,41,04,572 (Eight Crores Fourty
One Lacs Four Thousand Five Hundred
Seventy Two) (6,00,73,973 + 2,40,29,589) with
interest @15% per annum under claim heads
(a) and (b); Nil under claim head (c); and
Rs.33,60,668
Thirty
Three
Lacs
Sixty
Thousands
Six
Hundred
Sixty
Eight)
(Rs.13,60,668.00 +20 lacs) under claim head
(d).
12.2 The Respondent shall pay the award
money to the claimant within a period of three
months.”
Findings on Issue No.(i):30.
A perusal of the provisions of the Act would go on
to show that an "arbitration agreement," as defined under
Section 7 ‘Arbitration Agreement’ of the Act, means an
agreement by which the parties submit to arbitration all or
certain disputes which have arisen, or which may arise,
between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether
contractual or not.
31.
In sum and substance, Section 8 of the Act talks
about ‘Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an
arbitration agreement’ and provides that a judicial authority
before which an action is brought in a matter that is the subject
of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party or any person
claiming through or under them applies not later than the date
of submitting their first statement on the substance of the
dispute, would refer the parties to arbitration. This applies
notwithstanding any judgment, decree, or order of the Supreme
Court or any other court, unless the authority finds that prima
facie no valid arbitration agreement exists.
32.
The procedure for the appointment of arbitrators is
provided under Section 11 ‘Appointment of arbitrators’ of the
Act which states that parties are free to agree on a procedure
for appointing the arbitrator or arbitrators. If a party fails to
appoint an arbitrator within thirty days from the receipt of a
request to do so from the other party, the High Court may be
approached by an application by the aggrieved party.
33.
Section 12 provides for ‘Grounds for challenge’
of the Act and makes it mandatory for a nominated arbitrator to
disclose in writing any circumstances such as the existence,
direct or indirect, of any past or present relationship with or
interest in any of the parties or the subject-matter in dispute
(financial, business, professional, or otherwise) that are likely to
give rise to justifiable doubts as to their independence or
impartiality. This disclosure must be made in the form
prescribed in the Sixth Schedule. Furthermore, Section 12(4) of
the Act provides that a party may challenge an arbitrator
appointed by them, or in whose appointment they participated,
only for reasons of which they become aware after the
appointment has been made.
34.
Section 13 lays down the ‘Challenge procedure’
and gives the right to a party to challenge the appointment of
an arbitrator. A party intending to do so must, within fifteen days
after becoming aware of the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal
or any circumstances referred to in Section 12(3) of the Act,
send a written statement of the reasons for the challenge to the
Arbitral Tribunal. Section 13(3) of the Act makes it mandatory
for the Arbitral Tribunal to decide on the challenge. If the
challenge under any procedure agreed upon by the parties or
under sub-section (2) is not successful, the arbitral tribunal shall
continue the arbitral proceedings and make an arbitral award,
as provided under sub-section (4). Under sub-section (5), if an
arbitral award is made, the party who challenged the arbitrator
may make an application for setting aside such an award in
accordance with Section 34 of the Act. Section 13 of ‘the Act’
reads as under:“13. Challenge procedure.-(1) Subject to subsection (4), the parties are free to agree on a
procedure for challenging an arbitrator.
(2) Failing any agreement referred to in subsection (1), a party who intends to challenge an
arbitrator shall, within fifteen days after
becoming aware of the constitution of the arbitral
tribunal or after becoming aware of any
circumstances referred to in sub-section (3) of
section 12, send a written statement of the
reasons for the challenge to the arbitral tribunal.
(3) Unless the arbitrator challenged under subsection (2) withdraws from his office or the other
party agrees to the challenge, the arbitral
tribunal shall decide on the challenge.
(4) If a challenge under any procedure agreed
upon by the parties or under the procedure
under sub-section (2) is not successful, the
arbitral tribunal shall continue the arbitral
proceedings and make an arbitral award.
(5) Where an arbitral award is made under subsection (4), the party challenging the arbitrator
may make an application for setting aside such
an arbitral award in accordance with section 34.
(6) Where an arbitral award is set aside on an
application made under sub-section (5), the
Court may decide as to whether the arbitrator
who is challenged is entitled to any fees.”
35.
Section 16 refers to ‘Competence of arbitral
tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction’ of the Act and further
provides that the Arbitral Tribunal may rule on its own
jurisdiction, including ruling on any objections with respect to
the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. The issue
of jurisdiction must be raised not later than the submission of
the statement of defence. Furthermore, a party is not precluded
from raising such a plea merely because they have appointed,
or participated in the appointment of an arbitrator.
Section
16(5) of the Act further provides that the Arbitral Tribunal shall
decide on a plea referred to in sub-section (2) or sub-section
(3), where the Arbitral Tribunal rejects the plea, it shall continue
with the arbitral proceedings and make an arbitral award. A
party aggrieved by this decision may then make an application
to set aside the arbitral award in accordance with Section 34 of
the Act. Section 16 reads as under:“16. Competence of arbitral tribunal to rule
on its jurisdiction.
(1) The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own
jurisdiction, including ruling on any objections
with respect to the existence or validity of the
arbitration agreement, and for that purpose,
(a) An arbitration clause which forms part
of a contract shall be treated as an
agreement independent of the other terms
of the contract; and
(b) a decision by the arbitral tribunal that
the contract is null and void shall not entail
ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration
clause.
(2) A plea that the arbitral tribunal does not
have jurisdiction shall be raised not later than
the submission of the statement of defence;
however, a party shall not be precluded from
raising such a plea merely because that he has
appointed, or participated in the appointment of,
an arbitrator.
(3) A plea that the arbitral tribunal is exceeding
the scope of its authority shall be raised as
soon as the matter alleged to be beyond the
scope of its authority is raised during the
arbitral proceedings.
(4) The arbitral tribunal may, in either of the
cases referred to in sub-section (2) or sub-
section (3), admit a later plea if it considers the
delay justified.
(5) The arbitral tribunal shall decide on a plea
referred to in sub-section (2) or sub-section (3)
and, where the arbitral tribunal takes a decision
rejecting the plea, continue with the arbitral
proceedings and make an arbitral award.
(6) A party aggrieved by such an arbitral award
may make an application for setting aside such
an arbitral award in accordance with section
34.”
36.
Section 18 ‘Equal treatment of parties’ of the Act
mandates that equal treatment must be afforded to the parties.
37.
Section 21 provides for ‘Commencement of
arbitral proceedings’ of the Act and specifies that, unless
otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral proceedings in
respect of a particular dispute commence on the date on which
a request for that dispute to be referred to arbitration is received
by the respondent.
38.
Section 34 of the Act, governs the 'procedure for
setting aside an arbitral award', and provides that recourse
to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only through
an application for setting aside such an award in accordance
with sub-sections (2) and (3). Specifically, Section 34(2)(a)(v) of
the Act provides that an award may be set aside, if the
composition of the Arbitral Tribunal or the arbitral procedure
was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties.
Meanwhile, sub-section (iii) provides for setting it aside, if the
party making the application was not given proper notice of the
appointment of an Arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings.
39.
Thus, a conjoint reading of these Sections
demonstrates that party autonomy is paramount to ensure
equal treatment and equal participation. Resultantly, the
contracting parties must have an equal say in the constitution of
the Arbitral Tribunal. The performance of the contract, as acted
upon by the respondent at a later stage, took place bilaterally,
therefore, one party cannot unilaterally assume jurisdiction and
proceed independently. The only exception to this Rule is found
under the proviso to Section 12(5) of the Act, where the
applicability of the sub-section may be waived by an express
agreement in writing subsequent to disputes having arisen
between them. In the present case, it is undisputed that no
such waiver exists.
40.
Unilateral appointments have a profound impact,
and in this regard, reliance can be placed upon the judgment of
the Apex Court in Dharma Prathishthanam Vs. Madhok
Construction (P) Limited (2005) 9 SCC 868. The principle
established therein must be kept in mind, as the Apex Court laid
down the following position, the relevant paragraph reads as
under:“12. On a plain reading of the several provisions
referred to hereinabove, we are clearly of the
opinion that the procedure followed and the
methodology adopted by the respondent is
wholly unknown to law and the appointment of
the sole arbitrator Shri Swami Dayal, the
reference of disputes to such arbitrator and the
ex parte proceedings and award given by the
arbitrator are all void ab initio and hence nullity,
liable to be ignored. In case of arbitration without
the intervention of the Court, the parties must
rigorously stick to the agreement entered into
between the two. If the arbitration clause names
an arbitrator as the one already agreed upon,
the appointment of an arbitrator poses no
difficulty. If the arbitration clause does not name
an arbitrator but provides for the manner in
which the arbitrator is to be chosen and
appointed, then the parties are bound to act
accordingly. If the parties do not agree then
arises the complication which has to be resolved
by reference to the provisions of the Act. One
party cannot usurp the jurisdiction of the Court
and proceed to act unilaterally. A unilateral
appointment and a unilateral reference both will
be illegal. It may make a difference if in respect
of a unilateral appointment and reference the
other party submits to the jurisdiction of the
arbitrator and waives its rights which it has under
the agreement, then the arbitrator may proceed
with the reference and the party submitting to his
jurisdiction and participating in the proceedings
before him may later on be precluded and
estopped from raising any objection in that
regard. According to Russell (Arbitration, 20th
Edition, p. 104)
"An Arbitrator is neither more nor less than a
private judge of a private court (called an arbitral
tribunal) who gives a private judgment (called an
award). He is a judge in that a dispute is
submitted to him;... He is private insofar as (1)
he is chosen and paid by the disputants (2) he
does not sit in public, (3) he acts in accordance
with privately chosen procedure so far as that is
not repugnant to public policy, (4) so far as the
law allows he is set up to the exclusion of the
State courts, (5) his authority and powers are
only whatsoever he is given by the disputants'
agreement, (6) the effectiveness of his powers
derives wholly from the private law of contract
and accordingly the nature and exercise of these
powers must not be contrary to the proper law of
the contract or the public policy of England,
bearing in mind that the paramount public policy
is that freedom of contract is not lightly to be
interfered with."
41.
There is no dispute regarding the fact that Clause
53, as reproduced in paragraph 12, would go on to show that
the dispute must be resolved by mutual negotiations, failing
which, the matter shall be referred to an arbitrator appointed as
per the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
42.
By the letter dated 03.10.2019 (Annexure C-19),
the allotment was cancelled, and a legal notice was
subsequently served upon the State on 30.10.2019 (Annexure
C-20). This notice requested a refund of the amount, suggested
the name for an Arbitrator, and formally proposed the said
Arbitrator.
43.
Pursuant to Section 21 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996, the cause of action accrued, when the
State chose not to appoint an arbitrator within thirty days of
receiving the notice. Resultantly, the Contractor had failed to
take the necessary steps to have the arbitrator appointed and
the Arbitral Tribunal constituted through a Court of law, a
procedure prescribed under Section 11 of the Act and explicitly
mentioned in the Contractor's own letter. Similarly, the
Contractor took no action against the State, even though it
could have followed the procedure outlined in the notice itself.
44.
C-21),
Instead, via a letter dated 09.12.2019 (Annexure
the
Contractor
had
unilaterally
requested
the
proposed/nominated arbitrator to preside over the matter
without following the statutory procedure, solely on the grounds
that the State had failed to respond. Immediately thereafter, on
13.12.2019 (Annexure P-1), the State had raised an objection,
asserting that it had neither given express nor implied consent
to the proposed arbitrator, and directed the Contractor to act in
accordance with the relevant provisions of the Act.
45.
Thereafter, the Arbitrator had fixed a hearing date
for 21.01.2020 to decide the modalities of the arbitration. The
State had given immediate notice on 30.12.2019 that it was
approaching the Court for intervention and objected to the
unilateral appointment.
46.
Thus, it is very apparent that the State had never
consented to the appointment of the Arbitrator. Resultantly, the
Arbitrator was bound to decide the application under Sections
13(2) & (3) of the Act which had been filed initially. It was also
stated in the said application under Section 13 of the Act that
the Court had been approached for the appointment of an
independent and impartial Arbitrator, and that notice of the
same had already been issued.
47.
It is not disputed that the Arbitrator recorded this in
his proceedings on 21.01.2020 and wrongly held prima facie,
that the appointment of the Arbitrator is valid without giving any
valid reasons. However, he further held that it is in the best
interest of the parties that the fate of the petition under Section
11 of the Act filed by the State be decided first. The claim of the
contractor was that the State had forfeited its right to appoint an
Arbitrator as recommended by the claimant by not replying to
the notice dated 30.10.2019.
48.
The Arbitrator was under a bounden statutory duty
to decide the application under Section 13 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 ('the Act'). This duty arose after the
Contractor successfully rebutted and dislodged the plea filed by
the State under Section 11(6) of the Act, which had sought the
appointment of an Arbitrator on the ground that only a challenge
under Section 34 of the Act would be applicable.
However,
while passing the impugned award on 29.04.2023, the
Arbitrator had completely failed to consider the Section 13
application. Despite being fully aware of the application moved
under Sections 13(2) and 13(3) of the Act, the Arbitrator ignored
the statutory mandate under Sections 13 and 16 of the Act,
which explicitly obligates the Tribunal to rule on challenges to
its credentials and jurisdiction. The Apex Court has time and
again appreciated and emphasized the unique procedural
autonomy of the Act, stressing that parties must strictly adhere
to its prescribed procedures. By failing to follow this mandatory
procedure, the Arbitrator's mandate suffers from a patent
illegality and an inherent lack of jurisdiction, thereby rendering
the final award void ab initio.
49.
The Apex Court in Rajasthan State Road
Transport Corporation and Others v. Zakir Hussain (2005) 7
SCC 447, has held that jurisdiction cannot be conferred by any
order of a Court. Once an Act provides a specific remedy and
creates an obligation to enforce performance in a designated
manner, that performance cannot be enforced in any other way.
Therefore, when a worker approaches a Civil Court instead of
utilizing the prescribed statutory remedy under the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, it acts without inherent jurisdiction.
Furthermore, if the parties agreed to arbitration under an
agreement, resort to arbitration must follow the agreed
procedure, a unilateral appointment of an Arbitrator would be
void ab initio. This goes to the root of the matter a fundamental
illegality that the learned Single Judge had failed to appreciate
while rejecting the petition under Section 34 of the Act.
50.
In Dharma Prathishthanam (supra), a judgment
under the Arbitration Act, 1940, it was held that where an
appointment of an arbitrator is unknown to law and done
unilaterally by one party, the appointment, the reference, and
the resulting award are all void ab initio. A party cannot usurp
the jurisdiction of the Court and proceed to act unilaterally. It
was further held that mere inaction by a party when called upon
by the other party to act, does not lead to an inference of
implied consent or acquiescence. Accordingly, the award was
declared a nullity. The relevant observations are found in
paragraphs 31 & 32, which read as under:“31. Three types of situations may emerge
between the parties and then before the Court.
Firstly, an arbitration agreement, under
examination from the point of view of its
enforceability, may be one which expresses the
parties' intention to have their disputes settled by
arbitration by using clear and unambiguous
language, then the parties and the Court have
no other choice but to treat the contract as
binding and enforce it. Or, there may be an
agreement suffering from such vagueness or
uncertainty as is not capable of being construed
at all by culling out the intention of the parties
with certainty, even by reference to the
provisions of the Arbitration Act, then it shall
have to be held that there was no agreement
between the parties in the eye of law and the
question of appointing an arbitrator or making a
reference or disputes by reference to Sections 8,
9 and 20 shall not arise. Secondly, there may be
an arbitrator or arbitrators named, or the
authority may be named who shall appoint an
arbitrator, then the parties have already been ad
idem on the real identity of the arbitrator as
appointed by them before hand; the consent is
already spelled out and binds the parties and the
Court. All that may remain to be done in the
event of an occasion arising for the purpose, is
to have the agreement filed in the Court and
seek an order of reference to the arbitrator
appointed by the parties. Thirdly, if the arbitrator
is not named and the authority who would
appoint the arbitrator is also not specified, the
appointment and reference shall be to a sole
arbitrator unless a different intention is expressly
spelt out. The appointment and reference both
shall be by the consent of the parties. Where the
parties do not agree, the Court steps in and
assumes jurisdiction to make an appointment,
also to make a reference, subject to the
jurisdiction of the Court being invoked in that
regard. We hasten to add that mere inaction by a
party called upon by the other one to act does
not lead to an inference as to implied consent or
acquiescence being drawn. The appellant not
responding to respondent's proposal for joining
in the appointment of a sole arbitrator named by
him could not be construed as consent and the
only option open to the respondent was to have
invoked the jurisdiction of Court for appointment
of an arbitrator and an order of reference of
disputes to him. It is the Court which only could
have compelled the appellant to join in the
proceedings.
32. In the present case, we find that far from
submitting to the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator and
conceding to the appointment of and reference
to the Arbitrator-Shri Swami Dayal, the appellant
did raise an objection to the invalidity of the
entire
proceedings
beginning
from
the
appointment till the giving of the Award though
the objection was belated. In ordinary course, we
would have after setting aside the impugned
judgments of the High Court remanded the
matter back for hearing and decision afresh by
the learned Single Judge of the High Court so as
to record a finding if the award is a nullity and if
so then set aside the same without regard to the
fact that the objection petition under Section 30
of the Act filed by the appellant was beyond the
period of limitation prescribed by Article 119(b)
of the Limitation Act, 1963. However, in the facts
and circumstances of the case, we consider
such a course to follow as a futile exercise
resulting in needless waste of public time. On
the admitted and undisputed facts, we are
satisfied, as already indicated hereinabove, that
the impugned Award is a nullity and hence liable
to be set aside and that is what we declare and
also do hereby, obviating the need for remand.”
51.
In Newton Engineering’s case (supra), since the
designated office of the arbitrator no longer existed, Indian Oil
Corporation
Limited
unilaterally
appointed
its
Director
(Marketing) as the arbitrator. The Contractor had approached
the Delhi High Court under Section 11(6)(c), read with Sections
13 and 15 of the Act, seeking the appointment of a retired
Judge of that Court as the sole arbitrator to adjudicate the
claims raised in the petition. A learned Single Judge of the High
Court had dismissed the Contractor's petition, observing that
the challenge to the arbitrator's appointment should be raised
before the Arbitral Tribunal itself. Resultantly, the matter was
taken up before the Apex Court. The Apex Court had held that it
was not open to either party to unilaterally appoint an arbitrator
to resolve disputes. Resultantly, the appointment was set aside,
leaving the parties free to pursue appropriate ordinary civil
proceedings for the redressal of their grievances in view of the
peculiar facts of the case.
52.
In the Walter Bau AG’s case (supra), the
appointment had been made by the petitioner-company, the
second arbitrator was to be appointed by the Corporation, and
the third arbitrator was to be chosen as per the agreement.
Thereafter, the matter was referred to the International Centre
for Alternative Dispute Resolution in India (for short, "ICADR")
for the appointment of an arbitrator on behalf of the party that
failed to act, or for the appointment of the third arbitrator, as the
case may be. The “ICADR” is governed by specific norms
contained in Rules 5 and 35 of the “ICADR” Rules, 1996, which
govern the procedure for appointing arbitrators. However, the
“ICADR's” power to make an appointment from a panel of three
names, does not include an independent right to appoint an
outside
arbitrator,
which
was
nevertheless
done.
This
procedure was objected to as being non est in law and contrary
to the agreed procedure, since the appointment could only have
been made from the panel. Resultantly, the appointment of the
retired Judge was set aside, and a fresh appointment was
made by the Apex Court. Thus, it is apparent that sanctity has
to be given to the agreement inter se the parties.
53.
In Bharat Broadband Network’s case (supra),
the arbitrator was nominated by the Managing Director of the
appellant-company. Subsequently, an application was filed
seeking the arbitrator's withdrawal on the grounds of a de jure
inability to perform his functions. Although this application was
rejected on the pretext that the company itself could not object
in view of the law laid down in TRF Limited Vs. Energo
Engineering Projects Limited (2017) 8 SCC 377 (“TRF Ltd.”).
Taking provisions of Sections 12 and 14 of the Act into
consideration, it was held that the Arbitral Tribunal must first
decide the challenge before it can continue to proceed, keeping
in mind the de jure inability of an arbitrator to act as such, and
that party autonomy must be respected.
The relevant
paragraphs read as under:“14. From a conspectus of the above decisions,
it is clear that Section 12(1), as substituted by
the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment)
Act, 2015 [“Amendment Act, 2015”], makes it
clear that when a person is approached in
connection with his possible appointment as an
arbitrator, it is his duty to disclose in writing any
circumstances which are likely to give rise to
justifiable doubts as to his independence or
impartiality. The disclosure is to be made in the
form specified in the Sixth Schedule, and the
grounds stated in the Fifth Schedule are to serve
as a guide in determining whether circumstances
exist which give rise to justifiable doubts as to
the independence or impartiality of an arbitrator.
Once this is done, the appointment of the
arbitrator may be challenged on the ground that
justifiable doubts have arisen under sub-section
(3) of Section 12 subject to the caveat entered
by sub-section (4) of Section 12. The challenge
procedure is then set out in Section 13 together
with the time limit laid down in Section 13(2).
What is important to note is that the arbitral
tribunal must first decide on the said challenge,
and if it is not successful, the tribunal shall
continue the proceedings and make an award. It
is only post award that the party challenging the
appointment of an arbitrator may make an
application for setting aside such an award in
accordance with Section 34 of the Act.
15. Section 12(5), on the other hand, is a new
provision which relates to the de jure inability of
an arbitrator to act as such. Under this provision,
any prior agreement to the contrary is wiped out
by the non-obstante clause in Section 12(5), the
moment any person whose relationship with the
parties or the counsel or the subject matter of
the dispute falls under the Seventh Schedule.
The sub-section then declares that such person
shall be “ineligible” to be appointed as arbitrator.
The only way in which this ineligibility can be
removed is by the proviso, which again is a
special provision which states that parties may,
subsequent to disputes having arisen between
them, waive the applicability of Section 12(5), by
an express agreement in writing. What is clear,
therefore, is that where, under any agreement
between the parties, a person falls within any of
the categories set out in the Seventh Schedule,
he is, as a matter of law, ineligible to be
appointed as an arbitrator. The only way in
which this ineligibility can be removed, again, in
law, is that parties may after disputes have
arisen between them, waive the applicability of
this sub-section by an “express agreement in
writing”. Obviously, the “express agreement in
writing” has reference to a person who is
interdicted by the Seventh Schedule, but who is
stated by parties (after the disputes have arisen
between them) to be a person in whom they
have faith notwithstanding the fact that such
person is interdicted by the Seventh Schedule.
54.
It is in such circumstances, the appointment was
set aside, even though the proceedings under Section 34 of the
Act were still pending before the Delhi High Court, thereby
rendering them infructuous.
55.
In
Re:
Interplay
Between
Arbitration
Agreements under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 and the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2024) 6 SCC 1, the
Constitution Bench has addressed the issue of stamped and
unstamped instruments. The Apex Court has applied the
doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz (competence-competence),
adopted from German jurisprudence, which mandates that
Arbitral Tribunals must first rule on their own jurisdiction. This
principle supports the separability presumption meaning the
arbitration clause exists independently of the underlying
contract. By giving Arbitrators the first opportunity to hear
jurisdictional challenges, Court’s intervention at the referral
stage was held to be kept to a minimum. The initial rulings by
the Arbitral Tribunal remain subject to subsequent judicial
review by Courts, reinforcing the primacy of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996, as a special statute over general acts
like the Indian Stamp Act, 1899.
The relevant paragraphs
reads as under:“123. The doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz
(also known as competence-competence), as
originally
developed
in
Germany,
was
traditionally understood to imply that arbitrators
are empowered to make a final ruling on their
own jurisdiction, with no subsequent judicial
review of the decision by any court. However,
many jurisdictions allow an Arbitral Tribunal to
render a decision on its jurisdiction, subject to
substantive judicial review.
124. It is a well-recognized principle of public
international law that a legal authority
possessing adjudicatory powers has the right to
decide its own jurisdiction. Similarly, it is a
general rule of international arbitration law that
an Arbitral Tribunal has the power to determine
its own jurisdiction. The ability of an Arbitral
Tribunal to determine its own jurisdiction is an
important facet of arbitration jurisprudence
because it gives effect to the separability
presumption.
The separability presumption
insulates the arbitration agreement from the
defects of the underlying contract, and thereby
ensures the sustenance of the tribunal’s
jurisdiction over the substantive rights and
obligations of the parties under the underlying
contract even after such a contract is put to an
end. The doctrine of competence-competence
allows the tribunal to decide on all substantive
issues arising out of the underlying contract,
including the existence and validity of the
arbitration agreement.
125 to 130 x x x x x x x x x
131. Section 16 empowers the Arbitral Tribunal
to rule on its own jurisdiction, including ruling on
any objections with respect to the existence or
validity of arbitration agreement. Importantly, the
parties have a right under Sections 16(2) and
16(3) to challenge the jurisdiction of the Arbitral
Tribunal on grounds such as the non-existence
or invalidity of the arbitration agreement. The
Arbitral Tribunal is obligated to decide on the
challenge to its jurisdiction, and where it rejects
the challenge, it can proceed with the arbitral
proceedings and make an arbitral award. It is the
principle of procedural competence-competence
which recognizes the power of an Arbitral
Tribunal to hear and decide challenges to its
jurisdiction. Once the Arbitral Tribunal makes an
arbitral award, Section 16(6) allows the
aggrieved party to make an application for
setting aside the award under Section 34.
Sections 16(5) and 16(6) further show that
Parliament has completely ousted the jurisdiction
of Courts to interfere during the arbitral
proceedings-courts can intervene only after the
tribunal has made an award. Thus, Section 16 is
intended to give full effect to the procedural and
substantive aspects of the doctrine of
competence-competence.
132. Section 34 of the Arbitration Act deals with
applications for setting aside arbitral awards.
Section 34(2) provides that an arbitral award
may be set aside by the Court only if the party
making the application establishes, on the basis
of the record of the Arbitral Tribunal, any of the
following five grounds:
132.1. A party was under some incapacity; or
132.2. The arbitration agreement is not valid
under the law to which the parties have
subjected it or, failing any indication thereon,
under the law for the time being in force; or
132.3. The party making an application was not
given proper notice of the appointment of an
arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was
otherwise unable to present his case; or
132.4. The arbitral award deals with a dispute
not contemplated by or not failing within the
terms of the submission to arbitration, or it
contains decisions on matters beyond the scope
of the submission to arbitration, provided that if
the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration
can be separated from those not so submitted,
only that part of the arbitral award which
contains decisions on matters not submitted to
arbitration may be set aside; or
132.5. The composition of the Arbitral Tribunal or
the arbitral procedure was not in accordance
with the agreement of the parties, unless such
agreement was in conflict with a provision of Part
I from which the parties cannot derogate, or
failing such agreement, was not in accordance
with Part I.
132.6. Moreover, the Court can set aside an
arbitral award if it finds that:
132.6.1. The subject-matter of the dispute is not
capable of settlement by arbitration under the
law for the time being in force; or
132.6.2. The arbitral award is in conflict with the
public policy of India.
133. Under Section 34, the grounds for setting
aside an arbitral award are specific. The
provision requires a party challenging an award
to plead and prove the existence of one or more
such grounds. The scheme of the Arbitration Act
shows that although an Arbitral Tribunal is given
priority to determine all issues pertaining to its
jurisdiction based on the principle of
competence-competence, the tribunal’s decision
is subject to judicial review at the stage when an
award is challenged. Moreover, one of the
grounds on which an arbitral award can be set
aside is that the arbitration agreement is not
valid under law. This indicates that the
Arbitration Act does not contemplate the Court
determining the validity of an arbitration
agreement at a pre-arbitral stage.
134 to 135 x x x x x x x x x
136. In view of the above discussion, the issue
that comes up for our consideration is whether
an issue of stamping is a jurisdictional issue.
Jurisdiction is generally defined as the power of
a court or tribunal to hear and determine a
cause, and to adjudicate or exercise any judicial
power in relation to such cause. Jurisdiction
refers to the authority of a court or tribunal to
decide matters that are litigated before it or to
take cognizance of matters presented before it in
a formal way for its decision. In Official Trustee
v. Sachindra Nath Chatterjee, this Court held
that for a court to have jurisdiction to decide a
particular matter, it must not only have
jurisdiction to try the suit brought but must also
have the authority to pass the orders sought. In
NTPC Ltd. v. Siemens Atkeingesellschaft, this
Court observed that any refusal to go into the
merits of a claim may be in the realm of
jurisdiction.
Accordingly, it was observed that
the issue of limitation goes to jurisdiction
because if a claim is barred by limitation, a
tribunal can refuse to exercise its jurisdiction.
137 to 138 x x x x x x x x x
139. The international arbitration law as well as
domestic law prioritize the arbitral tribunal by
permitting them to initially decide challenges to
their authority instead of the courts. The policy
consideration behind this approach is two-fold:
first, to recognize the mutual intention of the
parties of choosing the arbitrator to resolve all
their disputes about the substantive rights and
obligations arising out of contract; and second,
to prevent parties from initiating parallel
proceedings before courts and delaying the
arbitral process. This is the positive aspect of the
doctrine of competence-competence.
140. The negative aspect, in contrast, speaks to
the national courts. It instructs the courts to limit
their interference at the referral stage by
deferring to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal
in issues pertaining to the existence and validity
of an arbitration agreement. Thus, the negative
aspect of the doctrine of competencecompetence suggests that the courts should
refrain from entertaining challenge to the
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal before the
arbitrators themselves have had an opportunity
to do so. Allowing arbitral tribunals to first rule on
their own jurisdiction and later allowing the
courts to determine if the tribunal exercised its
powers properly safeguards both the power and
authority of the arbitral tribunal as well as the
courts. The negative aspect of the doctrine has
been expressly recognized by Indian courts.
Considering both the positive and negative
facets, the principle can be defined as a rule
whereby arbitrators must have the first
opportunity to hear challenges relating to their
jurisdiction, which is subject to subsequent
review by courts.
141. In Chloro Controls India (P) Ltd. v. Severn
Trent Water Purification Inc., one of the issues
before this Court was whether the court at the
referral stage under Section 45 is required to
determine the validity of an arbitration
agreement. This Court recognized that the
doctrine of competence-competence has both
the positive and the negative aspects. It was
observed that while the positive aspect enables
the arbitrator to rule on its own jurisdiction, the
negative aspect deprives the courts of their
jurisdiction. However, this Court noted the
absence of a provision similar to Section 16 in
Part II to conclude that the referral court is
required to test for the ingredients of Section 45
at the threshold stage itself.”
56.
Reliance was also placed upon the Constitution
Bench judgments of the Apex Court in Khardah Company
Ltd. Vs. Raymon & Co. (India) Private Ltd. AIR 1962 SC
1810 and Waverly Jute Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. Raymon & Co.
(India) Private Ltd. AIR 1963 SC 90, holding that where there
is no such agreement, there is an initial want of jurisdiction
which could not be cured by acquiescence and consent.
57.
In Hindustan Zinc Limited (HZL) Vs. Ajmer
Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited (2019) 17 SCC 82, a threeJudge Bench came to the conclusion that there was a statutory
provision as such that the matter had to be decided otherwise
and the arbitrator could not be appointed by the State
Commission. Furthermore, the Court held that if there is an
inherent lack of jurisdiction, the plea can be taken up at any
stage and even in collateral proceedings.
58.
In
Central
Organization
for
Railway
Electrification Vs. ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV) (2025) 4 SCC
641, a Constitution Bench re-examined party autonomy
regarding consensual agreements to submit disputes to a
decision-maker chosen by or for the parties. The Apex Court
has also held that the right to arbitrate makes dispute
resolution a private right for in personam matters, subject to
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which allows parties
freedom to agree unless otherwise provided while balancing
challenges under Section 34 of the Act, the provisions of
Section 12 of the Act, equality in arbitration proceedings under
Section 18 of the Act, and the self-contained nature of Court
intervention.
Ultimately,
the
unilateral
appointment
of
arbitrators was held to violate the equality clause under
Section 18 of the Act and Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
The Apex Court further held that any clause allowing a single
party to make such an appointment gives rise to justifiable
doubts
regarding
the
arbitrator’s
impartiality
and
independence. The relevant paragraphs reads as under:“127. Reference of disputes to a sole arbitrator
has various advantages, including easy
arrangements of meetings or hearings, reduced
expenses since the parties will only have to bear
the expense of one arbitrator, and speedy
decision-making. In the case of the appointment
of a sole arbitrator, the decision-making vests in
the hands of one person. This poses a greater
risk of bias against the weaker party, especially if
the arbitrator is unilaterally appointed by the
other party.
128. x x x x x x x
129. Equal treatment of parties at the stage of
appointment of an arbitrator ensures impartiality
during the arbitral proceedings. A clause that
allows one party to unilaterally appoint a sole
arbitrator is exclusive and hinders equal
participation of the other party in the
appointment process of arbitrators. Further,
arbitration is a quasi-judicial and adjudicative
process where both parties ought to be treated
equally and given an equal opportunity to
persuade the decision-maker of the merits of the
case. An arbitral process where one party or its
proxy has the power to unilaterally decide who
will adjudicate on a dispute is fundamentally
contrary to the adjudicatory function of arbitral
tribunals.”
59.
Justice
P.S.
Narasimha,
while
delivering
a
concurring judgment and summarizing his conclusions, held
that party autonomy is the brooding and guiding spirit of
arbitration. However, arbitration agreements enabling one of
the parties to unilaterally constitute an Arbitral Tribunal do not
inspire confidence in its independence and may violate the
public policy requirement of constituting an independent and
impartial tribunal. The relevant paragraphs read as under:-
“288.2.
Party autonomy in making of an
arbitration agreement is an essential feature of
arbitration. It commences with choosing the
members of the Arbitral Tribunal, extends to the
procedure that would apply for its conduct, and
concludes with the method by which an award
could be challenged before a court. It is thus a
brooding and guiding spirit of arbitration. Party
autonomy is sufficiently incorporated in the
Arbitration Act, along with a restraint on judicial
intervention.
288.3. to 288.5. x x x x x x x
288.6. The power to ensure that the arbitration
agreement is complaint of the public policy
requirement of establishing an independent and
impartial tribunal is always of the Court. This
principle
is
recognised
and
statutorily
incorporated in the Contract Act and the
Arbitration Act. It is the duty of the Court to
ensure that the arbitration agreement inspires
confidence and it will enable establishment of an
independent and impartial Arbitral Tribunal.
288.7.
Neither public policy considerations
under the Contract Act or the Arbitration Act
restrain the parties to the arbitration from
maintaining a panel of arbitrators in any manner.
However, arbitration agreements enabling one of
the parties to unilaterally constitute Arbitral
Tribunal do not inspire confidence of
independence and may violate the public policy
requirement of constituting an independent and
impartial tribunal. The Court will, therefore,
scrutinise the agreement and hold them to be
invalid if it considers it appropriate.”
60.
Reliance can also be placed upon the
Division Bench judgment of the Delhi High Court in M/s
Mahavir Prasad Gupta and Sons v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi
(2025) SCC OnLine Delhi 4241, on the issue of unilateral
appointments. The Court addressed whether proceedings and
awards by a unilaterally appointed, ineligible arbitrator are
nullities, violate the public policy of India, and can be set aside
under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.
61.
In Bhadra’s case (supra), the issues that arose
concerned the appointment of a sole arbitrator, the right of
challenge under Section 34 of the Act, and unilateral
appointments that were inconsistent with the basic tenet of
arbitration-namely, mutual confidence in the arbitrator. It was
also held not unreasonable for a party to apprehend that an
arbitrator unilaterally appointed by the opposite party may not
act with complete impartiality. Resultantly, it was held that the
ineligibility of an Arbitrator can be raised at any stage of the
proceedings.
A
unilateral
appointment
is
inherently
exclusionary, violates the principle of equal treatment and
procedural equality between the parties, and leaves the
Arbitrator lacking jurisdiction. Such an Arbitrator cannot make
an award on the merits, as the defect goes to the root of the
matter and strikes at the very authority of the Arbitrator.
Instead, the principle was laid down that it is the duty of the
Arbitrator to ensure that the parties are genuinely willing to
participate in the proceedings and to insist upon a written
agreement waiving the requirement of Section 12(5) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. If any party fails to
appear despite receiving notice, the Arbitrator must not
proceed further and should immediately withdraw from the
arbitral proceedings. The Arbitrator must record the minutes
along with the waiver agreement, even when the parties are
cooperating. This practice was held certainly to save time and
avoid a multiplicity of proceedings. The relevant paragraphs
reads as under:“113. A challenge to an arbitrator’s ineligibility
could be raised at any stage because an award
passed in such circumstance is non-est, i.e., it
carries no enforceability or recognition in law.
We say so because an arbitrator does not
possess the jurisdiction to pass an award. In
arbitration, the parties vest the jurisdiction in the
tribunal by virtue of a valid arbitration agreement
and an appointment made in accordance with
the provisions of the Act, 1996. This jurisdiction
is grounded in the consent of the parties as
explained in the foregoing paragraphs of this
judgment.
114 to 115 x x x x x x x
116. This Court, in catena of decisions, has held
that the validity of a decree can be challenged
even in execution proceedings if the court
passing such decree lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction over the dispute. As a decree passed
by a court without jurisdiction goes to the root of
the matter. Any decision passed by a court
lacking jurisdiction would be coram non judice,
since a court cannot give itself jurisdiction. No
act of the parties can cure an inherent lack of
jurisdiction.
117 to 123 x x x x x x x
124. For all the foregoing reasons, we have
reached the conclusion that the High Court
committed an egregious error in passing the
impugned judgment. We are left with no other
option but to set aside the impugned judgment.
As a result, the arbitral awards dated 30.07.2018
passed by the sole arbitrator are also set aside.”
62.
In such circumstances, we are of the considered
opinion that having unilaterally appointed the Arbitrator
in
question without the consent of the State, the said
appointment was void ab initio and needs to be commenced
afresh. Resultantly, we answer Issue No.(i) by holding that
the appointment of the Arbitrators was void ab initio without
the consent of the State and contrary to the prescribed
procedure, as agreed. Furthermore, the contractor himself had
stated that he would be taking steps to seek the constitution of
the Arbitral Tribunal through a Court of law, in his
communication dated 30.10.2019.
Findings on issue No.(ii):63.
We have already reproduced the challenge and the
objections raised by the respondent-contractor when the
petition under Section 11(6) of the Act was filed and
subsequently dismissed on 02.06.2022. That dismissal was
based primarily on the ground that the law allowed for a
challenge under Section 34 of the Act, since an application
under Section 13 had already been filed. The issue now arises
regarding the argument that the objections filed under Section
34 against the appointment would be invalid and not
maintainable in proceedings under Section 37 of the Act,
given that they were not argued before the Arbitrator.
64.
We are of the considered opinion that the parties
cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate. Having taken
a calculated stand while opposing the proceedings under
Section 11(6) of the Act, the party cannot now be permitted to
turn around and submit that a challenge cannot be made
under Section 34 to the award and proceedings that were void
ab initio.
65.
Reliance can be placed upon the established
principle that inconsistent pleas cannot be taken by parties, as
well as the doctrine of estoppel, which operates as a rule in
equity to prevent prolonged proceedings. This principle is
supported by the Apex Court judgment in Joint Action
Committee of Air Line Pilots' Association of India Vs.
Director General of Civil Aviation (2011) 5 SCC 435.
66.
In Suzuki Parasrampuria Suitings Pvt. Ltd.,
case (supra), the three-Judge Bench held that a litigant
cannot take a contradictory stand at different times in the
same case. The relevant paragraph reads as under:“12. A litigant can take different stands at
different times but cannot take contradictory
stands in the same case. A party cannot be
permitted to approbate and reprobate on the
same facts and take inconsistent shifting stands.
The untenability of an inconsistent stand in the
same case was considered in Amar Singh Vs.
Union of India, observing as follows: (SCC p.86,
para 50)
“50. This Court wants to make it clear that an
action at law is not a game of chess. A litigant who
comes to court and invokes its writ jurisdiction
must come with clean hands. He cannot
prevaricate and take inconsistent positions.”
67.
In such circumstances, it does not lie in the mouth
of the respondent-Contractor to argue that because the
Arbitrator had issued a notice, and despite the fact or solely on
account of the fact that the State did not appear before the
Arbitrator after the Section 11(6) proceedings, the State is now
estopped from raising these issues. Having successfully got
rejected the petition under Section 11(6), whereby the State
sought the appointment of an independent Arbitrator, it would
not lie in the mouth of the Contractor to claim that an objection
to the Arbitrator's appointment cannot be raised under Section
34 of the Act, as a party cannot be allowed to blow hot and
cold. Furthermore, it was the bounden duty of the Arbitrator,
being an expert in the field, to decide the said issue in order to
cut short the litigation. However, a review of the arbitral award
dated 29.04.2023 reveals that it fails to even refer to the
application filed under Section 13(2), the relevant part of which
reads as under:
“2. Chronology of Events:Difference and dispute having arisen between
the parties, the claimant invoked the arbitration
clause vide letter/notice dated 30.10.2019
suggesting arbitration by a single member
arbitral tribunal comprising of Mr. Justice S.N.
Jha, former Judge of Patna High Court and
Chief Justice of Jammu & Kashmir and
Rajasthan High Courts. The respondent did not
send any response denying the claim and/or
objecting to the arbitration. On 07.12.2019 the
claimant set request letter to Mr. Justice S.N.
Jha to adjudicate the disputes between the
parties. Mr. Justice S.N. Jha vide letter dated
19.12.2019 accepted the nomination and called
upon the parties to appear before him on
21.01.2020 to decide the modalities of
arbitration. On 21.01.2020 the first sitting of the
arbitral tribunal was held which was attended by
representatives of both sides. The respondent
however did not appear on the next date viz.
19.03.2020, and instead filed arbitration
applications (Nos.5 & 6 of 2020) in the High
Court of Himachal Pradesh under section 11 (6)
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for
appointment of arbitrator. The said applications
were dismissed by the High Court as not
maintainable on 02.06.2022. On receipt of letter
dated 14.06.2022 from the claimant’s lawyer to
proceed with the arbitration in view of the High
Court’s order, on 23.06.2022 the tribunal issued
notice to the parties for hearing on 23.07.2022.
On 23.07.2022 the claimant filed Statements of
Claim (SoC); however, the respondent did not
appear. The respondent chose not to appear on
the next date also viz. 06.09.2022 as, indeed,
on subsequent dates viz. 10.10.2022 and
07.11.2022. In the circumstances, by a speaking
order dated 07.11.2022 the proceedings were
fixed for ex-parte hearing taking note of the
recalcitrant conduct of the respondent and the
legislative mandate of section 29A of the Act to
conclude the arbitration within a time frame. On
10.12.2022 the evidence of the sole witness on
behalf of the claimant was recorded and on
04.02.2023 final arguments were heard, and the
award was reserved.”
68.
The award suffers from patent illegality because
the tribunal had failed to notice that the application filed under
Section 13 of the Act was still pending before it. This oversight
occurred despite the Tribunal’s noting, on an earlier occasion
three years prior on 20.01.2020 that it prima facie had
jurisdiction and was merely awaiting the outcome of
proceedings under Section 11 of the Act application.
Findings on issue No.(iii):69.
Keeping in view the law laid down, we are of the
considered opinion that the Contractor cannot now turn around
and contend that because the application under Section 11(6)
of the Act had not been challenged further, the issues cannot
be raised under Section 34 of the Act. The reliance placed by
the learned counsel(s) for the parties on the judgment of the
Apex Court in the Quippo Construction Equipment Ltd.
case (supra) could not be of much help. In that case, an
ex-parte award was passed by the arbitrator, and the
respondents had failed to participate in the arbitration
proceedings. Resultantly, the Apex Court had interfered and
held that the High Court was in error in setting aside the
award, as no objections had been raised by the respondents,
who were therefore deemed to have waived their right to raise
any such objections. In the present case, however, as has
been noticed, the objections under Sections 13(2) & 13(3) of
the Act were pending before the Arbitrator, who failed to
decide the said issue, even though it was his bounden duty to
do so.
70.
The judgment in A.C. Chokshi Share Broker
Private Limited v. Jatin Pratap Desai case (supra) could not
be of much help. It was recorded that the High Court had
erred in holding that the respondents had raised a jurisdictional
objection at any stage. Since no such objection was raised
before the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 16 of the Act, but
was only brought up under Section 37 of the Act, the Division
Bench of the High Court was not justified to set aside in
appeal.
71.
Similarly, in Gayatri’s case (supra), it was held
that if a right is waived under Section 4 of the Act, then the
issue cannot be allowed to be raised under Section 34 of the
Act.
72.
In the facts and circumstances of the case, as
noticed right from day one, the State has always objected to
the appointment of the learned Arbitrator and had rather filed
an application before this Court for the appointment of an
independent Arbitrator. The Arbitrator had chosen to proceed
in spite of the fact that there was a lack of consent, and then
had chosen not to decide the application under Section 13 of
the Act. Therefore, it can be safely said that this was the
manner in which the unilateral appointment had taken place. It
was a further requirement flowing from the contractual rights of
the parties; however, the parties' autonomy has been
compromised. The contractor could not have pushed through
with the proposed Arbitrator having successfully opposed the
appointment of a fresh Arbitrator before this Court, with the
plea that all the issues could be challenged by filing a petition
under Section 34, as provided under the Act.
In such
circumstances, the State did not need to challenge the order
dated 02.06.2022, as it was given the right to raise the issue
under Section 34.
Rather, the said fact should have been
highlighted by the Contractor before the Arbitrator and it
should have ruled on its own jurisdiction before proceeding to
decide on merits and therefore, the Tribunal committed a
grave irregularity and illegality which has led to the quandary
giving us jurisdiction to interfere under Section 34(2)(a)(v) as
the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal was void ab initio.
73.
We are conscious of the limited jurisdiction under
Section 37 of the Act. The Appellate Court's power under
Section 37 of the Act is not equivalent to the normal appellate
jurisdiction of Civil Courts; thus, this Court's review is limited.
74.
Once a case for interference is made out, and the
unilateral appointment strikes at the root of the matter,
affecting the core issue of jurisdiction, the principle applies that
the Award is void and the learned Single Judge had failed to
exercise proper jurisdiction.
A party cannot be allowed to
suffer from such a fundamental infirmity; therefore, this Court
must interfere and set aside the award. The limits on
exercising arbitral power were established in the judgment of
the Apex Court in MMTC Limited Vs. Vedanta Ltd. (2019) 4
SCC 163, which held that when there is a manifest error
apparent on the face of the record, including legal perversity
by the Arbitrator, or an exercise of power beyond the terms of
the agreement, this Court has no choice but to set aside the
award and the subsequent orders passed by the learned
Single Judge on 14.07.2025.
75.
In such circumstances, we are of the considered
opinion that the State can raise this issue at this stage also, as
the appointment is void ab initio. Keeping in view the three
questions as answered, we are of the considered opinion that
the ex-parte award dated 29.04.2023, passed by the learned
Arbitrator cannot be sustained.
76.
Accordingly, we set aside the judgment dated
14.07.2025, passed by the learned Single Judge and allow the
present appeals and set aside the award dated 29.04.2023.
Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand
disposed off.
77.
The parties are, therefore, free to appoint an
independent Arbitrator in accordance with their agreed-upon
procedure.
The amount deposited by the State will be
refunded to it and the respondent-Contractor will re-deposit the
amount, it had withdrawn under the order of the Apex Court on
the principle of restitution.
(G.S. Sandhawalia)
Chief Justice.
(Jiya Lal Bhardwaj)
Judge.
September 18, 2026
(Hemlata/Munish Thakur)
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