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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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Judgment reserved on: 13.05.2026
Judgment pronounced on:16.05.2026
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CRL.A. 214/2018
STATE (NCT of DELHI)
Through:
.....Appellant
Mr. Utkarsh, APP for the State with
SI Rajender Singh, PS Nangloi.
Versus
MAHAVIR SINGH
Through:
.....Respondent
Mr. Abhinav Sekhri and Mr. Aru
Vashisht, Advocates with respondent
in person (DHCLSC).
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA
JUDGMENT
CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA, J.
1.
In this appeal filed under Section 378 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (the Cr.PC), the respondent/State in
Sessions Case No. 556 of 2009 on the file of the Metropolitan
Magistrate-03, West District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, assails the
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judgment dated 11.08.2015 as per which the sole accused has been
acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A
of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).
2.
The prosecution case is that on 22.02.1999 at
about11:15 P.M. at Nangloi Chowk, Najafgarh Road, the accused
drove tanker lorry bearing registration no. HR-47-5860 in a rash
and negligent manner so as to endanger human life and personal
safety and knocked down one Constable Chander Pal, brother of
PW7,who was crossing the road along with PW6 and fled from the
spot. Chander Pal thereafter succumbed to injuries on the same
date and was declared as “brought dead” by the hospital. Hence, as
per the charge-sheet/final report, the accused was alleged to have
committed the offences punishable under Sections 279, 304A IPC
and Sections 134 and 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (the
MV Act).
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3.
On the basis of Ext. PW6/A FIS/FIR of PW6, given on
22.09.1999, crime no. 1025/1999, Nangloi Police Station, was
registered for commission of offences punishable under Sections
299 and 304A IPC by PW1, Head Constable. PW8 was entrusted
with the investigation of the crime and on completion of the same,
filed the charge-sheet/final report alleging the commission of the
offences punishable under the aforementioned Sections.
4.
On appearance before the trial magistrate, all the copies
of the prosecution records were furnished to him, as contemplated
under Section 207 Cr.PC. The particulars of the offences
punishable under Sections 279 and 304A IPC as contemplated
under Section 251 Cr.PC, was read over and explained to the
accused, to which he pleaded not guilty.
5.
On behalf of the prosecution, PWs. 1 to 8 were
examined and Exts. PW1/A, PW2/A, PW3/A, PW4/A, PW5/A,
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PW6/A-D, PW7/A, PW8/A-D and Mark PW8/1 were marked in
support of the case.
6.
After the close of the prosecution evidence, the accused
was questioned under Section 313(1)(b) Cr.P.C. regarding the
incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the evidence
of the prosecution. The accused denied all those circumstances and
maintained his innocence.
7.
No oral or documentary evidence was adduced by the
accused.
8.
Upon consideration of the oral and documentary
evidence on record, and after hearing both sides, the trial court,
vide the impugned judgement dated 11.08.2015, acquitted the
accused under Section 255(1) Cr.PC. of the offences punishable
under Sections 279 and 304A IPC. Aggrieved, the State has come
up in appeal.
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9.
It was submitted by the learned Additional Public
Prosecutor that the impugned judgment, is contrary to the facts and
circumstances of the case, is bad in law as the trial court has failed
to appreciate the legal maxim res ipsa loquitur (things speaks for
itself) as a rule of evidence for determining the onus of proof and,
therefore, liable to be set aside. It was further submitted that the
trial court failed to appreciate that the respondent/accused was
driving the offending tanker in a rash and negligent manner, as a
result of which the accident occurred causing fatal injuries to the
deceased. The finding of acquittal is contrary to the materials on
record as the trial court erred by assuming PW6 Constable, the
eye-witness to the incident as a planted witness who stood by his
version throughout the trial regarding the manner in which the
accident took place and the subsequent apprehension of the
accused by him. It was also submitted that the absence of blood
stains or fresh damage on the tanker was not fatal to the
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prosecution case as the deceased had only been hit and not crushed
by the vehicle.
10. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the
respondent/accused that there is no infirmity in the impugned
judgment calling for an interference by this Court.
11. Heard both sides and perused the records.
12. The only point that arises for consideration in the
present appeal is whether there is any infirmity in the impugned
judgment calling for an interference by this Court.
13. I make a brief reference to the oral and documentary
evidence relied on by the prosecution in support of the case. Ext.
6/A, the FIS/FIR of PW6 dated 23.09.1999, recorded in Hindi
roughly translated reads thus: — “…On the intervening night of
22.09.1999-23.09.1999, I was on patrol duty with Constable
Chandar Pal No. 218/DHG (the deceased) on Sultanpuri Road. At
about 11:15 P.M., when I was crossing Najafgarh Road near
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Nangloi Chowk with Chandar Pal (the deceased); I was slightly
ahead and Chandar Pal (the deceased) was behind me, at which
time, a tanker bearing registration no. HR-47-5860 coming from
the direction of Peera Garhi, driven by Mahavir (the accused),
whose name and address were later ascertained upon inquiry,
came driving the said tanker at a very high speed, in a negligent
and careless manner, and suddenly turned left towards Najafgarh
Road and hit Chandar Pal (the deceased) who was crossing the
road, due to which he fell at some distance. At that same time, a
PCR Van arrived at the spot and took the injured Chandar Pal to
DDU Hospital, and I chased the tanker and caught the tanker
driver Mahavir (the accused) along with the tanker near the water
tank on Najafgarh Road. This accident was caused by the
aforementioned tanker driver Mahavir by driving his said tanker
at a very high speed and in a negligent and careless manner. I
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have presented the tanker driver along with the tanker to you.
Legal action should be taken against him.…”
14. PW6, when examined before the trial court, more or
less stood by his version in Ext. PW6/A FIS/FIR and supported the
prosecution case. According to PW6, when he along with the
deceased was crossing the road, the offending vehicle took a
sudden turn towards the Najafgarh Road and hit the deceased due
to which the latter fell down on the road 2 to 3 feet away.
Thereafter, several public persons gathered at the spot. Meanwhile,
the PCR van, which was present at Nangloi Chowk, arrived at the
spot and took the injured Chander Pal to the hospital. PW6 further
deposed that he then chased the offending tanker on a private
vehicle and apprehended the accused near the water tank on
Najafgarh Road. PW6 further deposed that he then came back to
the scene of crime and handed over the accused along with the
offending vehicle to PW8, the investigating officer (IO).
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According to PW6, the accident was caused due to the rash and
negligent driving of the accused as the latter was driving the
vehicle at high speed and took a sudden turn towards the Najafgarh
Road.
14.1. PW6, in his cross-examination, admitted that at the
time of accident, he had noted down the truck number as well as
the color and structure of said truck, but had not seen the driver at
that time. PW6 further deposed that he had chased the truck and
apprehended the truck driver (the accused) with the truck near the
water tank in Najafgarh Road, at which time, the accused was on
the driver’s seat.
15. PW2, Automobile Engineer, deposed that he had
inspected the truck bearing registration no. HR-47-5860 at the
request of the IO and had issued Ext. PW2/A report. His inspection
revealed “no fresh damage on the body of vehicle”.
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16. PW8, the IO, deposed that on the date of incident, at
about 11:30 P.M, he received Mark PW8/1 DD No. 26A regarding
the accident. When he along with two Constables, Dharmender
and Tara Chand, reached the scene of occurrence, it was found that
the injured had already been shifted to DDU Hospital. Thereafter,
when he reached the hospital, Chander Pal, the injured was
declared “brought dead” by the doctor. When he returned to the
scene of occurrence, PW6 met him and claimed to have seen the
accident. PW6 produced the accused along with offending vehicle.
He recorded PW6’s statement, i.e., Ext. PW6/A. He prepared Ext.
PW8/B Site Plan at the instance of PW6. PW8, in his cross
examination, deposed that he reached the scene of occurrence
within 2 minutes as the place of accident is close to the police
station. PW8 admitted that no eye-witness was found. PW8 denied
the suggestion that he had planted PW6 as eye-witness in the case.
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17. To bring home an offence under the Sections 279 IPC,
the prosecution has to establish that the accused had driven the
vehicle on a public way in a manner so rash or negligent as to
endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any
person. Further, in order to attract section 304A IPC, the
prosecution has to establish that the death of a person was caused
by such rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide.
Therefore, the prosecution is required to prove: (i) there must be
death of the person in question; (ii) the accused must have caused
such death; and (iii) that such act of the accused was rash or
negligent and that it does not amount to culpable homicide.
18. In Naresh Giri v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2008) 1
SCC 791, it has been held that Section 304A IPC applies to cases
where there is no intention to cause death and no knowledge that
the act done in all probability would cause death. The provision is
directed at offences outside the range of Sections 299 and 300 IPC.
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Section 304A IPC applies only to such acts which are rash and
negligent and are directly the cause of the death of another person.
Negligence and rashness are essential elements under Section
304A IPC.
19. The criminality as far as rash acts are concerned, lies in
running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or
indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence occurs
when there is gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise the
required care and precaution to guard against injury, either to the
public generally or to an individual in particular, which, having
regard to all the circumstances, was the imperative duty of the
accused person to have adopted. [See Alister Anthony Pareira
Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 2 SCC 648] In other words,
negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable
man, guided upon the considerations which ordinarily regulate the
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conduct of human affairs, would do, or, the doing of something
which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.
20. In the case on hand, the factum of the death of the
deceased duly stands proved. The crucial question is whether the
prosecution has been able to establish beyond reasonable doubt
that it was the respondent/accused who was driving the offending
vehicle at he relevant time and that the accident occurred due to his
rash and negligent driving in order to bring home the offence
under Sections 279 and 304A IPC.
21. The prosecution case primarily rests on the sole
testimony of PW6, who claims to be the sole eye-witness to the
incident. According to PW6, the offending tanker came at a “very
high speed”, took a sudden left turn towards Najafgarh Road and
hit the deceased and that the accident was caused due to “rash and
negligent driving”. Beyond this general assertion, the prosecution
has not brought on record the approximate speed of the vehicle, the
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exact position of the deceased at the time of the incident, the
prevailing traffic conditions, the width of the road or any other
surrounding circumstance from which criminal negligence could
safely be inferred. Mere use of the expressions “rash” and
“negligent” is in law, insufficient unless supported by concrete
facts demonstrating the manner of driving.
22. Further, Ext. PW8/B site plan refers to point ‘A’ as the
place where the accident allegedly occurred near Nangloi Chowk
at the turning towards Najafgarh Road. However, it is silent
regarding the width of the road, the exact position of the deceased
or PW6, the position of the offending vehicle, the presence of skid
marks, blood stains, etc. Therefore, the site plan is of no help in
deciding the rashness or negligence of the accused.
23. There can be no doubt that vehicles are intended to be
driven in speed. Merely because the vehicle is being driven at a
high speed does not show that the driver was rash or negligent by
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itself. “High speed” or “over speed” as it is often referred to, is a
relative term. It is for the prosecution to bring on record materials
to establish as to what is meant by “high speed” in the facts and
circumstances of the case. Criminality is not to be presumed,
subject of course to some statutory exceptions. In the absence of
any material-on-record, no presumption of “rashness” or
“negligence” could be drawn against the accused by invoking the
maxim “res ipsa loquitur”. (See State of Karnataka v. Satish,
1998 (8) SCC 493). In a criminal trial, the burden of proving
everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an
accused always rests on the prosecution and there is a presumption
of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved.
[See Partap v. State of U.P., AIR 1976 SC 966 and Vijayee
Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1990 SC 1459].
24. Another aspect is regarding the identity of the driver of
the offending vehicle. PW6 has admitted that he has not seen the
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driver at the time of incident. According to PW6, he chased the
lorry in another vehicle and had apprehended the accused along
with the offending vehicle near the water tank, Najafgarh Road.
There is no clarity as to the vehicle in which PW6 is supposed to
have chased the offending vehicle. Was it driven by PW6 himself
or by another person? Where did that vehicle come from? The time
of the incident is stated to be 11:15 P.M. PW6 does not have a case
that his vehicle had been parked nearby. So, in whose vehicle did
he chase the accused? No materials are forthcoming on the said
aspect. Further, the scene of crime is situated in close proximity to
Nangloi Police Station. Despite the same, PW6 neither informed
the nearby police station nor sought immediate assistance from
other police personnel and instead is alleged to have chased the
tanker on a private vehicle. This Court is conscious that different
individuals may react differently in moments of panic or confusion
and there can be no straightjacket formula regarding human
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conduct. Nevertheless, while exercising appellate jurisdiction
against an order of acquittal, the question is not whether another
view is possible, but whether the view taken by the trial court is
wholly unreasonable or perverse. Upon a consideration of the
materials on record, it cannot be said that the view taken by the
trial court in entertaining doubt regarding the presence and conduct
of PW6 was so improbable or perverse calling for an interference
in appeal.
25. On an overall appreciation of the oral and documentary
evidence on record, this Court is of the considered view that the
appreciation of evidence undertaken by the trial court cannot be
said to be perverse or wholly unsustainable. Hence, no interference
is called for.
26. In the result, the appeal sans merit is dismissed.
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27. Application(s), if any, pending, shall stand closed.
CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA
(JUDGE)
MAY 16, 2026
kd /rs
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