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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+
FAO(OS) (COMM) 216/2025, CM APPLs. 82771/2025 &
1823/2026
STAR SMITH EXPORT
PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR.
.....Appellants
Through: Mr. Manoj Chouhan, Mr.
Ujjwal Singh Parmar and Ms. Neha Raj
Singh, Advs.
versus
A O SMITH CORPORATION & ANR.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Ranjan Narula, Mr. Shakti
Priyan Nair and Mr. Parth Bajaj, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C.HARI SHANKAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA
JUDGMENT(ORAL)
13.02.2026
%
OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.
1.
The present appeal has been filed under Section 13 of the
Commercial Courts Act, 2015, read with Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 19081, assailing the impugned judgments
dated 22.03.2024 and 24.12.2025 passed by learned Single Judge of
this Court in C.S. (COMM) 532 of 2022. By way of the impugned
judgments, the application preferred by the respondents under Order
XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of CPC, seeking interim injunction restraining
the appellants from using impugned trademarks as a trade name,
trademark, or domain name, was allowed.
1 “CPC” hereinafter
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2.
The aforementioned suit was instituted by the respondents
herein (“plaintiffs”) against the appellants (“defendants”) seeking a
decree for permanent injunction, restraining the appellants’ use of
“STARSMITH”,
“STAR
“
/
SMITH”,
”
“BLUE
DIAMOND”,
& “
”
(“impugned mark” hereinafter) on the ground that it is deceptively
similar to respondents’ marks, i.e., “A.O. SMITH”, “BLUE
DIAMOND”, “
” & “
”, along
with passing off, delivery-up, damages and costs.
3.
The learned Single Judge, vide order dated 03.08.2022, prima
facie concluded that the use of the impugned marks by the appellants
in respect of said products would amount to infringement of the
respondents’ registered mark and thus granted an ex-parte ad-interim
injunction restraining the
appellants from using the marks
“STARSMITH”, “STAR SMITH” and “BLUE DIAMOND” or any
deceptively similar mark in relation to the manufacture and sale of
geysers, water purifiers, RO systems and allied goods. However, the
appellants were allowed to use Appellant No.1’s corporate name
(‘Star Smith Export Pvt. Ltd.), so long as no undue emphasis was
made on “STAR SMITH”. The relief qua appellants’ use of domain
name was deferred till they entered appearance.
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4.
Accordingly, vide judgment dated 22.03.2024 (first impugned
judgment), the interim order was made absolute, though the learned
Single Judge noted that the aspects relating to the impugned trade
name and domain name were yet to be adjudicated.
5.
Thereafter, the appellants filed an application under Order
XXXIX Rule 4 of CPC seeking vacation of the ex-parte ad interim
injunction.
6.
Pursuant thereto, vide judgment dated 24.12.2025 (second
impugned judgment), the appellants were restrained from using the
corporate name and the domain name (www.starsmith.in), or any
other trade name or domain name identical or deceptively similar to
the respondents’ trademark, trade or domain name.
BRIEF FACTS
7.
Shorn off unnecessary details, the brief factual background
necessary for the adjudication of the present dispute is as follows.
8.
As per the plaint, Respondent No. 1 is a US-based company and
Respondent No. 2 is its wholly owned Indian subsidiary incorporated
in 2006, with its registered office in Bengaluru. They claim use of
“AO SMITH” internationally since 1874 and in India since 2006 for
geysers, purification systems, water heaters and other allied goods.
The respondents sell their products through e-commerce sites such as
Amazon, etc. and retail channels such as Vijay Sales, etc. They claim
use of “AO SMITH” and “BLUE DIAMOND” as both word and
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device marks. They also assert worldwide turnover of around USD 3.5
billion as in 2021, with 20 offices globally and significant presence in
India. They registered the domain names www.aosmith.com in 1994
and www.aosmithindia.com in 2008. They contest the use of the
impugned marks by the appellants, claiming that the impugned marks
are deceptively similar to their registered marks, which are as follows:
9.
On the other hand, Appellant No. 1 was incorporated in August
2020, with Appellant No.2 as is its Director. As per the Written
Statement, “STAR ENTERPRISES” was incorporated in 1990 for
manufacturing electrical appliances. Thereafter, it was converted to
“AEROSTAR” in 2005 and subsequently to Appellant No. 1 in 2020.
It was averred that “SMITH” was adopted from the nickname of
Appellant No. 2’s son and in ordinary sense, it meant ‘worker’.
Purportedly, the nickname was added to Appellant No. 2’s
grandmother’s name “SUMITRA” to coin the trade name. Trademark
Application No. 4580404 was filed for the word mark “STAR
SMITH” on proposed-to-be-used basis for identical products such as
geysers, RO systems, etc. The respondents opposed the said
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application, pursuant to which the registration stands suspended.
Consequently, the appellants do not hold any registration in the
impugned marks as of today. They also claim to have registered the
domain name “www.starsmith.in” on 07.04.2020 and assert honest
adoption, denying any similarity between the rival marks.
10.
Against this factual backdrop, the respondents were aggrieved
by alleged dishonest adoption and use of impugned marks for identical
products.
11.
Consequently, the respondents instituted a suit seeking, inter
alia, a decree of permanent injunction restraining the appellants from
using the impugned marks as trade name, trademark and domain
name, along with passing off and reliefs of delivery-up, damages and
costs.
IMPUGNED JUDGMENTS
12.
The learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment dated
22.03.2024 made the ex-parte ad interim injunction absolute but the
aspect of corporate name and domain name remained open. It was
observed as follows:
(i)
The appellants’ mark was not registered. The appellants
and respondents sold identical products. By placing reliance on
various judgments2, the dominant part test was employed to
Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories2, PhonePe Pvt. Ltd. v.
EZY Services & Anr.2, Vasundhra Jewellers Pvt. Ltd. v. Kirat Vinodbhai Jadvani & Anr.2, Under Armour,
Inc. v. Aditya Birla Fashion & Retail Ltd.2, Amritdhara Pharmacy v. Satya Deo Gupta2 and M/s South
India Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v. General Mills Marketing Inc. & Anr.2,
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determine deceptive similarity between the rival marks when
viewed as a whole and the likelihood of confusion among
consumers thereof. “SMITH” was found to be the dominant and
distinctive element of both marks, whereas “AO” lacked
significance.
(ii)
“SMITH” is of uncommon usage in India and was not
used in subservient manner to other parts of the mark. “SMITH”
is specific and more familiar since it is a name and also used as
a suffix and prefix in locksmith, blacksmith etc.
(iii)
Appellants’ contention that “SMITH” was adopted since
the proprietor’s son was named so, was not proved.
(iv)
Onus was on the appellants (defendants) to show
significant business turnover by third party users of similar
marks or that they pose a threat to respondents’ (plaintiffs’)
distinctiveness. The respondent/plaintiff is not mandated to take
action against infringement which does not prejudice it.
(v)
The respondents were prior adopters and extensively used
the mark.
(vi)
Appellants were using different marks (‘AERO STAR’
and “STAR ENTERPRISES”) and only adopted the impugned
mark in 2020. They had predilection for “STAR” not “SMITH”,
hence, the sudden adoption of “SMITH” in 2020 for identical
goods, prima facie indicates dishonesty.
(vii) Appellants cannot claim that ‘SMITH’ is generic, since
they themselves applied for registration of ‘STAR SMITH’.
13.
The learned Single Judge vide judgment dated 24.12.2025
granted interim injunction against the appellants’ use of the
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deceptively similar corporate and domain names. It was observed as
follows:
(i)
The Court proceeded on the finding in the first impugned
decision that “SMITH” was the dominant part, the impugned
mark was deceptively similar, and that the appellants had prima
facie dishonestly adopted the impugned mark.
(ii)
As per Telecare Network India Pvt. Ltd. v. Asus
Technology Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.3, after the registration of a
trademark, only the registration certificate is to be considered.
Respondents’ marks were registered without a disclaimer;
hence, respondents can claim exclusive use of the same.
(iii)
Respondents established their prior use, goodwill and
reputation through the various documents placed on record.
They commenced use in India in 2008, whereas the appellants
adopted the impugned mark in 2020.
(iv)
Impugned trademarks are nearly identical; class of
consumers and the channels of trade directly overlap. Hence,
there is likelihood that consumers may mistakenly associate
appellants’ goods with those of the respondents’ or perceive
them as a variant of respondents’ products.
(v)
The appellants are estopped from claiming that ‘SMITH’
is generic and common to trade, since they themselves applied
for registration of ‘STAR SMITH’.
(vi)
Use of similar marks by third parties is not a valid
defense for infringement under the Trade Marks Act, 19994.
(vii) Appellants’ trade name is deceptively similar to that of
3 MANU/DE/1838/2019
4 “Act” hereinafter
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respondents’. The said trade name is also used for dealing in
identical and cognate products. Since infringement is made out
with respect to the impugned marks, injunction must also follow
with respect to the trade name as under Section 29(5) of the Act.
(viii) As per Satyam Infoway Ltd. v. Sifynet Solutions Pvt.
Ltd.5, domain names are also protected. Appellants’ domain
name subsumes the respondents’ trademarks, and is, therefore,
deceptively similar thereto. Such use is likely to cause
confusion among consumers. Even if consumers ultimately
realise the distinction prior to consummating a transaction, the
diversion of internet traffic to appellants’ website constitutes
‘initial interest confusion’.
14.
Aggrieved, the appellants approached this Court alleging that
the impugned judgments suffer from perversity, thereby warranting
interference.
RIVAL SUBMISSIONS BEFORE THIS COURT
15.
Mr. Manoj Chouhan, the learned Counsel for the appellants
submits that the impugned orders are untenable; “STAR SMITH” is
distinct from “AO SMITH” and doesn’t cause confusion with
respondents’ mark.
16.
Mr. Chauhan argues that the learned Single Judge erred in
holding that “SMITH” was the dominant part and uncommon in
Indian parlance since distinctiveness depends on a mark’s ability to
5 AIR 2004 SC 3540; (2004) 6 SCC 145
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identify the source and not linguistic rarity as per Section 9(1)(a).
Being a common English surname and noun, “SMITH” is descriptive
and non-distinctive.
17.
Relying on Section 17(2)(b), it is submitted that registration of a
composite mark confers no exclusive rights in a part thereof; hence,
the respondents could not claim exclusivity over “SMITH”. Reliance
is placed on PhonePe Pvt. Ltd. (supra). Further, it is submitted that
assuming acquired distinctiveness, the respondents failed to establish
such distinctiveness prior to registration under Section 9(1)(b) of the
Act6. In absence thereof, as per Pernod Ricard India (P) Ltd. v.
Karanveer Singh Chhabra7, they cannot claim exclusivity over
“SMITH”.
18.
The application of the “dominant part” test is argued to be
violative of Section 17(2) and the anti-dissection rule. Appellants’
adoption of “STAR SMITH” was honest and the contrary finding of
the learned Single Judge was unsupported by any evidence. It is also
submitted that exclusivity over common words such as “SMITH” is
antithetical to commercial morality.
19.
It is further submitted that, as per their response to the
Examination Report, the respondents accepted that the marks must be
compared as a whole, hence, they cannot restrain others from use of a
generic part thereof. In support, reliance is placed on People
“9. Absolute grounds for refusal of registration.— (1)(b) which consist exclusively of marks or
indications which may serve in trade to designate the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, values,
geographical origin or the time of production of the goods or rendering of the service or other characteristics
of the goods or service;”
7 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1701
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Interactive (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Vivek Pahwa8 and Raman Kwatra &
Anr. v. KEI Industries Ltd9. It is also contended that failure to
disclose third-party use of “SMITH” misrepresented exclusivity over
the said mark, rendering the impugned judgments liable to be set aside
as per Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India10. In further support of
their contentions, reliance was placed on Registrar, Trade Marks v.
Ashok Chandra Rakhit Ltd.11, Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila
Pharmaceuticals Ltd.12 and Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhai
Shah13.
20.
Per contra, Mr. Ranjan Narula, the learned Counsel for the
respondents submits that impugned orders are well-reasoned and
warrant no interference. They assert prior adoption, continuous use
since 2008 and registration of their trademarks, trade name, and
domain name in India.
21.
Mr. Narula submits that appellants dishonestly adopted the
dominant part of their mark, i.e., “SMITH”; the appellants’ use of
deceptively similar marks in respect of identical goods through
overlapping trade channels constitutes infringement under Section 29.
It is contended that once infringement is established, an injunction
must necessarily follow. Further, use of a deceptively similar domain
name is argued to cause diversion of internet traffic and initial interest
confusion. Reliance was placed on Wow Momo Foods Private
8 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 7351
9 2023 SCC OnLine Del 38
10 (2010) 14 SCC 38
11 (1955) 1 SCC 655
12 (2001) 5 SCC 73
13 (2002) 3 SCC 65
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Limited v. Wow Burger and Ors.14, Amar Singh Chawal Wala Vs.
Shree Vardhman Rice and Genl. Mills15, M/s South India Beverages
(supra), K.R. Chinna Krishna Chettiar v. Shri Ambal and Co. and
Ors.16, Pidilite Industries Ltd. v. Jubilant Agri & Consumer Products
Ltd.17, Shree Nath Heritage Liquor Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. v. Allied
Blender & Distillers Pvt. Ltd.18, Bloomberg Finance Ltd. v. Prafull
Saklecha & Ors.19, Satyam Infoway Ltd. (supra), Kaviraj Pandit
Durga Dutt Sharma (supra), Under Armour (supra) and Zydus
Wellness Products Ltd. v. Cipla Health Ltd. & Anr.20
22.
Mr. Narula highlights the inconsistent explanations for adoption
of “SMITH” by appellants, asserting it to be a common dictionary
word, a nickname, and a coined term. Hence, it is argued that the
appellants’ adoption of the impugned marks was dishonest and that, as
subsequent adopters, they ought to have conducted due diligence
regarding existing similar marks. Reliance is placed on Aktiebolaget
Volvo of Sweden v. Volvo Steels Ltd. of Gujarat (India)21, Ciba
Geigy Ltd. v. Crosslands Research Laboratories Ltd.22, Midas
Hygiene Industries P. Ltd. and Ors. v. Sudhir Bhatia and Ors.23, Ishi
Khosla v. Anil Aggarwal and Ors.24, Infosys Limited v. Southern
Infosys Ltd.25 and Laxmikant V. Patel (supra).
14 MANU/DE/8039/2025
15 MANU/DE/0745/2009
16 MANU/SC/0303/1969
17 MANU/MH/0019/2014
18 MANU/DE/1933/2015
19 MANU/DE/3673/2013
20 2023:DHC:4344; CS(COMM) 115/2023
21 MANU/MH/0076/1997
22 MANU/DE/1267/1995
23 MANU/SC/0186/2004
24 MANU/DE/7192/2007
25 MANU/DE/4097/2024
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23.
It is submitted that the tripartite test for grant of interim relief is
satisfied, i.e., prime facie case and balance of convenience favored the
respondents since they were prior adopters, users and registrants of
“AO SMITH” marks and that once the aforesaid factors are
established, irreparable damage may be presumed, as held in Ramdev
Food Products Pvt. Ltd. v. Arvindbhai Rambhai Patel & Ors.26
24.
On passing off, the respondents assert substantial goodwill and
reputation through extensive use of their registered marks in India
since 2008, supported by sales and promotional figures; by 2020,
when the appellants commenced use of the impugned marks,
respondents generated approximately Rs. 269 crores in sales and
incurred promotional expenditure of Rs. 20 crores. Thus, it is argued
that continued use of the impugned marks would cause monetary loss,
dilution of goodwill and distinctiveness of the respondents’ marks.
Reliance is placed on Mahendra & Mahendra Paper Mills Ltd. v.
Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd.27 and N.R. Dongre and Ors. v.
Whirlpool Corpn. and Ors.28.
25.
The appellant’s contention that respondents concealed existence
of third-party registrations of the mark “SMITH” was refuted by
contending that mere registrations do not establish actual use of the
mark in trade and that a plaintiff is not required to sue every infringer.
Reliance was placed on Allied Blender (supra), Shri Pankaj Goel v.
M/s Dabur India Ltd.29, Automatic Electric Ltd. v. R.K. Dgawan and
26 MANU/SC/3725/2006
27 MANU/SC/0724/2001
28 MANU/SC/1223/1996
29 2008:DHC;1941-DB; FAO(OS) 82/2008
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Ors.30 and Dr. Reddy's Laboratories Ltd. v. Reddy Pharmaceuticals
Ltd.31. It is further contended that likelihood of confusion among
consumers is sufficient to grant relief and proof of actual confusion is
not mandatory as per Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v. Prius Auto
Industries Ltd. and Ors.32.
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
26.
We have heard the learned Counsels for both parties and
carefully perused the material on record.
27.
It goes without saying that appellate interference under Order
XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC is limited, as crystallized by the
Supreme Court in Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd.33 and
reiterated in Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi &
Ors.34.
28.
It warrants no elaboration that at an interlocutory stage, an
appellate court must not substitute its own view for the view adopted
by the court of first instance, unless the same is found to be arbitrary,
capricious, perverse or is in teeth of settled legal principles. Mere
plausibility of a reasonable alternative based on the material on record
is insufficient.
29.
Accordingly, the impugned judgments are examined within this
30 MANU/DE/0461/1991
31 MANU/DE/0658/2004
32 MANU/SC/1619/2017
33 1990 Supp SCC 727
34 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3538
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narrow scope to ascertain if any of the infirmities delineated above
exist, so as to warrant interference.
30.
The appellants argue that “SMITH” is generic, commonly used,
and also a surname, and that their adoption of “STAR SMITH” is
honest. They emphasize that respondents cannot claim exclusivity
over generic elements. In contrast, respondents’ case is that “SMITH”
is the dominant part of their mark which is dishonestly adopted by
appellants. As per the respondents, when viewed as a whole, the
impugned mark is deceptively similar to their mark, creating
likelihood of confusion, particularly since the impugned mark is used
for identical goods. They rely on prior adoption, registration and
goodwill to justify the grant of interim relief.
31.
Therefore, the short issue for consideration of this Court is
whether the appellants’ use of the impugned mark infringes
respondents’ registered marks, trade name or domain name,
necessitating interim relief.
32.
At the outset, we deem it relevant to note that the appellants do
not hold any valid registration in the impugned marks as on date.
Conversely, the respondents’ registrations are valid and subsisting.
33.
The Supreme Court in Pernod Ricard (supra) clearly laid down
the applicable standard for assessing deceptive similarity. The relevant
observation reads as under:
“41. It is a settled principle of trademark law that deceptive
similarity does not necessitate exact imitation. What is material is
the likelihood of confusion or association in the minds of
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consumers arising from an overall resemblance between the
competing marks. The applicable standard is that of an average
consumer with imperfect recollection.
42.
While comparing rival marks, Courts must assess the
marks in their entirety, rather than dissecting composite
trademarks into isolated components. The dominant feature of a
mark may assist in crossing the preliminary threshold of analysis,
but the ultimate inquiry must focus on the overall impression
created by the mark – especially in the context of the relevant
goods, trade channels, and target consumers. The proper test is
not to place the two marks side by side to identify dissimilarities,
but to determine whether the impugned mark, when viewed
independently, is likely to create an impression of association or
common origin in the mind of the average consumer. Even if a
particular component of a mark lacks inherent distinctiveness, its
imitation may still amount to infringement if it constitutes an
essential and distinctive feature of the composite mark as a whole.
43. Section 17(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 grants exclusive
rights only in respect of the mark as registered. Section 17(2)
excludes protection for common or non-distinctive elements unless
such elements have acquired secondary meaning. Sections 27(2)
and 29 preserve the right to institute passing off actions and define
the contours of infringement, respectively. Notably, Section 29(3)
presumes confusion only where identical marks are used for
identical goods – a condition not met in the present case as the
marks.”
(emphasis supplied)
34.
Thus, upon a plain reading it can be discerned that in assessing
deceptive similarity, the marks must be compared as a whole and from
the perspective of an average consumer of ordinary intelligence and
imperfect recollection. Therefore, the dominant part of a mark
assumes significance, since consumers are likely to recollect or recall
this part for purposes of future identification. The test is one of overall
impression and likelihood of confusion, not a meticulous comparison
of individual components placed side by side. Additionally, even
where a mark is composite, its essential or dominant feature may be
relevant, but infringement depends on whether the impugned mark,
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viewed in its entirety and in the context of the goods, trade channels
and class of purchasers, is likely to cause confusion or suggest
association.
35.
Needless to state that Section 17 grants exclusivity over a
composite mark as a whole but such exclusivity does not extend to
any constituent part thereof which is not separately registered (or for
which separate application is made), or which is common to trade or
non-distinctive.
36.
Further, as recognized in Satyam Infoway Ltd. (supra), courts
have consistently invoked the common law remedy of passing off to
resolve domain name disputes. Domain names serve as source
identifiers in the virtual marketplace; their deceptive similarity may
lead to diversion of online consumers. Therefore, domain names
possess attributes of a trademark capable of protection in a passing off
action.
37.
Adverting to the facts of the present case, the learned Single
Judge, vide judgment dated 22.03.2024 whereby the interim order was
made absolute, returned the following findings:
“21. After considering the pleas taken by the Plaintiffs and reply
given by the Defendants, this Court is convinced that the use of the
mark 'STAR SMITH' / 'STARSMITH' and 'BLUE DIAMOND' for
an identical set of products is completely dishonest, inasmuch as
the Defendants could not have hit upon both the marks belonging
to the Plaintiffs, which are registered trademarks. The Plaintiffs
have a global reputation as also reputation in India. The adoption
and use of the mark 'STAR SMITH'/ 'STARSMITH' which is
deceptively similar to 'A.O. SMITH' and 'BLUE DIAMOND'
which is identical to the mark of the Plaintiffs, would clearly lead
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to likelihood of confusion and infringement of trademarks of the
Plaintiffs as per Section 29(2) of the Trade Mark, 1999.”
(emphasis supplied)
38.
The learned Single Judge, in the second impugned judgment
dated 24.12.2025, returned the following findings:
“19. The Defendants' adoption and use of the Impugned
Domain Name creates a strong likelihood of consumer confusion
and, prospective future customers of the Plaintiffs may visit the
Impugned Domain Name believing it to be that of the Plaintiffs.
Even if pursuant to visiting the Impugned Domain Name they
realise that the Defendants' products are in fact not the services
of the Plaintiffs, the same still gives rise to the category of
confusion identified as 'Initial Interest Confusion'.
20.
If a web search for the Plaintiffs' products using the
Plaintiffs' Trade Marks, the initial interest confusion caused by
the Impugned Domain Name may deceive and lure the web user
to the website associated with the Impugned Domain Name. Even
when the web users access the Impugned Domain Name they
may find that it is not the Plaintiffs' platfonn, the Defendants
have succeeded in luring users to their site thus, resulting in
passing off. The Plaintiffs and the Defendants are dealing with
similar and allied and cognate goods and there exists a strong
likelihood of deception through the Impugned Domain Names.
Although, the Act does not provide for protection of Domain
Names per se, Domain Names can be protected under the Act as
has been held by this Court in Satyam Infoway Ltd. (supra).
23.
A clear case of infringement of the Plaintiffs’ Trade Marks
is made out. The Impugned Trade Marks are nearly identical, the
class of consumers targeted by both parties directly overlaps, and
the channels of trade, are identical. Consequently, there exists a
likelihood that consumers may mistakenly associate the
Defendants' products with those of the Plaintiffs' or perceive
them as a variant of the Plaintiffs' products, causing irreparable
hann to the Plaintiffs' goodwill and reputation.”
(emphasis supplied)
39.
We are in agreement with the findings of the learned Single
Judge that there exists a likelihood of confusion.
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40.
According to us, both marks “STAR SMITH” and “AO
SMITH” share “SMITH” this dominant part. Since the marks are used
for identical goods, target the same consumer class through
overlapping retail and online trade channels and owing to imperfect
recollection, the rival marks may lead to confusion among consumers.
41.
Additionally, the inconsistent explanations offered by the
appellants for adopting “SMITH” in 2020, such as ‘Smith’ is the
nickname of Appellant No.2’s son or a coined term derived from the
names of Appellant No.2’s son and grandmother, militate against their
bona fides, particularly since “STAR” has been the recurring element
in all their previous marks/trade names (M/s Star Enterprises, Aerostar
etc.). These circumstances justify a prima facie inference of dishonest
adoption.
42.
Further, this Court is not convinced regarding the existence of
any perversity in the impugned decisions. In light of Wander Ltd.
(supra), dehors any perversity or arbitrariness, we cannot intervene in
the view adopted by the learned Single Judge merely because another
view is plausible.
43.
Having concluded that the rival marks are deceptively similar
and likely to cause confusion among consumers, the essential
ingredients of infringement are prima facie established. The admitted
use of the impugned marks in relation to identical goods by the
appellants is fatal in terms of Section 29 of the Act. Consequently,
once infringement is made out, an injunction must follow as under
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Section 135 of the Act.
44.
In view of the aforesaid, the use of the impugned mark as part
of the appellants’ trade name in relation to identical and cognate and
allied goods is equally impermissible by virtue of Section 29(5) of the
Act35.
45.
Further, the respondents are the undisputed prior users in India
since 2008, and have, by extensive sales, promotional activities and
significant presence in Indian cities, successfully established prima
facie goodwill and reputation well before the appellants’ adoption in
202036. Therefore, the respondents are entitled to protect such
goodwill from encroachment.
46.
In the present case, the impugned mark, which is found to be
prima facie infringing, is also used as the domain name and wholly
incorporates the dominant part of the respondents’ registered mark.
47.
The appellants own www.starsmith.in and the respondents own
www.aosmith.com and www.aosmithindia.com. When the rival
domain names are juxtaposed, we find that the similarity in the
domain names may lead an online consumer of average intelligence
and imperfect recollection to either confuse the source of the products
or assume a business connection between them, particularly since both
parties deal in identical and cognate goods. Owing to such overlap of
the domain names and the goods in relation to which they are used,
35 (5) A registered trade mark is infringed by a person if he uses such registered trade mark, as his trade name
or part of his trade name, or name of his business concern or part of the name, of his business concern dealing
in goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is registered.
36 Pernod Ricard (supra); Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v. Prius Auto Industries Ltd, (2018) 2 SCC 1
Signed By:GUNN FAO(OS) (COMM) 216/2025
20:48:02
actual loss to respondents is highly probable.
48.
Given the prima facie finding of deceptive similarity, the
respondents’ established goodwill in their registered mark prior to the
adoption by the appellants and the likelihood of confusion and
consequential damages, a case of passing off in respect of the domain
name is made out. The appellants’ domain name wholly subsumes the
respondents’ registered mark, creating both initial interest confusion
and likelihood of confusion, hence, the learned Single Judge rightly
concluded that an injunction must follow.
49.
We do not agree with the contention of Mr. Chouhan that the
learned Single Judge erred in holding that “SMITH” is the dominant
part of the respondent's mark and that as per Section 17(2)(b), no
exclusive rights were conferred on a part of a composite mark which
is common to trade or non-distinctive. This contention is in the teeth
of the well-settled principle laid down in Pernod Ricard (supra) and
South India Beverages (supra) and is thereby rejected. In our
considered view, the respondents are not claiming exclusivity over
“SMITH”, instead, it is their case that the impugned mark as a whole
is deceptively similar to their registered marks. The respondents are,
therefore, aggrieved by the use of deceptively similar marks for
identical goods by the appellants. With respect to generic nature of
“SMITH”, the Act does not prohibit the use of common or generic
words but the ones lacking distinctiveness. Rather, even an ordinary or
common word may, upon acquiring secondary meaning and
association with the proprietor’s products, merit protection by way of
Signed By:GUNN FAO(OS) (COMM) 216/2025
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injunction37. The assessment of distinctiveness of a mark is to be done
in relation to the goods and services for which it is used. The
appellants cannot, after filing for registration of “STAR SMITH”,
contend that “SMITH” is not distinctive, as also rightly observed by
the learned Single Judge that a party cannot approbate and reprobate38.
Thus, the learned Judge correctly held that the appellants were
estopped from contending that “SMITH” was not distinctive since
they themselves sought to register “STAR SMITH”.
50.
The reliance on Raman Kwatra (supra) is misplaced, as the
respondents’ trademark registration certificate, which lacks any
disclaimer, should be the sole consideration39. The appellants’ claim
of third parties using similar marks is devoid of merit, as mere thirdparty use does not dilute respondents’ rights. As held in Pankaj Goel
(supra), significant business turnover or volume of sales must be
proven to show dilution or commonality in trade. The contention of
concealment is also refuted since that suppression is fatal only if it
pertains to something material which may alter the court’s decision40.
51.
Thus, upon perusal of the impugned judgments, we find little
room for cavil with the prima facie conclusion reached by the learned
Single Judge that the appellants’ marks are deceptively similar to
those of the respondents. Accordingly, the direction to keep the use of
the impugned marks as a trademark, corporate name or domain name,
at abeyance till final adjudication of the suit was rendered on the
Leayan Global Pvt ltd. vs Bata India Ltd.; 2025:DHC:11331-DB
38 Automatic Electric Limited (supra)
39 Telecare Network India Pvt. Ltd. (supra)
40 Arunima Baruah v. Union of India & Ors., (2007) 6 SCC 120
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correct anvil of settled principles, so as to obviate any further loss to
the respondents.
52.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Pending applications, if
any, stand disposed of. No order as to costs.
53.
However, twelve weeks’ time is granted to change the name of
the company and two weeks’ time to change the domain name.
54.
Needless to say, all observations made by this Court are
confined to the present adjudication and do not have any bearing on
the merits of the pending suit.
OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.
C.HARI SHANKAR, J.
FEBRUARY 13, 2026/gunn/pa
Signed By:GUNN FAO(OS) (COMM) 216/2025
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