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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 09.07.2026
+
RC.REV. 248/2025, CM APPL. 51874/2025 (Stay), CM APPL.
51876/2025 (Delay of 98 days in Re-filing the petition) & CM
APPL. 27177/2026 (Early Hearing)
SAT NARAYAN TAPARIA
.....Petitioner
Through:
Mr. Kumar Vikram, Advocate.
versus
SULEKH JAIN
Through:
+
.....Respondent
Mr. Sidhant Dhingra, Advocate.
RC.REV. 251/2025, CM APPL. 52233/2025 (Stay), CM APPL.
52235/2025 (Delay of 98 days in Re-filing the petition) & CM
APPL. 22479/2026 (Early Hearing)
SAT NARAYAN TAPARIA
.....Petitioner
Through:
Mr. Kumar Vikram, Advocate.
versus
SULEKH JAIN
Through:
+
.....Respondent
Mr. Sidhant Dhingra, Advocate.
RC.REV. 256/2025, CM APPL. 53198/2025 (Stay) & CM
APPL. 27540/2026 (Early Hearing)
SHYAM SUNDAR TAPARIA
Through:
.....Petitioner
Mr. Kumar Vikram, Advocate.
versus
SULEKH JAIN
Through:
+
.....Respondent
Mr. Sidhant Dhingra, Advocate.
RC.REV. 262/2025, CM APPL. 53991/2025 (Stay) & CM
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
11:21:15
RC.REV. 248/2025 & connected matters
APPL. 24896/2026 (Early Hearing)
SRIKISHSAN TAPARIA
Through:
.....Petitioner
Mr. Kumar Vikram, Advocate.
versus
KIRAN JAIN
Through:
+
.....Respondent
Mr. Sidhant Dhingra, Advocate.
RC.REV. 263/2025, CM APPL. 54196/2025 (Stay) & CM
APPL. 24894/2026 (Early Hearing)
SRIKISHSAN TAPARIA
Through:
.....Petitioner
Mr. Kumar Vikram, Advocate.
versus
SULEKH JAIN
Through:
+
.....Respondent
Mr. Sidhant Dhingra, Advocate.
RC.REV. 268/2025, CM APPL. 54370/2025 (Stay) & CM
APPL. 26774/2026 (Early Hearing)
PRAKASH TAPARIA
Through:
.....Petitioner
Mr. Kumar Vikram, Advocate.
versus
KIRAN JAIN
Through:
.....Respondent
Mr. Sidhant Dhingra, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
%
1.
JUDGEMENT (Oral)
The present Petitions, filed under Section 25B(8) of the Delhi
Rent Control Act, 1958 [“DRC Act”], seek setting aside of Impugned
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
11:21:15
RC.REV. 248/2025 & connected matters
Orders dated 25.02.2025, passed by Ms. Charu Asiwal, learned ARC,
Karkardooma Courts, Delhi [“learned ARC”], in six distinct Eviction
Petitions, whereby the respective Applications seeking leave to defend
filed by the Petitioners were dismissed.
2.
Learned counsel for the Petitioners submits that all the present
Petitions arise in a substantially similar factual backdrop and involve
issues of an identical nature, namely, the dismissal of the respective
Applications seeking leave to defend. He submits that the distinction
between the respective Petitions lies essentially in the fact that each
pertains to a separate tenanted premises and has been instituted by
different members of the same family, who are tenants in their
respective premises.
3.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner,
therefore, requests this Court that, from amongst the connected
matters, RC.REV. 263/2025 be taken up first for consideration.
Accordingly, at his request, RC.REV. 263/2025 is taken up for
hearing and final disposal.
RC.REV. 263/2025
4.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner submits
that the Application seeking leave to defend filed by the Petitioner
came to be rejected by the learned ARC vide Order dated 25.02.2025
[“Impugned Order”], consequent whereto an Eviction Order was
passed in favour of the Respondent and against the Petitioner in
respect of Shop No. 4, IX/6379, Netaji Gali, Gandhi Nagar, Delhi110031 [“subject premises”].
5.
Learned counsel for the Petitioner assails the Impugned Order
primarily on three grounds, viz., firstly, that the Respondent has failed
to establish the existence of a bona fide requirement in respect of the
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
11:21:15
RC.REV. 248/2025 & connected matters
subject premises; secondly, that material facts were concealed by the
Respondent from the learned ARC; and thirdly, that the alleged bona
fide requirement is incapable of being satisfied by the subject
premises.
6.
Elaborating on the aforestated grounds, learned counsel for the
Petitioner submits that the eviction of the Petitioner was sought on the
ground that the subject premises were required for the son of the
Respondent, whereas the said son was already a Director in three
companies and was also engaged in the business of manufacturing
garments. He, therefore, contends that no bona fide requirement in
favour of the son of the Respondent could be said to exist.
7.
Learned counsel further submits that the aforesaid facts,
including the business activities of the son of the Respondent, were
concealed from the learned ARC and that such concealment of
material facts goes to the root of the claim of bona fide requirement
and, consequently, vitiates the Impugned Order.
8.
Learned counsel for the Petitioner further submits that the
requirement projected by the Respondent is, in any event, incapable of
being satisfied by the subject premises. He submits that the
Respondent seeks eviction of the Petitioner for the purpose of
establishing a showroom for his son, whereas the area and dimensions
of the subject premises are wholly inadequate for the said purpose.
9.
Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondent submits that each of the aforesaid grounds had been
specifically raised before and duly considered by the learned ARC. He
submits that the learned ARC, upon consideration of the material
available on record, has returned findings against the Petitioner on
each of the aforesaid aspects and, therefore, the Impugned Order
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
11:21:15
RC.REV. 248/2025 & connected matters
warrants no interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of
this Court.
ANALYSIS:
10.
This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and,
with their able assistance, perused the material available on record.
11.
Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged
on behalf of the Petitioner, it would be apposite to advert to the scope
and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.
12.
The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance
Co. Ltd.1, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar
Singh2, and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua3, has
consistently held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court
under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory
and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction.
13.
The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied
upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia, in Pankaj
Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors.4, and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny
Grover5.
14.
In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while
elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25B of the
DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against
(1998) 8 SCC 119
(2014) 9 SCC 78
(2022) 6 SCC 30
2024:DHC:9322
2025:DHC:11285
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
11:21:15
RC.REV. 248/2025 & connected matters
an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and
deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is,
therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process,
including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the
High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent
Controller merely because another view on the material available on
record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court read as under:
“23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive
power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller,
being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the
decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance.
Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its
views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate
jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The
scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and
except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the
record, which would only mean that in the absence of any
adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb
such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in
such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the
power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act,
totally forbidden by the legislature.”
15.
In Pankaj Pahwa (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court,
upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra),
reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that
this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of
the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the
decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned
Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an
absence of adjudication warranting interference.
16.
In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges
is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
11:21:15
RC.REV. 248/2025 & connected matters
25B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to
undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to
arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute.
Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Order
suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material
irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the
learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous
premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left
unconsidered or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an
error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional
jurisdiction may be warranted.
17.
It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional
scrutiny that the grounds urged on behalf of the Petitioner against the
Impugned Order are required to be examined.
18.
At this juncture, before adverting to the discussion on merits of
the present Petition, this Court deems it appropriate to first advert to
the pleas raised by the Petitioner, before the learned ARC, in support
of their Application for leave to defend, as recorded in the Impugned
Order. The relevant portion thereof is reproduced herein below for
ready reference:
“Petitioner Case
2. The petition Sulekh Jain, S/o Late Sh. M. P. Jain has filed the
instant eviction petition to oust the respondent Sh. Krishan Taparia,
S/o Late Sh. Ganpat Rai Taparia from the tenanted premises Shop
No. 04 Ground Floor, IX/6379, Netaji Gall, Gandhi Nagar, Delhi110031 as the same is stated to be required for the bonafide need
and requirement of himself and his younger son- Aman Jain. It is
claimed that the the tenanted premises was purchased by the
petitioner on 02.09.2002 from Smt. Vidhya Wanti, D/o Sh. Ram
Lal, W/o Sh. Jaswant Rai and Sh. Darshan Lal, So Sh. Sukh Dayal
by way of sale deed. It is averred that the respondent was
inducted in the tenanted premises at a monthly rent of Rs.440/- per
month excluding electricity charges.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
11:21:15
RC.REV. 248/2025 & connected matters
3. Petitioner avers that his family comprises of his wife, two sons
two daughters in law and two minor grand daughter and minor
grand son. It is claimed by the petitioner that his younger son Sh.
Aman Jain is completely unemployed and it is for the purpose of
his financial well being that the tenanted. premises is required for
establishing the wholesale cloth showroom.
4. Petitioner also avers that respondent is also repeatedly guilty of
defaulting in payment of rent w.e.f. April, 2017 despite multiple
requests to clear the rental dues, however to no avail. Compelled by
the non payment of rent, petitioner also issued legal notice dated
11.02.2019 urging the respondent to pay the arrears of rent from
01.04.2017 to 31.01.2019 along with the enhanced rent at the rate
of 10% (revised every three years, however, despite receiving the
notice and replying to it, respondent failed to tender rent to the
petitioner.
5. It is the version of the petitioner that he is not in possession of
any other suitable commercial accommodation for setting up a
wholesale cloth business for his son Amar Jain ,hence the present
petition.”
19.
Having taken note of the aforesaid pleas raised by the
Petitioner, it would now be apposite to advert to the analysis
undertaken and the findings returned by the learned ARC in the
Impugned Order. The relevant portion thereof is reproduced herein
below for ready reference:
“
Finding and Analysis
16. In order to succeed in a petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the
Delhi Rent Control Act (“DRC”) the landlord is required
to establish three conditions:i. There must be a relationship between the parties as landlord and
tenant
ii. The tenanted premises must be bonafidely required by the
landlord either for himself or for his family members
iii. There is no other alternate suitable accommodation available
with the landlord.
17. The nub of the issue in the entire leave to defend application is
the allegation that the supposed bonafide requirement of the son of
the petitioner is a sham as Aman Jain is profitably engaged with his
own business. Furthermore, the petitioner and his family members
are owners of as many as twenty immovable properties and
therefore even favourable alternate accommodation is readily
available with them.
18. It is no longer res integra that the petitioner / landlord in
eviction proceedings under Section 14(1)(e) DRC has merely to
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
11:21:15
RC.REV. 248/2025 & connected matters
show that he is something more than a tenant. Thus, the existence
of landlord tenant relationship, is to be ascertained by applying the
well settled and time tested propositions that (i) for the purpose of
establishing landlord-tenant relationship, the onus of proof on the
landlord is not akin to a title suit; (ii) as long as it is established that
a landlord has a better title than that of a tenant, a tenant cannot
resist a plea of existence of a landlord tenant relationship. In view
of the same therefore, this Court finds favor with the assertions of
the petitioner on this count. In addition the tenancy in the present
case is categorically admitted by the respondent hence there does
not even remain an iota of doubt that the petitioner has a better title
to show as compared to the respondent.
19. With regards testing the bonafide need of the petitioner to
obtain possession of the tenanted premises, it is well settled that the
Court must presume the bonafide requirement of the landlord. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court in “Sarla Ahuja v. United India
Insurance Co. Ltd.,” [(1998) 8 SCC 119] observed that:
“14. The crux of the ground envisaged in clause (e) of
Section 14(1) of the Act is that! the requirement of the
landlord for occupation of the tenanted premises must be
bona fide. When a landlord asserts that he requires his
building for his own occupation, the rent Controller shall
not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not
bona fide. When other conditions of the clause are
satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case,
it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption
that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide. It is often
said by courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms
to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself
without getting possession of the tenanted premises. While
deciding the question of bona fides of the requirement of
the landlord, it is quite unnecessary to make
an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have
adjusted himself.”
20. The landlord is only required to show that the requirement of
the tenanted premises is a bonafide requirement and not merely a
whimsical or a fanciful desire by him . The Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the landmark case of “Deena Nath v. Pooran
Lal"[(2001) 5 SCC 705] observed that:“15...The statutory mandate is that there must be first a
requirement by the landlord which means that it is not a
mere whim or a fanciful desire by him; further, such
requirement must be bona fide which is intended to avoid
a mere whim or desire. The “bona fide requirement” must
be in present and must be manifested in actual need
.which would evidence the court that it is not a mere
fanciful or whimsical desire.”
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
11:21:15
RC.REV. 248/2025 & connected matters
21.In the present case as well, once the landlord has stated that he
requires the tenanted premises for a particular use, the Court is
required to believe the statement to be true and genuine, unless and
until it is shown by the tenant through cogent material that the
requirement is fanciful or whimsical. Examining on the said
touchstone , this court is of the view that the petitioner has
manifested a bonafide requirement of his son Aman Jain for
opening wholesale cloth showroom. To refute such bonafide
requirement, respondent has contended that the son of the petitioner
is gainfully employed as a Director in three companies namely M/s
Olive Infratech Pvt. Ltd., M/s Milestone Creators Pvt. Ltd. And
Ms/ Olive Solution Pvt. Ltd. Having office at H-32/38, Sector-3,
Rohini, Delhi and H. No. 318, Sector-3, Rohini Delhi. To
substantiate such averments, respondent has filed company master
data of the aforesaid companies as per which Aman Jain is named
as one of the Directors along with the petitioner himself. On
perusal of the companies master data filed by the respondent, it is
found that two companies ie. Ms/ Olive Solution Pvt. Ltd. and
Milestone Creators Pvt. Ltd. have been struck off from the
Registrar of Companies therefore it is clear that the two companies
are no longer active and generating any revenue to the benefit of
Aman Jain. Regarding M/s; Olive Infratech Pvt. Ltd., it is seen
from the company master data that the company status is “active”.
However, to discredit the viability and profitability of M/s Olive
Infratech Pvt. Ltd. petitioner has filed company information along
with Indian Income Tax return acknowledgment for the assessment
year 2024-2025 wherein the reverie generated by the company is
shown to be nil rather profits before remuneration is shown to be
minus Rs.649/- Thus, it is clear that neither of the three companies
is a profit making entity so as to conclude that Aman Jain is
gainfully employed or running a profitable business along with the
petitioner.
22.In addition, respondent also claims that Aman Jain is also
running a business bearing GSTIN 24ABEFA8739RIZR namely
Ashu Hosiery. Admittedly the said business established, in Surat,
Gujarat wherein it is contended that the said business is run
independently by Aman Jain. To emphasize the same, respondent
has filed goods and service tax details of the aforesaid business in
the form of Annexure-III. On perusal of Annexure-III, it is found
that the aforesaid entity is constituted as a partnership, however,
Annexure-III does not disclose the name of its partners, it is only
by way of leave to defend that it is contended that it is run by
Aman Jain. No other document has been put forth to prove or to
even indicate that the aforesaid business is independently run by
Aman Jain. Per contra, petitioner has denied such contention, it is
claimed that business is not run by Aman Jain, rather during the
course of arguments, it was submitted that the said business is run
by the petitioner and his elder son namely Ashwini Jain.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
11:21:15
RC.REV. 248/2025 & connected matters
Furthermore, it was also submitted that the aforesaid business is
being run in the State of Gujarat and therefore even from the
standpoint of geographical viability, said business is not suitable
or feasible for the bonafide requirement of Aman Jain. On perusal
of the entire factual matrix and material placed on record, it has
come to pass that respondent has not provided sufficient material so
as to cogently conclude that the business in the name of Ashu
Hosiery is run by Sh. Aman Jin. Even for the sake of arguments if
is assumed that the said business in Gujarat does belong to Aman
Jain it would not satisfy the bonafide requirement of starting a
business in Delhi. Hence the assertion of respondent as to gainful
employment of Aman Jain remain uncompelling.
23. Another issue vehemently pressed by the respondent is
regarding the dimension of the space in the tenanted premises i.e.
8X5.5 sq. feet being insufficient for running a wholesale cloth
showroom. To this, it is submitted by the petitioner that petitioner
and his family members have filed multiple petitions U/s 14(1)(e)
of DRC Act before Rent Controllers and in the event all the
adjoining shops are vacated, the entire space shall be utilized for
the purpose of starting a wholesale cloth showroom. On perusal of
record, it is found that petitioner and his family members have filed
as many as six petition U/s 14 (1)(e) of DRC Act seeking vacation
of adjoining premises which is pending adjudication before this
court, all 06 petitions are running simultaneously on same date,
wherein argument on leave to defend were also advanced on same
date. Accordingly, there is merit to the assertion of the petitioner
that the entire space can be effectively used for the purpose of
running a wholesale cloth showroom. Further, it also could not be
shown that the space of the tenanted premises would not
supplement in starting a wholesale cloth showroom. Therefore the
contention of the respondent that the space of an individual shop is
insufficient is found to be immaterial against the bonafide need of
the petitioner.
24. Considering the same, it is held that the petitioner has
successfully shown his bonafide requirement of the tenanted
premises for his son Aman Jain and there is nothing on the record
to suggest otherwise. However, at the stage, it is pertinent to record
that though the petition speaks of bonafide requirement of the
petitioner as well as his son Aman Jain, however, petitioner has not
made a compelling case to showcase his own bonafide requirement.
25.With regards the requirement of there being alternative
accommodation being available with the petitioner, it is to be noted
that it has been repeatedly held that the Courts are not to sit in the
armchair of the landlord and dictate as to how the available
property of the landlord is to be best utilised by him. The landlord
is the absolute owner of his property and the best person to decide
which property is to be utilised in what way is the landlord himself.
In addition, the respondent also cannot dictate as to how the
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
11:21:15
RC.REV. 248/2025 & connected matters
landlord is to utilise his property. The landlord possesses the
prerogative to determine their specific requirements, exercising full
autonomy in this regard. It is not within the purview of the courts to
impose directives on the landlord regarding the nature or quality of
their chosen usage of the tenanted premises. Essentially , the courts
should refrain from prescribing any standard or guidelines for the
landlord's residential/commercial choices. In “Ragavendra
Kumar v. Prem Machinery & Co.” [(2000) 1 SCC 679] the
Hon'ble Supreme Court was of the view that:“10...It is true that the plaintiff landlord in his evidence
stated that there were a number of other shops and houses
belonging to him but he made a categorical statement that
his said houses and shops were not vacant and that the
suit premises is suitable for his business purpose. It is a
settled position of law that the landlord is the best judge of
his requirement for residential or business purpose and
he has got complete freedom in the matter. (See Prativa
Devi v. T.V. Krishnan [(1996) 5 SCC 353] .) In the case in
hand the plaintiff landlord wanted eviction of the tenant
from the suit premises for starting his business as it was
suitable and it cannot be faulted.”
26.The respondent has stated that in paragraph No. 10 above, that
the petitioner and his family members are owners of as many as 20
immovable properties in the country out of which seven properties
are stated to be owned by Aman Jain himself and three properties
are owned by the petitioner. It is worth noting that except for the
aforesaid list, respondent has not filed any title documents so to
substantiate that the aforesaid properties are owned by the
petitioner and his son Aman Jain. It is wroth pointing out that
during the course of arguments, respondent was given multiple
opportunities to bring on record the title documents of the aforesaid
properties allegedly in the name of the petitioner, however, such
opportunities remained unavailed. It is contended that the
respondent has generated the aforesaid list by a simple search with
the name of the family members of the petitioner and the properties
as populated in the list pertains to other persons. bearing the same
names as the petitioner and his family members. During the course
of arguments, Ld. Counsel for the petitioner had submitted that
except for one, the petitioner and his family members have no
relations whatsoever with any of the properties mentioned in the
list. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that the property at
plot No. 304, GIDC, Pandesara, Surat, Gujarat belongs to the elder
son of the petitioner i.e. Ashwini Jain and such ownership does not
qualify as an alternate accommodation for the bonafide need of the
petitioner and his younger son Aman Jain. The above observation
and argument shows that the aforesaid list is merely a list and does
not in any shape or form prove that the 20 immovable properties as
contended by the respondent is owned by the petitioner or his son
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
11:21:15
RC.REV. 248/2025 & connected matters
Aman Jain. It is a matter of record that opportunities were granted
to the respondent to furnish the title documents of the aforesaid
properties, however, despite the title documents being a public
record, respondent could not furnish the same. Therefore, it cannot
be held that the filing of list of immovable property would ipso
facto lead to the conclusion that the properties are owned by the
petitioner and in turn manifest a triable issue. Further owning of an
immovable properties by the other son of petitioner cannot deem to
be an alternate accommodation to fulfill bonafide requirement of
Aman Jain. All in all, more attending details were required to be
furnished by the respondent with regards the same which have not
been furnished discussed above therefore, this Court is of the view
that the petitioner landlord has successfully shown that the tenanted
premises is best suitable accommodation for petitioner needs and
that he is the landlord of the same. Accordingly,
application seking leave to defend is dismissed and eviction order
with regards property bearing no. Shop No. 04, Ground Floor,
IX/6379, Netaji Gali, Gandhi Nagar, Delhi-110031 (shown in red
in site plan) is passed in favor of the petitioner and against the
respondent.
27.The petitioner landlord shall not be entitled to get possession of
the tenanted premises before the expiry of six months from today
as per Section 14(7) of the DRC Act.”
20.
A conjoint reading of the pleas raised by the Petitioner and the
findings returned in the Impugned Order, particularly Paragraph Nos.
17 to 23 thereof, makes it manifest that the learned ARC has adverted
to each of the principal grounds sought by the Petitioner and has
returned specific findings thereon upon consideration of the material
placed before it.
21.
The principal contention of the Petitioner that the bona fide
requirement pleaded by the Respondent was not genuine, since his
son, Aman Jain, was already engaged in business activities and was a
Director in three companies, has been specifically considered by the
learned ARC in Paragraph Nos. 21 and 22 of the Impugned Order.
Upon consideration of the material placed before it, the learned ARC
returned a finding, particularly in Paragraph No. 24 thereof, that the
Respondent had successfully established the bona fide requirement of
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
11:21:15
RC.REV. 248/2025 & connected matters
the tenanted premises for his son.
22.
Insofar as the contention regarding the dimensions of the
tenanted premises and its alleged unsuitability for establishing a
wholesale cloth showroom is concerned, the same has been
specifically considered and rejected by the learned ARC in Paragraph
No. 23 of the Impugned Order.
23.
Similarly, the plea regarding the alleged availability of
alternative suitable accommodation with the Respondent and his
family members has been considered in Paragraph Nos. 25 and 26 of
the Impugned Order, wherein the learned ARC, upon examining the
material placed before it, concluded that the Petitioner had failed to
raise a triable issue in respect thereof.
24.
It is, therefore, evident that the present case is not one where
any material plea raised by the Petitioner has escaped consideration or
remained unadjudicated. Each of the grounds sought to be urged
before this Court was raised before the learned ARC, duly considered
in the Impugned Order and rejected for reasons recorded therein.
25.
The challenge mounted by the Petitioner before this Court, in
substance, seeks a reconsideration of the very same pleas and a reappreciation of the material already examined by the learned ARC,
with a view to persuade this Court to arrive at a conclusion different
from that recorded in the Impugned Order.
26.
This Court is unable to discern any jurisdictional error, manifest
illegality, material irregularity, perversity or error apparent on the face
of the record in the decision-making process adopted by the learned
ARC. Equally, this is not a case where any material plea raised by the
Petitioner has been left unconsidered so as to warrant interference by
this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
11:21:15
RC.REV. 248/2025 & connected matters
27.
In view of the foregoing discussion and having regard to the
limited scope of interference under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of
the DRC Act, this Court finds no ground to interfere with the
Impugned Order dated 25.02.2025 passed by the learned ARC.
Therefore, the present Petition, being devoid of merit, is dismissed.
28.
Accordingly, the present Petition, along with pending
Application(s), if any, is disposed of.
29.
There shall be no Order as to the Costs.
RC.REV. 248/2025, RC.REV. 251/2025, RC.REV. 256/2025,
RC.REV. 262/2025, RC.REV. 268/2025
30.
This Court now proceeds to consider the aforementioned
connected Revision Petitions.
31.
At this stage, learned counsel for the Petitioners submits that the
grounds of challenge to the respective Impugned Orders, by way of
the present connected Revision Petitions, are substantially same and
that he would be advancing identical submissions in each of the
present connected Revision Petitions.
32.
This Court takes note of the submission of the learned counsel
for the Petitioner, as recorded hereinbefore, that all the connected
Petitions arise in a substantially same factual backdrop and involve
issues of an identical nature, namely, the dismissal of the respective
Applications seeking leave to defend. The only distinction between
the respective connected Petitions lies in the fact that each pertains to
a separate tenanted premises and has been instituted by different
members of the same family, who are tenants in their respective
premises.
33.
This Court further takes note of the submission of the learned
counsel for the Petitioner that he would be advancing identical
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
11:21:15
RC.REV. 248/2025 & connected matters
submissions in all the present connected Revision Petitions.
34.
In view of the foregoing submissions of the learned counsel for
the Petitioner, the decision rendered in RC.REV. 263/2025, herein
above, would mutatis mutandis, apply to the remaining connected
Revision Petitions as well.
35.
Accordingly, in view of the findings returned hereinabove,
while deciding RC.REV. 263/2025, and for the reasons recorded
therein, this Court finds no ground to interfere with the respective
Impugned Orders passed by the learned ARC in the present connected
Revision Petitions, and therefore, the present Petitions are dismissed.
36.
Accordingly, the present Petitions, along with respective
pending Application(s), if any, are disposed of.
37.
A photocopy of this Order be kept in the connected matters.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
JULY 09, 2026/nd/DJ
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
11:21:15
RC.REV. 248/2025 & connected matters
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