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IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA
WRIT PETITION No. 32844 of 2025
03rd SEPTEMBER, 2026
BETWEEN:
Surender Bantia, S/o Late G.P. Bantia
… Petitioner
AND
Union of India, and another
… Respondents
ORDER:
The letter dated 10.10.2025 issued by respondent No.2-Executive
Officer, Secunderabad Cantonment Board, rejecting the representation
dated 06.12.2023 submitted by the petitioner, seeking regularization of
construction in the property premises bearing Bungalow No. 207, situated
at Tarbund, Secunderabad Cantonment, is challenged in this writ petition.
The respondentNo.2, by the impugned letter, directed the petitioner to
vacate the subject property.
2.
Heard Mr. B. Vamshidhar Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner;
and Mr. K.R. Koteswar Rao, learned Standing Counsel for 2nd respondentCantonment Board. Perused the record.
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PETITIONER’s CONTENTIONS:
3.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner
purchased Bungalow No.207, situated at Tarbund, Secunderabad
Cantonment, from its owners under a registered sale deed dated 22.04.1965
and has remained in absolute and uninterrupted possession and enjoyment
of the property ever since. The said sale deed describes the land as freehold
and records that the earlier vendors had not paid any leasehold assessment.
It is therefore contended that the subsequent assertion of the respondent
authorities that the entire property is B-3 land belonging to the
Government of India is wholly untenable.
3.1.
Learned counsel submits that the subject property is situated
in Tarbund, which formed part of the erstwhile Moglai village known as
Sikh Village and, more broadly, the Civil Area of Secunderabad
Cantonment. According to the petitioner, when the British Army
established the Cantonment at Hyderabad, the then Government of
Hyderabad under HEH The Nizam transferred police jurisdiction over 13
Moglai villages, including Sikh Village, to the British military authorities
only for the limited purpose of exercising police jurisdiction. Reliance is
placed upon the Firman issued by HEH The Nizam in 1906 A.D., which,
according to the petitioner, expressly reserved civil and revenue
jurisdiction to the Nizam and protected the rights of the Government of
Hyderabad, Jagirdars and private landowners. It is therefore contended that
neither the said 13 Moglai villages nor the privately owned lands situated
therein were ever transferred to the British authorities or to the then
Government of India.
3.2.
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Learned counsel further submits that the provisions of the
Cantonment Act, 1924, must be understood in the context of the peculiar
status of Secunderabad Cantonment. While the Act was enacted to
consolidate and amend the law relating to Cantonments and to facilitate
their administration and the accommodation of military authorities,
Secunderabad Cantonment was situated within the erstwhile Hyderabad
State ruled by HEH The Nizam and was distinct from Cantonments
established in territories directly governed by the Government of India. It
is contended that Cantonment authorities could acquire rights over
privately held lands only if the Nizam’s Government had transferred such
lands to them, and no such transfer took place in respect of the 13 Moglai
villages.
3.3.
In support of the said contention, learned counsel relies upon
the report dated 10.10.1926 prepared by Sir William Barton concerning
land tenure in areas administered by the Government of India. According
to the petitioner, the report records that the British authorities exercised
only police jurisdiction, together with sanitary control, over the 13 Moglai
villages and that no land had been assigned to the Government of India by
the Nizam’s Government. Reliance is also placed upon the report dated
05.02.1934 of Capt. C.M. James, Special Lands Officer, Secunderabad
Cantonment, which, according to the petitioner, records that no land within
the Secunderabad and Bollaram Cantonments belonged to the Government
of India, the sovereign rights of HEH The Nizam and the rights of private
individuals having been reserved.
3.4.
Learned counsel submits that the General Land Register
prepared in 1933 is of considerable significance. It is contended that,
following the enactment of the Cantonment Act, 1924, the Government of
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India called for particulars of landholdings in Cantonment areas and,
accordingly, the 1933 GLR recorded most of the lands, including the
subject property, as private lands, with the origin of occupation shown as
“unknown”. Significantly, according to the petitioner, the Government of
India did not at that stage assert ownership over the lands situated in the 13
Moglai villages, nor was the subject property described as an “Old Grant”.
The petitioner therefore contends that the 1933 GLR constitutes
contemporaneous material which militates against the subsequent claim
that the subject property was Government land.
3.5.
It is further submitted that, under the Rendition Agreement
entered into in 1945, the Cantonment Areas were reverted to HEH The
Nizam, including the police jurisdiction over the relevant villages, while
only municipal administration continued to remain with the Cantonment
authorities. Learned counsel submits that, notwithstanding the earlier
entries in the 1933 GLR, a fresh GLR was prepared in or about 1956 and,
without notice to the affected landholders, the nature of several
landholdings was altered, including the classification of the petitioner’s
property as an “Old Grant”. Such unilateral reclassification, it is
contended, was illegal, arbitrary and contrary to the principles of natural
justice. An administrative entry made without notice, it is submitted,
cannot retrospectively extinguish, alter or create proprietary rights, and the
1956 description of the property as an “Old Grant” cannot, by itself,
establish title in favour of the Government of India or defeat the
petitioner’s registered title.
3.6.
Learned counsel submits that the petitioner subsequently
reconstructed a portion of the property and leased the reconstructed
premises to M/s. Blue Star Limited. When the respondent authorities
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threatened demolition of the structures, the petitioner approached the
competent Civil Court and other forums to protect his possession and
proprietary rights. In this context, the respondent authorities, by letter
dated 05.02.2003, asserted that the property was B-3 land belonging to the
Central Government and rejected the petitioner’s request for regularization
of the alleged unauthorized construction on the ground that the
construction stood upon Government land.
3.7.
Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner instituted W.P. No.2528 of
2003. During the pendency of the said writ petition, the respondent
authorities, by letter dated 14.08.2003, sought police assistance, escort,
vehicles and other arrangements for demolishing the disputed structures
with heavy machinery. In view of the threatened coercive action, the
petitioner instituted O.S. No.75 of 2003 before the Judge-Cum-Additional
Chief Judge, Family Court at Secunderabad, seeking declaration of title
and permanent injunction restraining the respondents from interfering with
his peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property.
3.8.
Learned counsel submits that O.S. No.75 of 2003 was
ultimately decreed in part by judgment and decree dated 31.12.2014. The
trial Court directed the plaintiffs to approach the defendants for
regularization of their possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule
property and the structures thereon and directed the 2nd defendant to
exercise the powers available under Section 248 of the Cantonments Act,
2006 within a reasonable time. The defendants were also restrained from
evicting the plaintiffs except by due process of law. According to learned
counsel, the said judgment and decree attained finality and was neither set
aside nor suspended.
3.9.
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Pursuant to the said decree, the petitioner submitted a
representation dated 13.12.2016 seeking regularization of his possession
and the structures standing on the subject property. Learned counsel
submits that the representation remained pending without consideration for
a considerable period.
3.10. It is further submitted that, although W.P. No.2528 of 2003
had remained pending, the petitioner was not aware of its listing as his
counsel failed to inform him, resulting in the writ petition being dismissed
in his absence by order dated 05.09.2022. Learned counsel contends that
the respondents, who participated in the said proceedings, failed to bring to
the notice of this Court the material fact that, in the interregnum, the
competent Civil Court had rendered the judgment and decree dated
31.12.2014 in O.S. No.75 of 2003. It is therefore contended that the
respondents cannot derive any advantage from the dismissal of W.P.
No.2528 of 2003 so as to defeat the rights and protection subsequently
declared by the Civil Court. According to learned counsel, in view of the
decree dated 31.12.2014 and the petitioner’s pending request for
regularization, the respondents could not have proceeded as though no
such decree existed.
3.11. Learned counsel further submits that, notwithstanding the
decree in O.S. No.75 of 2003 and the petitioner’s representation seeking
regularization, respondent No.2 again issued a vacation notice dated
10.04.2023 directing the petitioner to vacate Bungalow No.207, Sikh
Road, Secunderabad Cantonment, within three days, purportedly for
demolition of the alleged unauthorized construction. The said notice, it is
contended, was issued despite the respondents’ knowledge of the pending
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claim and the protection granted by the Civil Court against eviction except
by due process of law.
3.12. The petitioner submitted a detailed reply dated 11.04.2023
and thereafter instituted W.P. No.10352 of 2023 challenging the notice
dated 10.04.2023. Learned counsel submits that this Court, by order dated
06.11.2023, disposed of the writ petition by directing the petitioner to
submit a detailed representation within two weeks seeking compounding of
the structure erected over 500 Sq. Yds. of the subject land. The 2nd
respondent was, in turn, directed to consider such representation within
four weeks in accordance with law and in conformity with the principles of
natural justice, after affording the petitioner a reasonable opportunity of
hearing. Until such consideration, the respondents were directed not to take
coercive steps pursuant to the vacation notice dated 10.04.2023.
3.13. In compliance with the said order, the petitioner submitted a
detailed
representation
dated
06.12.2023
seeking
regularization/compounding of the construction. However, respondent
No.2 rejected the representation by the impugned letter bearing Lr. No.
SCB/EB/B No.207/GLR/SY. No.678/2414, dated 10.10.2025, once again
directing the petitioner to vacate the subject property.
3.14. Learned counsel submits that the impugned order is vitiated
by patent illegality, non-application of mind and failure to consider the
binding judgment and decree dated 31.12.2014 in O.S. No.75 of 2003.
Particular reliance is placed upon the findings recorded by the trial Court
on Issues Nos.5 and 7, wherein, according to the petitioner, the Court
accepted the property as freehold and permitted the petitioner to approach
the 2nd respondent for regularization under Section 248 of the
Cantonments Act, 2006. It is contended that the respondent authority could
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not mechanically reject the petitioner’s request by reiterating that the
property was B-3 “Old Grant” land belonging to the Government of India,
Ministry of Defence, without addressing the findings and directions
contained in the said decree.
3.15. Learned counsel further submits that the trial Court had
specifically noticed the petitioner’s title flowing from registered sale deed
bearing Document No.842 of 1965, dated 22.04.1965, as well as the title of
his vendors under the registered sale deed dated 11.08.1947, marked as
Ex.A1 and Ex.A2 respectively. It is therefore contended that the impugned
order, in ignoring the petitioner’s registered title and the findings of the
competent Civil Court and proceeding solely on the basis of the subsequent
B-3 “Old Grant” classification, is arbitrary and unsustainable.
3.16. Learned counsel also challenges the rejection of the
petitioner’s request on the ground that the Floor Space Index (FSI) was
restricted to 0.5 and that the construction did not satisfy the prescribed
setback requirements. It is submitted that the Secunderabad Cantonment
Board itself had issued guidelines enhancing the permissible FSI to 1.5 and
that the authority failed to examine the petitioner’s request for
regularization/compounding in the light of the applicable provisions of the
Cantonments Act, 2006 and the National Building Code, 2016. According
to learned counsel, these aspects were required to be considered on their
own merits instead of rejecting the representation by mechanically treating
the land as Government-owned B-3 “Old Grant” land.
3.17. It is therefore the submission of learned counsel that the
respondents, having been directed by the judgment and decree dated
31.12.2014 to consider the petitioner’s request for regularization by
exercising their powers under Section 248 of the Cantonments Act, 2006,
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could not disregard the said decree or the petitioner’s subsequent
representations. The decree having attained finality, and there being no
order setting it aside or suspending its operation, the petitioner’s claim was
required to be considered in accordance with the said judgment and decree
and on its own merits.
3.18. Learned counsel consequently submits that the impugned
proceedings dated 10.10.2025, which proceed on the assumption that the
subject property is Government-owned B-3 “Old Grant” land and reject the
petitioner’s request for regularization without properly considering the
judgment and decree in O.S. No.75 of 2003, the petitioner’s registered
title, the historical revenue and land records, the 1933 GLR, the subsequent
representations and the applicable building regulations, are arbitrary,
illegal and unsustainable. The respondents, it is contended, cannot
dispossess the petitioner by relying upon a unilateral classification in the
GLR or by ignoring the binding findings and directions of the competent
Civil Court. The impugned proceedings are therefore liable to be set aside
and the respondents ought to be directed to reconsider the petitioner’s
request for regularization/compounding strictly in accordance with law and
in the light of the judgment and decree dated 31.12.2014 in O.S. No.75 of
2003.Learned counsel relies on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Roshan Minoo Patel v. Union of India1.
CONTENTIONS OF RESPONDENT NO.2
(inthe Writ Petition)
2011 SCC OnLine AP 402
4.
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Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2, referring to the
counter affidavit filed in the writ petition as well as the separate counter
affidavit filed opposing I.A. No.3 of 2025, submits that the writ petition is
not maintainable either on facts or in law and that the impugned speaking
order dated 10.10.2025 was passed strictly in accordance with the
provisions of the Cantonments Act, 2006 and pursuant to the directions
issued by this Court in W.P. No.10352 of 2023. It is contended that the
petitioner was afforded adequate opportunity to submit his representation,
the same was duly considered, and the impugned order was thereafter
passed for reasons recorded therein. There is, therefore, no violation of the
principles of natural justice or any procedural illegality warranting
interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
4.1.
Learned counsel submits that Bungalow No.207, GLR
Sy.No.678, Sikh Road, Secunderabad Cantonment, forms part of land
admeasuring approximately Ac.5.29 guntas, which is classified in the
General Land Register as B-3 “Old Grant” land. The said land is under the
management of the Defence Estate Officer and the proprietary rights
therein vest in the Union of India, Ministry of Defence. The petitioner’s
claim of absolute ownership and freehold title is therefore disputed. It is
further contended that even the petitioner’s registered sale deed dated
22.04.1965 contains a reference acknowledging the proprietary rights of
the Government.
4.2.
Learned counsel submits that the question of the petitioner’s
title cannot be adjudicated in the present writ proceedings, particularly
when the title itself is disputed and is also the subject matter of civil
litigation. It is contended that the petitioner has suppressed material facts
concerning the pendency of O.S. No.892 of 2005, in which declaration and
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injunction were originally sought in respect of the property and the relief
was subsequently confined to perpetual injunction after the Court required
payment of appropriate Court fee. According to learned counsel, the
petitioner cannot convert the proceedings under Article 226 of the
Constitution into proceedings for adjudication of disputed questions of title
or for determining the validity of the GLR entries.
4.3.
Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner’s
constructions have consistently been treated as unauthorized and that the
history of litigation demonstrates that the constructions were raised without
obtaining the requisite permission. In O.S. No.676 of 1998, the Civil Court
found that new constructions had been raised without sanction and held
that the Cantonment Board was entitled to take action in accordance with
law. The appeal in A.S. No.59 of 2001 was also dismissed, and the
appellate Court recorded that construction had continued despite the
subsistence of a status quo order. In the contempt proceedings, an order
dated 19.10.2002 was passed directing payment of Rs.25,000/- as
compensation for disobedience of the Court’s orders. The subsequent S.A.
No.881 of 2002 was dismissed on 22.01.2003, wherein this Court also
recorded findings concerning the unauthorized nature of the constructions
and violation of the status quo order.
4.4.
Learned counsel submits that, pursuant to the order dated
24.01.2003 in W.P. No.1442 of 2003, the petitioner’s representation dated
23.01.2003 seeking regularization/compounding was considered and
rejected by a speaking order dated 05.02.2003. The said rejection was
challenged by the petitioner in W.P. No.2528 of 2003, which came to be
dismissed on 05.09.2022, this Court having found no ground to interfere
with the decision of the Cantonment Board. It is therefore contended that
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the petitioner’s earlier request for regularization had already been
considered and rejected and cannot be revived merely by relying upon
subsequent proceedings.
4.5.
Learned counsel submits that O.S. No.75 of 2003 was decreed
in part by judgment and decree dated 31.12.2014. However, it is contended
that the said decree was confined to the extent of 500 Sq. Yds. and directed
the petitioner and his mother to approach the Cantonment Board for
regularization under Section 248 of the Cantonments Act, 2006. According
to the respondent, Bungalow No.207 comprises approximately 22,372 Sq.
Yds. and the constructions now sought to be protected substantially exceed
the extent of 500 Sq. Yds. covered by the said decree. The petitioner,
therefore, cannot rely upon the judgment in O.S. No.75 of 2003 as though
the entire property or all the existing structures stood protected or
regularized thereunder.
4.6.
It is further submitted that, after dismissal of W.P. No.2528 of
2003, respondent No.2 issued the vacation notice dated 10.04.2023
directing the petitioner to vacate the premises for demolition of the
unauthorized constructions. The said notice, according to learned counsel,
was not a fresh or arbitrary action but a continuation of the proceedings
initiated in respect of the unauthorized construction. The petitioner
challenged the said notice in W.P. No.10352 of 2023, whereupon this
Court, by order dated 06.11.2023, directed the petitioner to submit a
detailed representation seeking compounding of the structure erected over
500 Sq. Yds. and directed respondent No.2 to consider the same in
accordance with law and after affording reasonable opportunity to the
petitioner.
4.7.
petitioner
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Learned counsel submits that, pursuant to the said order, the
submitted
his
representation
dated
06.12.2023.
The
representation was considered in accordance with the directions of this
Court and was rejected by the impugned speaking order dated 10.10.2025.
It is therefore contended that the impugned order cannot be characterized
as a mechanical or non-speaking order or as one passed in violation of
natural justice.
4.8.
Learned counsel further submits that the constructions
existing at the site substantially exceed the extent of 500 Sq. Yds. referred
to in O.S. No.75 of 2003 and W.P. No.10352 of 2023. According to the site
plan submitted by the petitioner, the building footprint is approximately
534.88 Sq. Yds. on a site area of 1534 Sq. Yds. The inspection records
disclose RCC Ground and First Floor structures having a built-up area of
approximately 9,717 Sq. Ft., besides other structures including
GI/Aluminium roof sheds, a generator room, transformer yard and security
room. It is contended that these structures are inseparable and collectively
occupy approximately 1534 Sq. Yds., thereby materially exceeding the 500
Sq. Yds. in respect of which the petitioner relies upon the earlier decree.
4.9.
It is also submitted that the constructions do not conform to
the applicable setback requirements prescribed under the relevant orders,
including the orders of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief,
Southern Command, Pune, dated 23.07.1984. Further, since the property is
classified as B-3 “Old Grant” land and is subject to a permissible FSI of
0.5, the constructions are stated to be contrary to the applicable Building
Bye-Laws and FSI restrictions. The petitioner’s reliance upon any
subsequent guidelines allegedly enhancing the FSI to 1.5 does not,
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according to the respondent, confer any automatic right to regularization of
an unauthorized construction.
4.10. Learned counsel submits that the proceedings pursuant to W.P.
No.10352 of 2023 were confined to consideration of the petitioner’s
request for compounding/regularization of the unauthorized construction
and did not involve adjudication of disputed title. The respondent authority
was therefore entitled to examine whether the constructions satisfied the
statutory and regulatory requirements for regularization. The order dated
06.11.2023, according to learned counsel, did not confer upon the
petitioner any vested right to regularization or prevent the competent
authority from rejecting the representation after consideration on its merits.
4.11. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Rajendra Kumar Barjatya v. U.P. Avas Evam Parishad, Civil
Appeals Nos.14604 of 2024 and 14605 of 2024, to contend that
unauthorized constructions raised without competent sanction or contrary
to sanctioned plans ought not ordinarily to be regularized and that
demolition of such constructions cannot be avoided on considerations of
sympathy. It is therefore submitted that the petitioner cannot claim
regularization as a matter of right when the constructions are beyond the
permissible parameters and were raised without the requisite sanction.
4.12. Learned counsel further submits that there is no merit in the
petitioner’s contention that the impugned order ignores the judgment and
decree dated 31.12.2014 in O.S. No.75 of 2003. According to the
respondent, the decree merely directed the petitioner to approach the
competent authority for regularization under Section 248 of the
Cantonments Act, 2006; it did not itself regularize the construction or
direct that regularization must necessarily be granted. The competent
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authority was consequently required to examine the petitioner’s
representation in accordance with the statutory requirements and, upon
such consideration, rejected the representation for the reasons recorded in
the speaking order dated 10.10.2025.
4.13. It is therefore submitted that the respondents have acted
strictly in accordance with the statutory framework and the orders passed
by this Court. The petitioner was afforded an opportunity to make his
representation; the same was considered; and the impugned order dated
10.10.2025 was passed for reasons recorded therein. The writ petition,
according to learned counsel, therefore discloses no ground warranting
interference under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Additional contentions in I.A. No.3 of 2025
4.14. Insofar as I.A. No.3 of 2025 is concerned, learned counsel for
respondent No.2 submits that the petitioner seeks an interim direction
permitting construction of a compound wall around the entire premises of
Bungalow No.207 and has also claimed damages of Rs.1,75,00,000/-,
comprising Rs.1,25,00,000/- towards alleged reconstruction costs and
Rs.50,00,000/- towards mental agony, on the allegation that approximately
80% of the structure was illegally demolished during the pendency of the
writ petition. The said allegations are specifically denied.
4.15. Learned counsel submits that the demolition carried out on
05.12.2025 was pursuant to the speaking order dated 10.10.2025 and the
statutory proceedings initiated in respect of the unauthorized construction.
There was no interim order staying the operation of the speaking order or
restraining the respondents from taking further action. It is also specifically
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denied that any undertaking was given by the learned Standing Counsel on
behalf of the respondents that demolition would not be undertaken.
4.16. Learned counsel further submits that the alleged status quo
order passed in O.S. No.71 of 2023 did not operate in respect of the
structure that was demolished. According to the respondent, the
demolished structure was not included in the suit schedule of the said suit.
The respondents had already filed their written statement along with an
application seeking vacation of the status quo order and, upon receiving
communication dated 05.12.2025 from the XII Additional Chief Judge,
City Civil Court, Secunderabad, furnished clarification that the structure
demolished by the authorities did not form part of the suit property. It is
therefore contended that the allegation that the respondents violated the
status quo order is factually incorrect.
4.17. Learned counsel submits that the construction in question has
consistently been held to be unauthorized in the earlier proceedings
referred to above and that the demolition cannot be characterized as illegal
merely because the petitioner’s challenge to the speaking order dated
10.10.2025 was pending. In the absence of any stay or other prohibitory
order from the competent Court, the respondents were entitled to proceed
in accordance with the statutory orders and notices already issued.
4.18. The respondent categorically denies the petitioner’s allegation
that approximately 80% of the property was illegally demolished or that
the demolition was undertaken in breach of any undertaking or subsisting
Court order. It is consequently submitted that the claim for damages of
Rs.1,75,00,000/- is wholly untenable and unsupported by any legal or
factual basis.
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4.19. As regards the petitioner’s prayer for permission to construct
a compound wall, learned counsel submits that the petitioner has not even
submitted an application before the Chief Executive Officer seeking such
permission. Section 261 of the Cantonments Act, 2006 prescribes the
procedure for construction of a compound wall and requires the applicant
to submit the requisite application and documents, including a plan clearly
indicating the boundaries of the property and the applicant’s right over the
property. Unless the petitioner follows the statutory procedure and
establishes his entitlement in accordance with law, he cannot seek a direct
judicial direction permitting construction of a compound wall over the
entire premises.
4.20. Learned counsel reiterates, in this context, that Bungalow
No.207, situated in GLR Sy.No.678, forms part of approximately Ac.5.29
guntas of B-3 “Old Grant” land under the management of the Defence
Estate Officer, TS & AP Circle, with proprietary rights vested in the
Central Government, Ministry of Defence. The respondent further relies
upon the petitioner’s sale deed dated 22.04.1965, contending that the
document contains an acknowledgment of the Government’s proprietary
rights. Thus, according to the respondent, the petitioner cannot seek an
interim direction enabling him to undertake further construction without
first establishing his legal right over the land and obtaining the requisite
statutory permission.
4.21. Learned counsel accordingly submits that I.A. No.3 of 2025 is
devoid of merit. There is no interim stay against the impugned speaking
order or the demolition, the alleged status quo order does not cover the
demolished structure, no undertaking against demolition was given on
behalf of the respondents, the claim for damages is unsupported, and the
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petitioner has not followed the statutory procedure under Section 261 of
the Cantonments Act, 2006 for obtaining permission to construct a
compound wall. The application is therefore liable to be dismissed.
4.22. For the aforesaid reasons, learned counsel submits that both
the writ petition and I.A. No.3 of 2025 are liable to be dismissed.
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT:
5.
Having considered the respective contentions and perused the
material placed on record, it is evident that the principal challenge in the
present writ petition is to the speaking order dated 10.10.2025, whereby
the
petitioner’s
request
for
regularization/compounding
of
the
constructions in Bungalow No.207, Sikh Road, Secunderabad Cantonment,
was rejected.
6.
The petitioner asserts title and uninterrupted possession over the
property on the strength of the registered sale deed dated 22.04.1965 and
contends that the property is freehold and cannot be treated as B-3 “Old
Grant” land belonging to the Union of India. The respondents, on the other
hand, dispute the petitioner’s claim of absolute ownership and assert that
the property comprised in GLR Sy.No.678, admeasuring approximately
Ac.5.29 guntas, is classified as B-3 “Old Grant” land, under the
management of the Defence Estate Officer, with proprietary rights vested
in the Central Government.
7.
The petitioner has placed considerable reliance upon the historical
material concerning the 13 Moglai villages, the position prevailing during
the erstwhile Hyderabad State, the reports relating to the exercise of
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jurisdiction by the British authorities, and the entries contained in the GLR,
particularly the 1933 and subsequent entries. In this context, reliance has
also been placed upon the judgment of the erstwhile Andhra Pradesh High
Court in Roshan Minoo Patel (supra).
8.
In Roshan Minoo Patel, the petitioners claimed ownership over
property situated in the Secunderabad Cantonment on the strength of their
title documents and long possession, while the Defence Estate Officer
treated the property as B-3 “Old Grant” land belonging to the Central
Government and proceeded against the petitioners under the Public
Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. The Court
considered the historical material relating to the 13 Moglai villages,
including the circumstances in which jurisdiction had been transferred by
the then Government of Hyderabad, the historical reports and the entries in
the GLR. The Court found that the question whether the property
constituted Government/public premises involved a complex dispute
concerning title and could not appropriately be determined in the summary
proceedings under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised
Occupants) Act, 1971. The Court, in the facts of that case, therefore
interfered with the proceedings of the Defence Estate Officer.
9.
The said decision, however, does not by itself advance the
petitioner’s claim for regularization in the present proceedings. The
distinction lies in the nature of the proceedings and the relief which fell for
consideration in Roshan Minoo Patel. In that case, the proceedings were
under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act,
1971, and the determination as to whether the property constituted “public
premises” was foundational to the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer under
the said enactment. The Court found that such a disputed and complex
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NBK, J
question of title could not appropriately be determined by the Estate
Officer in the summary proceedings before him.
10.
The present case stands on a different footing. The immediate
challenge herein is not to an order passed by an Estate Officer under the
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971,
determining the petitioner to be an unauthorised occupant of Government
premises. The impugned order dated 10.10.2025 arises out of the
petitioner’s request for regularization/compounding of the construction.
The petitioner had been directed to approach the competent statutory
authority for consideration of his request, and, pursuant to the order dated
06.11.2023 in W.P. No.10352 of 2023, the petitioner was afforded an
opportunity to submit a detailed representation. The question before the
competent authority was consequently whether the construction sought to
be regularized/compounded satisfied the requirements under the applicable
statutory and regulatory provisions.
11.
It is therefore not necessary for this Court, in deciding the present
writ petition, to pronounce upon the ultimate title to the subject property or
upon the correctness of the competing historical claims concerning the
GLR classification. A disputed question of title, particularly one requiring
examination of documentary material, is more appropriately adjudicated
before the competent civil Court, especially where such issue is already the
subject matter of civil proceedings. At the same time, the principle laid
down in Roshan Minoo Patel (supra) cannot be understood to mean that
the mere assertion of freehold title or a challenge to a B-3 “Old Grant”
entry confers upon the petitioner an enforceable right to regularization of a
construction. The said judgment also does not lay down that a claim of
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NBK, J
ownership by itself renders the statutory requirements governing
construction and regularization inapplicable.
12.
The record further discloses that the issue regarding the
unauthorized nature of the construction is not one which has been raised
for the first time in the impugned proceedings. The petitioner and his
predecessor had earlier instituted O.S. No.676 of 1998 seeking to restrain
demolition of the structures in Bungalow No.207. The said suit was
dismissed on 04.06.2001, with a finding that new constructions had been
raised without sanction. The appeal in A.S. No.59 of 2001 was also
dismissed, and the appellate Court recorded that construction had
continued despite an order of status quo. In the proceedings arising
therefrom, an order dated 19.10.2002 was passed directing payment of
Rs.25,000/- as compensation for disobedience of the Court’s order. The
subsequent S.A. No.881 of 2002 was dismissed on 22.01.2003, wherein
this Court also recorded findings concerning the construction having been
raised without obtaining permission from the Cantonment Board.
13.
The petitioner thereafter pursued the remedy of regularization.
Pursuant to the order dated 24.01.2003 in W.P. No.1442 of 2003, his
representation dated 23.01.2003 was considered and rejected by a speaking
order dated 05.02.2003. The said rejection was challenged in W.P. No.2528
of 2003, which was ultimately dismissed on 05.09.2022. The petitioner’s
contention that the said order should be treated as non est merely because
his counsel allegedly failed to inform him about the listing of the matter
cannot be accepted in the absence of any order recalling, setting aside or
otherwise nullifying the said judgment. The order dated 05.09.2022
therefore continues to operate in accordance with law.
14.
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NBK, J
The petitioner places substantial reliance upon the judgment and
decree dated 31.12.2014 in O.S. No.75 of 2003, particularly upon the
findings concerning the freehold character of the property and the direction
to approach the Cantonment Board for regularization under Section 248 of
the Cantonments Act, 2006. The said judgment and decree undoubtedly
required the competent authority to consider the petitioner’s request for
regularization. However, the operative direction cannot be construed as
itself granting regularization or directing that the request must necessarily
be accepted. The statutory power under Section 248 was left to be
exercised by the competent authority in accordance with law.
15.
At this juncture, it is relevant to refer to relevant portions of
Paragraph No. 5(c), and 5(g), of the impugned Letter dated 10.10.2025,
with facts borne out by the record, which read as follows:
“5(c). …… Furthermore, apart from the Notice dated 20.06.1998
issued u/Sec.185(1) of the Cantonments Act 1924, the Cantonment
Board had also issued a Final Notice dated 26.08.1998 u/Sec. 256
of
the
Cantonments Act
to
carryout
demolition
of
unauthorized construction. The above referred Notices were
challenged in a Suit in O.S. No. 676 of 1998 which was dismissed
on merits, then filed an Appeal Suit in A.S. No. 59 of 2001 which is
also dismissed on merits, then filed a Second Appeal before the
Hon’ble High Court in S.A.No. 881 of 2002, the same was
dismissed vide Judgment 22.01.2003 holding that huge structures
were erected with RCC Columns and Slabs and the said
constructions were exhibited in Ex.B12 to B15 photographs which
indicates that the construction was in progress. The Hon’ble Court
further observed that, they completed the construction under the
guise of Status Quo Order and they faced legal consequences,
hence Second Appeal was dismissed.
….
5(g).
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NBK, J
……. Since the subject property is classified as B3-Old
Grant, the FSI (Floor Space Index) Restrictions is 0.5 and, in your
case, you have erected the unauthorized construction without
leaving requisite setbacks in the land Adm. 1534 Sq.Yds, which is
contrary to the Building Bye-Laws and FSI Restrictions that are in
force. Therefore, request for regularization of unauthorized
constructions
which
were
erected
contrary
to
the
above
guidelines, cannot be considered….”
16.
Consequently, the question before this Court is not whether the
petitioner had an absolute right to have his representation accepted, but
whether the subsequent decision of the competent authority rejecting the
representation is contrary to the judgment and decree in O.S. No.75 of
2003, contrary to the directions issued by this Court, or otherwise arbitrary,
unreasonable or vitiated by non-application of mind.
17.
In this regard, it is relevant that, pursuant to the order dated
06.11.2023 in W.P. No.10352 of 2023, the petitioner was afforded an
opportunity
to
submit
a
detailed
representation
seeking
compounding/regularization of the construction. The petitioner accordingly
submitted his representation dated 06.12.2023. The same was considered
by the competent authority and culminated in the impugned speaking order
dated 10.10.2025. The order records reasons with regard to the nature and
extent of the construction, the alleged unauthorized nature thereof,
setbacks, FSI restrictions and the status of the property. There is, therefore,
no material to conclude that the authority mechanically rejected the
representation without consideration or in breach of the principles of
natural justice.
18.
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NBK, J
The respondent authorities have also placed material to contend that
the construction sought to be regularized extends beyond the extent of 500
Sq. Yds. referred to in the earlier proceedings. According to the site plan
submitted by the petitioner, the ground coverage/building footprint is
approximately 534.88 Sq. Yds. over a site area of 1534 Sq. Yds., while the
inspection records disclose RCC Ground and First Floor structures having
a built-up area of approximately 9,717 Sq. Ft., besides GI/Aluminium roof
sheds, generator room, transformer yard and security room. The petitioner
has not placed any material before this Court demonstrating, prima facie,
that the construction dealt with in the impugned proceedings is confined to
the extent of construction covered by or protected under the judgment and
decree in O.S. No.75 of 2003. This aspect, therefore, cannot be ignored
while considering the petitioner’s claim for regularization.
19.
The contention of the petitioner that the permissible FSI was
subsequently enhanced also does not, by itself, advance his case. Even
assuming that there was a subsequent enhancement of permissible FSI,
such enhancement does not automatically or retrospectively legalize a
construction which was raised without the requisite sanction. The
petitioner
was
required
to
establish
his
entitlement
to
regularization/compounding under the applicable statutory and regulatory
provisions, and the competent authority was entitled to examine the
construction with reference to the applicable parameters, including FSI and
setback requirements.
20.
The mere passage of time also cannot, by itself, confer legality upon
a construction which was raised without the requisite sanction. The record
shows that the issue of unauthorized construction had been the subject
matter of proceedings as early as O.S. No.676 of 1998 and continued
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NBK, J
through the subsequent civil and writ proceedings. The petitioner,
therefore, cannot contend that the respondents raised the objection
regarding unauthorized construction for the first time in the impugned
proceedings. The Supreme Court in Rajendra Kumar Barjatya v. U.P.
Avas Evam Vikas Parishad2has also reiterated that unauthorized
construction cannot ordinarily be legitimized merely on account of delay,
inaction or the expenditure incurred by the person responsible for the
construction.
21.
The reliance placed by the petitioner upon the historical reports, the
1933 GLR and the subsequent classification of the property as “Old Grant”
may have relevance to an appropriate adjudication of title. The principle
emerging from Roshan Minoo Patel that a disputed and complex question
of title cannot, in the circumstances of that case, be conclusively
determined in summary proceedings before an authority exercising limited
statutory jurisdiction, is also kept in view. However, the present
proceedings do not require this Court to finally determine that title
controversy. The petitioner’s assertion of freehold title, even if kept open
for adjudication before the competent forum, does not by itself establish a
substantive right to regularization of the construction.
22.
The distinction between the two questions is material. The question
as to who ultimately holds title to the land is one matter; the question
whether a particular construction, admittedly or otherwise found by the
competent authority to have been raised without the requisite sanction,
satisfies the statutory requirements for regularization or compounding is
another. The latter question was the subject matter of the representation
considered by the competent authority pursuant to the orders of this Court.
2024 INSC 990
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NBK, J
The impugned order has rejected the request on grounds relating not
merely to the nomenclature of the land but also to the extent of
construction, setbacks, FSI and other applicable requirements. Therefore,
the decision cannot be said to rest solely upon the B-3 “Old Grant”
classification.
23.
The Court is also unable to accept the contention that the impugned
order is contrary to the judgment and decree dated 31.12.2014 in O.S.
No.75 of 2003. The decree required the petitioner to approach the
competent authority, and the subsequent proceedings before this Court
required the representation to be considered in accordance with law after
affording reasonable opportunity. Both requirements have been complied
with. The fact that the competent authority ultimately rejected the
representation does not, by itself, establish disobedience with the earlier
judicial directions.
24.
Accordingly, this Court finds no sufficient ground to hold that the
impugned speaking order dated 10.10.2025 is arbitrary, unreasonable,
contrary to the earlier judicial directions, or vitiated by violation of natural
justice. The challenge to the said order therefore fails.
I.A. No.3 of 2025
25.
Insofar as I.A. No.3 of 2025 is concerned, the petitioner seeks
permission to construct a compound wall around the premises and claims
damages of Rs.1,75,00,000/- on the allegation that approximately 80% of
the structure was demolished during the pendency of the writ petition.
26.
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NBK, J
The allegation that the demolition dated 05.12.2025 was undertaken
in breach of an undertaking given on behalf of the respondents cannot be
accepted in the absence of any order or other material placed before this
Court recording such an undertaking. Likewise, the pendency of the writ
petition, by itself, did not operate as a stay of the impugned speaking order
dated 10.10.2025. No specific interim order restraining the respondents
from taking further action pursuant to the impugned proceedings has been
brought to the notice of this Court.
27.
As regards the status quo order stated to have been passed in O.S.
No.71 of 2023, the respondents contend that the structure demolished on
05.12.2025 did not form part of the suit schedule. The respondents further
state that they had already filed their written statement and an application
seeking vacation of the status quo order and, upon receiving
communication dated 05.12.2025 from the XII Additional Chief Judge,
City Civil Court, Secunderabad, furnished clarification that the demolished
structure was not part of the suit property. In the circumstances, and in the
absence of material establishing that the demolished structure was covered
by the subsisting status quo order, the allegation of deliberate violation of
the said order cannot be accepted in these proceedings.
28.
The
claim
for
damages
of
Rs.1,75,00,000/-,
comprising
Rs.1,25,00,000/- towards alleged reconstruction costs and Rs.50,00,000/towards mental agony, is likewise not supported by sufficient material
establishing any illegality on the part of the respondents. The mere fact that
demolition was undertaken while the challenge to the impugned order was
pending, in the absence of a subsisting order restraining such action, does
not by itself establish a basis for awarding damages.
29.
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NBK, J
Insofar as the prayer for permission to construct a compound wall is
concerned, the petitioner has admittedly not submitted an application
before the competent authority seeking such permission. Section 261 of the
Cantonments Act, 2006 prescribes the statutory procedure for such
construction and requires the applicant to furnish the requisite particulars
and documents, including the plan and material demonstrating the
boundaries of the property and the applicant’s right over the property. The
petitioner cannot bypass the statutory mechanism and seek a positive
direction from this Court permitting construction without first approaching
the competent authority in accordance with law.
30.
For the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition is dismissed. I.A. No.3 of
2025 is also dismissed. No costs. Consequently, all miscellaneous
petitions, if any, pending in the writ petition shall stand closed.
03rd September, 2026
ksm
________________________________
JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA
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NBK, J
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA
WRIT PETITION No. 32844 of 2025
03rd SEPTEMBER, 2026
ksm
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