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LegalFirms.in Judgments · legalfirms.in/judgments/sri-m-sheshaiah-vs-sri-mylarappa-20261017/ · Printed 21 Nov 2026
Civil

Sri M Sheshaiah vs Sri Mylarappa

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Court
Karnataka High Court
Date
17 October 2026
Case No.
RSA 1757/2011
Result
Dismissed
Bench
Venkatesh Naik T
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69. For the foregoing reasons and subject to the determination of I.A. No.4/2026 under Order XLI, Rule 27 of CPC, this Court finds no demonstrated perversity, non- consideration of material evidence or erroneous application of law warranting interference with the concurrent findings of the trial Court and the First Appellate Court. The appellant has failed to establish a substantial question of law requiring interference under Section 100 of CPC.

70. Consequently, the judgment and decree passed in interference by this Court in the present Regular Second Appeal. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed.

71. I.A. No.4/2026 filed by the appellant under Order XLI, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is hereby dismissed. In view of the dismissal of the appeal, pending interlocutory applications, if any, shall stand dismissed. Sd/(VENKATESH NAIK T)

Filed under

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Indian Evidence Act, 1872 Section 100, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Order XLI Rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Section 101, Indian Evidence Act, 1872

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-1- RSA No. 1757 of 2011 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 17TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VENKATESH NAIK T REGULAR SECOND APPEAL NO.1757 OF 2011 (DEC/INJ) BETWEEN: SRI M. SHESHAIAH S/O M. VENKATASUBBAIAH, AGED ABOUT 75 YEARS, RESIDING AT: NO.G1, ADITYA RESIDENCY, BHADRAPPA LAYOUT, NAGASHETTY HALLI, BENGALURU - 560 094. …APPELLANT (BY SRI VIVEK SUBBAREDDY, SENIOR COUNSEL, FOR SRI K.N. SUBBA REDDY, ADVOCATE) AND: SRI MYLARAPPA S/O LATE MOGAIAH, SINCE DEAD, BY HIS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES: CHANDRASHEKAR LAXMAN KATTIMANI Location: High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench, Dharwad 1(A) SRI YELLAPPA S/O LATE MYLARAPPA, SINCE DEAD, BY HIS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE: 1(A)1 SRI NAGRAJ S/O YELLAPPA, AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS. 1(B) SRI KRISHNAPPA S/O LATE MYLARAPPA, AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS. 1(C) SRI MUNIYANNA S/O LATE MYLARAPPA, AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS. -2- RSA No. 1757 of 2011 1(D) SMT. YELLAMMA D/O LATE MYLARAPPA, AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS. 1(E) SMT. NEELA RATHNAMMA D/O LATE MYLARAPPA, AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS. 1(F) SMT. VARALAKSHMI D/O LATE MYLARAPPA, AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS, 1(G) SMT. MANJAMMA D/O LATE MYLARAPPA, AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS. ALL ARE RESIDING AT VADERAHALLI VILLAGE, YELAHANKA HOBLI AND TALUK, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT, BENGALURU - 560 064. 2. SRI D. RAJAN S/O LATE Y. DANIEL, AGED ABOUT 72 YEARS, RESIDING AT NO.115, KALATHUR LAYOUT, GANGAMMA CIRCLE, JALAHALLI, BENGALURU - 560 013. 3. SRI RAMACHANDRA REDDY S/O LATE C.V. REDDY, AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS, RESIDING AT NO.26, SREE RANGAM RESIDENCY, FLAT NO.1, 1ST MAIN ROAD, HEBBALA, BENGALURU - 560 024. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI UDAY HOLLA, SENIOR COUNSEL, FOR SRI AKSHAY R. HUDDAR, SRI NAVEED AHMED, AND SRI RAMANA, ADVOCATES, FOR R-1 (A TO G), & SRI B. RAMESH, ADVOCATE, FOR R-2) *** -3- RSA No. 1757 of 2011 THIS REGULAR SECOND APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 100 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908, PRAYING TO ALLOW THIS APPEAL AND SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 13.06.2011 IN R.A. NO.23/2011 PASSED BY THE PRINCIPAL SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT, BENGALURU, AND ALSO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 05.03.2011 IN O.S. NO.479/2004 PASSED BY THE PRINCIPAL CIVIL JUDGE (JR. DN.), BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT, BENGALURU, AND CONSEQUENTLY, DECREE THE SUIT OF THE APPELLANT-PLAINTIFF AS PRAYED IN THE ABOVE SUIT WITH COSTS. THIS REGULAR SECOND APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED ON 28.08.2026, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT, THIS DAY, THE VENKATESH NAIK T. J., PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VENKATESH NAIK T CAV JUDGMENT This appeal is filed by the appellant challenging the concurrent findings of the trial Court in O.S. No.479/2004 and the First Appellate Court in R.A. No.23/2011. 2. the The appellant is the plaintiff and the respondent is defendant (since the respondent has died and is represented by his legal representatives, for the sake of convenience, the respondents are referred to as the defendant throughout this judgment). 3. Brief facts of the appellant's case, in nutshell, are as under: The appellant-plaintiff claims to be absolute owner and in lawful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property -4- RSA No. 1757 of 2011 bearing Sy.No.12/1, measuring 3 acres, out of the total extent of 5 acres 7 guntas, situated at Doddabettahalli Village, Yelahanka Hobli, Bengaluru North Taluk. The said property was acquired by the appellant under a registered sale deed dated 14.09.1998 for valuable consideration. The appellant had acquired the remaining extent of 2 acres 7 guntas in the same survey number from the same vendors, namely Narasimhaiah, Muninanjappa and Muniraju, under a registered sale deed dated 20.12.2001. Thus, according to the appellant, he became the absolute owner of the total extent of 5 acres 7 guntas comprised in Sy.No.12/1 and has been in lawful possession and enjoyment thereof. Pursuant to the said transactions, the revenue authorities mutated his name in the revenue records. Owing to the development of the surrounding area, he could not carry on agricultural operations in the suit schedule property and, therefore, the schedule property was kept vacant. The respondent-defendant, who has no manner of right, title or interest over the suit schedule property, is alleged to have interfered with the appellant's possession and thus, 07.05.2004, the attempted to dispossess him. 4. When things stood on respondent, along with his henchmen, attempted to interfere -5- RSA No. 1757 of 2011 with the suit schedule property and tried to form a layout by putting up fence. The appellant, with the assistance of his neighbours, resisted the said attempt, whereupon the respondent and his associates left the spot. The appellant claims that, when he called upon the respondent to produce any document evidencing his alleged right over the property, the respondent failed to produce any such document, instead threatened him with dire consequences. 5. It is further alleged that, on 22.05.2004, the respondent again appeared near the suit schedule property and attempted to interfere with the appellant's possession. The appellant once again resisted the said attempt. At that time, the respondent allegedly asserted that he is the absolute owner of the suit schedule property and denied the appellant's title and interest therein. In the aforesaid circumstances, the appellant contends that he was left with no alternative, but to institute a suit seeking a declaration that he is the absolute owner and in lawful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property, along with the consequential relief of permanent injunction restraining the respondent from interfering with his peaceful possession and enjoyment thereof. -6- RSA No. 1757 of 2011 6. Per contra, the respondent filed his written statement, inter alia contended that the suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable either in law or on facts. He specifically denied the contention that the appellant is the absolute owner or that he is in lawful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. The respondent contended that the property described in the plaint schedule is, in fact, the property belonging to him, over which he had been in continuous, peaceful and lawful physical possession and enjoyment as its absolute owner. He disputed the appellant's claim of possession and contended that the alleged possession pleaded by the appellant was merely illusory and imaginary. 7. The respondent further denied the alleged incidents of interference dated 07.05.2004 and 22.05.2004. According to him, no such incidents had occurred and the alleged cause of action had been concocted by the appellant for the purpose of maintaining the suit. He also pointed out that the appellant had initially referred to the date of the alleged incident as 03.05.2004 and subsequently, corrected the same to 07.05.2004, which according to the demonstrated the falsity of the appellant's case. respondent, -7- RSA No. 1757 of 2011 8. The respondent disputed the evidentiary value of the mutation entries and other revenue records relied upon by the appellant. It is contended that such entries had been made merely on the basis of the sale deeds relied upon by the appellant and that revenue records did not confer title upon a person. The respondent also relied upon Section 136 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964, in support of his contention regarding the nature and evidentiary value of revenue entries. 9. The respondent traced his title to the larger extent of land bearing Sy.No.12/1, which originally measured 29 acres 20 guntas and, according to him, the entire property belonged to one A. Shamanna. It is contended that the respondent's father, Mogaiah, along with five others, purchased the said property under a registered sale deed dated 07.09.1942 for valuable consideration and thereafter continued in joint possession and enjoyment of the property along with their respective family members. 10. subsequent The respondent further relied upon a series of transactions to establish his claim over the property. According to him, his father purchased 5 acres from Muniswamappa under a registered sale deed dated 31.07.1948 -8- RSA No. 1757 of 2011 and subsequently sold the said extent to Thimma Reddy under a registered sale deed dated 09.02.1950. It was further contended that the respondent purchased acres from G. Venkatappa under a registered sale deed dated 15.09.1960 and thereafter sold 1 acre 10 guntas to Sheik Ahmed under a registered sale deed dated 04.06.1966. He claimed to have subsequently further purchased 1 acre from H. Muniswamappa under a registered sale deed dated 17.10.1966 and again sold 20 guntas to H. Muniswamappa under a registered sale deed dated 06.07.1967. 11. The respondent further stated that he sold 1 acre in favour of H. Muniswamappa under a registered sale deed dated 12.12.1967 and thereafter purchased 1 acre 10 guntas from Sheik Ahmed Sahib under a registered sale deed dated 14.12.1967. He subsequently sold 2 acres 20 guntas to Muniswamappa under a registered sale deed dated 12.03.1969 and again purchased 2 acres 20 guntas from H. Muniswamappa under a registered sale deed dated 19.02.1970. According to the respondent, upon taking into consideration the aforesaid transactions, he and his father had, at different points of time, purchased an aggregate extent of 19 acres 13 guntas and sold -9- RSA No. 1757 of 2011 10 acres 10 guntas, leaving an extent of 9 acres 20 guntas, as claimed by him, in their ownership and possession. 12. The respondent also relied upon the proceedings before the Survey Authority to dispute the appellant's claim and the identity of the suit schedule property. According to him, proper revenue and survey records had not been maintained in respect of the original Sy.No.12 resulting in disputes among several persons claiming portions of the said survey number. The respondent stated that he had approached the Survey Department seeking phodi proceedings in respect of his lands. The appellant had also participated in the said proceedings along with several other persons, including Jayachandra, Adhilakshmamma, Krishnoji Rao, Manohar Lal, Abdulla, R. Subramanyam and Venkatappa. 13. Records, It is contended that the Assistant Director of Land in Case No. ADLR/MPR/BN/380/2003-04, after conducting an enquiry, found that proper survey records were not available and that extents mentioned in the respective sale deeds did not correspond with the extent actually available on the ground. Consequently, by order dated 07.01.2004, the Survey Authority held that it was not possible to undertake the - 10 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 phodi work and disposed of the proceedings, reserving liberty to the parties to approach the competent authority for resolution of their disputes. 14. The respondent further contended that the survey records did not disclose the names of the persons from whom the appellant allegedly purchased the suit schedule property. He alleged that the appellant had deliberately furnished boundaries corresponding to the respondent's property and had relied upon fabricated or invalid documents purportedly executed by persons who themselves had no right, title or interest over the property. The respondent accordingly maintained that the sale deeds relied upon by the appellant did not confer any valid title upon him and that the appellant had failed to establish either his title or possession over the suit schedule property. 15. Based upon the pleadings of both the parties, learned trial Court framed relevant issues. In order to prove the case of the plaintiff, he himself entered the witness box and was examined as PW1. The plaintiff also examines one witness as PW2 in support of his oral evidence. He also got marked Exs.P1 to P20 and closed his side of evidence. To rebut the - 11 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 evidence of the plaintiff, the defendant was examined as DW1. He got marked Exs.D1 to D46 and closed his side of evidence. Upon hearing the arguments of both the side and on careful examination and consideration of facts as well as law, the trial Court had dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the suit, the plaintiff preferred Regular Appeal before the First Appellate Court. The learned First Appellate Court after hearing the arguments of both the sides and on appreciation of evidence of both the parties, being the last fact finding Court, dismissed the appeal of the plaintiff, by confirming the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. Hence, the plaintiff is before this Court challenging the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts in this regular second appeal. 16. Sri Vivek Subba Reddy, learned senior counsel appearing for Sri K.N. Subba Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiff, has vehemently contended that the Courts below erred in accepting the defence of the respondent despite the absence of a clear and consistent plea regarding the exact extent, identity, boundaries and location of the land allegedly retained by him. The respondent had taken mutually inconsistent stands regarding the extent of land claimed by - 12 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 him, namely 9 acres 20 guntas in the written statement, 7 acres in the written arguments and 2 acres 20 guntas in the revenue proceedings, without establishing which specific property constituted the suit schedule property. It is contended that the respondent's case could not have been accepted when his evidence travelled beyond and was inconsistent with his pleadings. The respondent had set up different versions in the written statement, objections to the application under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure,1908 (for short, ‘CPC’), evidence, proceedings before the revenue authorities and written arguments. The trial Court and the First Appellate Court, without considering these material contradictions, accepted the defence and recorded findings in favour of the respondent. Learned senior counsel further contended that the finding regarding the respondent's possession of 9 acres 20 guntas was not supported by any definite pleading or evidence and that, when the respondent himself had taken different stands regarding the extent of land allegedly remaining with him, the Courts below could not have recorded a definite finding regarding his possession without identifying the property and the documentary basis of such possession. - 13 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 17. Learned senior counsel further contended that both the Courts have failed to appreciate that the respondent had not specifically disputed the appellant's possession of the suit schedule property in the cross-examination of PW1. The respondent had assertion regarding 22.05.2004. also These not denied the appellant's interference on unchallenged assertions specific 07.05.2004 and materially supported the appellant's case and could not have been ignored. It is further contended that the Courts below committed an error in dismissing the suit principally on the ground that the appellant's predecessor-in-title was entitled to 4 acres 25 guntas, whereas the appellant's sale deed referred to 5 acres 7 guntas. It is further contended that, a discrepancy in extent could not, by itself, establish the respondent's title or defeat the appellant's claim when the respondent had failed to prove any better or competing title over the suit schedule property. Learned senior counsel contended that DW1 himself admitted the title of the appellant's vendor and the transfer of the property to the appellant. Despite such admission, the Courts below accepted the defence without examining how the respondent could claim title over the very property or whether he had established any independent source of title. - 14 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 18. Learned senior counsel further contended that a material circumstance ignored by the Courts below was that the respondent, who claimed title to 2 acres 20 guntas under a sale deed dated 19.02.1970 and asserted continuous possession thereof, had allegedly sold the very same property on 26.02.1970. The appellant relies upon Ex.D.41 and the relevant encumbrance entries to contend that the respondent's claim of continued ownership and possession since was demonstrably false. It is further contended that the respondent, notwithstanding the earlier sale, again sold the property in favour of Saira Banu on 29.10.2004 after initiation of the suit. Therefore, the prior sale and the subsequent alienation were material facts bearing directly on the respondent's credibility, title and locus to contest the suit, but the same were not properly considered by both the Courts. It is contended that the trial Court and the First Appellate Court also misread the documentary evidence by treating documents, including Ex.D.39 to Ex.D.46, as establishing the respondent's title without correctly appreciating their nature and contents. In particular, Ex.D.41 discloses the alienation of the property claimed by consideration. the respondent, which was not given due - 15 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 19. Learned senior counsel further contended that the revenue records relied upon by the respondent did not establish his title over Sy.No.12/1, which is the subject matter of the suit. The earlier RTCs relied upon by him related to Sy.No.12/2, while the subsequent entry concerning 2 acres 20 guntas in Sy.No.12/1 was subject to revenue litigation. The Courts below, therefore, erred in relying upon records pertaining to a different survey number or disputed revenue entries to uphold the respondent's claim. It is also contended that the appellant had established a consistent chain of title through the sale deeds, mutation entries, RTCs and other revenue records. The appellant had relied upon the survey conducted by the Taluk Surveyor in the presence of the respondent, wherein the appellant's property was identified and the respondent had failed to produce documents in support of his rival claim. 20. Learned senior counsel further contended that the findings of both the Courts are the result of failure to consider the material admissions, contradictions in the defence, prior and subsequent alienations made by the respondent, the distinction between Sy.No.12/1 and Sy.No.12/2, and the documentary evidence produced by the appellant. - 16 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 21. It is contended that the defendant, Mylarappa, fraudulently obtained mutation entries in respect of 2 acres 20 guntas of land in Sy.No.12/1 of Doddabettahalli Village, Yelahanka Hobli, by representing before the Tahsildar that he had acquired the property under the sale deed dated 19.02.1970. It is alleged that Mylarappa suppressed the material fact that, within seven days of the said purchase, he had sold the entire extent of 2 acres 20 guntas to Shaik Pyaru under a registered sale deed dated 26.02.1970. Having already divested himself of title, Mylarappa allegedly executed another sale deed dated 29.10.2004 in favour of Saira Banu in respect of the very same property. It is contended that the boundaries mentioned in the subsequent inconsistent with subsequently altered the suit sale schedule through a deed were property rectification initially and were deed dated 26.11.2004, allegedly with an intention of bringing the property within the suit schedule. It is also alleged that Mylarappa executed further agreements of sale dated 25.07.2011 and 06.02.2012 in favour of other persons in respect of the same property, despite having no subsisting title over the extent already conveyed in 1970. It is further contended that the subsequent transactions arising out of the alleged fraudulent - 17 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 sale deed in favour of Saira Banu have resulted in further claims over the suit schedule property. Saira Banu is stated to have entered into an agreement of sale dated 25.06.2019 with one Ravi Chandra Reddy, who instituted O.S. No.1351/2021 seeking specific performance of the agreement, which came to be dismissed, leading to Regular First Appeal No.818/2022. Saira Banu also executed a registered agreement of sale dated 14.01.2019 in favour of Zaheer Pasha, who allegedly attempted to interfere with the appellant’s possession and assert rights over the property. The appellant alleges that these transactions are fraudulent, collusive and pendente lite, having been undertaken to create multiple claims over the property and defeat the appellant’s lawful rights. 22. It is further contended that, despite the status quo orders passed by the Court, attempts were made to interfere with the possession of the suit schedule property through the involvement of other persons and alleged anti-social elements. The appellant therefore seeks to bring the subsequent developments to the notice of the Court to demonstrate the alleged fraud and prevent the creation of further third-party rights during the pendency of the proceedings. Learned senior counsel further contended that the appellant asserts absolute - 18 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 ownership over 4 acres 25 guntas of the suit schedule property on the basis of the original sale deeds dated 10.09.1998 and 20.12.2001, together with the earlier title deeds of 1948 executed in favour of Thammaiah, the predecessor in title of the appellant's vendor, Narasimhaiah. It is contended that certain original title documents were not produced before the trial Court because the defendant had, during cross- examination, admitted the appellant's title to an extent of 4 acres 25 guntas, whereas the remaining documents are necessary to establish the complete chain of title and the identity of the property through its boundaries. The appellant accordingly seeks permission to produce the additional documents, including the subsequent sale deeds, rectification deed, agreement of sale, historical title deeds and photographs showing alleged interference with possession. It is contended that these documents are essential for the effective and complete adjudication of the dispute, particularly in view of the subsequent developments during the pendency of the suit and second appeal. 23. In support of the appeal, the appellant filed I.A. No.4/2026 under Order XLI, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking production of documents such as - 19 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 original sale deeds, certified copy of the sale deeds, rectification deed, agreement of sale, etc. The said I.A. is supported by an affidavit of the appellant, wherein he has stated that he has purchased the suit schedule property bearing Sy.No.12/1 measuring to an extent of 3 acres, and 2 acres 7 guntas of Doddabettahalli Village, Yelahanka Hobli, Bengaluru North Taluk, under two separate sale deeds dated 10.09.1998 and 20.12.2001, respectively. Relying on the principle that fraud vitiates all judicial and other acts, the learned senior counsel prayed that the additional documents be received on record to establish the alleged fraudulent transactions, protect the appellant's title and possession, and prevent irreparable loss and injury to the appellant, who is 87 years of age. Hence, he prayed to allow the appeal. 24. Learned senior counsel for the appellant relied on following decisions: i. M.S. Karuppanna Nadar vs Nariyan alias Shanmugham (dead) and others reported in 1997 (1) CTC 309, ii. Uttaradi Mutt vs Raghavendra Swamy Mutt reported in (2018) 10 SCC 484, - 20 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 iii. Smt. Dayamathi Bai vs K.M. Shaffi reported in (2004) 7 SCC 107, iv. Jamuna Prasad and others vs Shivnandan and others reported in 2011 (4) M.P.L.J 427, v. Nanjunda Setty @ N.S. Tallam and Others vs Tallam Subbaraya Setty and Sons and Others reported in ILR 2004 KAR 924, and vi. S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) by L.Rs vs Jagannath (Dead) by L.Rs and others reported in 1994 (1) SCC 1. 25. Per-contra, Sri Uday Holla, learned senior counsel appearing for Sri Akshay R. Huddar, learned counsel for the respondent-defendant, has vehemently contended that, the suit filed by the appellant-plaintiff is not maintainable and the plaintiff is not absolute owner or in lawful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. The plaintiff has no title over the suit schedule property. The plaintiff has shown wrong boundary and claiming property of the defendant. In fact, the defendant is in lawful, peaceful, physical possession and enjoyment of the same as absolute owner thereof. The suit schedule property is in the vicinity of developed area and the plaintiff could not take up any agricultural operation in the suit schedule property and thus, same is kept vacant, all these - 21 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 contention are illusionary and imaginary one. Since the defendant is in possession of his property, the question of interfering with illusionary and imaginary possession over the suit schedule property by the plaintiff is nothing but an imaginary story set up by the plaintiff. It is contended that there is no cause of action for the suit and the cause of action one stated is created for the purpose of the suit. It is contended that, all the revenue records have been created pursuant to fabricated sale deeds. Hence, no title can be conferred on the plaintiff. 26. The defendant further contends that the land bearing Sy.No.12/1 originally measured 29 acres 20 guntas and belonged to one A. Shamanna from whom the defendant’s father, Mogaiah, along with five others, purchased the same under a registered sale deed dated 07.09.1942 for valuable consideration, and thereafter continued in joint possession and enjoyment thereof as absolute owners along with their respective family members, including the defendant. He further contends that his father purchased 5 acres of land from Muniswamappa under a registered sale deed dated 31.07.1948 and subsequently sold the said extent to Thimma Reddy under a registered sale deed dated 09.02.1950. The defendant further - 22 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 claims to have purchased 5 acres from G. Venkatappa under a registered sale deed dated 15.09.1960 and thereafter, sold 1 acre 10 guntas to Sheik Ahmed under a registered sale deed dated 04.06.1966; purchased 1 acre from H. Muniswamappa under a registered sale deed dated 17.10.1966 and subsequently, sold 20 guntas to H. Muniswamappa under a registered sale deed dated 06.07.1967; sold 1 acre in favour of H. Muniswamappa under a registered sale deed dated 12.12.1967 and thereafter, purchased 1 acre 10 guntas from Sheik Ahmed Sahib under a registered sale deed dated 14.12.1967; again sold 2 acres 20 guntas to Muniswamappa under a registered subsequently, H. sale deed dated 12.03.1969 and purchased the same extent from Muniswamappa under a registered sale deed dated 19.02.1970. Hence, on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid transactions, he and his father had purchased an aggregate extent of 19 acres 13 guntas and sold 10 acres 10 guntas, leaving an extent of 9 acres 20 guntas. It is further contended that proper revenue and survey records relating to the original Sy.No.12 was not maintained by the competent authorities, resulting in disputes among the persons claiming lands in the said survey number. In this regard, the defendant - 23 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 had approached the Survey Department seeking phodi of his lands, and the plaintiff and several other persons, namely, Jayachandra, Adhilakshamma, Krishnojirao, Manohar Lal, Abdulla, R. Subramanyam and Venkatappa were also parties to the proceedings. The Assistant Director of Land Records, after conducting proceedings in Case No.ADLR/MPR/BN/380/200304, found that proper survey records were not available and that extents mentioned in the respective sale deeds did not tally with the actual extent available on the ground. Consequently, by order dated 07.01.2004, the Survey Authority held that it was not possible to undertake the phodi work and disposed of the proceedings with liberty to the parties to approach the competent authority for appropriate relief. The defendant further contends that the survey records do not disclose the names of the persons from whom the plaintiff allegedly purchased the suit schedule property and that the plaintiff, with an intention to establish a false claim, has furnished incorrect boundaries and relied upon documents, including sale deeds allegedly executed by persons who themselves had no right, title or interest over the suit schedule property. The defendant has been in peaceful, lawful and continuous possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule - 24 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 property and his possession and title are supported by the aforesaid chain of registered transactions. On these grounds, the defendant contends that the plaintiff has no right, title or interest over the suit schedule property and consequently, prays for dismissal of the appeal. 27. In view of the submissions made by both the parties, the following substantial questions of law are framed for consideration: “A. Whether the Courts below are justified in not attaching due weightage to Ex.D19, under which Narasimhaiah, vendor of the appellant, purchased 4 acres 25 guntas in the suit schedule property? B. Whether the Courts below are justified in dismissing the suit in its entirety solely on the ground that what was purchased by the vendor of the appellant was 4 acres 25 guntas and not 5 acres 7 guntas, particularly when it was open for the Courts below to mould the relief?” 28. I have carefully considered the pleadings of the parties, oral and documentary evidence, the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and the First Appellate Court, the grounds urged by the appellant, the submissions of learned senior counsel appearing for both the parties and the list of authorities relied upon by them. The principal controversy in - 25 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 the present Regular Second Appeal concerns the appellant's claim of title over the suit schedule property bearing Sy.No.12/1, measuring 3 acres, purchased under a registered sale deed dated 14.09.1998, and another piece of land bearing Sy.No.12/1, measuring 2 acres 7 guntas, purchased under a registered sale deed dated 20.12.2001 from previous owners Narasimhaiah, Muninanjappa and Muniraju for valuable consideration, so totally measuring 5 acres 7 guntas, situated at Doddabettahalli Village, Yelahanka Hobli, Bengaluru North Taluk. 29. The respondent-defendant disputes the appellant's title contending that the appellant's vendor did not possess a valid title to the entire extent conveyed and that the boundaries described in the plaint including the land belonging to the respondent. The question that arises for consideration is whether the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below suffer from any perversity, misreading or non-consideration of material evidence, or an erroneous application of law warranting interference under Section 100 of CPC. Hence, it is just and necessary to analyse Section 100 of CPC, which reads as under: - 26 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 "100. Second appeal (1)[Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. (2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte. (3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. (4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. (5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question.]" - 27 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 30. At the outset, it is necessary to bear in mind the limited scope of the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 100 of CPC. A Regular Second Appeal cannot be treated as a continuation of the first appeal for the purpose of undertaking a fresh appreciation of the entire evidence. Interference with concurrent findings of fact is permissible only when such findings disclose a substantial question of law, including where there are perverse, based on no evidence, recorded by not considering the material evidence, founded upon a misreading of material documents or vitiated by the application of an erroneous legal principle. Therefore, the mere possibility of another view being taken on the evidence does not, by itself, justify interference with the judgments under challenge. 31. In the instant case, the respondent-defendant is disputing the title of the appellant-plaintiff and his vendor on the ground that the vendor of the plaintiff had no title to the suit schedule property and there is variation as to an extent and boundary of the suit schedule property and hence, no valid title has been passed to the plaintiff. Thus, it is just and necessary to analyse Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which reads as under: - 28 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 "54. “Sale” defined.— "Sale” is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and partpromised. Sale how made.— Such transfer, in the case of tangible immoveable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, or in the case of a reversion or other intangible thing, can be made only by a registered instrument. In the case of tangible immoveable property of a value less than one hundred rupees, such transfer may be made either by a registered instrument or by delivery of the property. Delivery of tangible immoveable property takes place when the seller places the buyer, or such person as he directs, in possession of the property. Contract for sale.— A contract for the sale of immoveable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties. It does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property." 32. A perusal of the aforesaid proposition of law, it appears that, there must be a transfer of ownership from one person to another. Right of possession over the property is a - 29 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 fact of title, upon every transfer of property, all the rights and claims, including those which are capable of being waived and which are not exercised, do not automatically pass to the transferee, whether, they relate to property or as to property. The question whether there has been transfer of ownership in any case will depend upon the intention of parties, and this again must be ascertained from the fact and circumstances of the particular case. That means vendor of the property must have clear title over the property. The burden is on the person who asserts his title over the property that his vendor has/had clear title over the property. This is the condition precedent as per the definition under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. 33. In the light of the above provisions of law, let me analyse the evidence of the parties, the appellant-plaintiff entered the witness box and led his evidence. In his chiefexamination, he states that he is the absolute owner and in lawful possession and enjoyment of land bearing Sy.No.12/1 measuring to an extent of 5 acres 7 guntas situated at Doddabettahalli Village, Yelahanka Hobli, Bengaluru North Taluk. He further states that he has acquired the said land to an extent of 3 acres by virtue of sale deed dated 14.09.1998 - 30 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 and further purchased 2 acres 7 guntas in Sy.No.12/1 by virtue of sale deed dated 20.12.2001. Subsequently, the khata has been effected in his name. However, the respondent-defendant without having any manner of right, title and possession over the same, is interfering in the suit schedule property and claiming his right over the suit schedule property. 34. PW1 was cross-examined at length. In his cross- examination, he has stated that Narasimhaiah had purchased 5 acres 7 guntas from Thammaiah, wherein Thammaiah sold 4 acre 25 guntas in Sy.No.12/1 to Narasimhaiah and not an extent 5 acre 7 guntas. He further admits that Narasimhaiah was absolute owner to an extent of 4 acre 25 guntas. However, he subsequently states that he had purchased 5 acre 7 guntas from Narasimhaiah by virtue of two registered sale deeds. He expressed his inability to answer the suggestions that, Thammaiah purchased 9 acre 10 guntas in land bearing Sy.No.12/1 and subsequently, sold 6 acre 11 guntas to one Abdullah. Further, certain suggestions were suggested to PW1 that Thammaiah retained only 3 acre 1 gunta after alienation of acre guntas to Abdullah, the plaintiff's vendor, Narasimhaiah, purchased land bearing Sy.No.12/4 measuring 10 guntas and Sy.No.12/5 measuring 4 acres 15 guntas from - 31 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 one Muniyappa, however, these transactions are not within the knowledge of the plaintiff. Further, the plaintiff has no knowledge that, on 11.12.1967, the plaintiff's vendor, Narasimhaiah, sold 6 acre 7 guntas to one Abdullah. The plaintiff has not answered in clear terms as to the suggestion that, the plaintiff's vendor had right over 4 acre 15 guntas and how he can sell 5 acre 7 guntas to the plaintiff. The plaintiff is unaware of the fact that, the defendant purchased the land which is measuring in all 14 acre 30 guntas in Sy.No.12/1. Further, the plaintiff does not know whether the Tahsildar has passed an order in favour of the defendant for change of khata in respect of 2 acre 20 guntas. He admits that he had filed an appeal before the Assistant Commissioner challenging khata, which stands in the name of the defendant. He also admits that, in the application filed before the Assistant Commissioner for condonation, he has claimed only 4 acre 19 guntas. He specifically expressed that he does not know whether the defendant purchased 14 acre 30 guntas in Sy.No.12/1 and sold 7 acre 30 guntas and retained 7 acres in his name. 35. PW1 The trial Court mainly relied upon the admission of during cross-examination that Narasimhaiah, the appellant's predecessor-in-title, had rights only to an extent of - 32 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 4 acres 25 guntas in Sy. No.12/1, whereas the appellant claimed 5 acres 7 guntas. The trial Court considered the evidence relating to the earlier ownership and alienations made by Thammaiah and the transactions concerning Sy.Nos.12/1, 12/4 and 12/5. It concluded that the appellant had not satisfactorily established how his predecessor-in-title could convey an extent exceeding that which was shown to have been held by him. The trial Court further held that the khata standing in the name of the predecessor for a particular extent could not, by itself, establish ownership over the entire extent claimed by the appellant. 36. the The First Appellate Court independently considered aforesaid admission and rejected the appellant's explanation that the same was attributable to a language problem or that the deposition did not reflect his actual understanding. It found that the explanation subsequently advanced in the written arguments did not displace the evidentiary value of the deposition recorded before the trial Court. The appellant relies upon Exs.P1 and P16, being the sale deeds under which the property was allegedly acquired, and contends that the original title deeds and earlier conveyances would establish his ownership. However, the existence of - 33 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 registered sale deeds, though relevant to the claim of title, does not dispense with the requirement of establishing the vendor's title to the extent purportedly conveyed. A conveyance ordinarily transfers only such right, title and interest as the transferor is legally competent to convey. 37. The appellant has contended that the Courts below failed to appreciate the admission of DW1 concerning the title of the appellant's vendor and the transfer of the property in favour of the appellant. Such an admission, if established from the evidence, is undoubtedly a relevant circumstance and must be considered along with the other evidence on record. However, an admission concerning the title of a predecessor or the execution of a conveyance must be read in its proper context. It does not necessarily establish that the transferor possessed title to the entire extent claimed under the sale deed or that the boundaries of the property conveyed correspond to the entire suit schedule property. The evidentiary value of the admission must therefore be assessed together with the earlier conveyances, the extent held by the vendor and the evidence identifying the property. The question is whether the Courts below failed to consider a material admission or whether they - 34 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 considered it, but found it insufficient to establish the appellant's title to the entire extent claimed. 38. The Courts below also examined the identity and boundaries of the suit schedule property. The trial Court found inconsistencies between the boundaries described in the appellant's documents and those appearing in the earlier transactions, and concluded that the appellant had not established that the entire extent described in the plaint corresponded to the property validly acquired under the conveyances relied upon. The First Appellate Court affirmed that finding. Since the identity of the property is essential to a decree declaring title, the appellant was required to establish that the land claimed in the suit could be identified with the land conveyed before the under Assistant the sale Director of deeds. The proceedings Land Records in Case No.ADLR/MPR/BN/380/2003-04, which culminated in the order, dated 07.01.2004 declining to undertake phodi work owing to the absence of proper survey records and discrepancies in the extents, are also relevant to this issue. However, the said order cannot, by itself, be treated as a determination of title in favour of either party. The identity and title of the property must - 35 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 ultimately be established before the civil Court on the basis of the evidence adduced. 39. The appellant has further contended that the respondent took inconsistent stands concerning the extent of land allegedly retained by him, referring to 9 acres 20 guntas in the written statement, 7 acres in the written arguments and 2 acres 20 guntas in the revenue proceedings. It is also contended that the Courts below recorded a finding regarding the respondent's possession of 9 acres 25 guntas without a clear and consistent basis in the pleadings and evidence. Such inconsistencies, if established, are relevant to the assessment of the respondent's credibility and the evidentiary basis for the findings recorded by the Courts below. However, it must be examined whether the alleged discrepancies relate to the very property described in the suit schedule or to different extents forming part of the larger survey number. A discrepancy in the aggregate extent claimed by the respondent would not, without more, establish that the appellant has title to the particular extent in dispute. The material question remains whether the Courts below have identified the property in dispute and considered the documentary evidence relevant to the rival claims. - 36 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 40. The appellant has also relied upon the alleged sale of 2 acres 20 guntas by the respondent to Shaik Pyaru under a registered sale deed dated 26.02.1970, following the respondent's alleged purchase of the same extent under a sale deed dated 19.02.1970. notwithstanding the According earlier to the appellant, alienation, the respondent subsequently executed a sale deed dated 29.10.2004 in favour of Saira Banu, followed by a rectification deed dated 26.11.2004, and thereafter executed or was associated with further agreements of sale concerning the same property. The appellant contends that the earlier alienation demonstrates that the respondent had no subsisting title when he executed the subsequent conveyance and that the rectification deed was intended to bring the property within the boundaries of the suit schedule property. 41. The legal effect of these transactions depends upon the terms of the instruments, the identity of the property conveyed, the rights of the parties under the earlier conveyances and the admissible evidence establishing the alleged prior conveyed the alienation. very If same the respondent property in had 1970, already the legal consequences of such conveyance would have to be considered - 37 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 while assessing his claim under the subsequent transactions. Nevertheless, the appellant's allegations concerning the prior sale, subsequent conveyance and rectification deed cannot be treated as conclusively establishing fraud merely because such transactions have been referred to in the pleadings or in the application for additional evidence. The civil Court must examine the documents and determine whether the transactions concern the same identifiable property and what legal effect follows from them. Even if a subsequent transaction relied upon by the respondent is found to be invalid or ineffective, such a finding would not automatically establish the appellant's title to the entire extent claimed. The appellant must independently establish the title asserted in the plaint. 42. The appellant has also relied upon mutation entries, RTCs, khata and other revenue documents to establish his title and possession. In this regard, the legal position is well settled. In Smt. Sawarni v. Smt. Inder Kaur and Others, reported in (1996) 6 SCC 223, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that mutation of property in revenue records neither creates nor extinguishes title and has no presumptive value as to title. Such entries are primarily maintained to enable the person in whose favour the mutation is effected to pay land revenue. The - 38 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 principle has also been reiterated in Suraj Bhan and others v. Financial Commissioner and others, reported in (2007) 6 SCC 186, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that entries in revenue records do not confer ownership upon the person whose name is recorded therein and that title to immovable property must be determined by the competent civil Court. 43. Consequently, the mere fact that the appellant's name has been entered in the revenue records pursuant to the sale deeds cannot, by itself, establish his title to the suit schedule property. Equally, the revenue entries relied upon by the respondent cannot independently establish his ownership over the disputed extent. The evidentiary value of the revenue records must be assessed in the context of underlying title documents, chain of conveyances, identity of the property and other admissible evidence. The order of a revenue authority recording a person's name in the record of rights does not operate as a conveyance of ownership or a relinquishment of another person's proprietary rights. The jurisdiction of the civil Court to determine the underlying title remains unaffected by such entries. Therefore, the decisive question in the present case is whether the appellant has established a valid chain of title and identity of the property through the documents and - 39 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 evidence relied upon, and not merely whether his name appears in the revenue records. 44. The appellant has relied upon the principle laid down in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) by LRs v. Jagannath (Dead) by LRs and Others, reported in (1994) 1 SCC 1, that fraud vitiates judicial proceedings and that a party who obtains an advantage by suppressing material facts cannot be permitted to retain such advantage in law. The principle is well settled. However, the existence of fraud, the material facts allegedly suppressed and the effect of the impugned transactions must be established on the evidence and in accordance with law. The Court cannot presume fraud merely from the existence of successive transactions or from a party's allegation that an earlier conveyance was suppressed. The alleged sale dated 26.02.1970 and the subsequent transactions may be material to the respondent's claim of title, but his evidentiary and legal effect must be determined on the basis of the documents themselves. The principle that fraud vitiates an act cannot dispense with the appellant's obligation to establish his own title and the identity of the property claimed. - 40 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 45. The appellant has sought permission to produce additional documents under Order XLI, Rule 27 of CPC, including original sale deeds, earlier conveyances, the sale deed dated 29.10.2004, and the rectification deed dated 26.11.2004, subsequent agreements of sale and photographs allegedly showing interference with possession. The appellant contends that the documents are necessary for effective adjudication and that their non-production before the trial Court was occasioned by understanding that their production was unnecessary in view of the admissions made during cross-examination. The application must be considered independently in accordance with the requirements of Order XLI, Rule 27 of CPC. The mere relevance of a document does not automatically entitle a party to produce it as additional evidence at the appellate stage. The Court must determine whether the conditions prescribed by the provision are satisfied, including whether the evidence could not, despite the exercise of due diligence, have been produced earlier, whether the Appellate Court requires the document to pronounce judgment, or whether another ground expressly recognised by the provision is made out. Unless the application is allowed and the documents are received in accordance with - 41 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 law, their contents cannot be treated as proved merely because they are referred to in the written submissions. 46. The perusal of the rival contentions of both the parties, throughout the legal proceedings, it is a specific defence and assertion of the respondent-defendant that the land bearing Sy.No.12/1 originally was measuring 29 acre 20 guntas which originally belongs to one A. Shamanna. It was defendant’s father, Mogaiah, along with five others had purchased the said property under a registered sale deed dated 07.09.1942 for a valuable consideration. These purchasers continued in joint possession and enjoyment of the schedule property, and also enjoyed the same as absolute owners, along with respective family members, including the present defendant. On scrupulous perusal of the pleadings pleaded by the defendant, it is shown that defendant's father had purchased 5 acres of land from one Muniswamappa under a registered sale deed dated 31.07.1948, and subsequently they sold the said property to one Thimma Reddy under a registered sale deed dated 09.02.1950. It is further pleaded and stated on oath by DW1 that he purchased 5 acre from G. Venkatappa under a registered sale deed dated 15.09.1960. Thereafter, he sold 1 acre 10 guntas to one Sheik Ahmed under a registered - 42 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 sale deed dated 04.06.1966 and purchased 1 acre from H. Muniswamappa under a registered sale deed dated 17.10.1966. It is further pleaded and stated on oath by DW1 that he subsequently sold 20 guntas to H. Muniswamappa under registered a sale deed dated 06.07.1967 and he also sold 1 acre in favour of same person under a registered sale deed dated 12.12.1967. Thereafter, he purchased 1 acre 10 gunta from Sheik Ahmed under a registered sale deed dated 14.12.1967 and again sold 2 acre 20 guntas to Muniswamappa under a registered sale deed dated 12.03.1969. It is further stated that he subsequently purchased 2 acre 20 guntas from H. Muniswamappa under a registered sale deed dated 19.02.1970. To prove the said transactions, the defendant relied upon Exs.D16, D27, D28, D29, D30 and D31, respectively. 47. On cumulative reading of the aforesaid sale deeds and transactions so pleaded by the defendant, it is very much clear that, his father had purchased an aggregate extent of 19 acre 30 guntas and from that, he sold 10 acre 10 guntas of land and thereby, retained 9 acre 20 guntas of land. It is a specific defence of the defendant that, the concerned revenue and survey number was with respect to Sy.No.12 and in this - 43 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 regard, there was revenue dispute. Due to this, the defendant was compelled to approach Survey Department seeking for phodi/bifurcation of his land, by arraying the plaintiff and also others as stated in the pleadings as the respondents. But the result was that the Assistant Director of Land Records after conducting proceedings found that, the property survey record was not available and the extent mentioned in the sale deeds did not match with the actual extent available on the spot. Accordingly, an order was passed on 07.01.2004 giving liberty to the parties to approach the competent authority, seeking appropriate relief. 48. On perusal of the documentary evidence, produced by the plaintiff vide Exs.P1 to P20 and the contentions raised by the defendant, the survey records do not disclose the names of the persons from whom the plaintiff had purchased the suit schedule property. The perusal of the admission in the crossexamination of PW1, and the documents produced by parties, it clearly established the fact that the present plaintiff has been claiming the suit schedule property by furnishing wrong/incorrect boundaries and relying upon various sale deeds alleged to have been executed by the persons, who had no right, title and interest over the suit schedule property. When - 44 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 the plaintiff’s vendor had no better title over the suit schedule property, the sale deeds relied upon by the plaintiff now will not come to his rescue to prove that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the suit schedule property by virtue of the sale deeds relied upon by him. 49. Therefore, the trial Court and the First Appellate Court have rightly not given due weightage to Ex.D19 under which, Narasimhaiah, vendor of the plaintiff, purchased 4 acre 25 guntas in the said survey number. Therefore, on reading of the findings of both the Courts and evidence available on record, both the Courts have rightly disbelieved the claim of the plaintiff and rightly not attached due weightage to Ex.D.19. Therefore, this Court finds no factual/legal error in the findings of the Courts below in not giving due weightage to Ex.D.19. 50. Both the Courts below clearly held that, the plaintiff has to succeed his case based on his merits and establish his title to the schedule property, so also to his vendor. Now, the plaintiff cannot take an undue advantage of the defendant’s demerits and claim that he has established a better title and rights over the suit schedule property. When the defendant’s father retained portions of the property, so purchased, and his - 45 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 right, never extinguished by any sale transactions, decree/documents and when the defendant is exercising his ownership and right peacefully, then he has a legal right enforceable against the entire world, namely, a right in rem. 51. In so far as, the burden of proof under Section 101 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, is concerned, the burden of proof to establish a title in the present case lies upon the plaintiff, as this burden lies on the party who asserts the existence of particular of state of things, based on which the plaintiff claims relief. This rule may not be universal and has exceptions, but in the factual background of the present case, the general principle is applicable. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Smriti Debbarma (Dead) through Legal Representative v. Prabha Ranjan Debbarma and Others, reported in (2023) 19 SCC 782, while considering Sections 101 and 102 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, held that the burden of proving title lies upon the party who asserts the existence of facts on the basis of which relief is claimed. The burden may shift during the evaluation of evidence, but such shifting ordinarily occurs when the plaintiff has first produced evidence creating a sufficiently strong probability in support of the title asserted. In the absence of such evidence, the plaintiff must - 46 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 discharge the initial burden of establishing title. The weakness of the defendant's case cannot, by itself, constitute a justification for decreeing the suit. 52. Applying the aforesaid principle to the present case, the documentary evidence produced by the plaintiff and admissions of PW1 and his witnesses, so also the rebuttal evidence led by the defendant clearly shows that the plaintiff has/had not discharged burden to prove his title over the suit schedule property. When the plaintiff's vendor had no clear and better title, on that strength, the plaintiff cannot claim any title. This would be the true effect of Section 101 and Section 102 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Therefore, it follows that the plaintiff should have satisfied and discharge the burden of proof under the Evidence Act, failing which the suit would be liable to be dismissed. Rightly, the trial Court had dismissed the suit and dismissal of the suit is rightly affirmed by the First Appellate Court. 53. So far as moulding of relief is concerned, the question is whether the Court can exercise its power under Order VII, Rule 7 of CPC where the prayer clause of the plaint is defective, but plaint contains all facts to establish the - 47 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 plaintiff's entitlement to relief. Order VII, Rule 7 of CPC provides that every plaint shall specifically state the relief which the plaintiff claims, either simply or in the alternative. The provision also empowers the Court to grant general or other relief as it may deem just and proper, provided such relief is consistent with the pleadings and the case presented by the plaintiff. 54. On perusal of the bare plaint, it is clear that pleadings are confined to declaration and injunction claimed by the plaintiff and opposed by the defendant. When specific issues were framed in accordance with the specific pleadings and parties had occasion to adduce evidence in support of their respective claims, confining to the issues framed then it would be beyond the jurisdiction of the trial Court in moving beyond the scope of pleadings, issues and evidence, and thereafter grant a totally different relief as claimed by the plaintiff now. 55. In Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by LRs. and others, reported in 2008 (4) SCC 594, the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained the principles governing suits for injunction, declaration of title and possession. The Court held that where the plaintiff's title is under a cloud and the - 48 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 defendant asserts a hostile title, a mere suit for injunction may not be sufficient, and a declaration of title, with consequential relief where necessary, may have to be sought. Where the plaintiff seeks a declaration of title and consequential injunction, the Court must examine whether the plaintiff has established the title asserted and whether the property in dispute has been properly identified. The said decision also makes it clear that a plaintiff who is not in possession may have to seek the appropriate consequential relief of possession, depending upon the facts of the case. 56. The appellant-plaintiff has sought both a declaration that he is the absolute owner of the suit schedule property and a consequential relief of permanent injunction against the respondent-defendant. In the instant case, the trial Court and the First Appellate Court consistently held that, the plaintiff is not in possession of the suit schedule property and hence, the ratio laid down in Anathula Sudhakar’s case squarely applicable to the case on hand. The plaintiff ought to have sought for possession along with declaration and injunction. 57. Therefore, the issue is not merely whether the appellant was required to seek a declaration of title, but - 49 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 whether he has established a valid title to the property claimed, identity and extent of the property conveyed under the registered sale deeds and his entitlement to the consequential relief. The appellant relies upon the registered sale deeds dated 14.09.1998 and 20.12.2001, together with mutation entries, RTCs, earlier title deeds and other revenue records. The respondent, on the other hand, disputes the title of the appellant's vendor and asserts an independent chain of title. In such circumstances, the appellant is required to establish his own title by admissible evidence and cannot succeed merely by pointing out alleged inconsistencies in the respondent's defence. 58. The provision of Order VII, Rule 7 of CPC cast upon a duty over the plaintiff, also to seek relief, which the plaintiff intend either simple or in alternative. Now, in view of the clear finding of fact and law by the Courts below and also the factual aspect involved, in the present case, this Court cannot exercise its discretionary power in moulding the relief as claimed by the plaintiff now. Therefore, it is held that the Courts below have rightly not attached any due weightage to EX.D19 and have not exercised their power of moulding the relief. Therefore, it is held that the Courts below are justified in dismissing the suit in - 50 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 entirety. Now, it is not at all open for the Courts below or to this Court to mark the relief as claimed by the plaintiff. Hence, the substantial questions of law are answered against the plaintiff. 59. in C. The scope of Section 100 of CPC is further explained Doddanarayana Reddy (Dead) by LRs. v. C. Jayarama Reddy (Dead) by LRs, reported in (2020) 4 SCC 659, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court, relying upon Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Anjuman-E-Ismail MadrisUn-Niswan, reported in 1999 (6) SCC 343, reiterated that the High Court cannot routinely interfere with concurrent findings of fact in the absence of a substantial question of law. In State of Rajasthan and Others v. Shiv Dayal and Another, reported in 2019 (8) SCC 637, the Hon'ble Supreme Court clarified that concurrent findings may be challenged in second appeal where they are recorded dehors the pleadings, based on no evidence, founded upon a misreading of material documentary evidence, contrary to a provision of law or are findings that no judicially acting judge could reasonably have reached. - 51 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 60. The same principle was reiterated in Ramachandra Reddy (Dead) through LRs and others v. Ramulu Ammal (Dead) through LRs, reported in (2025) 8 SCC 788, with reference to the limitations governing interference with concurrent findings of fact under Section 100 of CPC. The decisions in Gurdev Kaur and others v. Kaki and others, reported in 2007 (1) SCC 546, Ramanuja Naidu v. V. Kanniah Naidu and Another, reported in 1996 (3) SCC 392, Navaneethammal v. Arjuna Chetty, reported in (1996) 6 SCC 166, and Mussummat Durga Choudhrain v. Jawahir Singh Choudhri, reported in 1890 SCC OnLine PC 10, likewise emphasise that a second appeal cannot be used to enlarge the permissible grounds of interference with findings of fact. These authorities, read together, establish that a concurrent finding is not immune from scrutiny where a recognised legal defect is demonstrated; however, the High Court cannot substitute its own appreciation of the evidence merely because another view is possible. 61. In the present case, the trial Court has considered the appellant's title documents, testimonies of PW1 and PW2, revenue records, earlier transactions and the documents produced by the respondent. Therefore, it recorded reasons for - 52 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 concluding that the appellant had failed to establish his title to the entire extent of 5 acres 7 guntas claimed in the suit. The First Appellate Court independently reconsidered the evidence, addressed the appellant's explanation concerning the admission of PW1 and affirmed the findings of the trial Court. The essential basis of the concurrent findings is the discrepancy between the extent claimed and the extent shown to have been held by the appellant's predecessor-in-title, deficiencies identified in the chain of title and inconsistencies concerning the boundaries and identity of the property. 62. The inconsistent allegations claims, the concerning alleged prior the respondent's alienation dated 26.02.1970, the subsequent sale deed dated 29.10.2004, the rectification deed dated 26.11.2004 and the further agreements of sale are relevant circumstances that must be assessed to the extent they are established by admissible evidence and relate to the very property in dispute. However, the existence of such allegations does not, by itself, establish that the appellant has title to the suit schedule property. Similarly, the appellant's mutation entries and revenue records cannot independently establish ownership, just as the respondent's revenue entries cannot independently establish his title. The parties' respective - 53 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 claims must be determined on the strength of their underlying title documents and the evidence identifying the property. 63. On an examination of the reasoning recorded by the Courts below, the appellant's contentions must be tested against the principles laid down in Anathula Sudhakar’s case, Smriti Debbarma’s case, Smt. Sawarni’s case, C. Doddanarayana Reddy’s case, Shiv Dayal’s case and Ramachandra Reddy’s case, cited supra. The appellant has not demonstrated, on the reasoning presently available, that the Courts below treated revenue entries as conclusive documents of title, or that they dismissed the suit solely because the respondent had established a superior title. Rather, the central ground for dismissal was the appellant's failure to establish the title of his vendor to the entire extent claimed and identity of the property conveyed. The alleged contradictions in the respondent's case and the subsequent transactions do not dispense with the appellant's burden under Sections 101 and 102 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, as applicable to the proceedings. 64. The Court is conscious that a finding based on a material misreading of a registered conveyance, disregard of a - 54 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 decisive admission or omission to consider evidence directly establishing the identity of the suit property may, in an appropriate case, give rise to a substantial question of law. However, the appellant must demonstrate such a defect from the record. A general allegation that the Courts below failed to appreciate the evidence, or that the respondent's case contains inconsistencies, is insufficient. 65. In the instant case, the substantial questions of law framed has to whether the Courts below are justified in not attaching due weightage to Ex.D19 under which Narasimhaiah, vendor of the plaintiff, purchased 4 acre 25 guntas in the property. Admittedly, the land bearing Sy.No.12/1 originally measured 29 acre 20 guntas, which belong to one Shamanna. Later, one Mogaiah, father of the defendant, purchased the said land, along with five others, way back in the year 1940 and thereafter, several transactions have taken place in the said land. A perusal of Ex.D19, Narasimhaiah, plaintiff's vendor purchased 1 acre 25 guntas, 1 acre 20 guntas, and 1 acre 20 guntas from one Chikkamuniappa under a registered sale deed dated 29.06.1949. However, the plaintiff has not furnished the said sale deeds before the Court. The schedule mentioned in the sale deed and the schedule mentioned in the suit property - 55 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 does not tally with each other. There is variance as to the measurements shown in the schedule of the suit and shown in the sale deeds. Therefore, the property of the plaintiff is not identifiable and the source of title is also not established. 66. The appellant has taken contention that the defendant has taken inconsistent pleas that his lands are not identifiable and the defendant has not disputed the appellant's possession over the suit schedule property. Hence, the plaintiff is pointing out the demerits of the defendant. Admittedly, one who comes to the Court must prove his case based on his merits and weakness of the defendant is not a trump card to the plaintiff. The trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court correctly analysed the oral and documentary evidence on record, including Ex.D19 and held that the plaintiff failed to prove his title and possession of the suit schedule property. Further, the trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court have justified in dismissing the plaintiff's claim that the plaintiff purchased the land from his vendor was 4 acre 25 guntas and not 5 acre 7 guntas, particularly when it was open for the Courts below to mould the relief. - 56 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 67. A perusal of the defence of the defendant and cross- examination portion of PW1, nowhere the defendant has admitted the title of the plaintiff and his possession over the suit schedule property. Learned counsel for the defendant merely suggested that under the sale deeds, the plaintiff purchased 5 acre 7 guntas, but the plaintiff's vendor had only 4 acre 25 guntas. Hence, it is not an admission under Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The admission must be clear, unambiguous, whereas the suggestions put to PW1 and extracting answer based on the documents is not an admission in order to grant relief by moulding the reliefs. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in a catena of judgments, held that the Courts have the authority to mould the relief; modifying or shaping the remedy requested based on established trial facts and circumstances; to render complete justice instead of outright dismissing a suit. Whereas, in the instant case, the plaintiff's vendor title is not established, however, the plaintiff is claiming the property of the defendant and hence, the relief cannot be moulded. 68. In the absence of a demonstrated defect of the nature recognised under Section 100 of CPC, this Court cannot undertake a fresh assessment of the entire evidence or - 57 - RSA No. 1757 of 2011 substitute a different factual conclusion merely because the appellant suggests an alternative interpretation. 69. For the foregoing reasons and subject to the determination of I.A. No.4/2026 under Order XLI, Rule 27 of CPC, this Court finds no demonstrated perversity, non- consideration of material evidence or erroneous application of law warranting interference with the concurrent findings of the trial Court and the First Appellate Court. The appellant has failed to establish a substantial question of law requiring interference under Section 100 of CPC. 70. Consequently, the judgment and decree passed in O.S. No.479/2004 and R.A. No.23/2011 do not warrant interference by this Court in the present Regular Second Appeal. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed. 71. I.A. No.4/2026 filed by the appellant under Order XLI, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is hereby dismissed. In view of the dismissal of the appeal, pending interlocutory applications, if any, shall stand dismissed. Sd/(VENKATESH NAIK T) JUDGE KVK

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