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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 15TH DAY OF JULY, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 17236 OF 2025
BETWEEN:
SRI IRFAN
S/O AMANULLA KHAN,
AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO. 21, 3RD MAIN,
MARENAHALLI KERE,
JAYANAGARA,
BENGALURU – 560 041.
…PETITIONER
(BY SRI N.SRIDHAR, ADVOCATE)
AND:
Digitally signed
by
PADMAVATHI B
K
Location: High
Court of
Karnataka
1.
STATE OF KARNATAKA BY
TILAKNAGARA POLICE,
REPRESENTED BY
STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT COMPLEX
BENGALURU - 01.
2.
MURALI RAO V.,
AGED ABOUT 26 YEARS,
S/O VENKOBA RAO,
NO.23, 3RD CROSS,
18TH MAIN ROAD,
JAYANAGARA, 5TH BLOCK,
BENGALURU – 560 041
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7411631245.
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT.WAHEEDA M.M., HCGP FOR R-1;
SRI NAMAN VANKADARI, ADVOCATE FOR R-2)
THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S 528 BNSS PRAYING PLEASED
TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS PASSED BY THE CHIEF
JUDICIAL
MAGISTRATE,
BENGALURU
AGAINST
THE
PETITIONER IN CC NO. 32308/2025 FOR THE OFFENCES
PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 303(2) OF BNS IN CRIME NO.
248/2024 FILED BY THE THILAKNAGARA POLICE IN THE ENDS
OF JUSTICE (ANNEXURE - D).
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY,
ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
ORAL ORDER
The petitioner is before the Court calling in question the
proceedings
in
CC.No.32308/2025
registered
for
offences
punishable under Section 303(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya
Sanhita (BNS), 2023 ('the BNS' for short).
2.
Heard Smt. N. Roopa, learned counsel appearing for
the petitioner; Smt. Waheeda M.M., learned High Court
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Government
Pleader
Sri.
Vankadari,
Naman
appearing
for
learned
respondent
counsel
No.1
and
appearing
for
respondent No.2.
3.
Facts in brief germane are as follows:
A complaint comes to be registered before the Tilak
Nagar Police Station by one MuraliRao, which becomes a crime
in crime No.248/2024. The fulcrum of the crime is theft, as
obtaining under Section 303(2) of the BNS. Long after the
registration of the crime, a notice is issued to the petitioner for
appearance. After conduct of investigation, on 30.08.2025, the
respondent/Police file a charge sheet against the petitioner and
others. The concerned Court takes cognizance of the offence
and issues summons. Issuance of summons is what has driven
the petitioner to this Court in the subject petition.
4.
The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
submits that the petitioner is drawn as accused No.2 only on
the voluntary statement of the co-accused, apart from that,
there is no corroborative material against the petitioner. Only
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on the score that the voluntary statement of the co-accused
cannot result in drawing a accused into the web of crime.
5.
This Court in order to ascertain as to whether there
was any corroborative material to draw the petitioner, as an
accused No.2 in the proceeding, summoned the records and
directed
the
High
Court
Government
Pleader
to
secure
instructions. Instructions and verification of the records would
clearly indicate that there is nothing corroborative against the
petitioner to draw him as an accused while filing the charge
sheet.
6.
The learned counsel appearing for the complainants
also is not in a position to place any material that lies in
corroboration for drawing the petitioner as an accused.
7.
In
the
light
of
the
said
submissions
and
contra-submissions, the unmistakable inference is that the
petitioner/accused No.2 is drawn into the web of proceedings
only on the voluntary statement of the co-accused. This is sans
countenance in the light of the settled principle of law and this
Court
in
the
case
of
PRAKASH
N.
Vs.
STATE
OF
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KARNATAKA, reported in 2026 SCC ONLINE KAR 1796 has
held as follows:
9. With there being no corroboration except the
voluntary statements, permitting further proceedings
against these petitioners would run foul of plethora of
judgments rendered by the Supreme Court on the issue.
9.1. In the case of Prem Prakash v. Enforcement
Directorate1, the Supreme Court holds that the
prosecution against an accused cannot start with the
statement of the co-accused as such statements are not
substantive pieces of evidence. The Supreme Court
observes as follows:
“Statement of Afshar Ali — Co-accused
………………
44. Being a co-accused with the appellant,
his statement against the appellant assuming
there is anything incriminating against the
present appellant will not have the character of
substantive evidence. The prosecution cannot
start with such a statement to establish its case.
45. We hold that, in such a situation, the law
laid down under Section 30 of the Evidence Act
by this Court while dealing with the confession
of
the
coaccused
will
continue
to
apply. In Kashmira Singh v. State of M.P. [Kashmira
Singh v. State of M.P., (1952) 1 SCC 275 : 1952 SCR
526], this Court neatly summarised the principle as
under: (SCC pp. 281-82, para 11)
“11. … The proper way to approach a case of
this kind is, first, to marshal the evidence
against the accused excluding the confession
altogether from consideration and see whether,
if it is believed, a conviction could safely be
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based on it. If it is capable of belief
independently of the confession, then of course
it is not necessary to call the confession in aid.
But cases may arise where the Judge is not
prepared to act on the other evidence as it
stands even though, if believed, it would be
sufficient to sustain a conviction. In such an
event, the Judge may call in aid the confession
and use it to lend assurance to the other
evidence and thus fortify himself in believing
what without the aid of the confession he would
not be prepared to accept.”
(emphasis in original)
46. Hence, insofar as Afshar Ali's statement
is concerned, the investigating agency will have
to first marshal the other evidence and can at
best look at the statement for lending
assurance.”
9.2. The Supreme Court in the case of Karan
Talwar v. State of T.N.2, holds that a confession
statement of the co-accused by itself cannot be the
reason for the implication of the accused in a crime. The
Supreme Court observes as follows:
“10. As is evident from the said Section, the
alleged offence is consumption of narcotic drug or
psychotropic substance other than those specified in
or under clause (a) of Section 27, NDPS Act, and
therefore, the question is whether any material is
available to charge the appellant thereunder. The
contention of the appellant is that he has been
arraigned as Accused 13 based on the
confession statement of co-accused viz. Accused
1. Certainly, in the absence of any other
material on record to connect the appellant with
the crime, the confession statement of the co-
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accused by itself cannot be the reason for his
implication in the crime. This view has been
fortified by the law laid down in Suresh
Budharmal Kalani v. State of Maharashtra [(1998) 7
SCC 337 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1625 : 1998 INSC
364], wherein it was stated that a co-accused's
confession containing incriminating matter
against a person would not by itself suffice to
frame charge against him. The materials on
record would reveal that the investigating
agency had not subjected him to medical
examination and instead, going by complaint
Witness No. 23, he smelt the accused. The less
said the better and we do not think it necessary
to comment upon adoption of such a course. We
need only to say that even if he tendered such
evidence, it would not help the prosecution in
anyway. There is absolutely no case that any
recovery of contraband was recovered from the
appellant. As regards the confession statement
of the appellant in view of Section 25 of
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 there can be no
doubt with respect to the fact that it is
inadmissible in evidence. In this context it is
worthy to refer to the decision of this Court
in Ram Singh v. Central Bureau of Narcotics, [(2011)
11 SCC 347 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 181 : 2011 INSC
342]. In the said decision, this Court held that
Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act would
make confessional statement of accused before
police inadmissible in evidence and it could not
be brought on record by prosecution to obtain
conviction.
Shortly
stated,
except
the
confessional statement of co-Accused 1 there is
absolutely no material available on record
against the appellant.
………………
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12. As noted hereinbefore, the sole material
available against the appellant is the confession
statement of the co-accused viz. Accused 1,
which undoubtedly cannot translate into
admissible evidence at the stage of trial and
against the appellant. When that be the
position, how can it be said that a prima
facie case is made out to make the appellant to
stand the trial. There can be no doubt with respect
to the position that standing the trial is an ordeal and,
therefore, in a case where there is no material at all
which could be translated into evidence at the trial
stage it would be a miscarriage of justice to make the
person concerned to stand the trial.”
9.3. Subsequently, the Supreme Court in P. Krishna
Mohan Reddy v. State of A.P.3, while discussing the law
on the evidentiary value and admissibility of confessional
statements of a co-accused observes as follows:
“40. Where a confessional statement is
otherwise excluded or inadmissible by virtue of
Section(s) 25 or 26 of the Evidence Act,
respectively, there can be no question of such
confessional statements being made admissible
against another co-accused by stretching it with
the help of Section 30 of the Evidence Act.
Section 25 places a complete ban on the making
of such confession by that person whether he is
in custody or not. Section 26 lays down that a
confession made by a person while he is in the
custody of a police officer shall not be proved
against him unless it is made in the immediate
presence
of
a
Magistrate.
[See: Sahib
Singh v. State of Haryana, (1997) 7 SCC 231]
Confessional statement contemplated under Section
30 of the Evidence Act, must be both relevant and
admissible in terms of the Evidence Act.
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………………
47. This is because a statement of an accused
under Section 161 of the CrPC stands on a different
footing from a police statement of any ordinary
witness. Statements of an accused person under
Section 161 of the CrPC by virtue of ordinarily
being in the form of either an admission or a
confession cannot be looked into qua another
co-accused, as to say otherwise would be to
ignore the substantive provisions of Section(s)
17, 21, 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act and the
well settled cannons of law of evidence.
However, the aforesaid does not apply, where the
statement of an accused under Section 161 of
the CrPC is exculpatory in nature, which we shall
discuss later.
………………
49. As
explained
in Pakala
Narayana
Swami (supra), a confession is one specie of an
admission, this flows from the logic that every
confession is an admission but not every admission is
a confession, while admissions in itself is a specie or
type of a statement. As a natural corollary to the
aforesaid, any statement of the accused under
Section 161 of the CrPC which is in the form of
an admission that admits any incriminating fact
or implicates another person by such statement,
would be governed by the provisions of Section
17 of Evidence Act, more particularly the
prohibition of usage of such admissions against
third-persons. An admission by one accused
cannot be used against another co-accused.
[See: Chintamani Das v. State, 1969 SCC OnLine Ori
17 : AIR 1970 Ori 100, Sohar Singh v. State of Bihar,
AIR 1960 Pat 448]. The aforesaid may be looked
at from one another angle, since the Evidence
Act, more particularly, Section(s) 17 and 30
clearly stipulate in well-defined terms, when an
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admission or a confession, respectively, may be
used against another person, the logical
sequitur of the aforesaid is that, except for the
manner laid down under the said provisions, no
admission or confession may be used against
another person. Since, Section 17 of the
Evidence Act does not postulate the use of an
admission by one accused against another, any
statement of the accused under Section 161 of
the CrPC, implicating such co-accused cannot be
looked into by the courts.
50. Even where the police statement of an
accused person under Section 161 of the CrPC is
neither an admission nor a confession i.e. it is
exculpatory in nature and not inculpatory, such
statements can be looked into by the courts only for
the limited purpose of culling out the stance of the
accused person qua the allegations. An exculpatory
police statement of an accused person under
Section 161 of the CrPC which at the same time
implicates another co-accused, cannot be relied upon,
merely because such statement is not hit by the
safeguards and rigours that apply in respect of
inculpatory statements in the form of an admissions
or confessions under the Evidence Act. The
fundamental cannon of criminal jurisprudence is
that a statement of one accused person cannot
be used against another co-accused person. The
limited exception to this aforesaid general
principle are inculpatory confessions, where the
accused person in his confessional statement
not only admits his own guilt but also implicates
another
co-accused. The rationale behind
this
limited
exception
as
explained
in Bhuboni
Sahu (supra), is that an admission by an accused
person of his own guilt affords some sort of credibility
or sanction in support of the truth of his confession
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against others as-well as himself. An exculpatory
statement is an affront to the aforesaid principle.
Thus, an exculpatory statement of an accused person
under Section 161 of the CrPC can only be looked into
for the limited purpose of either culling out the stance
of the accused person qua the allegations or for
contradicting the accused, if the accused chooses to
be examined as a witness in terms of Section 315 of
the CrPC However, such exculpatory statement
insofar as it implicates another co-accused
person can in no manner be relied upon by the
courts as against such co-accused as such
statements by their nature cannot be tested by
cross-examination if such accused person
declines to be a witness in the trial in terms of
Section 315 of the CrPC, and because such
exculpatory statement has no credibility.
51. Such statements at best could be said to be
helpful to the investigating authorities for the purpose
of ascertaining that the investigation is proceeding in
the right direction or not, as ordinarily, once the
investigation is over, these statements are neither
supplied to the accused along with chargesheet nor
placed on record.
52. Thus, Section 30 itself makes it clear that
the whole legal exercise by virtue of which this
provision of law can be made applicable,
depends upon the proving of confession before
a court which makes it into an admissible one in
order to implicate the other accused provided
the confession given by such person is
established with full strength on the basis of
other materials pertaining to the attendant
circumstances. It would necessarily mean that
mere confession alone will not be adequate or
sufficient to implicate other persons. It is
incumbent that there are other materials also which
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would render support or substantiate the case of the
confession. However, it is subject to the standard of
proving as contemplated by law. If this is the
position, the court should look into the
statements alleged to have been given by the
co-accused and that too before a police officer
during the course of investigation with great
care and circumspection. The said statements
are directly hit by Section 161 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. Particularly, the statement
given by any one of the accused persons and
recorded by the police officer during the course
of investigation cannot be relied upon by the
prosecution, except subject to the limitations
provided by Section 145 of the Indian Evidence
Act. The statement given by an accused
involving himself in the crime and also
implicating third person cannot be proved
legally in the court. It will be in direct conflict
with Sections 25 and 26 respectively of the
Evidence Act. If such evidence or confession
cannot be proved, then the occasion for utilizing
such statement against another person would
not arise.
53. From the above
following emerges:
exposition
of
law,
the
(i) A person who is accused of an offence or
named in the first information report, can be
examined by the police and his statement may
be recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC, as
held in Nandini Satpathy (supra).
(ii)
A
statement
of
an
accused
under
Section 161 of the CrPC, would ordinarily be of
two kinds, it may be inculpatory in nature or
may be exculpatory in nature.
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(iii) An inculpatory statement again may be in the
form of an admission or a confession. If such
statement admits either a gravely incriminating
fact or substantially all the facts which
constitute the offence, respectively, as held
in Pakala Narayana Swami (supra), then it
amounts to confession.
(iv) Where such police statement of an
accused is confessional statement, the
rigour
of
Section(s)
and
respectively will apply with all its vigour.
A confessional statement of an accused
will only be admissible if it is not hit by
Section(s) 24 or 25 respectively and is in
tune with the provisions of Section(s) 26,
and
of
the
Evidence Act,
respectively. In other words, a police
statement of an accused which is in the
form of a confession is per se inadmissible
and no reliance whatsoever can be placed
on such statements either at the stage of
bail
or
during
trial.
Since
such
confessional statements are rendered
inadmissible by virtue of Section 25 of the
Evidence Act, the provision of Section 30
would be of no avail, and no reliance can
be placed on such confessional statement
of an accused to implicate another coaccused.
(v) A confessional statement of one accused
implicating another co-accused may be
taken into consideration by the court
against such co-accused in terms of
Section 30 of the Evidence Act, only at the
stage of trial, where (1) the confession
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itself was relevant and admissible in
terms of the Evidence Act; (2) was duly
proved against the maker; (3) such
confessional statement incriminates the
maker along with the co-accused and; (4)
both the accused persons in question are
in a joint trial for the same offence.
(vi) Furthermore, because such confessional
statements are not “evidence” in terms of
Section 3 of the Evidence Act as held
in Bhuboni
Sahu (supra),
such
a
confession
as
held
in Kashmira
Singh (supra) can only be pressed into
consideration by the court as a rule of
prudence, to lend assurance to the other
evidence
against
such
co-accused,
provided that aforesaid ingredients or
conditions of Section 30 read with
Section(s) 24 to 29 of the Evidence Act,
are fulfilled.
(vii) Where the police statement of an
accused is in the form of an admission,
such inculpatory statement even if it
implicates another co-accused cannot be
taken into consideration against such coaccused in terms of Section(s) 17 read
with 21 of the Evidence Act, as doing so
would
militate
against
the
general
principle, that an admission may be given
as evidence against the maker alone. The
exceptions to the aforesaid general
principle carved out under the Evidence
Act, do not permit the usage of such
admission against a co-accused in any
scenario whatsoever.
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(viii) Where the police statement of the
accused is an exculpatory statement i.e. it
is neither a confession nor an admission,
the statement being one under Section
161, would immediately attract the bar
under Section 162 of the CrPC, and the
same may be used only for the very
limited purpose provided in the Proviso for
the purpose of contradiction or reexamination of such accused person
alone, as held in Mahabir Mandal (supra).
Even if such exculpatory statement of one
accused, implicates another co-accused,
the
same
cannot
be
taken
into
consideration against such co-accused, as
there can be no credibility attached to an
exculpatory statement of an accused
implicating another co-accused, more
particularly because it is neither required
to be given on oath, nor in the presence of
the co-accused, the same cannot be tested
by cross-examination and the exculpatory
nature of such statement militates against
the foundational principle that permits
taking into consideration a statement of
one accused person against another coaccused
as
explained
in Bhuboni
Sahu (supra) i.e. ‘when a person admits
guilt to its fullest extent either to a certain
incriminating fact or substantially all the
facts which constitute the offence, and in
doing so exposes himself and in the
process other co-accused persons to the
pain and penalties provided for the guilt,
there exists a sincerity and semblance of
sanction for the truthfulness of such
statement’.
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(ix) Although a handful of decisions of this Court such
as Indresh Kumar (supra) and Salim Khan (supra)
have held that statements under Section 161 of
the CrPC ought to be looked into by the courts at
the stage of anticipatory or regular bail for the
purpose
of
ascertaining
whether
a primafacie case has been made out against the accused
and the nature and gravity of the allegations, yet
the aforesaid rule only applies insofar as such
statements under Section 161 were made by
witnesses and not accused persons. A statement
of
an
accused
under
Section 161 of
the CrPC stands on a completely different footing
from a police statement of a witness. As already
discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, if the police
statement of an accused is inculpatory in nature,
its more in the form of a confession or admission
rather than a statement, and the relevant
provisions of Section(s) 17 to 30 of the Evidence
Act, will apply with all its vigour. Where such
statement of the accused is exculpatory in nature,
the same can be looked into by the courts only for
the limited purpose of either culling out the stance
of the accused person qua the allegations or for
contradicting the accused, if the accused chooses
to be examined as a witness in terms of
Section 315 of
the CrPC However,
such
exculpatory statement insofar as it implicates
another accused person cannot be looked into by
the courts, as such statements by their nature
cannot be tested by cross-examination if such
accused person declines to be a witness in the trial
in terms of Section 315 of the CrPC, and because
such exculpatory statement has no credibility as
explained in Bhuboni Sahu (supra).
(x) Before the court looks into the police statement of
any person under Section 161 of the CrPC for the
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purpose of anticipatory or regular bail, the court
must first ascertain whether such person is
actually a witness or an accused person, or likely
to be an accused person in respect of the
offence(s) alleged. This is because, there may be
situations where a person while giving his
statement under Section 161 of the CrPC may not
be an accused, but later arrayed as one. In such a
scenario the courts must be mindful of the fact
that because the investigation is still ongoing, it is
more likely for a person who was originally a
witness to happen to be later arrayed as an
accused person. If the court was to blindly place
reliance on statement of such a person merely
because he is not named in the first information
report, without first seeing whether such person is
likely to be arrayed as an accused or not, it would
lead to an absurd situation where the statement of
such a person may be relied upon up until such
person is arrayed as an accused. We also caution
the courts, where it emerges from the material on
record, that such a person is likely to be arrayed
as an accused, the courts should refrain from
expressing any such opinion so that the
investigation is not prejudiced in any manner.”
(Emphasis supplied at each instance)
In view of the law as elucidated by the Apex Court in the
afore-quoted judgments, I deem it appropriate to obliterate the
proceedings as against the petitioner.
8.
For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
(i)
The criminal petition is allowed.
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(ii)
The
proceedings
in
C.C.No.32308/2025
pending on the file of Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Bengaluru stands quashed.
Sd/(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
JY
List No.: 2 Sl No.: 41
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