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-1HC-KAR
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CRL.P No. 29 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010719822024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 7TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ
CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 29 OF 2025 (482(Cr.PC) /
528(BNSS)-)
BETWEEN:
SRI IMRAN PASHA
S/O ARIF PASHA
AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS
RESIDING AT NO. 45/2
13TH CROSS
K S STREET
PADARAYANAPURA
BENGALURU 560 026
…PETITIONER
(BY SRI. GOVIRDHAN REDDY. J.S., ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. MOHAMMED NAWAZ SHARIFF.,ADVOCATE)
AND:
Digitally signed
by SHWETHA
RAGHAVENDRA
Location: HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA
1.
STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY BANGARPET P S
REP BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
HIGH COURT BUILDING
BANGALORE 560 001
2.
SRI AZAM SHARIFF
S/O LATE SUBAN SHARIFF
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS
RESIDING AT ILAYI MASJID,
C RAHIM COMPOUND
BANGALRPET TOWN
K G F KARNATAKA 563114
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. RANJITH KUMAR.N., HCGP FOR R1;
R2-SERVED)
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THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED U/S 482 CR.PC (FILED U/S
528 BNSS) PRAYING TO QUASH THE CHARGE SHEET IN
C.C.2969/2023 FILED BY THE 1ST POLICE STATION RESPONDENT
BANGARPET AT ANNEXURE-D ARISING OUT OF CR NO. 80/2023FOR
THE ALLEGED OFFENCES PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 504,
506,114 R/W 34 IPC PENDING ON THE FILE OF COURT OF PRL. CJ
AND JMFC, BANGARPET, AGAINST THE PETITIONER I.E ACCUSED
NO. 1 AND ETC.
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS
DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ
ORAL ORDER
1.
The petitioner is before this Court seeking for the
following reliefs;
2.
a.
Quash the charge sheet in C.C.2969/2023 filed by
the 1st respondent Bangarpet Police Station
Annexure-D arising out of CR NO.80/2023 for the
alleged offences punishable under section 504,
506, 114 r/w 34 IPC pending on the file of Court of
Prl Civil Judge & JMFC, Bangarpet, against the
Petitioner i.e Accused NO.1 in the interest of justice
and equity.
b.
Grant such other relief/relief's as this Hon'ble Court
may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the
case in the interest of justice and equity.
The prosecution case arises out of an incident alleged
to have taken place on 20.03.2023 at about 3.30
p.m. at S.M. Function Hall, situated in C-Rahim
Compound.
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3.
It is alleged that respondent No.2-complainant, Azam
Shariff,
along
with
Mohammed
Mujaphir
and
Mubhakar Pasha, was present at the said place when
leaders of the JDS party, namely, Mr. Zameer Pasha
and Mr. Siraj Ahmed, had organised a political
meeting in connection with the ensuing Assembly
elections of the year 2023.
4.
According to the complaint, the petitioner had been
invited to attend the meeting as a speaker. During
the course of the gathering, Mr. Zameer Pasha and
Mr. Siraj Ahmed are stated to have called upon the
petitioner to address the gathering.
5.
It is the specific allegation of the complainant that,
while addressing the gathering, the petitioner made
a statement to the effect that he would enter the
house of one Mr. Narayanswamy, stated to be a
candidate contesting from the Bangarpet Assembly
Constituency, destroy his house and cause harm to
his life and liberty.
6.
The alleged statement is stated to have been made
in the course of election campaigning for the 2023
Assembly elections. The complainant claims to be a
follower of Mr. Narayanswamy and, alleging that the
statement
amounted
to
an
offence,
lodged
a
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complaint
resulting
in
registration
of
Crime
No.80/2023 on 20.03.2023.
7.
On the basis of the said complaint, the police
registered the case for the offences punishable under
Sections 504, 506 and 114 read with Section 34 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
8.
The petitioner has been arrayed as accused No.1 in
Crime No.80/2023. Aggrieved by the registration of
the
aforesaid
criminal
proceedings
and
the
allegations levelled against him, the petitioner has
approached this Court seeking appropriate relief in
respect of the said proceedings.
9.
Sri.Govirdhan Reddy.J.S., learned counsel for the
petitioner contending that;
9.1. The
statement
was
made
in
an
election
campaign, Mr.Narayanswamy was not present
at the said gathering. The said statement was
made during the course of campaign as regards
various issues which were subject matter of the
campaign.
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9.2. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
submits that, even if the allegations contained
in the complaint are taken at their face value,
the same do not disclose the commission of
offences punishable under Sections 504 or 506
of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. His submission
is that mere utterances, without the necessary
statutory
ingredients
accompanying
such
utterances, cannot constitute the offences in
question.
9.3. He relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex
Court in Vikram Johar v. State of U.P.,1 more
particularly para 22, 23 and 24 thereof which
are reproduced hereunder for easy reference;
22. In para 13 of the judgment, this Court has
noticed the ingredients of Section 504 IPC, which
are to the following effect: (Fiona Shrikhande
case [Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra,
(2013) 14 SCC 44 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715] ,
SCC p. 49)
“13. Section 504 IPC comprises of the following
ingredients viz. (a) intentional insult, (b) the
insult must be such as to give provocation to the
person insulted, and (c) the accused must intend
or know that such provocation would cause
another to break the public peace or to commit
(2019) 14 SCC 207
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any other offence. The intentional insult must be
of such a degree that should provoke a person to
break the public peace or to commit any other
offence. The person who intentionally insults
intending or knowing it to be likely that it will
give provocation to any other person and such
provocation will cause to break the public peace
or to commit any other offence, in such a
situation, the ingredients of Section 504 are
satisfied. One of the essential elements
constituting the offence is that there should have
been an act or conduct amounting to intentional
insult and the mere fact that the accused abused
the complainant, as such, is not sufficient by
itself to warrant a conviction under Section 504
IPC.”
23. In another judgment i.e. Manik Taneja v.
State of Karnataka [Manik Taneja v. State of
Karnataka, (2015) 7 SCC 423 : (2015) 3 SCC
(Cri) 132] , this Court has again occasion to
examine the ingredients of Sections 503 and
506. In the above case also, case was registered
for the offence under Sections 353 and 506 IPC.
After noticing Section 503, which defines criminal
intimidation, this Court laid down the following in
paras 11 and 12: (SCC pp. 427-28)
“11.***
A reading of the definition of “criminal
intimidation” would indicate that there must be
an act of threatening to another person, of
causing an injury to the person, reputation, or
property of the person threatened, or to the
person in whom the threatened person is
interested and the threat must be with the intent
to cause alarm to the person threatened or it
must be to do any act which he is not legally
bound to do or omit to do an act which he is
legally entitled to do.
12. In the instant case, the allegation is that the
appellants have abused the complainant and
obstructed
the
second
respondent
from
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discharging his public duties and spoiled the
integrity of the second respondent. It is the
intention of the accused that has to be
considered in deciding as to whether what he has
stated comes within the meaning of “criminal
intimidation”. The threat must be with intention
to cause alarm to the complainant to cause that
person to do or omit to do any work. Mere
expression of any words without any intention to
cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring in
the application of this section. But material has
to be placed on record to show that the intention
is to cause alarm to the complainant. From the
facts and circumstances of the case, it appears
that there was no intention on the part of the
appellants to cause alarm in the mind of the
second respondent causing obstruction in
discharge of his duty. As far as the comments
posted on Facebook are concerned, it appears
that it is a public forum meant for helping the
public and the act of the appellants posting a
comment on Facebook may not attract
ingredients of criminal intimidation in Section
503 IPC.”
In the above case, allegation was that the
appellant had abused the complainant. The Court
held that the mere fact that the allegation that
accused had abused the complainant does not
satisfy the ingredients of Section 506 IPC.
24. Now, we revert back to the allegations in the
complaint against the appellant. The allegation is
that the appellant with two or three other
unknown persons, one of whom was holding a
revolver, came to the complainant's house and
abused him in filthy language and attempted to
assault him and when some neighbours arrived
there the appellant and the other persons
accompanying him fled the spot. The above
allegation taking on its face value does not
satisfy the ingredients of Sections 504 and 506
as has been enumerated by this Court in the
above two judgments. The intentional insult
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must be of such a degree that should provoke a
person to break the public peace or to commit
any other offence. The mere allegation that the
appellant came and abused the complainant
does not satisfy the ingredients as laid down in
para 13 of the judgment of this Court in Fiona
Shrikhande [Fiona Shrikhande v. State of
Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44 : (2014) 1 SCC
(Cri) 715] .
9.4. By
relying
on
Vikram
Johar’s
case,
his
submission is that the Hon'ble Supreme Court,
after referring to the earlier decisions in Fiona
Shrikhande
v.
State
of
Maharashtra,
(2013) 14 SCC 44 and Manik Taneja v.
State of Karnataka, (2015) 7 SCC 423, has
explained
the
ingredients
necessary
to
constitute the offences under Sections 504 and
506 of the IPC.
9.5. It is submitted that, to attract Section 504 of
the IPC, there must be an intentional insult;
such insult must be of a nature which gives
provocation to the person insulted; and the
accused
must
intend
or
know
that
such
provocation is likely to cause that person to
break the public peace or to commit any other
offence. Mere use of abusive, offensive or
objectionable
words,
without
the
requisite
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intention
and
without
the
circumstances
contemplated by the provision, would not,
according to learned counsel, constitute an
offence under Section 504 of the IPC.
9.6. Learned counsel submits that the allegations in
the present case do not disclose any intentional
insult directed against the complainant. The
alleged statement was made by the petitioner
while addressing a political gathering during the
course
of
election
campaigning.
The
complainant was not the person against whom
the
alleged
statement
according to
was
directed
and,
learned counsel, there
is no
allegation that the complainant was personally
insulted, provoked or subjected to any conduct
intended to cause him to commit an offence or
disturb public peace.
9.7. It
is
further
submitted
that
there
is
no
allegation of any actual disturbance of public
peace consequent upon the alleged speech. No
overt
act
is
attributed
to
the
petitioner
thereafter, nor is there any allegation that the
gathering
was
disrupted,
that
any
person
present at the meeting was provoked into
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committing an offence, or that any breach of
public peace occurred as a consequence of the
alleged utterance.
9.8. Learned counsel submits that the context in
which the alleged statement was made is also
relevant. The statement is alleged to have been
made during an election campaign and in the
course of a political speech before persons who
were
assembled
According
particularly
to
for
that
him,
during
very
political
election
purpose.
speeches,
campaigns,
frequently contain rhetorical, exaggerated or
hyperbolic
expressions,
and
an
isolated
statement cannot be divorced from its context
and mechanically treated as an offence under
Section 504 of the IPC.
9.9. It is, therefore, contended that the essential
statutory requirement of an intentional insult
accompanied
by
the
requisite
intention
or
knowledge to provoke the person insulted to
break public peace or commit another offence is
absent from the allegations in the present case.
The mere fact that the words attributed to the
petitioner may be considered objectionable or
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intemperate,
according
to
learned
counsel,
would not by itself satisfy the ingredients of
Section 504 of the IPC.
9.10. Insofar as Section 506 of the IPC is concerned,
learned counsel submits that the same is
founded
upon
the
concept
of
“criminal
intimidation” as defined under Section 503 of
the IPC. Reliance is again placed upon Vikram
Johar, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court,
referring to Manik Taneja, has held that there
must be a threat of causing injury to the
person, reputation or property of the person
threatened, or to a person in whom such
person is interested, coupled with the requisite
intention to cause alarm or to compel the
person threatened to do an act which he is not
legally bound to do, or omit an act which he is
legally entitled to do.
9.11. Learned counsel submits that, in the present
case, the alleged statement does not disclose
the
necessary
intention
to
cause
alarm.
According to him, there is no allegation that the
petitioner thereafter proceeded towards the
house of Mr. Narayanswamy, attempted to
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enter the premises, caused any damage, made
any further communication or otherwise acted
upon the alleged threat.
9.12. It is his submission that the distinction between
an expression of anger, political rhetoric or an
exaggerated statement on the one hand, and a
legally cognisable threat amounting to criminal
intimidation on the other, cannot be lost sight
of.
For
Section
to
be
attracted,
the
prosecution must be able to demonstrate the
ingredients of Section 503 IPC and not merely
rely upon the words alleged to have been
spoken.
9.13. Learned
counsel
further
submits
that
the
complainant himself is stated to be a follower of
Mr. Narayanswamy and was present at the
meeting. However, there is no allegation that
the petitioner addressed the alleged threat to
the complainant, that the complainant was the
person whose property or life was threatened,
or that the petitioner intended to cause alarm
to the complainant. The alleged target of the
statement and the complainant are, according
to learned counsel, distinct persons.
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9.14. On this basis, learned counsel submits that the
complaint cannot be permitted to transform an
allegedly objectionable political statement into
an
offence
of
criminal
intimidation
merely
because the complainant considered himself
aggrieved by or apprehensive of the statement.
9.15. Learned counsel also submits that there is no
allegation of any subsequent conduct lending
assurance to the alleged threat. No overt act is
attributed to the petitioner after the meeting,
and there is no material to indicate that the
alleged statement was accompanied by conduct
demonstrating an intention to carry out the
threat.
9.16. It is, therefore, contended that the allegations,
even if accepted in their entirety, fall short of
the
threshold
required
to
constitute
the
offences under Sections 504 and 506 of the
IPC. Reliance is placed upon Vikram Johar,
wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held, on
the facts of that case, that the allegations, even
when taken at face value, did not satisfy the
ingredients of Sections 504 and 506 of the IPC.
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9.17. Learned
counsel
accordingly
submits
that
permitting the criminal proceedings to continue,
in the absence of the foundational ingredients
of the offences alleged, would amount to an
abuse of the process of law and that the
proceedings arising out of Crime No.80/2023
are
consequently
liable
to
be
quashed
in
exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this
Court.
10.
Learned HCGP would submit that the utterances
having been made, the petitioner was seeking to
incite the person who had assembled to commit such
offences and on that basis, he submits that the
matter needs to go for trial and this Court ought not
to intercede at this stage.
11.
Heard Sri.Govirdhan Reddy.J.S., learned counsel for
the petitioner and Sri.Ranjith Kumar.N., learned
HCGP for respondent No.1 and perused papers.
12.
Having considered the rival submissions and having
perused the complaint, the material collected during
investigation and the charge-sheet, this Court is of
the considered view that the allegations, even if
taken at their face value, do not disclose the
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essential ingredients of the offences punishable
under Sections 504 and 506 of the IPC.
13.
The
utterances
attributed
to
the
petitioner,
as
noticed hereinabove, are undoubtedly not in good
taste. Such expressions are certainly not expected
from a person holding or seeking public office,
irrespective of the political position held by such
person. Political discourse, even when vigorous or
adversarial, cannot be permitted to degenerate into
threats of violence or destruction of the property of a
political opponent.
14.
At the same time, the question before this Court is
not whether the alleged utterances were desirable or
appropriate in the context of democratic political
discourse.
The
attributed
to
question
the
is
petitioner,
whether
coupled
the
words
with
the
surrounding circumstances and the material collected
during investigation, satisfy the statutory ingredients
of Sections 504 and 506 of the IPC.
15.
The substance of the allegation is that, during the
course of the election meeting, the petitioner stated
that, depending upon what the opposing candidate
did or did not do, he would enter the house of the
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said candidate, destroy the house and cause harm or
injury to his life and liberty.
16.
It is not in dispute that the alleged statement was
made during the course of campaigning for the
Assembly
elections
of
2023.
The
statement,
therefore, cannot be completely divorced from the
circumstances in which it is alleged to have been
made. The fact that a statement is made in an
election meeting does not, by itself, confer immunity
upon the speaker from the operation of the criminal
law. Equally, however, the political and electoral
context is a relevant circumstance while determining
the
nature
accompanying
of
it
the
and
utterance,
the
intention
whether
the
statutory
ingredients of the alleged offence are made out.
17.
Political speeches may, at times, contain rhetorical,
exaggerated or hyperbolic expressions. The mere use
of intemperate language cannot automatically result
in criminal liability unless the ingredients prescribed
by the particular penal provision are satisfied. The
Court is therefore required to examine the alleged
words not merely in isolation but in the context in
which they are alleged to have been spoken and the
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consequences, if any, alleged to have followed
therefrom.
18.
In Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra,
(2013) 14 SCC 44, which has been referred to in
the subsequent judgement in Vikram Johar, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has explained that Section
504 of the IPC requires, inter alia, an intentional
insult of such a degree as to give provocation to the
person
insulted,
coupled
with
the
intention
or
knowledge that such provocation is likely to cause
that person to break the public peace or commit any
other offence.
19.
In the present case, assuming that the words
attributed to the petitioner amount to an intentional
insult, the material placed before this Court does not
disclose the remaining necessary ingredients with the
requisite degree of specificity.
20.
The person against whom the alleged statement was
directed, namely, Mr. Narayanswamy, has neither
lodged the complaint nor, more importantly, has his
statement
been
recorded
during
the
course
of
investigation alleging that he was provoked by the
statement in the manner contemplated under Section
504 of the IPC.
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21.
There is also no material placed before this Court
indicating that the alleged statement resulted in, or
was accompanied by, any conduct demonstrating
that the person allegedly insulted was provoked to
break the public peace or to commit any other
offence. No subsequent overt act on the part of the
petitioner pursuant to the alleged speech has been
brought on record.
22.
This Court is conscious that the actual occurrence of
a breach of public peace is not, by itself, the sole test
for attracting Section 504 of the IPC. The statutory
requirement is concerned with the nature of the
intentional insult and the intention or knowledge that
the provocation is likely to result in the person
insulted breaking the public peace or committing
another offence. Nevertheless, in the facts of the
present case, the absence of any complaint or
statement from the person allegedly insulted and the
absence of any material indicating the requisite
provocation or its intended consequences assume
considerable significance.
23.
Thus, even accepting the prosecution allegation in its
entirety, the material does not disclose a sufficient
factual
foundation
from
which
the
necessary
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ingredients of Section 504 of the IPC can be inferred.
The alleged utterance may be objectionable and
politically
improper,
but
every
objectionable
or
intemperate utterance does not constitute an offence
under Section 504 of the IPC.
24.
The position with regard to Section 506 of the IPC
stands on an even different footing. Section 506
prescribes the punishment for criminal intimidation,
while the ingredients of criminal intimidation are set
out in Section 503 of the IPC.
25.
As explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manik
Taneja, and reiterated in Vikram Johar, mere
expression of words does not, by itself, constitute
criminal
intimidation.
demonstrate
a
threat
The
of
prosecution
injury
of
the
must
nature
contemplated under Section 503 and the requisite
intention to cause alarm to the person threatened, or
to compel such person to do an act which he is not
legally bound to do or omit an act which he is legally
entitled to do.
26.
In the present case, the alleged threat was directed
against Mr. Narayanswamy. The complaint, however,
has been lodged by a third person who claims to be
his follower. There is no material to demonstrate that
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the alleged threat was addressed to the complainant
or that the petitioner intended thereby to cause
alarm to the complainant.
27.
More significantly, the person who is alleged to have
been threatened has not come forward before the
Investigating Officer. There is no statement of Mr.
Narayanswamy in the charge-sheet material stating
that
he
received
apprehended
the
injury
to
alleged
his
threat,
person,
that
he
property
or
reputation, or that the alleged statement caused the
alarm contemplated under Section 503 of the IPC.
28.
The
absence
of
a
statement
from
the
person
allegedly threatened is not being treated as a
jurisdictional
bar
to
the
initiation
of
criminal
proceedings. It is settled that the criminal law can,
depending upon the circumstances and the nature of
the offence, be set in motion by a person other than
the person directly affected. The question, however,
is whether the material collected during investigation
discloses the ingredients of the offence alleged.
29.
In the present case, when the alleged threat is
specifically directed against a particular individual,
the absence of any statement from that individual
assumes significance in determining whether the
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alleged threat was intended to cause, or was of a
nature capable of causing, the alarm contemplated
under Section 503 of the IPC.
30.
There is, further, no allegation of any subsequent
conduct by the petitioner demonstrating an intention
to act upon the alleged threat. No attempt to enter
the residence of Mr. Narayanswamy, no act of
destruction or damage, no physical confrontation and
no other overt act pursuant to the alleged statement
is brought on record.
31.
The Court is not required, at this stage, to determine
whether the statement was actually made in the
precise terms attributed to the petitioner. Even
assuming that the statement was made as alleged,
the question remains whether the statement, viewed
in the context of the surrounding circumstances and
the material collected during investigation, satisfies
the ingredients of Sections 504 and 506 of the IPC.
32.
In Vikram Johar, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after
considering the ingredients of Sections 504 and 506
and the principles enunciated in Fiona Shrikhande
and Manik Taneja, held that allegations which, even
when taken at their face value, do not satisfy the
statutory ingredients of the offences cannot be
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permitted to result in continuation of the criminal
proceedings.
33.
In the present case, the material placed before this
Court
discloses,
at
the
highest,
an
allegedly
intemperate political statement made during an
election gathering. The statement is undoubtedly
capable of criticism and may legitimately attract
condemnation in the political and public sphere.
However, the criminal law can be invoked only where
the ingredients of the particular penal provision are
satisfied.
34.
The prosecution has not placed on record the
statement
of
the
person
allegedly
insulted
or
threatened. There is no material demonstrating that
the alleged utterance provoked that person in the
manner contemplated under Section 504 of the IPC.
Likewise, there is no material demonstrating that the
alleged threat caused or was intended to cause the
alarm contemplated under Section 503 of the IPC so
as to attract Section 506 of the IPC.
35.
Consequently, this Court is of the view that the
allegations
in
the
complaint
and
the
material
collected during investigation do not, ex facie, satisfy
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the essential ingredients of Sections 504 and 506 of
the IPC.
36.
Permitting the prosecution to proceed to trial in such
circumstances
would
require
undergo
rigours
of
the
a
the
petitioner
criminal
to
prosecution
notwithstanding the absence of the foundational
material necessary to constitute the offences alleged.
The inherent jurisdiction of this Court is precisely
intended
to
prevent
continuation
of
criminal
proceedings where the allegations, even if accepted
in their entirety, do not disclose the commission of
the offences alleged.
37.
Accordingly, insofar as the offences punishable under
Sections 504 and 506 of the IPC are concerned, the
continuation of the criminal proceedings against the
petitioner cannot be sustained.
38.
In that view of the matter, this Court passes the
following;
ORDER
i.
The criminal petition is allowed.
ii.
The charge sheet in CC No.2969/2023 filed by
respondent No.1 against the petitioner-Accused
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No.1
at
Annexure-D
arising
out
of
Crime
No.80/2023 pending on the file of Prl. Civil
Judge & JMFC, Bangarpet, is quashed.
Sd/(SURAJ GOVINDARAJ)
JUDGE
SR
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 11
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