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WP No. 36681 of 2025
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 6TH DAY OF APRIL, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
WRIT PETITION NO. 36681 OF 2025 (GM-RES)
BETWEEN:
Digitally signed
by
SANJEEVINI J
KARISHETTY
Location: High
Court of
Karnataka
1.
SRI BHARATH R.,
S/O C. RAMU,
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO.11,
FIRST STAGE, GELEYARA BALAGA,
MAHALAKSHMIPURAM,
BENGALURU – 560 086.
2.
DR. UMA R.,
W/O DR.VENKATA REDDY,
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO.05,
FIRST STAGE, GELEYARA BALAGA,
MAHALAKSHMIPURAM,
BENGALURU – 560 086.
3.
SRI RAVINDRA,
S/O LATE RAMAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO.169,
2ND STAGE, GELEYARA BALAGA,
MAHALAKSHMIPURAM,
BENGALURU – 560 086.
…PETITIONERS
(BY SRI MURALIDHAR H.M., ADVOCATE)
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AND:
1.
STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY RAJARAJESHWARI NAGAR
POLICE STATION,
REPRESENTED BY ITS
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
BENGALURU – 560 001.
2.
SRI M.R. SRINIVAS,
S/O M.RAMAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO.3,
FLAT NO.405,
DOLLARS SCHEME LAYOUT,
NANDINI LAYOUT,
BENGALURU – 560 096.
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT.SOWMYA R., HCGP FOR R-1;
SRI N.UDAYAKUMAR, ADVOCATE FOR R-2)
THIS WP IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO A. ALLOW THE
WRIT PETITION, ISSUE WRIT IN THE NATURE OF CERTIORARI
QUASHING
THE
CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS
NO.28373/2023
PENDING
ON
THE
FILE
ADDITIONAL
CHIEF
METROPOLITAN
OF
IN
C.C
THE
XLVI
MAGISTRATE,
BENGALURU, VIDE ANNEXURE-A.
THIS
PETITION,
COMING
ON
FOR
PRELIMINARY
HEARING, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
ORAL ORDER
Petitioners – accused Nos.1 to 3 are before this Court
calling in question proceedings in C.C.No.28373/2023, pending
before the XLVI Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,
Bengaluru, for the offences punishable under Sections 341, 504
and 506 r/w. 34 of the IPC.
2.
Heard
Sri
Muralidhar
H.M.,
learned
counsel
for
petitioners, Smt. Sowmya R., learned High Court Government
Pleader for respondent No.1 and Sri N. Udayakumar N., learned
counsel for respondent No.2.
3. Facts in brief, germane, are as follows:
The petitioners are said to be the office bearers of Sri
Lakshminarayana
Rao
Education
Society
(for
short
‘the
Society’) and the complainant is the erstwhile Secretary of the
said Society. The squabble between the two, with regard to
certain fabrication, leads the petitioners to pass orders on
19.09.2022 and 02.05.2023, removing respondent No.2 –
complainant from the post of Secretary and his primary
membership.
These orders of removal are challenged before
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the Registrar by respondent No.2 - complainant. It transpires
that the said complaint was challenged before the Registrar of
the Societies and the Registrar of Societies is said to have
recalled the said orders in favour of the complainant.
The
petitioners preferred a writ petition before this Court in
W.P.No.20266/2023 against the order passed by the Registrar
of Societies. A co-ordinate bench has also passed an order that
the complainant should not interfere with the affairs of the
Society, on 11.09.2023.
4. The issue in the lis is not with regard to the merit of
the
matter.
29.12.2023,
A
by
complaint
comes
to
be
respondent
No.2
against
registered
the
on
petitioners
alleging that the petitioners attempted to prevent respondent
No.2 from entering into the office of the Society. This becomes
a crime in Crime No.329/2023, for the offences under Sections
341, 504 and 506 r/w. 34 of the IPC.
The police after
investigation file a charge sheet in C.C.No.28373/2023, for the
afore-quoted offences.
This has driven the petitioners to this
Court in the subject petition.
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5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would
submit that none of the ingredients of the offences so alleged
i.e., Sections 341, 504 or 506 of the IPC is met in the case at
hand.
Permitting further proceedings would thus become an
abuse of the process of the law.
More so, in the light of the
fact that the proceedings are pending before the Karnataka
Appellate Tribunal and the order of the co-ordinate bench
passed in W.P.No.20266/2023.
He would seek quashment of
the proceedings.
6. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 complainant would however refute the submissions to contend
that the petitioners armed with the order of the Registrar of Cooperative Societies had sought to enter into his office but, he
was not permitted to enter the office.
Therefore, the
ingredients of the offences are clearly met in the case at hand.
Learned counsel submits that long before the order could be
passed by the co-ordinate bench, the complainant was still in
the post of the Secretary and therefore, the complainant
wanted to enter the Society’s office. The petitioners restrained
the complainant and therefore, the offences are clearly met.
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The learned counsel submits that the proceedings must be
permitted to be continued.
7.
I
have
given
my
anxious
consideration
to
the
submissions made by the learned counsel for the respective
parties and have perused the material on record.
8. The afore-narrated facts lie in a narrow compass, as
the dispute is between the erstwhile Secretary and the office
bearers of the
aforesaid Society.
The
allegations galore
between the parties, both of whom are before the Karnataka
Appellate Tribunal in a proceeding instituted by respondent
No.2 - complainant.
The petitioners prefer a writ petition in
W.P.No.20266/2023, challenging the order of the Registrar of
Societies. The co-ordinate bench passed the following order:
“Sri.R.S.Kedaresh, learned counsel has entered
appearance for respondent No.1 by filing a caveat
petition.
Learned Additional Government Advocate
directed to take notice for respondent No.2.
is
Learned counsel for the petitioner is directed to
serve a copy of the writ petition along with annexures on
the learned Additional Government Advocate.
The grievance of the petitioner-Society is that
although respondent No.2-Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies rejected the application/proposal for
amendment of the bye-laws which were submitted at the
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hands of respondent No.1 claiming to be the Secretary of
the petitioner-Society, nevertheless, when action has
been taken by the petitioner-Society to remove
respondent No.1 from the Primary membership of the
Society, the impugned order at Annexure-A has been
passed holding that the principles of natural justice were
not followed before removing respondent No.1 from the
primary membership of the Society.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that
when the respondent No.2-Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies found in the earlier order dated
09.01.2023 at Annexure M that respondent No.1 had
fabricated the resolution passed by the Board of the
petitioner-Society and had submitted a concocted
resolution and thereafter, action is taken by the Society
to remove respondent No.1, since it was obvious that
respondent No.1 has indulged in illegal and irregular
conduct which is not in the interest of the petitionerSociety, the order of removal could not have been set
aside only on the ground of not following the principles of
natural justice.
Per contra, the learned counsel for respondent
No.1-caveator submits that respondent No.1 has also
questioned the earlier order dated 09.01.2023 before the
Karnataka Appellate Tribunal.
It is the contention of respondent No.1 that
he did not manipulate or tinker with the original
resolution passed by the Board of the Society.
Nevertheless, respondent No.1 is hereby directed
not to do anything in the matter of the petitionerSociety,
until
further
orders.
Two weeks' time is granted at the request of
learned counsel for the respondents to file
statement of objections.”
(Emphasis supplied)
In the interregnum or even before the said proceeding
would get concluded, the criminal law is set into motion by
respondent No.2 - complainant on the score that he was not
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permitted to enter his chamber’s of the Society and therefore,
the offence under Section 341 of the IPC is alleged against the
petitioners.
It is necessary to quote Section 341 of the IPC. It
reads as follows:
“341. Punishment for wrongful restraint.—
Whoever wrongfully restrains any person shall be
punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may
extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to
five hundred rupees, or with both.”
Section 341 of the IPC has its ingredients in Section 339
of the IPC.
“339. Wrongful restraint.—Whoever voluntarily
obstructs any person so as to prevent that person
from proceeding in any direction in which that
person has a right to proceed, is said wrongfully to
restrain that person.
Exception.—The obstruction of a private way over
land or water which a person in good faith believes
himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an
offence within the meaning of this section.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 339 of the IPC mandates that the victim must not
be allowed to move in any direction and there should not be
any direction or should be blocked from every direction. It is
only then it would become a criminal restraint upon the
movement of the victim. The purport of this provision need not
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detain this Court for long or delve deep into the matter. The
Apex Court in KEKI HORMUSJI GHARDA v. MEHERVAN
RUSTOM IRANI reported in (2009) 6 SCC 475 has held as
follows:
“11. It is in the aforementioned backdrop of events,
the statement made by the first respondent that Accused 1
to 5 were managing the affairs of the Company and had
instigated Accused 6 to construct the road must be viewed.
It is one thing to say that the Company had asked Accused
6 to make construction but only because Accused 1 to 5
were its Directors, the same, in our opinion, would not be
sufficient to fasten any criminal liability on them for
commission of an offence under Section 341 IPC or
otherwise.
12. “Wrongful restraint” has been defined under
Section 339 IPC in the following words:
“339. Wrongful restraint.—Whoever voluntarily
obstructs any person so as to prevent that person from
proceeding in any direction in which that person has a
right to proceed, is said wrongfully to restrain that
person.
Exception.—The obstruction of a private way
over land or water which a person in good faith
believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is
not an offence within the meaning of this section.”
The essential ingredients of the aforementioned
provision are:
(1) Accused obstructs voluntarily;
(2) The victim is prevented from proceeding in
any direction;
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(3) Such victim has every right to proceed in
that direction.
13. Section 341 IPC provides that:
“341. Punishment for wrongful restraint.—
Whoever wrongfully restrains any person, shall be
punished with simple imprisonment for a term which
may extend to one month, or with fine which may
extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.”
14. The word “voluntary” is significant. It
connotes that obstruction should be direct. The
obstructions must be a restriction on the normal
movement of a person. It should be a physical one.
They should have common intention to cause
obstruction.
15. The appellants herein were not at the site.
They did not carry out any work. No overt act or
physical obstruction on their part has been
attributed. Only because legal proceedings were
pending between the Company and Bombay Municipal
Corporation and/or with the first respondent herein,
the same would not by itself mean that the appellants
were in any way concerned with commission of a
criminal offence of causing obstructions to the first
respondent and his parents.
16. We have noticed hereinbefore that despite
of the said road being under construction, the first
respondent went to the police station thrice. He,
therefore, was not obstructed from going to the
police station. In fact, a firm action had been taken
by the authorities. The workers were asked not to do
any work on the road. We, therefore, fail to
appreciate that how, in a situation of this nature, the
Managing Director and the Directors of the Company
as also the Architect can be said to have committed
an offence under Section 341 IPC.
……
……
……
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19. Even as regards the availability of the
remedy of filing an application for discharge, the
same would not mean that although the allegations
made in the complaint petition even if given face
value and taken to be correct in its entirety, do not
disclose an offence or it is found to be otherwise an
abuse of the process of the court, still the High Court
would refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
20. Indisputably, there might have been some delay
on the part of the appellants in approaching the High Court
but while adjusting equity the High Court was required to
take into consideration the fact that in a case of this nature
the appellants would face harassment although the
allegations contained in the complaint petition even
assuming to be correct were trivial in nature. The High
Court furthermore has failed to take into consideration the
fact that in the first information report no allegation in
regard to acts of common intention or common object on
the part of the appellants was made out. The appellants
were not named as accused therein. It is, therefore, really
difficult to appreciate as to on what basis the complaint
petition was filed.
21. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned
judgment and order of the High Court is set aside. The
appeal is allowed. The order summoning the appellant is
quashed.”
(Emphasis supplied)
It is the case of the complainant that he was not allowed
to enter the office of the Society. Non-allowing or preventing
entry of respondent No.2 into the office of the Society would
not amount to voluntary restraint by use of criminal force.
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Therefore,
the
said
offence
cannot
be
laid
against
the
petitioners or it is loosely laid against the petitioners.
9. The other two offences alleged are the ones punishable
under Sections 504 and 506 of the IPC, the ingredients of
which are found in Section 503 of the IPC. The interpretation
of what should be the ingredients of the said offences need not
detain this Court for long or delve deep into the matter. The
Apex
Court
in
the
case
of
MOHAMMAD
WAJID
AND
ANOTHER v. STATE OF U.P. reported in 2023 SCC OnLine
SC 951 considering the very offences has held as follows:
“SECTIONS 503, 504 AND 506 OF THE IPC
24. Chapter XXII of the IPC relates to Criminal
Intimidation, Insult and Annoyance. Section 503 reads
thus:—
“Section 503. Criminal intimidation. —
Whoever threatens another with any injury to
his person, reputation or property, or to the
person or reputation of any one in whom that
person is interested, with intent to cause alarm
to that person, or to cause that person to do any
act which he is not legally bound to do, or to
omit to do any act which that person is legally
entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the
execution of such threat, commits criminal
intimidation.
Explanation.—A threat to injure the
reputation of any deceased person in whom the
person threatened is interested, is within this
section.
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Illustration
A, for the purpose of inducing B to resist from
prosecuting a civil suit, threatens to burn B's house. A
is guilty of criminal intimidation.”
25. Section 504 reads thus:—
“Section 504. Intentional insult with intent
to provoke breach of the peace.—Whoever
intentionally insults, and thereby gives provocation to
any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that
such provocation will cause him to break the public
peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or
with both.”
26. Section 506 reads thus:—
“Section 506. Punishment for criminal
intimidation. —Whoever commits, the offence of
criminal
intimidation
shall
be
punished
with
imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both;
If threat be to cause death or grievous
hurt, etc.—And if the threat be to cause death or
grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any
property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable
with death or imprisonment for life, or with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven
years, or to impute unchastity to a woman, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to seven years, or with fine,
or with both.”
27. An offence under Section 503
following essentials:—
1) Threatening a person with any injury;
(i)
(ii)
to his person, reputation or property; or
to the person, or reputation of any one in
whom that person is interested.
2) The threat must be with intent;
(i)
has
to cause alarm to that person; or
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(ii)
to cause that person to do any act which
he is not legally bound to do as the means
of avoiding the execution of such threat;
or
(iii)
to cause that person to omit to do any act
which that person is legally entitled to do
as the means of avoiding the execution of
such threat.
28. Section 504 of
the IPC contemplates
intentionally insulting a person and thereby
provoking such person insulted to breach the
peace or intentionally insulting a person knowing
it to be likely that the person insulted may be
provoked so as to cause a breach of the public
peace or to commit any other offence. Mere abuse
may not come within the purview of the section.
But, the words of abuse in a particular case might
amount to an intentional insult provoking the
person insulted to commit a breach of the public
peace or to commit any other offence. If abusive
language is used intentionally and is of such a
nature as would in the ordinary course of events
lead the person insulted to break the peace or to
commit an offence under the law, the case is not
taken away from the purview of the Section
merely because the insulted person did not
actually break the peace or commit any offence
having exercised self control or having been
subjected to abject terror by the offender. In
judging whether particular abusive language is
attracted by Section 504, IPC, the court has to
find out what, in the ordinary circumstances,
would be the effect of the abusive language used
and not what the complainant actually did as a
result of his peculiar idiosyncrasy or cool
temperament or sense of discipline. It is the
ordinary general nature of the abusive language
that is the test for considering whether the
abusive language is an intentional insult likely to
provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of
the peace and not the particular conduct or
temperament of the complainant.
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29. Mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or
insolence, may not amount to an intentional insult
within the meaning of Section 504, IPC if it does
not have the necessary element of being likely to
incite the person insulted to commit a breach of
the peace of an offence and the other element of
the accused intending to provoke the person
insulted to commit a breach of the peace or
knowing that the person insulted is likely to
commit a breach of the peace. Each case of
abusive language shall have to be decided in the
light of the facts and circumstances of that case
and there cannot be a general proposition that no
one commits an offence under Section 504, IPC if
he merely uses abusive language against the
complainant.
In King
Emperor v. Chunnibhai
Dayabhai, (1902) 4 Bom LR 78, a Division Bench
of the Bombay High Court pointed out that:—
“To constitute an offence under Section 504, I.P.C. it
is sufficient if the insult is of a kind calculated to cause
the other party to lose his temper and say or do
something violent. Public peace can be broken by
angry words as well as deeds.”
(Emphasis supplied)
30. A
bare
perusal
of
Section 506 of
the IPC makes it clear that a part of it relates to
criminal intimidation. Before an offence of criminal
intimidation is made out, it must be established that the
accused had an intention to cause alarm to the
complainant.
31. In the facts and circumstances of the
case and more particularly, considering the nature
of the allegations levelled in the FIR, a prima
facie case to constitute the offence punishable
under Section 506 of the IPC may probably could
be said to have been disclosed but not under
Section 504 of the IPC. The allegations with
respect
to
the
offence
punishable
under
Section 504 of the IPC can also be looked at from
a different perspective. In the FIR, all that the
first informant has stated is that abusive language
was used by the accused persons. What exactly
was uttered in the form of abuses is not stated in
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the FIR. One of the essential elements, as
discussed above, constituting an offence under
Section 504 of the IPC is that there should have
been an act or conduct amounting to intentional
insult. Where that act is the use of the abusive
words, it is necessary to know what those words
were in order to decide whether the use of those
words amounted to intentional insult. In the
absence of these words, it is not possible to
decide whether the ingredient of intentional insult
is present.”
(Emphasis supplied)
If the elucidation of the law by the Apex Court in the
afore-quoted judgment is pitted against the facts obtaining in
the case at hand, it would not meet the ingredients as is
observed by the Apex Court.
In that light, permitting further
proceedings against these petitioners on the aforesaid score
would run foul on the afore-quoted judgments and result in
miscarriage of justice.
10. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
a. The writ petition stands allowed.
b. The
proceedings
before
the
XLVI
in
C.C.No.28373/2023,
Additional
Chief
pending
Metropolitan
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Magistrate, Bengaluru, qua the petitioners, stand
quashed.
c. The observations made in the course of the order
would not come in the way of any proceedings pending
before the concerned Court / tribunal or influence any
proceeding pending between the parties before any
other fora.
Sd/(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
NVJ
List No.: 2 Sl No.: 43
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