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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision: 16th September, 2026
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CNR No. DLHC011363892008
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W.P.(C) 6962/2008
SRI BHAGWAN
Through:
versus
D.T.C.
Through:
.....Petitioner
Mr. Vinay Sabharwal, Adv.
.....Respondent
Mr. Uday N. Tiwary, Mr.
Akshat Tiwary and Mr.
Saksham Gupta, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN
AMIT MAHAJAN, J. (Oral)
1.
By the present petition, the petitioner challenges the award
dated 14.09.2007 (hereafter ‘impugned award’) passed by the
learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Karkardooma Courts,
Delhi in I.D. No. 01/04 whereby the learned Tribunal declined relief
to the petitioner and upheld the order of punishment of removal from
service.
2.
Succinctly stated, the petitioner was appointed as a conductor
with the respondent in the year 1979. A chargesheet was issued to the
petitioner on 25.07.1991, inter alia, alleging that on 15.07.1991, when
the bus was intercepted, it was found that the petitioner had collected a
fare of ₹2/- from a passenger but had issued him a ticket of only ₹1/-.
Further, when the cash of the conductor was checked, it was found
short of ₹10/-.
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3.
Thereafter, an enquiry was held into the charges and the same
culminated in the order dated 10.02.1992 whereby the petitioner was
removed from service.
4.
The respondent approached the Industrial Tribunal under
Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 seeking approval
of the punishment imposed on the petitioner. The said approval was
granted by the Industrial Tribunal by order dated 07.03.2002. The said
order was upheld by a Coordinate bench of this Court vide order dated
14.10.2004 in CWP 2740/2002.
5.
Thereafter, an industrial dispute raised by the petitioner was
referred for adjudication and the point of adjudication referred to the
learned Tribunal was as follows:
“whether the action of the management in removing Sh. Sri
Bhagwan S/o Sh. Jugti Ram from the services of the corporation
vide its order dated 10.02.1992 is illegal and/or unjustified and if
so, to what directions are necessary in this respect?”
6.
The Petitioner had filed the Statement of Claim contending that
the domestic enquiry was vitiated by several procedural irregularities
inter alia, the list of documents and witnesses was not provided to him
and he was not given due opportunity to defend his case. He further
stated that the respondent did not award punishment as per its own
circular dated 03.01.1966 according to which the petitioner should
have been terminated only on account of three charges of cheating and
the present one was only the second charge of cheating. He further
claimed that the punishment awarded to him is harsh and
disproportionate.
7.
The Management had filed the written statement and stated that
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approval of punishment had already been granted by the Industrial
Tribunal vide order dated 07.03.2002 and stated that while this was
not the third charge of cheating, the petitioner was charged with
misconduct on several occasions. The record further reflects that the
petitioner, on earlier occasions, was warned for misbehaving with
passengers, misusing public money and punished with stoppage of
next due increment for six months with cumulative effect for nonissuance of tickets despite collecting due fare from passengers.
8.
By the impugned award, the learned Industrial Tribunal, upon
consideration of the material before it including the orders passed in
the proceedings under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 where the enquiry was held to be proper answered the reference
against the petitioner.
9.
Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has preferred the present
petition.
10.
While by order dated 23.09.2008, this Court had issued notice
on the limited question in respect of the quantum of punishment, this
Court deems it apposite to briefly take note of the merits of the case
since the same is inextricably linked to the quantum of punishment.
11.
The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the learned
Tribunal erred in taking note of the proceedings under Section
33(2)(b) of the Industrial Tribunal Act, 1947 to hold that the enquiry
was fair and proper. He submits that the ambit of a reference under
Section 10 of the Industrial Tribunal Act, 1947 is wider than that
under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act.
12.
He submits that the Industrial Tribunal was independently
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required to adjudicate the reference on merits under Sections 10 and
11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. He further submits that the
present case only involves alleged gain of ₹1/- and for the same,
removal from service is a shockingly disproportionate punishment. He
submits that the petitioner was unwell on the said day and had
inadvertently issued ticket of a lesser denomination to the respondent.
13.
Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent submits that
the impugned order is well reasoned and merits no interference by this
Court. He submits that the validity of domestic enquiry had already
been upheld in the earlier proceedings and the removal was thereafter
approved under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
He submits that the said order granting approval was also upheld by a
Coordinate Bench of this Court. He submits that even otherwise, the
learned Industrial Tribunal while passing the impugned award
independently took note of the entirety of circumstances and any
interference by this Court would essentially amount to a reappreciation of the evidence which is not warranted in exercise of writ
jurisdiction of this Court.
14.
I have heard the counsel and perused the record.
15.
In the present case, the petitioner has challenged the impugned
award essentially on the ground that the learned Industrial Tribunal
wrongly relied on the proceedings under Section 33(2)(b) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to hold that the enquiry proceedings
were proper. It has further been argued that the punishment is
disproportionate.
16.
Before this Court adverts to examine the same, it is pertinent to
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note that there is no quarrel regarding the settled position that the
proceedings under Section 33(2)(b) and the subsequent adjudication of
an industrial dispute cannot be equated with each other. The fact that
approval was granted in the earlier proceedings does not, by itself,
dispense with the adjudicatory exercise required in the substantive
reference. The jurisdiction available to an Industrial Tribunal under
Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, where attracted,
cannot be said to have disappeared merely because an order under
Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 had earlier been
passed.
17.
Having noted thus, it is pertinent to note that the same does not
further the case of the petitioner. Firstly, there is no bar upon any
Court/Tribunal to supplement their reasoning from the observations
and evidence led before a competent court of jurisdiction.
18.
Even otherwise, the question before this Court is not whether
the learned Tribunal could have given a more “elaborate” reasoning to
answer the reference, but whether the conclusion ultimately reached
warrants interference in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution.
19.
In the present case, however, a perusal of the impugned order
would reveal that the learned Tribunal did not only take note of the
observations made in the proceedings under Section 33(2)(b) to find
that the enquiry proceedings was proper but it also considered the
other material on record to hold that the enquiry was proper. In doing
so, the learned Tribunal considered that the only plea taken by the
petitioner was that he was not given a list of witnesses and documents.
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20.
The record reveals and as duly appreciated by the learned
Tribunal, the respondent had received the chargesheet and had duly
participated in the enquiry proceedings. The record further reveals that
in his reply to the chargesheet, the petitioner admitted the charges
levelled against him and voluntarily stated that he did not want any
further enquiry in the matter.
21.
The chargesheet further specifies that all the relevant documents
annexed to the chargesheet were given to the respondent.
Additionally, in the reply to the chargesheet, the workman did not ask
for any documents. Consequently, as rightly appreciated by the
learned Tribunal, the same only appeared to be an afterthought.
22.
The learned Tribunal further appreciated that while the
petitioner had taken the plea that he was unwell and had consequently
inadvertently issued the ticket of a lower denomination, nothing was
brought forth to substantiate his stance. The learned Tribunal further
noted that the petitioner had never taken the plea or brought forth any
material to show that he was medically examined after he finished his
duty on the relevant date. In such circumstances, in view of the
categorical admission and nothing to corroborate the illness of the
petitioner, the enquiry proceedings were rightly found to be fair and
proper.
23.
Insofar as the quantum of punishment is concerned, the learned
Tribunal noted that the punishment of removal was approved in the
application preferred by the respondent under Section 33(2)(b) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the challenge to the said order
granting approval was also upheld by a Coordinate Bench of this
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Court. On that occasion, the Coordinate Bench of this Court had noted
that the quantum of misappropriation would lose significance as such
acts would be repeated more than often.
24.
While approval granted under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 is subject to modification in exercise of power
under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the only plea
taken on behalf of the petitioner is that on the said date the petitioner
was unwell and had consequently issued ticket of a lower
denomination being ₹1/- instead of ₹2/-. A perusal of the record would
reveal that such stance was also pressed before the learned Tribunal
who categorically recorded that the petitioner had not brought forth
any evidence in support of his plea.
25.
Furthermore, even the contention of the petitioner that this was
only his second charge of cheating and consequently he should have
been awarded a lesser punishment in terms of circular dated
03.01.1966 does not aid the case of the petitioner. This is because the
circular in itself in its concluding paragraph provides that the
procedure was being laid down as a general policy and each case of
cheating would be decided on its own merits. The Circular further
provides that it would be the discretion of the enquiry officer to
impose a severe punishment even in the first or second case if the
same was warranted.
26.
Even otherwise, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Depot
Manager, A.P. SRTC v. B. Swamy : (2007) 12 SCC 40 affirmed that
merely because cheating was conducted for the first time was no
ground to hold that the alleged act was accidental and that for the
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same, punishment of dismissal from service is not disproportionate.
Further, in the case of U.P. SRTC v. Suresh Chand Sharma: (2010) 6
SCC 555, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that even if the case
involved misappropriation of a petty amount, the punishment of
dismissal from service was appropriate.
27.
The scope of judicial review over an industrial adjudication is
supervisory and not appellate. A mere possibility of another view on
the evidence is not sufficient.
28.
In the present case, the learned Tribunal considered the fact that
the domestic enquiry had already been upheld and that approval had
been granted in the earlier proceedings. While the reasoning contained
in the impugned award is brief, the ultimate conclusion cannot, for the
reasons discussed above, be said to be one which warrants
interference.
29.
It is also relevant that the disciplinary action dates back to the
year 1991 and the impugned award was rendered in the year 2007.
The present writ petition has remained pending thereafter for a
considerable period. The Court is therefore not persuaded to unsettle
the disciplinary action at this stage.
30.
The
writ
petition
is,
accordingly,
dismissed.
Pending
applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
AMIT MAHAJAN, J
SEPTEMBER 16, 2026
‘KDK’
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