Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
2026:HHC:3361
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP(M) Nos. 3042 & 3054 of 2025
Reserved on: 16.01.2025
Date of Decision: 23.01.2026.
_____________________________________
1. Cr.MP(M) No. 3042 of 2025
Sachin
...Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh
...Respondent
______________________________________
2. Cr.MP(M) No. 3054 of 2025
Sorabh
...Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh
...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Vacation Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioner(s)
:
Mr Rajesh Verma, Advocate, in both
the petitions.
For the Respondents/State:
Mr Lokender Kutlehira, Additional
Advocate
General,
for
the
respondents/State, in both the
petitions.
Rakesh Kainthla, Vacation Judge
The petitioners have (led the present petition for
seeking regular bail, in FIR No. 282 of 2025 dated 22.11.2025
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
registered at Police Station Sadar, Chamba, H.P., for the
commission of o2ences punishable under Sections 21 and 29 of
the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS
Act) and Section 221 and 132 of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS).
Since both petitions have arisen out of the same FIR; therefore,
they are being taken up together for convenience.
2.
It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the
police were checking the vehicles on 22.11.2025 at 7 AM. They
received secret information that Binta Mahajan and her son,
Aryan Mahajan, were selling heroin, and a huge quantity of
heroin could be recovered by searching their house. The police
went to their house after completing the formalities and
recovered one weighing machine, two burnt foil papers, one
folded and burnt ₹20 currency notes and one syringe. The police
also recovered 14 mobile phones and 20.65 grams of heroin. The
police arrested the occupants and seized the heroin. The police
found that the petitioner, Sachin, had made a transaction of
₹57,260/- and the petitioner, Sorabh, had made a transaction of
₹22,750/-
with
Aryan
Mahajan.
The
police
arrested
the
petitioners based on the (nancial transactions. The petitioners
are permanent residents of Chamba. They have roots in society,
and there is no chance of their absconding. They would abide by
the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it
was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the
petitioners be released on bail.
3.
The petitions are opposed by (ling a status report
asserting that the police were checking the vehicles on 22.11.2015.
They received secret information that Binta Mahajan and her son
Aryan Mahajan were selling heroin, and in case of a search of
their house, a huge quantity of heroin could be recovered. The
information was sent to the Additional Superintendent of Police,
Chamba and authorization letter was issued by the Additional
Superintendent of Police, Chamba. The police associated Seema
Kumari and Mahender Kumar and went to the house of Binta
Mahajan. The police found Aryan Mahajan in the house. The
police searched the house and recovered an electronic weighing
machine, two burnt foil papers, one burnt and one folded
currency note of ₹20/- and one syringe. Binta Mahajan also came
to the spot. The police conducted a further search of the house
and recovered 14 mobile phones, jewellery, 20.65 grams of
heroin, and ₹2,33,377/- in cash. The police seized all the articles
and arrested the occupants. The police checked their accounts
and found that various persons, including the petitioners, had
transferred the money to their accounts. The police arrested
those persons, including the petitioners. The petitioners, Sachin
Kumar and Sorabh, had transferred ₹57,260/- and ₹22,750/- to
the accounts of Aryan Mahajan and Binta Mahajan on di2erent
dates. The petitioner, Sachin, had talked to Aryan Mahajan 113
times between 02.06.2025 and 20.07.2025 and the petitioner,
Sorabh, had talked to Aryan Mahajan 175 times between
07.06.2025 and 20.07.2025. Hence, the status report.
4.
I have heard Mr Rajesh Verma, learned counsel for the
petitioners and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional
Advocate General for the respondent/State.
5.
Mr Rajesh Verma, learned counsel for the petitioners,
submitted that the petitioners are innocent and they were falsely
implicated. There is no evidence against them except the (nancial
transaction and the call detail record, which is not suBcient to
connect them to the commission of the crime. The petitioners are
the permanent residents of Chamba. The police have added
Section 27A of the NDPS Act, but the mere purchase of the
narcotics does not amount to (nancing. Therefore, he prayed that
the present petitions be allowed and the petitioners be released
on bail.
6.
Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate
General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioners
are involved in the sale/purchase of heroin, which adversely
a2ects the young generation. No leniency should be shown to the
petitioners. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be
dismissed.
7.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8.
The parameters for granting bail were considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC
314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:
(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail
56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1
SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while
elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution
of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under
trial, has laid down the key factors that should be
considered while granting bail, which are extracted as
under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the
vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or a conviction is con(rmed, also
bears upon the issue.
8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice
would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant
jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being.
[Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”
(Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 —
Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]
9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court
considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with
witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the
process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in
this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who
is applying for bail to $nd whether he has a bad record,
particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to
commit serious o%ences while on bail. In regard to
habituals, it is part of criminological history that a
thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the
opportunity to in&ict further crimes on the members of
society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the
criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise
in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied)
57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4
SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various
aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing
with an application seeking bail. The same may be
extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the
basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the
circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner.
While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the
nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support
thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction
will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing
of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the
accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of
the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the
witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the
public or State and similar other considerations. It has also
to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail
the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for
believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the
court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic
itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the
accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce
prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis
supplied)
58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh,
(2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through
Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion
in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In
highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of
course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as
follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)
“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but,
however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a
judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order
for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained.
Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is
dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being
dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case
to case. While placement of the accused in the society,
though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding
factor in the matter of grant of bail, and the same should
always be coupled with other circumstances warranting
the grant of bail. The nature of the o%ence is one of the
basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more
heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection
of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual
matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied)
59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC
528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is
established that a court considering a bail application
cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and
an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the
court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons
justifying the grant of bail.
60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14
SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that
where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said
order would su2er from the vice of non-application of
mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with
regard to the circumstances under which an order granting
bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought
to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also
been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere
with an order passed by the High Court granting or
rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally
incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion
judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the
basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this
Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other
circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while
considering an application for bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable
ground to believe that the accused had committed
the o%ence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or &eeing,
if released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and
standing of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the o%ence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses
being in&uenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted
by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxx
62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of
application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise
of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the
accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 :
(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this
Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order
(Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856
and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857)
of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as
follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 :
(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)
“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an
individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while
considering an application for bail courts cannot lose
sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an
accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case,
particularly, when the accusations may not be false,
frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by
adequate material brought on record so as to enable a
court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While
considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima
facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must
be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the
case brought on record. Due consideration must be given
to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal
antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of
punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the
o%ence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis
supplied)
9.
The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
10.
The status report mentions that the police checked the
bank accounts of the main accused and found that the petitioners
had transferred various amounts to the main accused. This is not
suBcient to connect the petitioners to the commission of a crime.
It was laid down by the Kerala High Court in Amal E vs State of
Kerala 2023:KER:39393 that (nancial transactions are not
suBcient to connect the accused with the commission of a crime.
It was observed:
“From the perusal of the case records, it can be seen that,
apart from the aforesaid transactions, there is nothing to
show the involvement of the petitioners. It is true that the
documents indicate the monetary transactions between the
petitioners and some of the accused persons, but the
question that arises is whether the said transactions were
in connection with the sale of Narcotic drugs. To establish
the same, apart from the confession statements of the
accused, there is nothing. However, as it is an aspect to be
established during the trial, I do not intend to enter into
any (nding at this stage, but the said aspect is suBcient to
record the satisfaction of the conditions contemplated
under section 37 of the NDPS Act, as the lack of such
materials evokes a reasonable doubt as to the involvement
of the petitioner.”
11.
The police also relied upon the call detail record to
conclude that the petitioner was involved in the commission of
crime. This is also not suBcient. It was laid down by this Court in
Dinesh Kumar @ Billa Versus State of H.P. 2020 Cri. L.J. 4564, that
the phone calls are not suBcient to deny bail to a person.
12.
It was laid down by this Court in Saina Devi vs State of
Himachal Pradesh 2022 Law Suit (HP) 211 that where the police
have no material except the call details record and the disclosure
statement of the co-accused, the petitioner cannot be kept in
custody. It was observed: “[16] In the facts of the instant case, the prosecution, for
implicating the petitioner, relies upon (rstly the
confessional statement made by accused Dabe Ram and
secondly the CDR details of calls exchanged between the
petitioner and the wife of co-accused Dabe Ram. Taking
into consideration the evidence with respect to the
availability of CDR details involving the phone number of
the petitioner and the mobile phone number of the wife of
co-accused Dabe Ram, this Court had considered the
existence of a prima facie case against the petitioner and
had rejected the bail application as not satisfying the
conditions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act.
[17] Since the existence of CDR details of accused person(s)
has not been considered as a circumstance suBcient to
hold a prima facie case against the accused person(s), in
Pallulabid Ahmad's case (supra), this Court is of the view
that petitioner has made out a case for maintainability of
his successive bail application as also for grant of bail in his
favour.
[18] Except for the existence of CDRs and the disclosure
statement of the co-accused, no other material appears to
have been collected against the petitioner. The disclosure
made by the co-accused cannot be read against the
petitioner as per the mandate of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Tofan Singh Vs State of Tamil Nadu, 2021 4 SCC 1.
Further, on the basis of the aforesaid elucidation, the
petitioner is also entitled to the bene(t of bail.
13.
A similar view was taken by this Court in Dabe Ram vs.
State of H.P., Cr.MP(M) No. 1894 of 2023, decided on 01.09.2023,
Parvesh Saini vs State of H.P., Cr.MP(M) No. 2355 of 2023, decided on
06.10.2023 and Relu Ram vs. State of H.P. Cr.MP(M) No. 1061 of
2023, decided on 15.05.2023.
14.
Therefore, the petitioners cannot be prima facie
connected to the commission of a crime merely because of
(nancial transactions and call detail records.
15.
The police have also added Section 27A of the NDPS
Act, which deals with the (nancing of the drugs. The term
(nancing was explained by the Bombay High Court in Rhea
Chakraborty v. Union of India 2021 Cr LJ 248 as under: “66. Section 27A is much wider if sub-clause (iv) of Section
2(viiia) is taken into account. This sub-clause (iv) of Section
2(viiia) takes in its sweep all the remaining activities which
are not mentioned in sub-clauses (i),(ii) & (iii). This covers
just about every activity that can be described as dealing in
narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances. The interpretation
of Section 27A should not be stretched to the extent of
rendering the classi(cation of sentences depending on the
quantities in penal Sections 20, 21, 22 and 23 otiose.
67. Sub-clause (viiia) of Section 2 of the NDPS Act is an
inclusive de(nition. The inclusive part mentions (nancing,
abetting, conspiring and harbouring. The (nancing and
harbouring parts are speci(cally made punishable under
Section 27A.
68. The activities mentioned in Section 2(viiia)(iii) and Section
8(c) refer to sale, purchase, export, import, etc. All these activities
involve monetary transactions. For every sale or purchase, there
can be a use of money. But that will not mean that either of the
parties has “$nanced” the transaction. Such sales and purchases
are separately prohibited and made punishable under Section
8(c), read with Section 20 and other similar Sections. Therefore,
“$nancing” is something more than just paying for purchases
and other activities involving contraband as de$ned under
Section 8(c). Contravention of that Section and indulging in
activities mentioned in Sections 20, 21, 22 and 23 incur
punishment depending on the quantity of the contraband.
69. For interpreting Section 27A harmoniously with the
Scheme of the Act and other Sections, it is necessary to go to
the Statement of Objects and Reasons for incorporating this
Section in the Act w.e.f. 29.5.1989. The Statement of Objects
and Reasons of the 1989 Amendment, which is reproduced
hereinbefore, mentions that India was facing a problem of
transit traBc in illicit drugs. The spillover from such traBc
was causing problems of abuse and addiction. Therefore, a
need was felt to amend the Law to further strengthen it.
70. Thus, the aim was to control the traBc in illicit drugs as
the spillover from such traBc was causing problems of abuse
and addiction. The Legislature wanted to attack the basic
cause of the illicit traBc of drugs. The prohibitory Section 8
already existed at that time. Therefore, a separate Section 27A
was introduced to check these activities, which were the root
cause of illicit traBc. “Financing” and “harbouring” such
activities were, therefore, speci(cally mentioned under
Section 27A.
71. “Financing” is not de(ned under the Act. The Concise
Oxford Dictionary de(nes the word “(nance” as “(1) the
management of (esp. public) money, (2) monetary support
for an enterprise, (3) (in pl.) the money resources of a state,
company, or person, to provide capital for (a person or
enterprise)”.
72. Black's Law Dictionary gives the meaning of the word
“(nance” as “to raise or provide funds”.
73. Thus, “$nancing” as generally understood is o%ering
monetary support or providing funds.
74. Therefore, simply providing money for a particular
transaction or other transactions will not be $nancing of that
activity. Financing will have to be interpreted to mean to provide
funds for either making that particular activity operational or for
sustaining it. It is the $nancial support that directly or indirectly
causes the existence of such illicit tra=c. The word “$nancing”
would necessarily refer to some activities involving illegal trade
or business
75. The allegations against the Applicant of spending money
in procuring drugs for Sushant Singh Rajput will not,
therefore, mean that she had (nanced illicit traBc.”
(emphasis supplied)
16.
Thus, the purchase of the drugs will not amount to
(nancing, and the petitioners cannot be, prima facie, held liable
for the commission of an o2ence punishable under Section 27A of
the NDPS Act.
17.
There is no other material to connect the petitioners to
the commission of a crime.
18.
In view of the above, the present petitions are allowed,
and the petitioners are ordered to be released on bail, subject to
their furnishing bail bonds in the sum of ₹1,00,000/- with one
surety each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned
Trial Court. While on bail, the petitioners will abide by the
following conditions: (I)
The petitioners will not intimidate the witnesses, nor
will they in&uence any evidence in any manner
whatsoever.
(II)
The petitioners shall attend the trial on each and every
hearing and will not seek unnecessary adjournments.
(III)
The petitioners will not leave the present address for a
continuous period of seven days without furnishing the
address of the intended visit to the SHO concerned, the
Police Station concerned and the Trial Court.
19.
(IV)
The petitioners will surrender their passports, if any, to
the Court; and
(V)
The petitioners will furnish their mobile number and
social media contact to the Police and the Court and will
abide by the summons/notices received from the
Police/Court through SMS/WhatsApp/Social Media
Account. In case of any change in the mobile number or
social media accounts, the same will be intimated to the
Police/Court within $ve days from the date of the
change.
It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of
any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to (le
petitions for cancellation of the bail.
20.
The petitions stand accordingly disposed of. A copy of
this order be sent to the Jail Superintendent of District Jail,
Chamba and the learned Trial Court by FASTER.
21.
The observations made hereinabove are regarding the
disposal of these petitions and will have no bearing whatsoever
on the case's merits.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Vacation Judge
23rd January, 2026
(Nikita)
CHANDER
SHEKHAR
CHANDER
SHEKHAR
Date: 2026.01.23
16:58:10 +0530
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review