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Serial No.01
Regular List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WA No. 35 of 2012 with
WA No. 36 of 2012
Date of Decision: 07.06.2021
Smti Jengme Sangma
Shri Deben Marak
Vs.
Vs.
State of Meghalaya & Ors.
State of Meghalaya & Ors.
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Biswanath Somadder, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Mr. Justice H. S. Thangkhiew, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner(s)/Appellant(s):
Mr. K. Paul, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. S. Thapa, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
Mr. A. Kumar, AG with
Mr. K.P., Bhattacharjee, GA
Mr. S. Dey, SC GHADC
:
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
By The Court :
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
1.
The two instant writ appeals are being taken up together for
consideration; being similar in nature and arising out of a common
judgment and order dated 10th September, 2012, passed by a learned
Single Judge of the erstwhile jurisdictional High Court (i.e. the Gauhati
High Court). Another writ appeal, being WA No. 6 of 2013, which had
arisen from this same judgment and order i.e. 10th September, 2012,
had been segregated earlier and taken up for consideration separately,
WA No. 35 of 2012 with
WA No. 36 of 2012
by this Bench and disposed of by a judgment and order dated 01st April,
2021, since, on examination, it was discovered that the proceedings
therein were neither wholly identical nor similar in nature with the
present two writ appeals, i.e. WA No. 35 of 2012 and WA No. 36 of
2012.
2.
Before proceeding to discuss the merits of the two appeals, it is
pertinent to note that in the batch of three writ petitions, which were
disposed of by a learned Single Judge by a common judgment and
order dated 10th September, 2012; WP(C) No. 353 (SH) of 2009 was
allowed and WP (C) No. 250 (SH) of 2009 and WP (C) No. 251 (SH)
of 2009 were dismissed. The appeals arising from the two writ petitions
which were dismissed are now being taken up for consideration by this
Court.
3.
In Writ Appeal No. 35 of 2012, arising out of WP(C) No. 250
(SH) of 2009, the appellant, as Nokma of Bangonggiri Akhing, had
instituted the said writ petition for restoration of the land allegedly
encroached by the State respondents based on the report submitted by
the Mouzadar of the Garo Hills Autonomous District Council coupled
with a request made by the Executive Member, i/c Land Revenue,
GHADC, dated 25.11.2008., in this regard. This writ petition, by the
impugned common judgment, came to be dismissed by the learned
Single Judge on the ground that the matter involved disputed questions
of fact.
4.
Similarly, the appellant in Writ Appeal No. 36 of 2012, arising
out of WP(C) No. 251 (SH) of 2009, had instituted the writ petition as
Nokma of Rongrenggiri Akhing, being aggrieved by the alleged
WA No. 35 of 2012 with
WA No. 36 of 2012
encroachment by the State respondents and had also based his claim on
the report submitted by the Mouzadar of the Garo Hills Autonomous
District Council and also on the request by the Executive Member, i/c
Land Revenue, GHADC, report dated 23rd September, 2008. This writ
petition along with WP(C) No. 250 (SH) of 2009 was also dismissed
as being not maintainable for non-exhaustion of alternative civil law
remedy.
5.
Being aggrieved by the directions passed by the learned Single
Judge to entertain the two writ petitions, the writ petitioners have
preferred the two instant writ appeals.
6.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
7.
Mr. K. Paul, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. S. Thapa,
learned counsel for the appellants in both the appeals submits that in
WA No. 35 of 2012, the predecessors-in-interest of the appellants
herein are the registered Nokmas of Bangonggiri Akhing IV-56 (1). He
submits that the boundaries of Bangonggiri Akhing were settled on 13th
March, 1930, by the then Deputy Commissioner of Garo Hills and that
this record was maintained with the Garo Hills Autonomous District
Council. Learned senior counsel submits that vide representation dated
04th June, 2004, addressed to the Deputy Commissioner, East Garo
Hills, the appellant had requested for verification of the map maintained
by the GHADC as to their Akhing land, alleging that a portion had been
encroached upon by the Forest Department and prayed therein that
orders be passed directing the Forest Department to vacate the portion
of encroached land. Learned senior counsel submits that there being no
action taken on the representation, the appellant filed an application on
WA No. 35 of 2012 with
WA No. 36 of 2012
09th August, 2007 before the Executive Member, i/c Land and Revenue,
GHADC, praying for an enquiry and survey by the GHADC. Vide
order dated 14th April, 2008, a Mouzadar was deputed to survey the
land along with the State Forest Department officials and though the
survey was conducted, no representative from the Forest Department
was present. This report, the learned senior counsel submits, was
accepted by the Executive Member, i/c Land and Revenue and it was
observed in his order dated 25th November, 2008, that the State and the
Forest Department had encroached upon the Akhing land as claimed by
the Nokma and that the respondent No. 2 i.e., the Secretary to the
Government of Meghalaya, be requested to restore the encroached
portion. It is also submitted that the order dated 25th November, 2008,
has not been challenged by the State respondents and has attained
finality.
8.
Learned senior counsel submits that thereafter efforts were made
by the appellants/writ petitioners before the respondents for restoration
of the encroached land by relying upon the said order of the Executive
Member, i/c Land and Revenue, but as no action was taken on their
representation, the writ petitioner came by way of WP(C) No. 250 (SH)
of 2009, praying for restoration of the encroached Akhing land and to
stop such illegal encroachment. Learned senior counsel submits that the
State respondents contested the claim of the writ petitioner by taking
the plea that Bangonggiri Forest Reserve was notified way back in 19th
June, 1883 by the then British Government; the boundary description of
Bangonggiri had been amended and notified on 29th January, 1932 and
that the said Reserved Forest is in existence and is being maintained by
WA No. 35 of 2012 with
WA No. 36 of 2012
the State Forest Department. Learned senior counsel submits that the
authority of the Executive Member, i/c Land and Revenue, GHADC,
was also challenged by the State respondents and the claim that there
was encroachment, was strongly refuted.
9.
The learned senior counsel submits that in the course of
proceedings in the two instant appeals, a Division Bench of this Court
had passed an order on 03rd November, 2014, directing the Directorate
of Survey of India, Shillong, to survey the lands in question within a
period of 2(two) months and to submit a report to this Court. It is
submitted by the learned senior counsel that this order i.e. 03rd
November, 2014, has not been challenged by the State respondents till
date and as such, the same has attained finality. He further submits
though the respondents in compliance of the order dated 03rd
November, 2014, had facilitated the survey by the Survey of India
concerning the issue in WA No. 6 of 2013, and a survey report also
submitted before this Court, however, till date, no such survey has been
conducted, so far as the land of the writ petitioners are concerned.
10.
The learned senior counsel submits that the order dated 03rd
November, 2014, having attained finality, the fundamental issue
between the parties to the lis, being encroachment of land, the same can
be set at rest by a proper survey being conducted by an independent
agency. Learned senior counsel has also submitted that the principle of
res judicata applies as between two stages in the same litigation to this
extent that the Court – at an earlier stage – having decided the matter in
one way, will not allow the parties to re-agitate the matter once again at
a subsequent stage of the same proceedings. Learned senior counsel in
WA No. 35 of 2012 with
WA No. 36 of 2012
order to buttress his submission has placed reliance in the case of
Satyadhyan Ghosal & Ors. v. Smt. Deorajin Debi & Anr., reported in
AIR 1960 SC 941. In conclusion, he submits that the learned Single
Judge wrongly came to a finding that the writ petition is not
maintainable on the ground that the petitioners had not exhausted
alternative civil law remedy, but in fact had given relief to the writ
petitioners in WP (C) No. 353 (SH) of 2009 by way of the common
judgment and order dated 10th September, 2012. As such, he prays that
the writ appeals be allowed and the judgment and order dated 10th
September, 2012, so far as it relates to WP(C) No. 250 (SH) of 2009, be
set aside.
11.
As far as WA No. 36 of 2012, is concerned, learned senior
counsel submits that the facts are identically placed as WA No. 35 of
2012 and that the Mouzadar report dated 23rd September, 2008, as in
the other Akhing (Bangonggiri), clearly indicated that the State Forest
Department had encroached into the Akhing land of the writ petitioner,
namely, Rongrenggre. Learned senior counsel submits that similar
relief is sought for as in WA No. 35 of 2012 and reiterates that the
purport of the order dated 03rd November, 2014, directing for survey of
the lands in question, includes the land of the writ petitioner.
12.
Mr. A. Kumar, learned Advocate General, assisted by Mr. K.P.
Bhattacharjee, learned GA for the State respondents, through written
submissions has contended that the writ petition is not maintainable for
being based on disputed question of facts and, in fact, the location of
the land in question is disputed and denied apart from denial of the
allegations of encroachment. It is submitted that for deciding the
WA No. 35 of 2012 with
WA No. 36 of 2012
disputes raised, inter-alia, the following issues (by way of illustration)
would have to be determined:
a. Whether the appellant is Nokma as claimed?
b. Whether appellant is owner and title holder of land in question?
c. What is the location and extent of the land owned by the
appellant (if any)?
d. Whether the documents submitted in support of the claims are
genuine?
e. Whether there is any encroachment of land?
Learned Advocate General submits that without determining each of
the above issues and several other relevant issues, there can be no
proper adjudication of the petitioner’s claim.
13.
On the issue of disputed facts, it is submitted that the writ Court
shall not generally enter upon a determination of questions which
demand an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right as
claimed. To support this contention, reliance has been placed on the
cases of Thansingh Nathmal & Ors. Superintendent of Taxes, Dhubri
& Ors. reported in AIR 1964 SC 1419 (para 7) and Suganmal vs. State
of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. reported in AIR 1965 SC 1740 (paras 6 &
9). It is further submitted by the learned Advocate General that the
principles contained in the said judgments would apply to the facts of
the instant case inasmuch as each of the claims of the petitioners
require detailed evidence and the petitioners have not demonstrated the
existence of any fundamental or legal right which can be enforced in
writ proceedings. It is further submitted that in order for the Court to
issue a writ in the nature of mandamus, as prayed for by the appellant,
WA No. 35 of 2012 with
WA No. 36 of 2012
to compel the authorities to do something, it must be shown that there
exists a legal right in favour of the party seeking its enforcement. In the
present case, the learned Advocate General submits that each of the
claims of the appellants are disputed and the existence of any right in
respect of the claimed property is denied by the respondents and that
nothing has been placed by the appellants on record to establish such a
right, which resulted in the writ petitions being rightly dismissed as
being not maintainable. In this context, reliance has been placed by the
learned Advocate General in the case of Sohan Lal vs. Union of India
& Anr. reported in AIR 1957 SC 529, wherein it was held that when
there are rival claims to a title of a property, a civil suit is a proper
remedy rather than approaching the Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution for exercising the prerogative of issuing writs. On this
point, the learned Advocate General has also cited various other
decisions wherein this principle has been upheld. The same, for the
sake of reference, are given hereinbelow:
i)
Arvind Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors. [2005 SCC Online ALL
190 [para 3-4 & 10]
ii)
State of Bihar v. Jain Plastics and Chemicals Ltd., (2002) 1
SCC 216
iii)
Bimal Kumar Ghosh v. Kolkata Municipal Corporation &
Ors. [2017 SCC Online Cal 15709] (Para 1, 41, 42, 45)
iv)
Swati
Ferro
Alloys
(P)
Ltd.,
v.
Orissa
Industrial
Infrastructure Development Corpn., (2015) 4 SCC 204
(Para 16-18)
WA No. 35 of 2012 with
WA No. 36 of 2012
v)
Smt. Gunwant Kaur & Ors. v. Municipal Committee,
Bhatinda & Ors. [1969 (3) SCC 769] (Para 14)
vi)
Real Estate Agencies v. State of Goa & Ors. [2012 (12) SCC
170] (Para 16-19, 24, 25)
14.
The learned Advocate General has next put up the ground that
the writ petitions are not maintainable, in view of the existence of
alternative efficacious civil remedy and submits that the facts pertaining
to encroachment can only be decided before a Civil Court, and in this
regard has drawn the attention of this Court to paragraph 13 of the
impugned judgment and order dated 10th September, 2012, which
reflects the clear finding of the learned Single Judge on this point. The
learned Advocate General on this aspect has relied upon the following
decisions:
i)
DLF Housing Construction (P) Ltd. vs. Delhi Municipal
Corpn. AIR 1976 SC 386
ii)
Babubhai Muljibhai Patel vs. Nandlal Khodidas Barot &
Ors. (1975) 2 SCR 71.
15.
The learned Advocate General also submits that the writ petitions
are unsustainable on merits as there is no record to sustain any of the
claims raised over the subject land and that the entire claim of the
appellants are based on unverified documents and on unauthenticated
sketch maps, which have been disputed specifically by the respondents.
He further submits that even the surveys conducted in the course of the
proceedings do not pertain to or concern the appellants’ claims and as
such there is no factual or legal foundation to sustain their prayer. It is
further argued that even a survey cannot be the basis of the claim of the
WA No. 35 of 2012 with
WA No. 36 of 2012
petitioner inasmuch as it will not determine entitlement over the
surveyed land and title, he submits, can only be established after an
elaborate examination of evidence by way of civil proceedings.
Learned Advocate General then concludes by submitting that only by
way of civil proceedings can the genuineness of each of the above
disputed issues be determined and that the writ petitions were,
therefore, rightly dismissed as being not maintainable by the learned
Single Judge.
16.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties, at the outset it is to
be noted that this judgment and order disposing of these two appeals
can be deemed to be a continuation of the earlier adjudication of WA
No. 6 of 2013, which had been disposed of by a judgment and order
dated 01st April, 2021, by this Court. This observation is made in view
of the fact that the earlier judgment and order dated 01st April, 2021,
will have a direct bearing on the adjudication and ultimate outcome of
the present two appeals. However, it is to be noted that the
circumstances of WA No. 6 of 2013, stand on a completely different
footing as compared to the present two writ appeals in view of the fact
that it has had a long chequered history marked by multiple proceedings
before the Courts, which has given the case a discernable character. To
illustrate this fact, it would be apposite to refer to the judgment and
order dated 01st April, 2021, wherein, in relation to WA No. 6 of 2013,
it has been discussed as follows in paragraphs 1 and 2, which are
reproduced hereinbelow:
“1. This batch of three writ appeals, arise from three writ
petitions i.e., WP(C) No. 353 (SH) of 2009, WP(C) No.
250 (SH) of 2009 and WP(C) No.251 (SH) of 2009, which
WA No. 35 of 2012 with
WA No. 36 of 2012
were disposed of by a common judgment and order dated
10.09.2012, by the Gauhati High Court (being the
erstwhile jurisdictional High Court of the State of
Meghalaya). In WA No. 6 of 2013, arising from WP(C)
No. 353 (SH) of 2009, which was at first dealt with by the
learned Single Judge, the dispute was regarding the
boundary between Depa Doratcha Akhing, a private
community land and Chimabangshi Reserve Forest,
which had been notified as a Reserve Forest, since
19.06.1883., as it appears, with boundaries notified on
29.01.1932. This particular dispute has already had more
than its fair share of doing the rounds before this Court
and from the records and materials available, the genesis
of the subject matter of dispute, being Civil Rule No. 1004
of 1983, which was filed by the State against an order
dated 17.08.1983 passed by the Executive Member-inCharge, Revenue, GHADC, in connection with the land
in dispute. In the said Civil Rule by order dated
19.08.1988, directions had been issued that the boundary
be demarcated by the Deputy Commissioner of the
concerned District and that status quo was to be
maintained in the meanwhile. It is to be noted that this
order was passed in Misc. Case No. 568 of 1983 arising
out of Civil Rule No. 1004 of 1983. Subsequently, by
order dated 09.06.1989, a direction was passed for
handing-over physical possession of encroached land on
the basis of the demarcation which had been made
pursuant to the order dated 1988. However, in another
connected Misc. Case being Misc. Case No. 1099 of 1988,
an order dated 18.09.1989 was passed which is
reproduced herein below: “O R D E R
Date
18-9-89.
An order was passed on 18-8-89 to demarcate the
boundary between Chinshangshi Reserved Forest
and Depa Daracha Akhing No. 53. Sri Sen states
that pursuant to this order some demarcation was
done on 31-3-1989 and 1-4-89. In support of the
submission, the learned counsel has produced a
sketch map and also states that the Field
Measurement Book would bear his submission.
It, however, seems that this demarcation work
was undertaken by Assistant Enforcement
Inspector and some other officers of the Deputy
Commissioner’s Officer under the supervision of
the Additional Deputy Commissioner. But then
the Additional Deputy Commissioner himself is
not very satisfied with the aforesaid demarcation
work. It has, therefore, become necessary to
WA No. 35 of 2012 with
WA No. 36 of 2012
properly demarcate the aforesaid two lands under
the supervision of the Director of Survey,
Government of Meghalaya.
Let the Director of Survey, therefore, undertake
the work, and if during the course of survey, it
would be found that the survey undertaken
earlier portrays the correct picture and has been
duly undertaken, the Director would survey,
otherwise a fresh survey would be done in the
presence of all parties.
I have passed this order after hearing Shri Sen,
the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, Shri
N.M.Lahiri,
Learned
Advocate
General,
Meghalaya for the State of Meghalaya who have
agreed to receive this order.
Let the survey be done within a period of two
months from today.
Let a copy of this order be given to the Learned
Counsel of both the sides, within two days.
Sd/- B.L.Hansaria,
Judge
Sd/- W.A.Shishak
Judge”
2.
Thereafter, it appears that many subsequent
events unfolded which involved related proceedings and
even the attachment of the disputed area under Sections
145 and 146 Cr.P.C. which eventually culminated in a
Criminal Revision being Crl. Rev. No. 25 (SH) of 1999
filed by the writ petitioner, wherein the orders passed in
Criminal proceedings were quashed and attachment
orders were also vacated. However, the stalemate
continued and in spite of repeated representations,
possession of the demarcated portion of the said land was
never handed-over to the writ petitioner, which compelled
him to file the writ petition which is WP(C) No. 353 (SH)
of 2009, out of which the instant appeal (WA No. 6 of
2013) has arisen. The prayer therein, was for handingover possession of the land, based on the orders dated
19.08.1988, 09.06.1989 and 18.09.1989 passed by the
High Court in Civil Rule No. 1004 of 1983 and the survey
report of the Additional Director of Survey dated
22.12.1989.”
17.
This Court upheld the order of the learned Single Judge, after
considering all aspects of WA No. 6 of 2013 and after taking into
account the peculiar circumstances surrounding the case, especially the
WA No. 35 of 2012 with
WA No. 36 of 2012
fact that a right had accrued to the appellant therein by virtue of the
surveys that had been conducted in respect of the land in dispute. In the
present appeals, a stark difference that appears is the foundation of the
case itself, i.e. the facts as put forth in the writ petitions. Whereas, as
can be seen from above, the prayer made in WP(C) No. 353 (SH) of
2009 was for handing-over possession of the land based on the orders
dated 19th August, 1988, 09th June, 1989 and 18th September, 1989,
passed in Civil Rule No. 1004 of 1983 and the survey report of the
Additional Director of Survey, dated 22nd December, 1989, in the
present two appeals, the claim of the writ petitioners is based on a
report submitted by a Mouzadar of the GHADC coupled with a request
made by the Executive Member, i/c Land and Revenue, GHADC, dated
25th November, 2008. The said report and proceedings before the
District Council authorities have been stoutly resisted by the State
respondents in their affidavit before the learned Single Judge and the
authority and jurisdiction of the Executive Member, i/c Land and
Revenue, has also been questioned. Further, the authenticity of the
survey of the Mouzadar based on an outdated rough unscaled Akhing
map was not accepted by the respondents. Situated thus, it is justifiable
that the learned Single Judge dealt with the two instant matters
differently and held them to be not maintainable. In this context, the
finding of the learned Single Judge at paragraphs 13 & 14 of the
judgment, which is of relevance, is reproduced hereinbelow:
“13. On going through the claims and counter-claims of
the petitioner and the answering respondents filed by
them in both the writ petitions in juxtaposition, it become
obvious, in the face of the serious and complicated
dispute raised by them, such disputes, I am afraid,
WA No. 35 of 2012 with
WA No. 36 of 2012
cannot be decided by this Court in a summary proceeding
under Article 226 of the Constitution: the dispute so
raised can be decided only by adduction of oral and
documentary evidence by the rival parties and not on the
basis of mere affidavits. This is so because the question
as to whether the two Akhing lands in both the writ
petitions are encroached upon by the answering
respondents or whether the boundaries between the
Akhing lands of the petitioners and Rongrenggiri
Reserved Forest were already settled and notified or not
on 29-1-1932 as claimed by the answering respondents,
are factual matters, and cannot be determined by
examining the documentary evidence produced by both
the rival parties. In other words, the rights asserted by
the petitioners, are seriously disputed by the Staterespondents in the Forest Department. It cannot be overemphasised that Article 226 of the Constitution is an
extra-ordinary jurisdiction which can only be invoked to
enforce an established right and not to establish a legal
right. By clever drafting or otherwise, what is essentially
a civil dispute cannot simply be converted into a public
law litigation for decisions under Article 226 of the
Constitution. The writ petitions are, therefore, not
maintainable due to disputed question of facts. This
reminds me of the observation of the Apex Court in State
of Bihar v. Jain Plastics and Chemicals Ltd., (2002) 1
SCC 216, which reads thus: (SCC, p. 218, para 7)
“In our view, it is apparent that the order
passed by the High Court is, on the face of it,
illegal and erroneous. It is true that many matters
could be decided after referring to the contentions
raised in the affidavits and counter-affidavits, but
that would hardly be a ground for exercise of
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution in case of alleged breach of contract.
Whether the alleged non-supply of road permits by
the appellants would justify breach of contract by
the respondent would depend upon facts and
evidence and is not required to be decided or dealt
with in a writ petition. Such a seriously disputed
questions or rival claims of the parties with regard
to breach of contract are to be investigated and
determined on the basis of evidence which may be
led by the parties in an properly instituted civil suit
rather than by a Court exercising prerogative of
issuing writs.”
14. It is, however, contended by Ms. A. Paul, the learned
counsel for the petitioner, that Section 11 of the Garo
Hills Autonomous District (Social, Customs and Usages)
Validating Act, 1958 bars the jurisdiction of a civil court
WA No. 35 of 2012 with
WA No. 36 of 2012
to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any
matter falling within the purview of the Act, and that
both the petitioners have no remedy except by way of
filing this writ petition. She vehemently contends that
non-suiting the petitioners on the facts and
circumstances of these cases will result in gross
miscarriage of justice. I have carefully gone through the
provisions of this Act, and am not, however, persuaded to
hold that the jurisdiction of a civil court to decide the
boundary disputes between the two petitioners and the
Forest Department of Meghalaya is barred by Section 11
of the Act. This piece of legislation is about social
customs and usages such as succession to the Nokmaship
in accordance with the prevalent social customs and
usages, and nothing else. Therefore, this contention fails
and is accordingly rejected. At this stage, I feel I owe an
explanation to the petitioners for dismissing these two
writ petitions while allowing the writ petition of the
petitioner in WP(C) No. 353 (SH) of 2009. It must be
noted that in WP(C) No. 353 (SH) of 2009, the dispute
raised therein was already finally settled by this Court in
a series of cases referred to therein: those orders have
now attained finality. It could, perhaps, be due to the
half-hearted contests or prosecutions made by the Staterespondents, for which the petitioner therein should not
be blamed nor should he be allowed to suffer. The
ingenuous attempt made by the State-respondents in that
writ petition to ignore or circumvent the decisions of this
Court or to re-open the entire matter afresh had to be,
and was repelled by me in the interest of upholding the
majesty of this Court so that no litigant public return
home with the possible idea that the orders of this Court
can be flouted or treated with contempt by the Staterespondents with impunity. The alternative is the
eventual destruction of the rule of law. I cannot allow
myself to be presiding over the undermining of the
dignity and majesty of law courts of this State, which are
established by and under the Constitution of India.”
18.
Coming to the pointed argument of the appellants that the order
dated 03rd November, 2014, passed by this Court directing for survey of
the lands of the appellants has attained finality, the fact which remains
is that though the same was never assailed by the State respondents, it
was partially complied with only with regard to W.A No. 6 of 2013,
possibly due to the earlier proceedings, wherein surveys under the
WA No. 35 of 2012 with
WA No. 36 of 2012
order(s) of the Court had been conducted. As far as the present two
appeals are concerned, neither was the order carried forward by the
State respondents to cause survey and neither was the issue pursued by
the appellants, except at this stage of final hearing of these appeals.
19.
Another fact that cannot be overlooked is that the order dated
03rd November, 2014, is an interim order passed in the course of
proceedings and will be naturally subject to the changed events and the
situation in the different stages of adjudication of these matters,
especially as to whether the same situation, as on 03rd November, 2014,
still exists today. As discussed above, the facts and circumstances of
these two appeals stand on a totally different footing from W.A No. 6
of 2013. The fact that the instant matter involves complex issues which
cannot be fully adjudicated in a proceeding under Article 226 of the
Constitution cannot be overlooked or glossed over. Reliance also
cannot be placed on the ratio of the judgment rendered in W.A No. 6 of
2013, as the situation and circumstances of the appeals are significantly
different. The availability of alternative efficacious remedy is another
aspect which will deter this Court from entering upon a determination
of questions which are based on several disputed facts in order to
establish the rights of the appellants to enforce a writ in the nature of
mandamus.
20.
We find force in the contentions of the learned Advocate General
that even a survey will not be a basis to sustain the claim of the
petitioner inasmuch as the same will not determine entitlement over the
surveyed land and in this respect, taking into account the totality of the
circumstances, the interest of justice would be best served for all the
WA No. 35 of 2012 with
WA No. 36 of 2012
parties if the appellants take recourse to and avail of alternative remedy
for a full and complete adjudication of all the issues.
21.
The authorities placed by the respondents, being pronouncements
on which this aspect of the law is settled and followed in the
consideration and disposal of the instant appeals, have been duly noted
and relied upon. The judgment placed by the appellants, however, will
be of no assistance due to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the
case, as presented in the instant appeals, rendering its ratio inapplicable.
22.
For reasons aforementioned and there being no illegality in the
impugned judgment, the same is upheld and the instant writ appeals,
i.e., W.A No. 35 of 2012 and W.A No. 36 of 2012 stand accordingly
dismissed.
23.
In view of the disposal of WA Nos.35 and 36 of 2012, the
connected miscellaneous applications, being MC (WA) Nos.452 and
454 of 2012, stand disposed of accordingly.
24.
No order as to costs.
(H.S. Thangkhiew)
Judge
(Biswanath Somadder)
Chief Justice
Meghalaya
07.06.2021
“V. Lyndem PS”
WA No. 35 of 2012 with
WA No. 36 of 2012
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