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WP No. 101601 of 2025
C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025
HC-KAR
®
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,AT DHARWAD
DATED THIS THE 10TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ
WRIT PETITION NO. 101601 OF 2025 (LB-RES)
C/W
WRIT PETITION NO. 105810 OF 2025 (LB-ELE)
IN W.P.NO.101601/2025
BETWEEN
1. SMT USHA MAHESH DASAR
W/O MAHESH DASAR ,
AGED ABOUT 27 YEARS,
R/A SIDDARAMESHWAR NAGAR,
NEAR HUBAR PLOT
GADAG-582101
Digitally signed
by SHWETHA
RAGHAVENDRA
Location: HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA
2. SRI ANIL M ABBIGERE
S/O MALLAPPA
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS,
OCC. R/A 1728 /5, OLD SARAF
BAZAAR,
GADAG-562101
3. SRI GULAPPA S MUSHIGERI
S/O HANAMANTHAPPA MUSHIGIRI
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS,
R/A NO. 250/9, VIVEKANANDA
NAGAR,
NEAR HANUMAN TEMPLE,
BETAGERI
GADAG-582101
...PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. K.N. PHANINDRA SR. ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. B.R. SRIVATSA., ADVOCATE FOR
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SRI. MRUTYUNJAYA S. HALLIKERI., ADVOCATE)
AND
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
URBAN DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT
M.S. BUILDING,
BENGALURU-560001
REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
GADAG DISTRICT
DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION BUILDING,
GADAG-582101
3. THE REGIONAL COMMISSIONER
BELAGAVI DIVISION
BELAGAVI-590002.
4. THE COMMISSIONER
CITY MUNICIPAL COUNCILGADAGBETAGERI
STATION ROAD, GANDHI CIRCLE,
GADAG-582102
5. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
GADAG CUM ELECTION OFFICER,
GADAG -BETAGERI CITY MUNICIPAL
COUNCIL
GADAG-582102
…. RESPONDENTS
6. KRISHNA
S/O PARASAPPA PARAPUR
AGE: 57 YEARS,
OCC: AGRICULTURE
R/O NO. 3982/1, PLOT NO.100,101,
D.C.MILL ROAD, TALGAERI ONI,
GADAG-582101
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C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025
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… IMPLEADING RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. K. SHASHI KIRAN SHETTY., A.G. A/W
SRI. GANDADHAR. J.M., AAG FOR R1 TO R3 & R5;
SRI. HARISH DESAI., ADVOCATE FOR R4;
SRI. K.L. PATIL & SRI. S.S. BETUMATH., ADVOCATE
FOR IMPLEADING FOR R6)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 & 227 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI QUASHING THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 27.02.2025
BEARING NO.PRA.AA.BE:K.M.C/53/2024-25-E.NO:262750 PASSED BY
THE
3RD RESPONDENT-REGIONAL COMMISSIONER (PRODUCED AS
ANNEXURE-A) AND ETC.
IN W.P.NO.105810/2025
BETWEEN
1. CHANDRASHEKHAR S/O BASAVARAJ TADSAD
AGE 52 YEARS, OCC. MEMBER
R/O BASAVESHWAR NAGAR, GADAG
2. VINAYAK S/O SHIVAPPA MANVI
AGE 65 YEARS, OCC. MEMBER
R/O VEERANARAYAN TEMPLE ROAD, GADAG
3. PRAKASH ANGADI
AGE 53 YEARS, OCC. MEMBER
R/O SHIDDARAMESHWAR NAGAR, GADAG
4. RAGHAVENDRA YELAVATI
AGE 38 YEARS, OCC. MEMBER
R/O KANAGINAHAL ROAD, BETAGERI
...PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. K.N. PHANINDRA SR. ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. MRUTYUNJAYA S. HALLIKERI., ADVOCATE)
AND
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
DEPT. OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT,
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WP No. 101601 of 2025
C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025
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GADAG-582101.
2. THE UNDER SECRETARY TO THE GOVT.
DEPT. OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT
M.S.BUILDING, BANGALORE-560008
3. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GADAG
DIST. GADAG-582101
4. THE MUNCIPAL COUNCIL OF GADAG-BETAGERI
DIST. GADAG
BY ITS COMMISSIONER
…. RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. K. SHASHI KIRAN SHETTY., A.G. A/W
SRI. GANDADHAR. J.M., AAG FOR R1 TO R3;
SRI. HARISH DESAI., ADVOCATE FOR R4)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 & 227 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING ISSUE A WRIT / ORDER /
DIRECTION IN THE NATURE OF CERTIORARI BY QUASHING THE
IMPUGNED NOTIFICATION BEARING NO. NA A E 48 MLR 2023 DATED
29.07.2024 PASSED BY THE RESPONDENT NO.2 VIDE ANNEXURE-D.,
IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY AND ETC.
THESE WRIT PETITIONS COMING ON FOR ORDERS AND HAVING
BEEN RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 14.10.2025, THIS DAY, THE COURT
PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM:
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ
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CAV ORDER
(PER: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ)
1.
The Petitioners in WP No.101601/2025 are before this
court seeking for the following reliefs:
a) Issue a writ of Certiorari quashing the impugned
order
dated
27.02.2025
bearing
No.
Pra.Aa.Be:K.M.C/53/2024-25/E.No:262750 passed
by the R3-Regional Commissioner (produced as
Annexure-A) and/or
b) Issue such other writ, orders or directions as
deemed fit in the circumstances of the case, in the
interest of justice and equity.
2.
The Petitioners in WP No.105810/2025 are before this
court seeking for the following reliefs:
a) Issue a writ / order / direction in the nature of
certiorari by quashing the impugned notification
bearing no. Na A E 48 MLR 2023 dated 29.07.2024
passed by the respondent no.2 vide Annexure-D., in
the interest of justice and equity.
b) Pass such other order, orders that this Hon’ble court
deems fit in the facts and circumstances of the case, in
the interest of justice and equity.
FACTS IN W.P. No.105810/2025:
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3.
The petitioners in W.P. No.105810/2025 are before
this Court challenging the legality of the appointment
of an administrator to the City Municipal Council,
Gadag-Betageri.
4.
It is their case that the election to the posts of
President and Vice-President of the CMC was duly
conducted
on
24.01.2022.
Pursuant
thereto,
the
successful candidates assumed office, and their tenure
commenced on the said date. In terms of the
governing statutory framework, the tenure was to
continue for a fixed duration and, accordingly, it came
to an end on 24.07.2024.
5.
The petitioners state that the 10th term of the
President
and
Vice-President
was
declared
on
05.08.2024. In order to facilitate continuation of the
democratic process for the remaining tenure, the
Assistant Commissioner was appointed as the Election
Officer to conduct elections to the posts of President
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and
Vice-President.
However,
despite
such
appointment, no election was held.
6.
While matters stood thus, the Under Secretary to the
Government,
Urban
Development
Department
(Respondent No.2), by notification dated 29.07.2024,
purportedly exercising powers under Sections 315 of
the Karnataka Municipalities Act, appointed the Deputy
Commissioner of Gadag District as Administrator of
the CMC. The petitioners contend that this step
effectively displaced the elected governance structure
and vested the administration of the municipal body in
a bureaucratic authority.
7.
The challenge in the present writ petition is directed
against
the
Administrator.
statutory
said
notification
According
conditions
to
the
precedent
for
appointing
the
petitioners,
the
invoking
such
extraordinary powers were not satisfied. It is urged
that
there
was
neither
dissolution
nor
valid
supersession of the municipal body in accordance with
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law, nor were the mandatory procedural safeguards
complied with.
8.
Insofar as W.P. No.10581/2025 is concerned, learned
Senior Counsel Sri K.N. Panindra submits that the
exercise of power under Section 315 of the Karnataka
Municipal Corporations Act is impermissible in the
absence of fulfillment of the statutory pre-conditions
contemplated therein. He would contend that the
impugned action is without jurisdiction, arbitrary in
nature,
and
violative
of
the
democratic
scheme
envisaged under the Act. On this premise, it is
submitted that the writ petition deserves to be allowed
and the notification appointing the Administrator be
set aside.
Facts in WP No.101601/2025.
9.
The facts in the present matter are more or less
identical to those in W.P. No.105810/2025. The
petitioners are elected councillors of the GadagBetageri City Municipal Council. They were elected in
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the general elections held in December 2021 from
Ward Nos. 35, 28 and 13 respectively. The term of
office of a councillor is five years and their term is still
continuing. It will expire only in December 2026.
10.
The election to the posts of President and VicePresident was held on 24.01.2022. Petitioner No.1 was
elected as President for a period of two and a half
years. Her term came to an end on 27.07.2024.
11.
When Petitioner No.1 was serving as President, a
resolution dated 09.02.2024, bearing No.378, was
said to have been passed in respect of the extension
of lease of Wakharsal properties. The Commissioner of
the CMC later alleged that the said resolution was
fabricated and that the signature appearing on it was
not his. On this allegation, he filed a complaint with
the jurisdictional police. Based on the complaint, an
FIR was registered on 14.08.2024 against several
persons,
including
the
petitioners.
After
the
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investigation, a charge sheet was filed in the said
case.
12.
Thereafter, on 24.01.2025, Respondent No.4, the
Commissioner of the CMC, sent a communication to
Respondent
No.2,
the
Deputy
Commissioner,
requesting that action be taken against the petitioners
for the alleged fabrication.
13.
Respondent
No.2,
upon
receiving
the
proposal,
forwarded the same to Respondent No.3, the Regional
Commissioner, Belagavi District, on 28.01.2025, since
the power to take action had been delegated to the
Regional
Commissioner
by
notification
dated
19.01.2015. Respondent No.3 issued a show cause
notice dated 31.01.2025 calling upon the petitioners
to submit their explanation within seven days from the
date of receipt of the notice under sub-section (1) of
Section 41 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964.
14.
The petitioners state that though the notice is dated
31.01.2025,
it
was
served
on
them
only
on
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06.02.2025 and therefore they did not get sufficient
time to submit their reply.
15.
Thereafter, on 07.02.2025, Respondent No.3 issued
another communication directing the petitioners to
appear personally before him on 13.02.2025 at 11.00
a.m.
along
with
relevant
documents.
This
communication is said to have been served on them
on 11.02.2025. The petitioners appeared before the
Regional Commissioner on 13.02.2025 and sought
three weeks’ time to submit a detailed reply. However,
without granting such time or conducting a detailed
enquiry, Respondent No.3 passed an order on the
same day i.e., 13.02.2025 removing the petitioners
from the post of councillors under sub-sections (1)
and (2) of Section 41 of the Act.
16.
The said order dated 13.02.2025 was challenged
before this Court in W.P. No.101414/2025. By order
dated 24.02.2025, this Court partly allowed the writ
petition, quashed the order of removal and granted
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liberty to the petitioners to submit their reply on or
before 27.02.2025 by 3.00 p.m.
17.
It
is
further
stated
that
in
the
meanwhile,
on
22.02.2025, the election to the posts of President and
Vice-President was declared and scheduled to be held
on 28.02.2025. Though Respondent No.5, the Election
Officer, had been appointed earlier in July 2024,
elections had not been conducted at that time. A
notification declaring the election was issued on
20.02.2025.
18.
Insofar as the order in W.P. No.101414/2025 is
concerned, the petitioners filed a writ appeal in W.A.
No.100124/2025 seeking a direction to the Regional
Commissioner to conduct a full enquiry under subsection (1) of Section 41 of the Act by following the
principles
of
natural
justice
and
by
Bench
observed
examining
witnesses if necessary.
19.
The
Hon’ble
Division
that
the
appellants are at liberty to bring to the notice of the
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Regional Commissioner the binding decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v.
District Collector, Raigad
while conducting the
enquiry. The petitioners state that they brought the
said observation to the notice of Respondent No.3 on
27.02.2025 and requested that a proper enquiry be
conducted.
20.
However, on the very same day i.e., 27.02.2025,
Respondent No.3 passed another order removing the
petitioners from the post of councillors under subsections (1) and (2) of Section 41 of the Act without
conducting the detailed enquiry as requested. It is in
these
circumstances
that
the
petitioners
have
approached this Court challenging the order dated
27.02.2025.
21.
The submission of Shri K.N. Phanindra, learned Senior
Counsel appearing for the petitioners, is as follows:
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21.1. The impugned order passed by Respondent No.3
– Regional Commissioner has been passed in
great
haste.
The
replies
submitted
by
the
petitioners have not been properly considered.
No
proper
enquiry
has
been
conducted.
Therefore, the order is arbitrary, illegal and not
sustainable in law.
21.2. The reply filed by the petitioners has not been
examined
in
a
meaningful
manner.
The
guidelines laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. District
Collector, Raigad [(2012) 4 SCC 407] have not
been followed. Respondent No.3 has acted in
violation of the principles stated by the Apex
Court.
21.3. The observation made by the Hon’ble Division
Bench in W.A. No.100124/2025 has not been
followed. Without conducting a proper enquiry,
the order has been passed. The action of
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Respondent No.3 is stated to be mala fide and a
colourable exercise of power.
21.4. Learned
Senior
Counsel
submits
that
no
councillor can be removed without giving a
reasonable opportunity of hearing and without
conducting a full enquiry. In the present case,
neither reasonable opportunity has been granted
nor a detailed enquiry conducted. All councillors
ought to have been called and their statements
recorded
regarding
the
authenticity
of
the
resolution. Only thereafter could the allegations
have been considered.
21.5. Action has been taken merely on the basis of a
complaint filed by the Commissioner stating that
the signature is not his. The resolution was
passed by the entire Council. Therefore, all
members should have been examined before
taking action.
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21.6. The resolution was passed by the Council in
accordance with the law. The dispute regarding
the lease of Wakharsal properties had been
pending for a long time. The Council thought it
appropriate to resolve the issue by extending the
lease. It is further submitted that a writ appeal
relating to Wakharsal properties was pending
before
another
Division
Bench
and
upon
submission of the resolution, the said writ appeal
was withdrawn.
21.7. It is contended that the Regional Commissioner
did
not
give
adequate
opportunity
to
the
petitioners to explain these aspects. If sufficient
time had been granted, all these facts would
have been placed before him.
21.8. The resolution was passed keeping in mind the
financial
interest
of
the
Municipality.
The
majority of councillors had decided to extend the
lease of the Wakharsal properties to the existing
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tenants for five more years with revised rent
based on market conditions. According to the
petitioners, the CMC would have benefited from
the revised rental income.
21.9. Possession certificates were issued to the tenants
pursuant to the resolution, which shows that the
action was that of the Council as a whole and not
only of the petitioners. It is alleged that the
complaint was filed by the Commissioner under
political
pressure.
It
is
contended
that
the
Commissioner had in fact signed the resolution
and the signature will be proved during trial. The
criminal proceedings are stated to be an abuse of
process of law.
21.10. The
allegation
of
forgery
made
by
the
Commissioner is self-serving and has not yet
been proved in a criminal court. Until such
adjudication, the petitioners cannot be treated as
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guilty. Therefore, Section 41 of the Karnataka
Municipalities Act, 1964 cannot be invoked.
21.11. It is contended that mere registration of an FIR
and filing of a charge sheet does not amount to
proof of guilt. At present, the petitioners are only
accused and not convicted. Until the trial is
completed, they are presumed innocent. The
allegations
do
not
amount
to
misconduct
warranting removal under Section 41
21.12. The order violates the principles of natural
justice.
By
removing
three
elected
representatives, the democratic functioning of
local self-government has been affected.
21.13. The elected representatives cannot be removed
by executive action in a casual manner, as it
goes against the will of the people who elected
them. The procedure adopted by Respondent
No.3 is stated to be a mere formality. No specific
charges were framed. No charge memo was
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issued. No detailed enquiry or cross-examination
of witnesses was conducted.
21.14. Respondent No.3, while acting in a quasi-judicial
capacity, has not complied with the requirements
of passing a reasoned quasi-judicial order. The
petitioners were not given proper opportunity to
present their case. The authority has not acted
fairly, reasonably or impartially. Removal of an
elected
representative
requires
a
clear
and
established case, which is absent here.
21.15. An elected representative is entitled to hold
office for the full term unless removed in
accordance with law. Removal affects not only
the individual member but also the people
represented by him. This aspect has not been
properly considered.
21.16. The order suffers from mala fides. The objections
were filed on 27.02.2025 at 3.00 p.m., and the
impugned order was passed at 6.30 p.m. on the
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same day. This shows undue haste, especially
when the election was scheduled on 28.02.2025.
21.17. Removal of the petitioners reduced the total
strength of the Council, which benefits the ruling
party. Therefore, the order is alleged to have
been passed to favour the ruling party.
21.18. Under Section 41(1), there must be proved
misconduct before removal. In the present case,
there is only a complaint and a charge sheet.
There is no finding of guilt. Removal under
Section 41 also results in disqualification under
Section 16(1)(c) and (f) of the Act. A person
removed under Section 41 is disqualified not only
for the present term but also from contesting
elections for four years from the date of removal.
21.19. The next election to the CMC is scheduled in
January 2027. If the impugned order is allowed
to stand, the petitioners will not be able to
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contest the said election. This will cause grave
and irreparable injury to them.
21.20. He relies
Collector
on the decision in Laxmibai v.
[(2020)12
SCC
186],
more
particularly paras 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 & 22
which
are
reproduced
hereunder
for
easy
reference:
13. It is urged by the learned counsel for the
appellant that the disqualification is disproportionate
to the default committed by the appellant. In a
judgment reported as D. Venkata Reddy v. R. Sultan
[D. Venkata Reddy v. R. Sultan, (1976) 2 SCC 455] ,
it was held that the election is a politically sacred
public act, not of one person or of one official, but of
the collective will of the whole constituency. The
challenge in the said appeal was to an election on the
allegation of corrupt practices. This Court held that
the valuable verdict of the people at the polls must
be given due respect and should not be disregarded
on vague, indefinite, frivolous or fanciful allegations.
The onus lies heavily on the election petitioner to
make out a strong case for setting aside an election.
The election results cannot be lightly brushed aside in
election disputes. At the same time, it is necessary to
protect the purity and sobriety of the elections by
ensuring that the candidates do not secure the
valuable votes of the people by undue influence,
fraud, communal propaganda, bribery or other
corrupt practices as laid down in the Act.
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14. The Court held as under: (D. Venkata Reddy case
[D. Venkata Reddy v. R. Sultan, (1976) 2 SCC 455] ,
SCC pp. 459-60, para 3)
“3. Mr P. Bassi Reddy, learned counsel for the
appellant has assailed before us the findings of the
High Court on Issues 7, 26 and 27 as these were the
only issues which affected the appellant. Mr B. Shiv
Sankar,
learned
counsel
for
the
contesting
respondent has endeavoured to support the
judgment of the High Court by submitting that the
findings arrived at by the High Court were based on a
correct and proper appreciation of the evidence and
the facts and circumstances of the record. In a
democracy such as ours, the purity and sanctity of
elections, the sacrosanct and sacred nature of the
electoral process must be preserved and maintained.
The valuable verdict of the people at the polls must
be given due respect and candour and should not be
disregarded or set at naught on vague, indefinite,
frivolous or fanciful allegations or on evidence which
is of a shaky or prevaricating character. It is well
settled that the onus lies heavily on the election
petitioner to make out a strong case for setting aside
an election. In our country election is a fairly costly
and expensive venture and the Representation of the
People Act has provided sufficient safeguards to make
the elections fair and free. In these circumstances,
therefore, election results cannot be lightly brushed
aside in election disputes. At the same time it is
necessary to protect the purity and sobriety of the
elections by ensuring that the candidates do not
secure the valuable votes of the people by undue
influence, fraud, communal propaganda, bribery or
other corrupt practices as laid down in the Act.”
15. This Court in a judgment reported as State of
Punjab v. Baldev Singh [State of Punjab v. Baldev
Singh, (1999) 6 SCC 172 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1080]
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held that the issue of removal of an elected officebearer has serious repercussion. It implicitly makes it
imperative and obligatory on the part of the authority
to have strict adherence to the statutory provisions.
It was held that severer the punishment, greater care
has to be taken to see that all the safeguards
provided in a statute are scrupulously followed.
16. In Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab
[Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab, (2001) 6
SCC 260] , this Court has held that holding and
enjoying an office, discharging related duties is a
valuable statutory right of not only the returned
candidate but also his constituency or electoral
college. Therefore, the procedure prescribed must be
strictly adhered to and unless a clear case is made
out, there cannot be any justification for his removal.
17. In Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. Collector [Ravi
Yashwant Bhoir v. Collector, (2012) 4 SCC 407] , this
Court held that an elected official cannot be
permitted to be removed unceremoniously without
following the procedure prescribed by law. Where the
statutory provision has very serious repercussions, it
implicitly makes it imperative and obligatory on the
part of the authority to have strict adherence to the
statutory provisions. It was held as under: (SCC pp.
428-29, paras 35-37)
“35. The elected official is accountable to its
electorate because he is being elected by a large
number of voters. His removal has serious
repercussions as he is removed from the post and
declared disqualified to contest the elections for a
further stipulated period, but it also takes away the
right of the people of his constituency to be
represented by him. Undoubtedly, the right to hold
such a post is statutory and no person can claim any
absolute or vested right to the post, but he cannot be
removed without strictly adhering to the provisions
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provided by the legislature for his removal (vide Jyoti
Basu v. Debi Ghosal [Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal,
(1982) 1 SCC 691] , Mohan Lal Tripathi v. District
Magistrate, Rai Bareilly [Mohan Lal Tripathi v. District
Magistrate, Rai Bareilly, (1992) 4 SCC 80] and Ram
Beti v. District Panchayat Raj Adhikari [Ram Beti v.
District Panchayat Raj Adhikari, (1998) 1 SCC 680] ).
36. In view of the above, the law on the issue stands
crystallised to the effect that an elected member can
be removed in exceptional circumstances giving strict
adherence to the statutory provisions and holding the
enquiry, meeting the requirement of principles of
natural justice and giving an incumbent an
opportunity to defend himself, for the reason that
removal of an elected person casts stigma upon him
and takes away his valuable statutory right. Not only
the
elected
office-bearer
but
his
constituency/electoral college is also deprived of
representation by the person of their choice.
37. A duly elected person is entitled to hold office for
the term for which he has been elected and he can be
removed only on a proved misconduct or any other
procedure established under law like “no confidence
motion”, etc. The elected official is accountable to its
electorate as he has been elected by a large number
of voters and it would have serious repercussions
when he is removed from the office and further
declared disqualified to contest the election for a
further stipulated period.”
18. The judgments relate to the procedure to be
followed in election petition and proof of allegation
but such principles are to be followed in the case of
inflicting punishment of disqualification, which has
far serious implication almost similar to indulging in
corrupt practices in an election. The purity and
transparency in election process does not give
unbridled and arbitrary power to the Election
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Commission to pass any whimsical order without
examining the nature of default. The extent of period
of disqualification has to be in proportion to the
default. The Election Commission has to keep in
mind that by such process, an election of duly
elected candidate representing collective will of the
voters of the constituency is being set at naught.
19. In a judgment reported as Krishna District Coop.
Central Bank Ltd. v. K. Hanumantha Rao [Krishna
District Coop. Central Bank Ltd. v. K. Hanumantha
Rao, (2017) 2 SCC 528 : (2017) 1 SCC (L&S) 462] ,
this Court held that the limited power of judicial
review to interfere with the penalty is based on the
doctrine of proportionality which is a concept of
judicial
review.
If
the
punishment
is
so
disproportionate that it shocks the judicial
conscience, the court would interfere. The relevant
extract reads as under: (SCC pp. 531-33, para 7)
“7.2. Even otherwise, the aforesaid reason could not
be a valid reason for interfering with the punishment
imposed. It is trite that courts, while exercising their
power of judicial review over such matters, do not
sit as the appellate authority. Decision qua the
nature and quantum is the prerogative of the
disciplinary authority. It is not the function of the
High Court to decide the same. It is only in
exceptional circumstances, where it is found that the
punishment/penalty awarded by the disciplinary
authority/employer is wholly disproportionate, that
too to an extent that it shakes the conscience of the
court, that the court steps in and interferes.
7.2.1. No doubt, the award of punishment, which is
grossly in excess to the allegations, cannot claim
immunity and remains open for interference under
limited scope for judicial review. This limited power
of judicial review to interfere with the penalty is
based on the doctrine of proportionality which is a
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well-recognised concept of judicial review in our
jurisprudence. The punishment should appear to be
so disproportionate that it shocks the judicial
conscience. (See State of Jharkhand v. Kamal Prasad
[State of Jharkhand v. Kamal Prasad, (2014) 7 SCC
223 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 386] .) It would also be
apt to extract the following observations in this
behalf from the judgment of this Court in Kendriya
Vidyalaya Sangthan v. J. Hussain [Kendriya
Vidyalaya Sangthan v. J. Hussain, (2013) 10 SCC
106 : (2013) 2 SCC (L&S) 833] : (SCC pp. 110-12,
paras 8 & 10)
‘8. The order of the appellate authority while having
a relook at the case would, obviously, examine as to
whether the punishment imposed by the disciplinary
authority is reasonable or not. If the appellate
authority is of the opinion that the case warrants
lesser penalty, it can reduce the penalty so imposed
by the disciplinary authority. Such a power which
vests with the appellate authority departmentally is
ordinarily not available to the court or a tribunal.
The court while undertaking judicial review of the
matter is not supposed to substitute its own opinion
on reappraisal of facts. [See State (UT of Dadra &
Nagar Haveli) v. Gulabhia M. Lad [State (UT of
Dadra & Nagar Haveli) v. Gulabhia M. Lad, (2010) 5
SCC 775 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 101] .] In exercise of
power of judicial review, however, the court can
interfere with the punishment imposed when it is
found to be totally irrational or is outrageous in
defiance of logic. This limited scope of judicial review
is permissible and interference is available only
when the punishment is shockingly disproportionate,
suggesting lack of good faith. Otherwise, merely
because in the opinion of the court lesser
punishment would have been more appropriate,
cannot be a ground to interfere with the discretion of
the departmental authorities.
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***
10. An imprimatur to the aforesaid principle was
accorded by this Court as well in Ranjit Thakur v.
Union of India [Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India,
(1987) 4 SCC 611 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 1] . Speaking
for the Court, Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was)
emphasising that “all powers have legal limits”
invoked the aforesaid doctrine in the following
words: (SCC p. 620, para 25)
“25. … The question of the choice and quantum of
punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion
of the court martial. But the sentence has to suit the
offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive
or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate
to the offence as to shock the conscience and
amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The
doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of
judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect
which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of
the court martial, if the decision of the court even as
to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then
the sentence would not be immune from correction.
Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds
of judicial review.”’”
Civil appeals arising out of SLPs (C) Nos. 20814-816
of 2019 and Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) …
Diary No. 40018 of 2019
22. Delay condoned. Leave granted.
21.21. By relying on Laxmibai it is submitted that the
Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that an election
is a sacred public act reflecting the collective will
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of the constituency. The verdict of the people
must be given due respect and cannot be lightly
set aside on vague or weak allegations. The
burden lies heavily on the person challenging an
elected representative to make out a strong
case.
21.22. In a democracy, the purity and sanctity of
elections must be preserved. At the same time,
election results cannot be lightly brushed aside.
The will of the voters must be respected unless
serious and proven grounds exist.
21.23. Removal of an elected office-bearer has serious
consequences. Therefore, the authority must
strictly follow the statutory provisions. The more
severe the punishment, the greater the care
required in following the safeguards provided by
law.
21.24. Holding an elected office is a valuable statutory
right not only of the elected candidate but also of
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the
constituency.
Therefore,
the
prescribed
procedure must be strictly followed and removal
can be justified only if a clear case is made out.
21.25. An elected representative cannot be removed
without
strictly
established
by
following
law.
the
Removal
procedure
has
serious
consequences not only for the elected person but
also for the voters who elected him, removal is
permissible only in exceptional circumstances,
after conducting a proper enquiry and following
the principles of natural justice. An elected
representative is entitled to hold office for the
full term unless there is proved misconduct or
removal in accordance with law.
21.26. Principles
relating
to
election
disputes
and
disqualification must be applied carefully, as
disqualification has serious consequences. The
authority does not have unbridled or arbitrary
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power. The period and nature of disqualification
must be proportionate to the default committed.
21.27. By applying the doctrine of proportionality, it is
submitted that though courts do not normally
interfere with the punishment imposed by an
authority. However, if the punishment is so
disproportionate that it shocks the conscience of
the
Court,
interference
is
permissible.
The
punishment must not be irrational, excessive or
vindictive.
21.28. On the basis of the above judgment, learned
Senior Counsel submits that the removal of an
elected councillor is a serious matter. It affects
not only the individual but also the electorate.
Therefore,
strict
compliance
with
statutory
procedure, adherence to principles of natural
justice and proof of misconduct are mandatory.
In
the
absence
of
such
compliance,
impugned order is liable to be set aside.
the
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21.29. He relies on the decision of the Apex court in P.
Vijayan v. State of Kerala [(2010)2 SCC
398] more particularly para
10, which is
reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
10. Before considering the merits of the claim of both the
parties, it is useful to refer to Section 227 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973, which reads as under:
“227. Discharge.—If, upon consideration of the record of
the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after
hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution
in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he
shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so
doing.”
If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to
suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the
trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and
at this stage he is not to see whether the trial will end in
conviction or acquittal. Further, the words “not sufficient
ground for proceeding against the accused” clearly show
that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge
at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his
judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine
whether a case for trial has been made out by the
prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for
the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or
into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities
which is really the function of the court, after the trial
starts.
21.30. By relying on
P. Vijayan it is submitted that
scope of Section 227 of the Code of Criminal
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Procedure, 1973, deals with discharge of an
accused. The provision states that if, upon
consideration of the record and the documents,
and after hearing both sides, the Judge finds that
there is no sufficient ground to proceed against
the accused, he shall discharge the accused by
recording reasons.
21.31. If two views are possible and one view gives rise
only to suspicion, as opposed to grave suspicion,
the trial court is empowered to discharge the
accused. At that stage, the court is not required
to examine whether the trial will ultimately end
in conviction or acquittal.
21.32. The words “not sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused” show that the Court is not
expected to act mechanically at the request of
the prosecution. The Court must apply its judicial
mind to the material on record and decide
whether a case for trial has been made out.
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However, at that stage, the court is not required
to conduct a detailed examination of evidence or
to weigh the probabilities. A detailed appreciation
of evidence is required only after the trial begins.
21.33. Relying on the above principles, learned Senior
Counsel submits that in the present case there is
only an allegation and a charge sheet. There is
no finding of guilt. Even in criminal law, mere
suspicion is not enough to proceed. Therefore, in
the absence of any proved misconduct, the
drastic action of removal under Section 41 of the
Karnataka
Municipalities
Act,
is
not
justified.
21.34. He relies
Ravi
on the decision of the Apex Court in
Yashwant
Bhoir-v-District Collector,
Raigad and others (supra), more particularly
para 30 to 36, which are reproduced hereunder
for easy reference:
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30. There can also be no quarrel with the settled legal
proposition that removal of a duly elected member on the
basis of proved misconduct is a quasi-judicial proceeding in
nature. [Vide Indian National Congress (I) v. Institute of
Social Welfare [(2002) 5 SCC 685 : AIR 2002 SC 2158] .]
This view stands further fortified by the Constitution Bench
judgments of this Court in Bachhitar Singh v. State of
Punjab [AIR 1963 SC 395] and Union of India v. H.C. Goel
[AIR 1964 SC 364] . Therefore, the principles of natural
justice are required to be given full play and strict
compliance should be ensured, even in the absence of any
provision providing for the same. Principles of natural
justice require a fair opportunity of defence to such an
elected office-bearer.
31. Undoubtedly, any elected official in local selfgovernment has to be put on a higher pedestal as against
a government servant. If a temporary government
employee cannot be removed on the ground of misconduct
without holding a full-fledged inquiry, it is difficult to
imagine how an elected office-bearer can be removed
without holding a full-fledged inquiry.
32. In service jurisprudence, minor punishment is
permissible to be imposed while holding the inquiry as per
the procedure prescribed for it but for removal,
termination or reduction in rank, a full-fledged inquiry is
required otherwise it will be violative of the provisions of
Article 311 of the Constitution of India. The case is to be
understood in an entirely different context as compared to
the government employees, for the reason, that for the
removal of the elected officials, a more stringent procedure
and standard of proof is required.
33. This Court examined the provisions of the Punjab
Municipal Act, 1911, providing for the procedure of
removal of the President of the Municipal Council on similar
grounds in Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab
[(2001) 6 SCC 260 : AIR 2001 SC 2524] and observed
that removal of an elected office-bearer is a serious
matter. The elected office-bearer must not be removed
unless a clear-cut case is made out, for the reason that
holding and enjoying an office, discharging related duties
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is a valuable statutory right of not only the elected
member but also of his constituency or electoral college.
His removal may curtail the term of the office-bearer and
also cast stigma upon him. Therefore, the procedure
prescribed under a statute for removal must be strictly
adhered to and unless a clear case is made out, there can
be no justification for his removal. While taking the
decision, the authority should not be guided by any other
extraneous consideration or should not come under any
political pressure.
34. In a democratic institution, like ours, the incumbent is
entitled to hold the office for the term for which he has
been elected unless his election is set aside by a
prescribed procedure known to law or he is removed by
the procedure established under law. The proceedings for
removal must satisfy the requirement of natural justice
and the decision must show that the authority has applied
its mind to the allegations made and the explanation
furnished by the elected office-bearer sought to be
removed.
35. The elected official is accountable to its electorate
because he is being elected by a large number of voters.
His removal has serious repercussions as he is removed
from the post and declared disqualified to contest the
elections for a further stipulated period, but it also takes
away the right of the people of his constituency to be
represented by him. Undoubtedly, the right to hold such a
post is statutory and no person can claim any absolute or
vested right to the post, but he cannot be removed without
strictly adhering to the provisions provided by the
legislature for his removal (vide Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal
[(1982) 1 SCC 691 : AIR 1982 SC 983] , Mohan Lal
Tripathi v. District Magistrate, Rae Bareily [(1992) 4 SCC
80 : AIR 1993 SC 2042] and Ram Beti v. District
Panchayat Raj Adhikari [(1998) 1 SCC 680 : AIR 1998 SC
1222] ).
36. In view of the above, the law on the issue stands
crystallised to the effect that an elected member can be
removed in exceptional circumstances giving strict
adherence to the statutory provisions and holding the
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enquiry, meeting the requirement of principles of natural
justice and giving an incumbent an opportunity to defend
himself, for the reason that removal of an elected person
casts stigma upon him and takes away his valuable
statutory right. Not only the elected office-bearer but his
constituency/electoral college is also deprived of
representation by the person of their choice.
21.35. By relying on Ravi Yashwant Bhoir it is
submitted that the removal of a duly elected
member on the basis of proved misconduct is a
quasi-judicial
proceeding.
Therefore,
the
authority must strictly follow the principles of
natural justice. Even if the statute does not
expressly provide for such procedure, a fair
opportunity of defence must be given to the
elected representative.
21.36. An
elected
representative
in
local
self-
government stands on a higher footing than a
government
servant.
If
even
a
temporary
government servant cannot be removed without
a full enquiry, then an elected office-bearer
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cannot be removed without conducting a fullfledged enquiry.
21.37. In service law, major punishments like removal
require a full enquiry. In the case of elected
representatives, an even stricter procedure and
higher standard of proof are required before
removal.
21.38. Removal of an elected office-bearer is a serious
matter. It affects not only the individual but also
the constituency. The procedure prescribed by
statute must be strictly followed. The authority
must
not
act
under
political
pressure
or
extraneous considerations.
21.39. In a democracy, an elected representative is
entitled to hold office for the full term unless
removed by following the procedure established
by law. The order of removal must show that the
authority has applied its mind to the allegations
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and
the
explanation
given
by
the
elected
representative.
21.40. Removal has serious consequences. It not only
removes the person from office but may also
disqualify him from contesting future elections. It
also
deprives
the
voters
of
their
chosen
representative. Though the right to hold office is
statutory,
removal
must
strictly
follow
the
procedure prescribed by law.
21.41. An elected member can be removed only in
exceptional circumstances. There must be strict
compliance
proper
with
the
statutory
must
be
enquiry
provisions. A
conducted.
The
principles of natural justice must be followed.
The elected member must be given a real
opportunity to defend himself.
21.42. Relying
on
these
principles,
learned
Senior
Counsel submits that in the present case no full
enquiry
has
been
conducted,
no
proper
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opportunity has been given, and the impugned
order does not reflect proper application of mind.
Therefore, the removal of the petitioners is
contrary to the law laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court and as such the above petition is
required to be allowed and reliefs sought for
granted.
22.
Shri Shashi Kiran Shetty, learned Advocate General
Appearing for the State - Respondents 1 to 3 submits
as follows:
22.1. It
is
strongly
contended
on
behalf
of
the
respondents that the petitioners, who are elected
Councillors of Respondent No.4 – Municipality,
have indulged in a serious and deliberate act of
fraud by creating and using a forged resolution.
It is submitted that the said resolution was not at
all passed let alone lawfully passed in accordance
with
the
procedure
prescribed
under
the
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Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 and the Rules
framed thereunder. The resolution was fabricated
with the intention of conferring unlawful benefit
upon certain private individuals who have been
in unauthorised occupation of valuable municipal
property for several decades.
22.2. Litigation concerning the said property has been
pending for a long period and that this Court has,
on
earlier
occasions,
passed
specific
orders
directing eviction of the unauthorised occupants.
In spite of such judicial orders, and with full
knowledge of the same, the petitioners have
created the impugned resolution in order to
defeat and overcome the effect of those orders.
22.3. It is contended that by virtue of the fabricated
resolution, valuable public property belonging to
the Municipality has been effectively transferred
or continued in favour of persons who have no
lawful right, title or interest over the same. The
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property in question is a prime municipal asset
and that its lease or renewal directly affects
public revenue. By extending the lease in favour
of unauthorised occupants, the petitioners have
caused serious financial loss to the Municipality
and thereby acted against public interest.
22.4. The said occupants had already been directed to
be evicted by competent judicial orders, and
therefore, the act of passing such a resolution
amounts not merely to administrative irregularity
but to wilful misconduct. Such conduct strikes at
the very root of responsible governance and
constitutes gross misconduct in the discharge of
official duties.
22.5. On the basis of the above allegations, it is
submitted that the conduct of the petitioners is
disgraceful
and
unbecoming
of
elected
representatives. It is argued that Councillors,
being trustees of public property, are expected to
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act in the interest of the Municipality and its
residents. Instead, the petitioners have acted to
protect private interests at the cost of public
property.
22.6. It is therefore contended that in view of the
seriousness of the allegations and the material
collected, proceedings under Section 41 of the
Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 were rightly
initiated. The competent authority, namely the
Regional
Commissioner,
Belagavi,
after
considering the complaint, the records and the
explanation offered, has passed the order of
removal. The respondents submit that the order
has been passed in accordance with law and that
this Court ought not to interfere with the same in
exercise of its writ jurisdiction.
22.7. It is also submitted that this Court, in W.P.
No.112012/2019, by order dated 12.08.2022,
had categorically held that the unauthorised
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occupants of the cotton market property were
not entitled to continue in possession. By the
said order, the longstanding dispute between the
Municipality and the unauthorised occupants was
adjudicated
eviction.
and
directions
were
issued
for
The resolution was passed in direct
contravention of the said judicial orders. The
petitioners, being fully aware of the earlier order
of this Court, could not have lawfully taken a
decision that effectively nullified or diluted the
effect of the judicial directions. Therefore, the
action of the Regional Commissioner in removing
the petitioners is justified in order to protect the
sanctity
of
judicial
orders
and
safeguard
municipal property.
22.8. On these grounds, it is submitted that the writ
petitions are devoid of merit and are liable to be
dismissed.
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22.9.
He relies on Para 25 and 26 of the order passed
in W.P. No.112012/2019, which are reproduced
hereunder for easy reference:
25. Before parting with this petition, this Court deems it
necessary to remind our citizens that public property
should be respected and should not be allowed to be
misused or wasted. Time and again the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has held that the natural resources, which also
include lands, along with the public properties are held by
the State as a trustee. This doctrine of trust and the
trusteeship vested in the State needs to be respected. It
is high time that the citizens of the State understood the
value of public property, that public property belongs to
each one of us and the citizens should ensure that public
properties are put to best use and they would fetch the
best price which would ultimately go into the coffers of
the State. Public property shall not become the fiefdom of
a few.
26. It is required to notice that although the order of
eviction was passed on 03.03.2004 and the District Court
dismissed the appeals on 19.12.2005 and this Court
disposed of W.P.No.474/2006 on 11.03.2013 and the
State Government communicated its decision to the
Secretary of the Association of the occupants on
07.09.2013, the petitioners have continued to squat on
public property. Further, although the petitioners were
evicted on 13th and 14th of July 2019, they have moved
this Court and obtained an order of status-quo at the
hands of this Court. The petitioners are responsible for
stalling the respondent-CMC from proceedings to put up
new construction which would have enured to the benefit
of general public. Even the petitioners would have
benefited, had they allowed the new construction to come
up on the premises. In the name of ‘rent’, the petitioners
have paid pittance to the CMC from 01.07.1982 to June
2019. For nearly 37 years they have been paying rents at
Rs.3,500/- per year! In that view of the matter, this Court
is of the considered opinion that this is a fit case for
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imposing exemplary costs on the petitioners while
dismissing the writ petitions. Nevertheless, this Court
would desist from imposing costs, with a fond hope that
the petitioners would give up the dispute and allow the
respondent-CMC to put up a new construction on the
premises.
22.10. By relying on paragraph 25, it is submitted that
this
Court
made
important
observations
regarding the nature of public property, public
property must be respected and cannot be
misused for private benefit. It was clearly
observed that natural resources and public lands
are held by the State in trust for the benefit of
the people. The State and its instrumentalities
act as trustees, and such trusteeship carries a
duty to protect, preserve and ensure proper
utilisation of public assets.
22.11. This Court further observed that public property
must fetch the best possible value and cannot
become the private estate of a few individuals.
These observations were not casual remarks but
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were made after considering the long history of
the dispute and the manner in which public
property had been retained by private occupants
for decades.
22.12. By referring to paragraph 26 it is submitted that
this Court traced the entire litigation history
relating to the cotton market property. An
eviction order had been passed as early as
03.03.2004. The appeals filed before the District
Court were dismissed on 19.12.2005. The writ
petition in W.P. No.474/2006 was disposed of on
11.03.2013. The State Government had also
communicated its decision to the occupants on
07.09.2013.
Despite
these
judicial
and
administrative orders, the occupants continued
in possession of the public property.
22.13. This court also noticed that even after eviction
proceedings were executed in July 2019, the
occupants once again approached this Court and
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obtained an interim order of status quo. This
Court has recorded that for nearly 37 years, the
occupants had paid only Rs.3,500/- per year as
rent, which was grossly disproportionate to the
value of the property. This Court expressed
clear disapproval of such prolonged occupation
and misuse of municipal property and dismissed
the writ petition, though it refrained from
imposing exemplary costs.
22.14. On the strength of the above findings, it is
submitted that the issue regarding the right of
the tenants to remain in possession had already
been
conclusively
adjudicated.
The
eviction
order dated 03.03.2004, confirmed in appeal
and followed by subsequent proceedings, had
attained
finality.
The
writ
petition
in
W.P.
No.112012/2019 was also dismissed with strong
observations.
Therefore,
legal
for
basis
the
there
remained
occupants
to
no
claim
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continuation of their lease or renewal of tenancy
rights.
22.15. It is contended that any action taken by the
Councillors
in
favour
of
such
occupants,
particularly by way of extension of lease, would
directly contradict the judicial findings recorded
by this Court. Such action would not only
disregard
binding
orders
but
would
also
undermine the authority of judicial decisions.
22.16. It is further submitted that the coordinate Bench
of this Court had clearly observed that the
occupants had been paying only a nominal
amount as rent for decades and that public
property cannot be allowed to become the
fiefdom of a few. Despite such categorical
findings, the petitioner-councillors claim to have
passed a resolution granting further rights to
the same occupants for an additional period.
This act amounts to deliberate disregard of
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judicial pronouncements and is contrary to
public interest. The Councillors, being custodians
of municipal property,
were
duty-bound
to
protect public assets and ensure lawful use of
such property. Instead, they have acted in a
manner that benefits private parties at the cost
of the Municipality.
22.17. Learned Advocate General submits that such
conduct, has resulted in substantial financial
loss to the Municipality and defeats the purpose
of redevelopment and public utilisation of the
property. It also sends a wrong message that
judicial orders can be diluted or nullified through
internal
resolutions.
Therefore,
Learned
Advocate General submits that the removal of
the petitioners was necessary to protect public
property, uphold the rule of law, and maintain
the integrity of municipal administration.
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22.18. It is emphatically contended that Resolution
No.378 dated 09.02.2024, on which the entire
defence of the petitioners rests, is not a genuine
municipal record but a fabricated document.
According
resolution
to
the
respondents,
register
the
maintained
official
by
the
Municipality does not contain any resolution on
09.02.2024 relating to extension of lease of the
Wakharsal
properties.
On
the
contrary,
Resolution No.378, as reflected in the official
books, was passed only on 19.07.2024 and
pertains to matters relating to a State Financial
Corporation
grant
under
the
15th
Finance
Commission scheme and a connected tender
process.
22.19. The municipal records are statutory records
maintained in the regular course of official
business
and
carry
a
presumption
of
correctness. The absence of the alleged lease
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resolution in such records, coupled with the
existence of a different Resolution No.378 on
another subject and date, clearly demonstrates
that the document relied upon by the petitioners
does not form part of the lawful proceedings of
the Council. It is further submitted that the
document bears a signature purportedly of the
Commissioner,
denied.
In
reasonable
which
these
he
has
categorically
circumstances,
inference,
according
the
only
to
the
respondents, is that the document is fabricated.
22.20. The falsity of the document is apparent on the
face of the record. The petitioners have not
disowned the resolution. Instead, they have
justified and defended it as validly passed. By
asserting the validity of a document that does
not find place in the official municipal records,
they
have,
confirmed
according
their
to
the
involvement
respondents,
in
the
act
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complained of. It is contended that fraud vitiates
all
actions
and
transactions.
A
document
founded on fraud cannot create any legal right,
nor can it be protected under the plea of
procedural irregularity. Once the foundation is
fraudulent, the superstructure built upon it
collapses. Therefore, the petitioners’ conduct
amounts to grave misconduct and abuse of their
position as elected representatives.
22.21. The allegation of fabrication is not a mere
administrative accusation but forms the subject
matter of criminal proceedings. A complaint was
lodged
and
an
FIR
was
registered.
The
petitioners invoked the inherent jurisdiction of
this Court under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal
Procedure
in
Criminal
Petition
No.102611/2024 seeking quashing of the FIR.
This
Court,
after
considering
the
material,
declined to interfere and dismissed the petition
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on 19.12.2024. The petitioners then approached
the
Hon’ble
Supreme
Court
(Criminal)
No.1616/2024,
dismissed
on
06.02.2025.
by
filing
SLP
which
was
also
Thereafter,
the
investigation was completed and a charge sheet
has been filed before the competent criminal
court. These developments demonstrate that
the matter has progressed beyond a mere
allegation and that sufficient material has been
found during investigation to proceed against
the petitioners in accordance with law.
22.22. Seriousness of the allegations is evident from
the fact that neither this Court nor the Hon’ble
Supreme Court found it appropriate to quash
the proceedings at the threshold. The filing of a
charge sheet indicates that prima facie evidence
exists. The fabricated resolution, if allowed to
stand, would create legal rights in favour of
persons
who
had
already
suffered
adverse
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orders before the District Court and this Court.
It would effectively nullify or overreach binding
judicial determinations. Such conduct strikes at
the very foundation of the rule of law and the
authority of judicial decisions.
22.23. The disputed resolution was relied upon before
this Court in W.A. No.100488/2022 as if it were
a
genuine
Producing
and
a
constitutional
validly
forged
court,
passed
document
and
seeking
resolution.
before
to
a
derive
advantage from it, is stated to be a serious act
of misconduct. An elected representative who
has sought to mislead this Court cannot claim
an equitable right to continue in public office.
22.24. The term of the President and Vice-President
expired on 24.07.2024, and an Administrator
was appointed on 29.07.2024. It was only
thereafter, upon scrutiny of records by the
Commissioner and communication to the Deputy
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Commissioner,
fabrication
that
came
Commissioner,
statutory
the
full
extent
to
light.
The
acting
duty,
in
of
the
Deputy
accordance
recommended
with
initiation
of
proceedings to the Regional Commissioner on
28.01.2025.
22.25. The Regional Commissioner issued a notice
dated 31.01.2025 calling upon the petitioners to
submit their explanation under Section 41 of the
Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964. A further
communication
dated
07.02.2025
fixed
13.02.2025 for personal appearance. Thus, the
petitioners were afforded notice as well as
opportunity to respond.
22.26. Despite such opportunity, the petitioners did not
submit
their
granted.
In
Commissioner
explanation
that
within
background,
passed
the
the
first
the
time
Regional
order
on
13.02.2025. When the said order was set aside
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by this Court in W.P. No.104141/2025 with
liberty to file a reply by 27.02.2025, the
petitioners
filed
Simultaneously,
their
they
explanation.
preferred
W.A.
No.100124/2025. The Hon’ble Division Bench
declined
to
interfere
and
merely
directed
consideration of the principles laid down in Ravi
Yashwant Bhoir.
22.27. The
Regional
reconsidered
Commissioner
the
matter,
thereafter
examined
the
explanation filed by the petitioners, perused the
records including the municipal register and the
material
collected
during
investigation,
and
applied the principles laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir. Upon
being
satisfied
that
the
resolution
was
fraudulent
and
that
the
conduct
of
the
petitioners
amounted
to
misconduct,
the
Regional Commissioner passed a reasoned order
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removing them from office, which is neither
mechanical or arbitrary.
22.28. He relies on Section 41 of the Karnataka
Municipalities Act, 1964 which is reproduced
hereunder for easy reference:
41. Liability to removal from office.—
(1)
The Government, if it thinks fit on the
recommendation of the municipal council, may
remove any councillor elected under this Act,
and after such enquiry as it deems necessary,
if such councillor has been guilty of misconduct
in the discharge of his duties, or of any
disgraceful conduct, or has become incapable
of performing his duties as a councillor.
[Provided that no Councillor shall be removed
except after being afforded an opportunity for
submitting an explanation.]
(2)
When under sub-section (10) of section 42 any
person is removed from the office of president
or vice-president for misconduct in the
discharge of his duties, he shall, from the date
of such removal cease to be a councillor and
shall be deemed to have been removed from
the office of councillor under sub-section (1).
22.29. It is submitted that Section 41 of the Karnataka
Municipalities
Act,
requires
that
an
explanation be sought and considered before
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removal. The statute does not mandate a triallike proceeding with examination and crossexamination of witnesses. The requirement is
one of fair opportunity, not a criminal trial. In
the present case, notice was issued, personal
appearance was permitted, written explanation
was received and considered. Therefore, the
principles of natural justice stand satisfied.
22.30. Lastly, it is contended that the petitioners have
not approached this Court with clean hands.
Material
facts
relating
to
the
criminal
proceedings, dismissal of the petition under
Section 482 Cr.P.C., dismissal of the SLP, and
the status of municipal records have not been
fairly disclosed. According to the respondents,
there has been both suppression of material
facts and presentation of misleading facts. In
writ jurisdiction, which is discretionary in nature,
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a party guilty of such conduct is not entitled to
equitable relief.
22.31. On these grounds, it is submitted that the order
of removal is justified, lawful and necessary to
protect public property, uphold judicial authority
and
maintain
integrity
in
municipal
administration.
22.32. He relies on the decision of Hon’ble Supreme
Court in K.D.Sharma -v- Steel Authority of
India Limited and others [(2008)12 SCC
481], more particularly, para 34 to 38 which are
reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
34. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32
and of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is
extraordinary, equitable and discretionary. Prerogative writs
mentioned therein are issued for doing substantial justice. It
is, therefore, of utmost necessity that the petitioner
approaching the writ court must come with clean hands, put
forward all the facts before the court without concealing or
suppressing anything and seek an appropriate relief. If there
is no candid disclosure of relevant and material facts or the
petitioner is guilty of misleading the court, his petition may
be dismissed at the threshold without considering the merits
of the claim.
35. The underlying object has been succinctly stated by
Scrutton, L.J., in the leading case of R. v. Kensington
Income Tax Commrs. [(1917) 1 KB 486 : 86 LJKB 257 : 116
LT 136 (CA)] in the following words: (KB p. 514)
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“… it has been for many years the rule of the court, and one
which it is of the greatest importance to maintain, that when
an applicant comes to the court to obtain relief on an ex
parte statement he should make a full and fair disclosure of
all the material facts—it says facts, not law. He must not
misstate the law if he can help it—the court is supposed to
know the law. But it knows nothing about the facts, and the
applicant must state fully and fairly the facts; and the
penalty by which the court enforces that obligation is that if
it finds out that the facts have not been fully and fairly
stated to it, the court will set aside any action which it has
taken on the faith of the imperfect statement.”
(emphasis supplied)
36. A prerogative remedy is not a matter of course. While
exercising extraordinary power a writ court would certainly
bear in mind the conduct of the party who invokes the
jurisdiction of the court. If the applicant makes a false
statement or suppresses material fact or attempts to
mislead the court, the court may dismiss the action on that
ground alone and may refuse to enter into the merits of the
case by stating, “We will not listen to your application
because of what you have done.” The rule has been evolved
in the larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants
from abusing the process of court by deceiving it.
37. In Kensington Income Tax Commrs. [(1917) 1 KB 486 :
86 LJKB 257 : 116 LT 136 (CA)] Viscount Reading, C.J.
observed: (KB pp. 495-96)
“… Where an ex parte application has been made to this
Court for a rule nisi or other process, if the Court comes to
the conclusion that the affidavit in support of the application
was not candid and did not fairly state the facts, but stated
them in such a way as to mislead the Court as to the true
facts, the Court ought, for its own protection and to prevent
an abuse of its process, to refuse to proceed any further
with the examination of the merits. This is a power inherent
in the Court, but one which should only be used in cases
which bring conviction to the mind of the Court that it has
been deceived. Before coming to this conclusion a careful
examination will be made of the facts as they are and as
they have been stated in the applicant's affidavit, and
everything will be heard that can be urged to influence the
view of the Court when it reads the affidavit and knows the
true facts. But if the result of this examination and hearing is
to leave no doubt that the Court has been deceived, then it
will refuse to hear anything further from the applicant in a
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proceeding which has only been set in motion by means of a
misleading affidavit.”
(emphasis supplied)
38. The above principles have been accepted in our legal
system also. As per settled law, the party who invokes the
extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 or of
a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is
supposed to be truthful, frank and open. He must disclose all
material facts without any reservation even if they are
against him. He cannot be allowed to play “hide and seek” or
to “pick and choose” the facts he likes to disclose and to
suppress (keep back) or not to disclose (conceal) other
facts. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in
disclosure of true and complete (correct) facts. If material
facts are suppressed or distorted, the very functioning of
writ courts and exercise would become impossible. The
petitioner must disclose all the facts having a bearing on the
relief sought without any qualification. This is because “the
court knows law but not facts”.
22.33. Learned Advocate General by relying on the
principles laid down in K.D. Sharma submits
that a person invoking the writ jurisdiction of this
Court must do so with utmost transparency,
fairness and bona fides. It is contended that the
petitioners, being elected Councillors, occupy a
fiduciary position. They are trustees of public
property and are under a statutory and moral
obligation to safeguard municipal assets. Instead
of protecting the interests of the Municipality,
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they have actively participated in creation of a
forged resolution, such conduct is not a mere
procedural lapse but a conscious act designed to
confer benefit upon private individuals contrary
to binding judicial orders. By attempting to
regularise or extend rights over valuable public
property in favour of unauthorised occupants,
the petitioners have acted against public interest
and in breach of the doctrine of public trust. The
misconduct is grave, intentional and strikes at
the root of responsible governance. In such
circumstances, it is contended that the Regional
Commissioner was duty-bound to act. The order
of removal, therefore, is not punitive excess but
a necessary corrective measure to preserve
institutional integrity.
22.34. The
fabrication
of
Resolution
No.378
dated
09.02.2024 cannot be viewed in isolation. The
dispute concerning the cotton market property
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has a long and settled history. The unauthorised
occupants had repeatedly litigated the matter
and suffered adverse orders at every stage. An
eviction
order
was
passed
as
early
as
03.03.2004. The appeals were dismissed. The
writ
petition
was
disposed
of.
Subsequent
proceedings culminated in the dismissal of W.P.
No.112012/2019,
wherein
this
Court
made
strong observations regarding misuse of public
property
and
violation
of
the
doctrine
of
trusteeship.
22.35. Despite such categorical judicial findings, the
unauthorised
occupants
preferred
W.A.
No.100488/2022. It is in that background that
the alleged Resolution No.378 dated 09.02.2024
surfaced. According to the respondents, this
document was furnished to the occupants and
relied upon in the writ appeal to assert a
subsisting right in the property. This, it is
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submitted, was an attempt to create a new
factual foundation to overcome binding judicial
pronouncements.
22.36. The
official
Resolution
municipal
No.378
was
records
reflect
actually
passed
that
on
19.07.2024 and pertains to a State Financial
Corporation
grant
under
the
15th
Financial
Scheme and a tender matter. There is no entry
in the resolution register of any lease extension
resolution on 09.02.2024. The document relied
upon in the writ appeal does not correspond with
the
official
subject
records.
matter,
Material
date
and
differences
numbering
in
are
highlighted.
22.37. In these circumstances, it is contended that
there
is
no
plausible
explanation
except
fabrication. The petitioners, being signatories to
the disputed document and having not denied
their signatures, are said to have prima facie
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engaged in fraudulent conduct. Fraud vitiates all
proceedings.
A
document
created
to
defeat
judicial orders cannot be clothed with legality.
The petitioners’ defence that the resolution was
validly passed only reinforces the allegation of
complicity.
22.38. The criminal proceedings lend additional weight
to the seriousness of the allegations. The FIR
was challenged before this Court and dismissed.
The Special Leave Petition was dismissed by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court. Investigation culminated
in
filing
of
acknowledged
a
charge
that
sheet.
criminal
While
guilt
it
is
will
be
determined at trial, the existence of prima facie
material sufficient to proceed is beyond dispute.
Had the allegations been baseless, the criminal
proceedings would have been quashed at the
threshold. The refusal of superior courts to
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interfere
indicates
that
the
matter
is
not
as
frivolous.
22.39. Permitting
the
petitioners
to
continue
Councillors
in
the
of
such
face
serious
allegations, it is submitted, would undermine
public confidence and expose municipal property
to further risk. An elected representative accused
of forging municipal records and using them to
influence judicial proceedings cannot claim an
equitable right to
remain
in office pending
protracted criminal trial.
22.40. It is further submitted that upon expiry of the
term of the President and Vice-President on
24.07.2024, the Government, in exercise of
statutory
powers
under
the
Karnataka
Municipalities Act, appointed an Administrator to
manage the affairs of the Municipality. The
Deputy Commissioner, Gadag, assumed charge.
Upon being apprised by the Commissioner of the
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fabrication, the Deputy Commissioner examined
the matter and, acting within statutory authority,
recommended initiation of proceedings under
Section 41 to the Regional Commissioner on
28.01.2025.
22.41. The Regional Commissioner issued a notice dated
31.01.2025 granting seven days to submit an
explanation. A further notice dated 07.02.2025
fixed 13.02.2025 for personal appearance. The
petitioners
were
thus
given
notice
and
opportunity. When the first order was set aside
by this Court in W.P. No.104141/2025 with
liberty to file reply by 27.02.2025, the petitioners
filed their explanation. The earlier order of this
Court was passed on consent of counsel for the
petitioners, who undertook to appear and submit
reply.
22.42. Though the order was passed on consent, the
petitioners preferred W.A. No.100124/2025. The
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Division Bench declined to interfere and directed
that the Regional Commissioner consider the
principles laid down in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir. It
is submitted that the Regional Commissioner
thereafter
complied
with
the
direction,
considered the explanation in detail, examined
the
municipal
records
and
the
surrounding
circumstances, and passed a reasoned order.
22.43. He reiterates that Section 41 requires issuance of
notice and consideration of explanation. It does
not mandate a full-fledged trial with examination
and
cross-examination
of
witnesses.
The
standard is that of administrative satisfaction
based on material available, subject to judicial
review. The petitioners were given opportunity to
explain; their explanation was considered; the
authority applied its mind; and a reasoned order
was passed.
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22.44. The petitioners have not approached this Court
with complete disclosure. The history of criminal
proceedings and dismissal of challenges has not
been fairly presented. In writ jurisdiction, which
is discretionary, a party guilty of suppression or
misrepresentation is not entitled to relief.
22.45. In the totality of circumstances, the misconduct
is grave, supported by prima facie material, and
directly affects public property and institutional
integrity. The order of removal is proportionate,
lawful and necessary to preserve the rule of law
and protect municipal assets.
22.46. Learned Advocate General also relies on the
judgment of the Hon’ble Apex court in
Ravi
Yashwant Bhoir, albeit different paragraphs,
namely 22, 30-36, 58 and 59 thereof, which are
reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
22. Amendment in the Constitution by adding Parts IX
and IX-A confers upon the local self-government a
complete autonomy on the basic democratic unit
unshackled from official control. Thus, exercise of any
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power having effect of destroying the Constitutional
institution besides being outrageous is dangerous to the
democratic set-up of this country. Therefore, an elected
official
cannot
be
permitted
to
be
removed
unceremoniously
without
following
the
procedure
prescribed by law, in violation of the provisions of Article
21 of the Constitution, by the State by adopting a casual
approach and resorting to manipulations to achieve
ulterior purpose. The Court being the custodian of law
cannot tolerate any attempt to thwart the institution.
30. There can also be no quarrel with the settled legal
proposition that removal of a duly elected member on the
basis of proved misconduct is a quasi-judicial proceeding
in nature. [Vide Indian National Congress (I) v. Institute
of Social Welfare [(2002) 5 SCC 685 : AIR 2002 SC 2158]
.] This view stands further fortified by the Constitution
Bench judgments of this Court in Bachhitar Singh v. State
of Punjab [AIR 1963 SC 395] and Union of India v. H.C.
Goel [AIR 1964 SC 364] . Therefore, the principles of
natural justice are required to be given full play and strict
compliance should be ensured, even in the absence of any
provision providing for the same. Principles of natural
justice require a fair opportunity of defence to such an
elected office-bearer.
31. Undoubtedly, any elected official in local selfgovernment has to be put on a higher pedestal as against
a government servant. If a temporary government
employee cannot be removed on the ground of
misconduct without holding a full-fledged inquiry, it is
difficult to imagine how an elected office-bearer can be
removed without holding a full-fledged inquiry.
32. In service jurisprudence, minor punishment is
permissible to be imposed while holding the inquiry as
per the procedure prescribed for it but for removal,
termination or reduction in rank, a full-fledged inquiry is
required otherwise it will be violative of the provisions of
Article 311 of the Constitution of India. The case is to be
understood in an entirely different context as compared
to the government employees, for the reason, that for
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the removal of the elected officials, a more stringent
procedure and standard of proof is required.
33. This Court examined the provisions of the Punjab
Municipal Act, 1911, providing for the procedure of
removal of the President of the Municipal Council on
similar grounds in Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of
Punjab [(2001) 6 SCC 260 : AIR 2001 SC 2524] and
observed that removal of an elected office-bearer is a
serious matter. The elected office-bearer must not be
removed unless a clear-cut case is made out, for the
reason that holding and enjoying an office, discharging
related duties is a valuable statutory right of not only the
elected member but also of his constituency or electoral
college. His removal may curtail the term of the officebearer and also cast stigma upon him. Therefore, the
procedure prescribed under a statute for removal must
be strictly adhered to and unless a clear case is made
out, there can be no justification for his removal. While
taking the decision, the authority should not be guided
by any other extraneous consideration or should not
come under any political pressure.
34. In a democratic institution, like ours, the incumbent is
entitled to hold the office for the term for which he has
been elected unless his election is set aside by a
prescribed procedure known to law or he is removed by
the procedure established under law. The proceedings for
removal must satisfy the requirement of natural justice
and the decision must show that the authority has applied
its mind to the allegations made and the explanation
furnished by the elected office-bearer sought to be
removed.
35. The elected official is accountable to its electorate
because he is being elected by a large number of voters.
His removal has serious repercussions as he is removed
from the post and declared disqualified to contest the
elections for a further stipulated period, but it also takes
away the right of the people of his constituency to be
represented by him. Undoubtedly, the right to hold such a
post is statutory and no person can claim any absolute or
vested right to the post, but he cannot be removed
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without strictly adhering to the provisions provided by the
legislature for his removal (vide Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal
[(1982) 1 SCC 691 : AIR 1982 SC 983] , Mohan Lal
Tripathi v. District Magistrate, Rae Bareily [(1992) 4 SCC
80 : AIR 1993 SC 2042] and Ram Beti v. District
Panchayat Raj Adhikari [(1998) 1 SCC 680 : AIR 1998 SC
1222] ).
36. In view of the above, the law on the issue stands
crystallised to the effect that an elected member can be
removed in exceptional circumstances giving strict
adherence to the statutory provisions and holding the
enquiry, meeting the requirement of principles of natural
justice and giving an incumbent an opportunity to defend
himself, for the reason that removal of an elected person
casts stigma upon him and takes away his valuable
statutory right. Not only the elected office-bearer but his
constituency/electoral college is also deprived of
representation by the person of their choice.
58. Shri Chintaman Raghunath Gharat, ex-President was
the complainant, thus, at the most, he could lead
evidence as a witness. He could not claim the status of an
adversarial litigant. The complainant cannot be the party
to the lis. A legal right is an averment of entitlement
arising out of law. In fact, it is a benefit conferred upon a
person by the rule of law. Thus, a person who suffers
from legal injury can only challenge the act or omission.
There may be some harm or loss that may not be
wrongful in the eye of the law because it may not result in
injury to a legal right or legally protected interest of the
complainant but juridically harm of this description is
called damnum sine injuria.
59. The complainant has to establish that he has been
deprived of or denied of a legal right and he has sustained
injury to any legally protected interest. In case he has no
legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on, he cannot be
heard as a party in a lis. A fanciful or sentimental
grievance may not be sufficient to confer a locus standi to
sue upon the individual. There must be injuria or a legal
grievance which can be appreciated and not a stat pro
ratione voluntas reasons i.e. a claim devoid of reasons.
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22.47. By relying on Ravi Yashwant Bhoir learned
Adovacate
General
decision,
properly
supports
the
submits
that
the
said
understood
and
applied,
taken
the
Regional
action
by
Commissioner.
22.48. It is submitted that paragraph 22 recognises that
after the insertion of Parts IX and IX-A in the
Constitution, local self-government institutions
enjoy constitutional protection and autonomy.
However, that autonomy is not absolute. It is
subject to the procedure established by law. The
Hon’ble
Supreme
Court
cautioned
against
arbitrary or manipulative removal of elected
representatives,
but
equally
affirmed
that
removal in accordance with statutory procedure
is permissible. Therefore, the emphasis is not on
insulating
elected
representatives
from
accountability, but on ensuring that the power of
removal is exercised lawfully, fairly and for
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legitimate reasons. In the present case, it is
submitted that the action taken in this case is
grounded in statutory authority under Section 41
of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 and is
supported
by
material
indicating
grave
misconduct.
22.49. By referring to paragraphs 30 to 36, learned
Advocate
General
Supreme
Court
submits
has
that
the
categorically
Hon’ble
held
that
removal of an elected member is a quasi-judicial
proceeding and must satisfy the requirements of
natural justice. A fair opportunity must be
granted. The authority must apply its mind to
the allegations and the explanation. Removal is
permissible in exceptional circumstances upon
strict adherence to statutory provisions.
22.50. It is submitted that these very requirements
have been scrupulously followed in the present
case. Notice was issued. Time was granted.
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Personal
appearance
was
permitted.
Written
explanation was received and considered. The
earlier order of removal was set aside by this
Court and liberty was granted to file a fresh
reply. The petitioners availed that opportunity.
The Division Bench directed consideration of the
principles laid down in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir.
The Regional Commissioner reconsidered the
matter and passed a reasoned order. Therefore,
the
safeguards
mandated
by
the
Hon’ble
Supreme Court stand fully complied with.
22.51. It is further submitted that paragraphs 58 and 59
of the said judgment clarify the concept of locus
standi and legal injury. A person can challenge
an action only if he demonstrates deprivation of
a legal right. A mere grievance without legal
basis does not confer standing. In the present
context, the proceedings under Section 41 are
statutory in nature and are initiated by the
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competent
authority
upon
material
exfacie
establishing misconduct. The authority is not
acting at the instance of a private adversary but
in discharge of statutory obligation to protect
public interest.
22.52. Learned Advocate General submits that the
Regional Commissioner has faithfully adhered to
the directions issued by the Division Bench and
has
applied
the
dicta
laid
down
in
Ravi
Yashwant Bhoir.
22.53. The impugned order reflects consideration of the
allegations relating to fabrication of Resolution
No.378 dated 09.02.2024, examination of the
official
municipal
records,
analysis
of
the
explanation submitted by the petitioners, and
reference
to
the
legal
principles
governing
removal of elected representatives. The order is
reasoned, structured and supported by material.
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Therefore, it cannot be characterised as arbitrary
or mechanical.
22.54. It is further submitted that Section 41 of the
Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 prescribes the
procedure for removal. The statute requires
issuance
of
notice
and
consideration
of
explanation. It does not mandate a trial in the
nature of criminal proceedings. The requirement
is one of fair opportunity, not of adversarial
adjudication
with
oral
evidence
and
cross-
examination as a matter of right. The legislative
scheme indicates that the authority must form
satisfaction based on available material after
affording opportunity to the member concerned.
22.55. In the present case, the petitioners were issued
notice dated 31.01.2025. A further opportunity
was
granted
fixing
personal
appearance
on
13.02.2025. Upon challenge to the first order,
this
Court
granted
liberty
to
file
reply
by
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27.02.2025.
The
petitioners
submitted
their
written explanation. The Regional Commissioner
considered
the
same
along
with
municipal
records and surrounding circumstances, including
the existence of criminal proceedings and the
discrepancy in the resolution register.
22.56. It is submitted that the Regional Commissioner
recorded a finding that Resolution No.378 dated
09.02.2024 does not find place in the official
records and that the genuine Resolution No.378
pertains
to
a
different
subject
passed
on
19.07.2024. The signature of the Commissioner
on the disputed document was denied. These
objective facts constitute material upon which
satisfaction could reasonably be formed.
22.57. With
regard
to
the
expression
“disgraceful
conduct” occurring in Section 41, it is submitted
that though not defined in the Act, the term
must
be
understood
in
its
ordinary
and
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contextual meaning. Disgrace denotes loss of
honour,
reputation
or
credibility.
Disgraceful
conduct refers to conduct which brings disrepute
to the office, undermines public confidence, or is
morally blameworthy. An elected Councillor is
expected to maintain high standards of integrity.
Fabrication of municipal records, creation of a
resolution not borne out by official registers, and
use of such document in judicial proceedings, if
established, would unquestionably bring discredit
to the institution.
22.58. It is further submitted that disgraceful conduct
need not be confined to acts committed strictly
during official meetings. Any act connected with
municipal affairs which erodes public trust or
injures the reputation of the institution can
attract action under Section 41. The focus is on
the impact of the conduct on the dignity and
integrity of public office.
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22.59. Learned Advocate General submits that the
Regional Commissioner has not acted on mere
suspicion. The action is based on documentary
discrepancies,
denial
of
signature
by
the
Commissioner, criminal investigation culminating
in filing of charge sheet, and the use of the
disputed resolution in judicial proceedings. These
circumstances collectively constitute sufficient
material to justify action under Section 41.
22.60. It is therefore contended that the order of
removal
is
proportionate
misconduct,
compliant
to
with
the
gravity
statutory
of
and
constitutional requirements, and necessary to
preserve
the
sanctity
of
public
office
and
protection of municipal property. The petitioners,
having been afforded full opportunity, cannot
now contend violation of natural justice merely
because the decision has gone against them.
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22.61. Learned Advocate General meticulously takes
this
Court
register. It
through
the
original
is submitted that
resolution
the
statutory
resolution register is maintained sequentially,
with serial numbers corresponding to dates and
subjects transacted in duly convened meetings of
the
Council.
Upon
such
examination,
it
is
demonstrated that there is no Resolution No.378
dated 09.02.2024 relating to extension of lease
of Wakharsal properties.
22.62. On
the
contrary,
the
records
show
that
Resolution No.378 was in fact passed only on
19.07.2024
and
pertains
to
a
completely
different subject, namely sanction relating to a
State Financial Corporation grant under the 15th
Finance Commission scheme and a connected
tender process. The subject matter, date, and
sequence in the register conclusively establish
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that no resolution bearing No.378 existed on
09.02.2024.
22.63. It is submitted that the numbering of resolutions
is continuous and cannot be retrospectively
altered without disturbing the entire sequence of
entries. Therefore, the existence of Resolution
No.378 on 19.07.2024 makes it impossible for
another Resolution No.378 to have existed five
months earlier on 09.02.2024. The absence of
any entry corresponding to the alleged lease
extension resolution in the official books, coupled
with the production of a separate document
before
the
Division
No.100488/2022,
leads
to
Bench
in
W.A.
only
one
logical
inference: that the document relied upon by the
petitioners is fabricated.
22.64. It is further submitted that production of such a
document before a constitutional court amounts
to a serious attempt to mislead the Court and to
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create an artificial foundation to defeat prior
judicial orders. Such conduct, by its very nature,
brings disrepute
to
the
office
held by
the
petitioners and falls squarely within the meaning
of disgraceful conduct under Section 41 of the
Act.
22.65. Learned Advocate General further submits that
the doctrine of public trust is firmly embedded in
constitutional jurisprudence. Public property is
not owned in a proprietary sense by the State or
the Municipality; it is held in trust for the benefit
of the public at large. A Municipality, being an
instrumentality of the State, is equally bound by
this doctrine. Councillors are not mere political
functionaries; they are custodians of municipal
assets.
They
owe
fiduciary
duties
to
the
institution and to the electorate. Their obligation
is to safeguard public property, ensure lawful
utilisation,
and
maximise
benefit
to
the
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community. In the present case, instead of
acting as trustees, the petitioners have acted in
a manner that facilitates continued occupation of
valuable municipal land by unauthorised persons.
22.66. Such conduct, it is submitted, constitutes a clear
breach of fiduciary duty. A fiduciary is expected
to act in utmost good faith and in the interest of
the beneficiary. Any action that confers private
benefit at the expense of public interest is
inconsistent with that obligation. The petitioners,
by fabricating a resolution to extend rights of
unauthorised occupants, have violated the trust
reposed in them by the electorate.
22.67. Learned Advocate General again invites attention
to the judgment of the coordinate Bench in W.P.
No.112012/2019. In that case, after tracing
decades of litigation, this Court categorically held
that the occupants of the cotton market property
were unauthorised and had no legal right to
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continue in possession. The Court emphasised
that
public
property
cannot
be
allowed
to
become the fiefdom of a few individuals and
deprecated the prolonged occupation at nominal
rent.
22.68. In light of such categorical findings, it was
incumbent
upon
the
Councillors
to
ensure
enforcement of eviction and proper utilisation of
the property for public benefit. Instead, the
petitioners have facilitated the very occupants
whose claims had been rejected by judicial
orders. This conduct directly undermines the
authority
of
judicial
determinations
and
frustrates the purpose of earlier litigation.
22.69. The fabricated resolution was placed before the
Division
Bench
in
W.A.
No.100488/2022
to
contend that the occupants had a subsisting right
in
the
property.
Such
use
of
a
fabricated
document to influence judicial proceedings is not
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merely administrative impropriety but a grave
act affecting the administration of justice itself.
22.70. With regard to criminal proceedings, learned
Advocate General submits that the seriousness of
the allegations is reinforced by judicial scrutiny
at multiple levels. The petitioners invoked the
inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section
482 Cr.P.C. in Criminal Petition No.102611/2024
seeking quashing of the FIR. By order dated
19.12.2024, a coordinate Bench declined to
interfere and recorded that there was strong
prima facie material warranting investigation.
22.71. The petitioners carried the matter to the Hon’ble
Supreme
Court
by
filing
SLP
(Criminal)
No.1616/2025. By order dated 06.02.2025, the
Hon’ble
Supreme
Court
dismissed
the
SLP,
observing that it found no reason to interfere
under Article 136 of the Constitution. Thereafter,
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investigation was completed and a charge sheet
was filed before the competent criminal court.
22.72. It is submitted that while the criminal trial will
determine guilt, the existence of prima facie
material
recognised
disturbed
by
establishes
that
by
the
this
Hon’ble
the
Court
and
Supreme
allegations
are
not
Court
neither
baseless nor motivated. Administrative action
under Section 41 does not require proof beyond
reasonable
doubt;
it
requires
formation
of
satisfaction based on credible material. The
material available satisfies that threshold.
22.73. Learned Advocate General further submits that
the litigation over the cotton market property
has spanned decades and has involved sustained
efforts by successive municipal administrations
to recover possession and protect public assets.
The act of the petitioners, if permitted to stand,
would undo years of institutional effort and
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judicial intervention. It would signal that binding
court orders can be neutralised through internal
resolutions, thereby eroding public confidence in
governance.
22.74. The fiduciary relationship between a Councillor
and the Municipality demands loyalty, integrity
and
protection
fabricating
a
of
institutional
resolution
interest.
and
By
enabling
unauthorised occupants to assert rights contrary
to
judicial
findings,
the
petitioners
have,
according to the respondents, fundamentally
breached that fiduciary obligation.
22.75. It is submitted that such misconduct is not minor
or technical; it strikes at the core of democratic
accountability and public trust. Permitting the
petitioners to continue in office despite such
serious
property
allegations
to
further
would
risk
expose
and
municipal
compromise
institutional integrity. Therefore, removal under
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Section 41 is not excessive but proportionate and
necessary
to
safeguard
public
interest
and
uphold the rule of law.
22.76. It
is
further
submitted
that
the
effect
of
permitting the petitioners to continue in office,
despite the serious allegations and material on
record, would have far-reaching consequences
not only for the Municipality but also for public
administration as a whole.
22.77. Firstly, it is contended that continuance in office
would directly affect the protection of public
property. The subject matter of the dispute
concerns valuable municipal land, which has
been the subject of prolonged litigation and
repeated judicial scrutiny. If persons accused of
fabricating a resolution relating to that very
property are allowed to remain in decisionmaking
positions,
there
exists
a
real
and
substantial apprehension that further steps may
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be taken to regularise, legitimise or otherwise
protect the interests of unauthorised occupants.
The risk is not hypothetical; it arises from the
very nature of the allegations.
22.78. Secondly, it is submitted that public confidence
in
local
self-government
would
be
severely
eroded. An elected body functions on trust, trust
reposed by the electorate that its representatives
will act honestly, transparently and in accordance
with
law.
If
serious
allegations
of
forgery,
fabrication and misuse of municipal records are
allowed to coexist with continued tenure in
office, it would send a message that public office
can be retained notwithstanding grave breaches
of integrity. Such a perception damages the
credibility of democratic institutions.
22.79. Thirdly, it is argued that continuance in office
may impede fair administration and enquiry.
Councillors exercise influence over municipal
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administration,
including
access
to
records,
interaction with officers and participation in
policy decisions. If individuals against whom
allegations of document fabrication are pending
continue to hold office, there exists a reasonable
apprehension
of
interference
with
records,
influence over subordinate officials, or shaping of
subsequent resolutions to protect earlier acts.
The
law
does
not
require
actual
proof
of
interference; reasonable likelihood is sufficient to
justify preventive action in public interest.
22.80. Fourthly,
it
is
submitted
that
the
financial
implications are significant. The cotton market
property
generating
is
a
municipal
substantial
asset
revenue
capable
if
of
properly
developed or leased at market rates. Judicial
findings have already recorded that for decades,
nominal rent was paid, resulting in loss to the
Municipality. Any
act that perpetuates such
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occupation
or
delays
recurring
financial
redevelopment
injury.
If
the
causes
petitioners
remain in office, and if their conductd facilitated
continuation of such occupation, the Municipality
may continue to suffer economic loss, thereby
affecting
civic
amenities
and
public
welfare
projects.
22.81. Fifthly, the doctrine of public trust requires that
public property be managed in the best interest
of the community. Trustees who have acted
contrary
to
continuation
that
in
trust
office
cannot
pending
insist
on
conclusion
of
criminal trial, particularly when administrative
action is supported by prima facie material.
Public law remedies are preventive as much as
corrective. The purpose of Section 41 is not
merely to punish proved criminality but to
maintain the dignity and integrity of municipal
governance.
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22.82. It is further submitted that the injury is not
confined to the Municipality alone. The electorate
of
the
concerned
wards
is
entitled
to
representation that is free from serious stigma
affecting institutional integrity. While removal of
an elected representative is indeed a serious
matter,
the
law
equally
recognises
that
continuance of a representative whose conduct
prima facie undermines public confidence can be
equally injurious to democratic functioning.
22.83. The balance, therefore, is not between removal
and individual hardship alone; it is between
individual tenure and collective public interest.
Where credible material indicates fabrication of
municipal records, misuse of official documents
and attempts to create rights contrary to judicial
orders, the larger public interest in preserving
institutional
credibility
and
protecting
public
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property
outweighs
the
private
interest
of
holding office.
22.84. It is on this premise that the respondents
contend that removal was necessary to prevent
further damage, to restore public confidence, to
protect municipal assets from further misuse,
and to ensure that governance proceeds in
accordance with law. Continuance in office in the
face of such allegations would, according to the
respondents, compound institutional harm and
undermine the very democratic values which the
Constitution seeks to protect.
22.85. Learned Advocate General therefore submits that
both the Writ Petitions be dismissed.
23.
Sri
Harsh
Desai,
learned
counsel
appearing
for
Respondent No.4 - Municipal Council, submitted as
follows:
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23.1. He advances detailed submissions placing the
entire historical and legal background of the
Wakharsal
property
before
this
Court
to
demonstrate the gravity of the matter and the
context in which the impugned action has been
taken.
23.2. The Wakharsal property is not an ordinary parcel
of land but a prime municipal asset situated in
the
very
heart
of
Gadag
City,
measuring
approximately 34 acres and 32 guntas. The land
was originally acquired as early as 26.03.1896
by the then Government of Bombay for the
specific public purpose of establishing a cotton
market. On 06.11.1896, 54 plots were allotted
on lease through public auction to traders. Thus,
from inception, the property was meant to serve
a public commercial purpose under regulated
conditions.
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23.3. Over time, the original cotton market became
dilapidated.
The
Agricultural
Committee
(APMC)
Produce
established
a
Market
new
and
modern cotton market, to which most traders
shifted. However, certain persons continued to
occupy the old market premises located in the
central and commercially valuable area of Gadag
City. Despite repeated efforts by the Council to
relocate them and recover possession, these
occupants remained in occupation in violation of
lease conditions. It is submitted that many of
them had sublet the premises to third parties
without
authority,
thereby
compounding
the
illegality.
23.4. At the request of the tenants, lease extensions
were granted from time to time, with enhanced
rent, and a final extension was granted up to
30.06.1992. Upon expiry of the lease, they were
bound to vacate. However, they failed to do so,
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compelling the Council to initiate litigation. A suit
in O.S. No.218/1988 was filed. In the First
Appeal in R.A. No.42/1990, it was categorically
held that the occupants were not permanent
tenants and were liable to pay rent. The decision
was upheld in the Second Appeal in R.S.A.
No.40/1994 and ultimately confirmed by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court on 14.03.1996. Thus, the
status of the occupants as unauthorised after
expiry of lease stood conclusively determined.
23.5. Despite
continued
final
in
adjudication,
the
unauthorised
occupants
possession.
Proceedings under the Public Premises (Eviction
of Unauthorised Occupants) Act culminated in an
eviction order dated 03.03.2004 directing them
to vacate. Appeals against the eviction order
were dismissed on 19.12.2005. A writ petition in
W.P. No.474/2006 was filed but withdrawn on
11.03.2013. Even thereafter, the occupants did
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not vacate, compelling issuance of a Government
Order dated 10.11.2014 directing eviction.
23.6. Yet another round of litigation ensued in W.P.
No.112012/2019, which was dismissed by a
coordinate Bench of this Court with strong
observations regarding misuse of public property
and violation of the doctrine of public trust. The
conduct of the occupants was deprecated. Thus,
over nearly three decades, the occupants have
consistently failed in judicial proceedings and
have been held to have no right to remain in
possession.
23.7. It is in this factual backdrop that the alleged
Resolution No.378 dated 09.02.2024 assumes
significance. During the writ appeal filed by the
unauthorised occupants, a document purporting
to be such resolution was produced to contend
that
the
Council
had
extended
lease
and
recognised their continued occupation. Learned
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counsel submits that this document is not borne
out by official municipal records. The resolution
register does not contain any such entry on
09.02.2024. The only Resolution No.378 in the
records pertains to an entirely different subject
and was passed on 19.07.2024 relating to a
financial grant and tender process.
23.8. The sequential nature of resolution numbering
makes it impossible for two resolutions bearing
the same number to exist on different dates for
different subjects. The absence of the alleged
resolution in statutory records, coupled with the
existence of Resolution No.378 on 19.07.2024 on
a distinct subject, establishes that the document
relied
upon
is
fabricated.
Learned
counsel
categorically submits that the Commissioner has
denied signing the disputed document and that
his signature has been forged with the intention
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of deceiving this Court and conferring advantage
upon the unauthorised occupants.
23.9. Learned
counsel
reiterates
that
the
alleged
resolution does not exist in the records either by
date or by subject. The official minutes and
registers maintained under statutory mandate do
not reflect any such decision of the Council.
Therefore,
the
document
produced
in
W.A.
No.100488/2022 is wholly unauthorised.
23.10. He submits that the proceedings under Section
41 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964
have been conducted strictly in accordance with
law. Notice was issued. Opportunity was granted.
Explanation was received and considered. The
Regional Commissioner applied the principles laid
down in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir and passed a
reasoned order. The statutory requirement is to
seek explanation and consider it; it does not
require a full-fledged criminal trial. The authority
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has
complied
with
the
mandate
of
natural
justice.
23.11. It is contended that the conduct attributed to the
petitioners,
namely fabrication of a municipal
resolution,
forging
the
signature
of
the
Commissioner, and producing such document
before a constitutional court , amounts to grave
and disgraceful conduct. Disgraceful conduct in
public office is not confined to minor impropriety;
it includes conduct that brings disrepute to the
institution, undermines judicial authority, and
violates fiduciary duty to the public.
23.12. Shri Desai submits that Councillors are trustees
of municipal property. When they act contrary to
the interests of the Council and seek to create
rights in favour of persons whose claims have
been repeatedly rejected by courts, they breach
that
trust.
Such
conduct
is
fundamentally
incompatible with continuation in public office.
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23.13. He
further
Councillors
submits
to
that
continue
permitting
would
have
such
serious
institutional consequences. It would undermine
enforcement
of
judicial
orders,
compromise
protection of valuable public property, and erode
public confidence in local self-government. He
also
reiterates
that
removal
in
such
circumstances is not punitive excess but a
necessary step to preserve the integrity of
municipal administration and to ensure that
public assets are not misused.
23.14. Therefore, he submits that the order of the
Regional Commissioner is lawful, proportionate,
and justified in public interest, and that this
Court ought not to interfere in exercise of its writ
jurisdiction.
24.
Heard
Sri.K.N.Phanindra,
appearing
for
Learned
Sri.Mrutyunjaya
Senior
Counsel
S.Hallikeri,
learned
counsel for the petitioner, Sri.Shashi Kiran Shetty,
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learned Advocate General appearing for the State
along with Sri.Gangadhar.J.M., learned Addl. Advocate
General for respondents No.1 to 3 and Sri.Harsh
Desai, learned counsel for respondent No.4. Perused
papers.
25.
The points that would arise for consideration are:
25.1. Whether
the
impugned
order
dated
27.02.2025
passed
by
the
Regional
Commissioner under Section 41 of the
Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 is
vitiated for non-compliance with the
principles of natural justice, including
denial of reasonable opportunity and
absence of a full-fledged enquiry as
contemplated in law?
25.2. Whether removal of an elected Councillor
under Section 41 of the
Karnataka
Municipalities Act, 1964 can be sustained
solely
on
the
basis
of
allegations,
registration of FIR, and filing of chargesheet, in the absence of a conviction or
proved misconduct?
25.3. Whether the alleged acts attributed to the
petitioners, relating to the passing and use
of Resolution No.378 dated 09.02.2024,
constitute “misconduct” or “disgraceful
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conduct” within the meaning and scope of
Section 41 of the Karnataka Municipalities
Act, 1964?
25.4. Whether the Regional Commissioner, while
exercising quasi-judicial powers under
Section 41 of the Karnataka Municipalities
Act, 1964, was required to conduct a
detailed enquiry with framing of specific
charges, examination of witnesses, and
consideration of defence evidence, in light
of the law laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court?
25.5. Whether the impugned order of removal
suffers from arbitrariness, mala fides,
colourable exercise of power, or extraneous
considerations, particularly having regard
to the timing of the order vis-à-vis the
scheduled election to the posts of President
and Vice-President of the City Municipal
Council?
25.6. Whether
the
drastic
consequence
of
removal and consequential disqualification
of the petitioners is disproportionate and
unsustainable in law, having regard to the
constitutional
mandate
protecting
democratic local self-government and the
rights of the electorate?
25.7. Whether the notification dated 29.07.2024
appointing an Administrator to the City
Municipal Council, Gadag-Betageri, is valid
and in accordance with Sections 3 and 315
of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964?
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25.8. What order?
26.
I answer the above points as follows:
27.
Answer to Point No.1: Whether the impugned
order dated 27.02.2025 passed by the Regional
Commissioner under Section 41 of the Karnataka
Municipalities Act, 1964 is vitiated for noncompliance with the principles of natural justice,
including denial of reasonable opportunity and
absence
of
a
full-fledged
enquiry
as
contemplated in law?
27.1. Section 41 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act,
1964, reads as under:
41. Liability to removal from office.—
(3)
The Government, if it thinks fit on the
recommendation of the municipal council, may
remove any councillor elected under this Act,
and after such enquiry as it deems necessary,
if such councillor has been guilty of misconduct
in the discharge of his duties, or of any
disgraceful conduct, or has become incapable
of performing his duties as a councillor.
[Provided that no Councillor shall be removed
except after being afforded an opportunity for
submitting an explanation.]
(4)
When under sub-section (10) of section 42 any
person is removed from the office of president
or vice-president for misconduct in the
discharge of his duties, he shall, from the date
of such removal cease to be a councillor and
shall be deemed to have been removed from
the office of councillor under sub-section (1).
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27.2. A
persual
of
Section
indicates
that
it
prescribes two essential requirements: (1) an
enquiry; and (2) reasonable opportunity to show
cause. The statute does not prescribe the exact
procedure to be followed, including whether
witnesses must be examined, whether crossexamination must be permitted, or whether
formal charges must be framed. The nature and
extent of the inquiry must be commensurate
with the facts and circumstances of each case.
27.3. The
expression
relative
and
"reasonable
contextual.
It
opportunity"
does
not
is
mean
unlimited opportunity or opportunity to prolong
proceedings
indefinitely.
What
is
reasonable
must be determined having regard to:
27.3.1. The nature and gravity of the allegations.
27.3.2. The evidence available on record.
27.3.3. The urgency of the situation.
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27.3.4. The
conduct
of
the
person
proceeded
against.
27.3.5. The public interest is involved.
27.4. Reasonable opportunity must depend on the
facts and circumstances of each case. It is not
possible to lay down any rigid rule or principle of
universal
application.
Reasonable
opportunity
does not mean an elaborate inquiry. It means
adequate opportunity having regard to the facts
and circumstances of the case.
27.5. The facts demonstrate that the petitioners were
afforded multiple opportunities:
-
31.01.2025: First notice was issued calling
upon the petitioners to show cause and
submit explanation regarding allegations of
forgery and misconduct;
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-
Petitioners'
allegation:
Notice
dated
31.01.2025 was served only on 06.02.2025,
hence insufficient time was given. However,
this
delay
was
beyond
the
Regional
Commissioner's control as it was caused by
the notice delivery mechanism;
-
07.02.2025: A second notice was issued
fixing 13.02.2025 at 11:00 a.m. for personal
hearing. The petitioners were called to appear
with all documents;
-
13.02.2025:
The
petitioners
appeared
personally before the Regional Commissioner.
An order was passed removing them. This
order was challenged in WP No. 101414/2025;
-
24.02.2025: WP No. 101414/2025 was partly
allowed. The original order of 13.02.2025 was
quashed, and liberty was granted to the
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petitioners
to
submit
their
reply
by
27.02.2025 by 3:00 p.m.;
-
12.02.2025:
The
Division
Bench,
while
disposing of WA No. 100124/2025, observed
that the appellants (petitioners herein) are at
liberty
to
impress
upon
the
Regional
Commissioner about the binding nature of
Ravi Yashwant Bhoir while conducting the
enquiry;
-
27.02.2025: The petitioners submitted their
detailed written reply by 3:00 p.m. thereafter,
the
Regional
Commissioner
considered
all
materials and passed the impugned order.
27.6. This chronology demonstrates that far from
denying reasonable opportunity, the Regional
Commissioner afforded the petitioners not one,
but
multiple
opportunities.
The
petitioners
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appeared personally, made oral submissions, and
filed written submissions.
27.7. This case involves allegations of forgery, the
most serious form of misconduct. The evidence is
not based on oral testimony or matters of
interpretation, but on documentary evidence that
is virtually conclusive:
27.7.1. The Municipal Council's official records do
not
contain
Resolution
No.
dated
09.02.2024 on the face of the resolution
register;
27.7.2. The
Municipal
Commissioner
has
categorically and persistently stated that he
never signed the alleged resolution and
that his signature has been forged;
27.7.3. The resolution document produced by the
petitioners bears obvious irregularities on
its
face,
wrong
format,
suspicious
signatures, absence in official records;
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27.7.4. This Court, in WP No. 112012/2019, had
passed
clear
orders
regarding
the
Wakharsal property directing eviction of
unauthorized occupants;
27.7.5. The
alleged
resolution
directly
violates
those court orders;
27.7.6. This court, vide order dated 19.12.2024 in
Cri. Petition No. 102611/2024, declined to
quash the criminal proceedings, observing
that there is "strong prima facie material to
proceed against the petitioners";
27.7.7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, by order dated
06.02.2025
in
SLP
1616/2025,
dismissed
(Criminal)
the
No.
petitioners'
challenge to the criminal proceedings.
27.7.8. When
evidence
documentary,
conclusive,
is
of
this
nature,
objective,
and
virtually
elaborate
examination
and
cross-examination of witnesses becomes
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unnecessary.
27.8. The principles of natural justice are flexible and
not rigid. They must be adapted to the context
and circumstances of each case. The rules of
natural justice are not embodied rules. What
particular rule of natural justice should apply to a
given case must depend to a great extent on the
facts
and
circumstances
of
that
case,
the
framework of the law under which the enquiry is
held and the constitution and rules of the body of
persons appointed for that purpose.
27.9. The aim of rules of natural justice is to secure
justice or
to
put
it
negatively,
to
prevent
miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate
only in areas not covered by any law validly
made.
They
do
not
supplant
the
law
but
supplement it.
27.10. The petitioners contend that the Division Bench
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in WA No. 100124/2025 directed a "full-fledged
enquiry"
which
was
not
conducted.
This
contention requires careful analysis.
27.11. The Division Bench merely observed that the
appellants are at liberty to impress upon the
Regional Commissioner about the binding nature
of Ravi Yashwant Bhoir while conducting the
enquiry. The Division Bench did not prescribe
any specific procedure or mandate that witnesses
be examined on oath or that a mini-trial be
conducted.
27.12. The Regional Commissioner has complied with
the Division Bench's direction by:
27.12.1. Issuing notices to the petitioners;
27.12.2. Affording them opportunity to file written
submissions;
27.12.3. Hearing them personally;
27.12.4. Considering their explanations in light of
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the
Principles
laid
down
in
Ravi
Yashwant Bhoir;
27.12.5. Examining the documentary evidence;
27.12.6. Passing a detailed reasoned order.
27.13. This constitutes substantial compliance with the
Division Bench's direction and the requirements
of natural justice.
27.14. The petitioners have relied on the argument that
the
resolution
was
"validly
passed
by
the
Council" and that "possession certificates were
issued by the council." However, this defence is
contradicted by:
27.14.1. The Council's official records which do not
show
any
such
resolution
dated
09.02.2024;
27.14.2. The categorical denial by the Municipal
Commissioner;
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27.14.3. The
absence
meeting
of
any
minutes
of
any
where
such
resolution
was
allegedly passed;
27.14.4. The
obvious
irregularities
in
the
document;
27.14.5. The fact that when other council members
were questioned, they denied that any
such resolution was passed.
27.15. When the defence is patently untenable and
contradicted by contemporaneous documentary
evidence,
the
need
for
elaborate
cross-
examination is eliminated.
27.16. When the evidence is clear and unambiguous,
and the defence is untenable, the enquiry can be
brief
without
violating
principles
justice.
27.17. From the above, it is clear that:
of
natural
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27.17.1. The
petitioners
were
afforded
a
reasonable opportunity to show cause
against their removal;
27.17.2. Multiple occasions were provided to the
petitioners to explain their conduct;
27.17.3. The
enquiry
appropriate,
was
having
adequate
and
regard
the
to
documentary nature of the evidence;
27.17.4. The principles of natural justice have been
substantially complied with;
27.17.5. The
absence
of
elaborate
procedural
safeguards (like examination of witnesses)
is not a violation of natural justice given
the nature of the evidence;
27.17.6. The impugned order is NOT vitiated for
non-compliance with principles of natural
justice.
27.18. I answer point No.1 by holding that the
impugned order is not vitiated for alleged
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non-compliance
with
the
principles
of
natural
infact
the
principles
of
justice,
natural justice have been complied with by
the Regional Commissioner.
28.
Answer to Point No. 2 — Whether removal of an
elected councillor under section 41 of the
Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 can be
sustained solely on the basis of allegations,
registration of FIR, and filing of charge-sheet, in
the absence of a conviction or proved
misconduct?
28.1. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners
submitted that:
28.1.1.
There is only a complaint filed, which
resulted in registration of FIR and filing of
charge-sheet.
Until
the
criminal
proceedings are completed, it cannot be
said
that
there
is
any
"proved
misconduct";
28.1.2.
The petitioners cannot be said to be guilty
of any offence merely on the registration
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of a FIR and filing of a charge-sheet. At
the most, they are "accused" and not
"convicts";
28.1.3.
Until the trial is completed, the petitioners
are deemed to be innocent until proven
guilty. The allegation against them would
not amount to
misconduct warranting
initiation of removal proceedings under
Section 41 of the KMA;
28.1.4.
Under Section 41(1)(d), there has to be
"proved misconduct" for removal of an
elected member. At present, there is only
a complaint and charge-sheet;
28.1.5.
Removal
of
membership
of
the
Municipality under Section 41 has longterm effect, as under Clause (c) and (f) of
Subsection (1) of Section 16 of the KMA, a
person
removed
would
suffer
disqualification not only for the present
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term but also for being chosen in the next
election until expiry of four years from the
date of such removal.
28.2. The learned Advocate General submitted that:
28.2.1.
Criminal conviction is not a prerequisite
for disciplinary action. The misconduct can
be proved by documentary evidence on
the preponderance of probabilities, which
is a lower standard than the criminal
standard of
proof "beyond reasonable
doubt";
28.2.2.
The allegations against the petitioners are
not
merely
allegations.
allegations
supported
conclusive
documentary
resolution
does
not
They
by
are
virtually
evidence.
exist
in
The
official
records. The signature is forged. This is
not a matter of opinion but fact;
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28.2.3.
The
criminal
administrative
proceedings
and
proceedings
are
independent. The pendency of criminal
proceedings does not bar administrative
action;
28.2.4.
The documentary evidence in the present
case
establishes
misconduct
beyond
doubt. The criminal courts have not found
the
allegations
to
be
frivolous
or
untenable, they have declined to quash
the proceedings;
28.2.5.
In matters of public employment and
removal of elected representatives, the
administrative authority need not wait for
criminal conviction to act. In fact, waiting
would allow the person to continue in
office and cause further harm;
28.2.6.
The
petitioners'
own
conduct
demonstrates misconduct. They produced
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the forged document before this Court in
WA No. 100488/2022 in an attempt to
mislead the Court.
28.3. The
petitioners'
fundamental
proceedings
argument
confusion
and
is
based
between
administrative
on
a
criminal
proceedings.
These are two distinct types of proceedings with
different objectives, different standards of proof,
and different consequences.
28.4. In P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that the principles applicable
to criminal prosecution are not identical to the
principles applicable to disciplinary proceedings.
The standard of proof in criminal cases is
'beyond
reasonable
disciplinary
cases
it
doubt',
is
whereas
in
'preponderance
of
probabilities'. Further, disciplinary action can be
taken
based
on
evidence
even
if
criminal
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prosecution fails.
28.5. Administrative action and criminal action are
independent streams. The pendency of criminal
proceedings does not bar administrative action.
In
fact,
it
may
be
necessary
to
take
administrative action in the public interest even
while criminal proceedings are pending.
28.6. The petitioners argue that the misconduct is not
"proved" but merely "alleged". This argument is
factually incorrect. The misconduct is established
by the following evidence:
28.6.1.
The official resolution register of the City
Municipal Council, produced before this
Court, does not contain any Resolution
No. 378 dated 09.02.2024 relating to
extension of Wakharsal property lease;
28.6.2.
The
Municipal
Commissioner
has
consistently and categorically stated that
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he never signed the alleged resolution and
that his signature has been forged;
28.6.3.
No minutes of any council meeting on
09.02.2024
show
passage
of
such
itself
bears
resolution;
28.6.4.
The
resolution
document
obvious irregularities on its face, wrong
format,
suspicious
signatures,
serial
number irregularities;
28.6.5.
Resolution No. 378 that actually exists
was passed on 19.07.2024 (five months
later) relating to an entirely different
matter, SFC grant under 15th Financial
Scheme;
28.6.6.
The petitioners themselves produced this
forged resolution before this Court in WA
No. 100488/2022, attempting to mislead
the Court regarding legal rights of the
unauthorised occupants;
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28.7. This
Court,
in
WP
No.
categorically
directed
unauthorised
occupants
112012/2019,
the
eviction
from
had
of
Wakharsal
property. The alleged resolution directly violates
those orders.
28.8. This is not a case of allegation based on oral
testimony or circumstantial evidence. This is a
case
where
forgery
is
established
documentary
evidence.
The
term
by
"proved"
means established by reliable evidence. The
evidence
in
the
present
case
is
reliable,
objective, and documentary.
28.9. In administrative law, the standard of proof is
the "balance of probabilities" or "preponderance
of probabilities", not "beyond reasonable doubt"
as in criminal law. Laxmibai v. Collector of
Belgaum, which was extensively cited by the
petitioners' counsel, makes this point clear.
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28.10. The preponderance of probabilities test requires
that the evidence in support of the allegation
must outweigh the evidence against it. In the
present
case,
the
documentary
evidence
overwhelmingly establishes the allegations of
forgery. The petitioners have not produced any
credible evidence to the contrary. In fact, they
have
not
even
seriously
disputed
the
core
allegations.
28.11. The petitioners argue that criminal proceedings
are pending, hence administrative action should
be deferred. This argument is unsustainable for
several reasons:
28.11.1. The investigation and trial of criminal
cases
can
take
several
years.
If
administrative action had to be deferred
until criminal proceedings conclude, it
would mean allowing the wrongdoer to
continue in office for years despite proved
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misconduct;
28.11.2. The Municipal Commissioner's allegation
that the petitioners forged his signature is
a serious matter affecting the credibility
and integrity of municipal administration.
If the petitioners are allowed to continue
in office while the criminal proceedings
drag
on,
it
would
undermine
public
confidence in municipal administration;
28.11.3. Criminal proceedings aim at punishing
crime. Administrative proceedings aim at
removing a person from public office if
found unfit to hold that office. These
objectives are independent;
28.12. Disciplinary action against an employee can be
taken
based
on
evidence
even
if
criminal
proceedings are pending or have failed. The
standard of proof is different, the objective is
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different,
and
the
pendency
of
criminal
proceedings is not a bar to disciplinary action.
28.13. Taking
administrative
action
(removal
from
office) does not prejudice the criminal trial. The
petitioners will still have full opportunity to
defend themselves in the criminal case;
28.14. A Co-ordinate bench of this court, vide order
dated 19.12.2024, declined to quash the criminal
proceedings. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, vide
order
dated
06.02.2025,
dismissed
the
petitioners' SLP against that order without any
disapproval of the Co-ordinate bench’s finding.
28.15. The
petitioners
rely
on
the
principle
of
"presumption of innocence" to argue that they
should not be removed from office pending
criminal trial. This argument misunderstands the
scope of that principle.
28.16. The "presumption of innocence" is a principle of
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criminal
jurisprudence.
It
means
that
in
a
criminal trial, the burden is on the prosecution to
prove
guilt
accused
is
beyond
reasonable
presumed
innocent
doubt.
until
The
proved
guilty.
28.17. However, the presumption of innocence does not
mean:
28.17.1. That a person cannot be removed from
office based on allegations supported by
evidence;
28.17.2. That a person must be allowed to continue
in public office pending criminal trial;
28.17.3. That administrative proceedings must be
frozen pending criminal proceedings.
28.18. The
circumstances
demonstrate
why
of
the
present
immediate
case
administrative
action was necessary and justified:
28.19. The petitioners had forged a resolution in their
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capacity as elected representatives and used
their office to issue illegal possession certificates.
This is a serious abuse of office;
28.20. The petitioners' forged resolution and illegal
possession certificates have caused substantial
harm
to
the
Municipality.
Unauthorised
occupants have obtained documents that they
might try to use to claim rights over valuable
municipal property;
28.21. By forging a resolution contrary to this Court's
orders in WP No. 112012/2019, the petitioners
have shown contempt for judicial authority;
28.22. If the petitioners were allowed to continue in
office pending criminal trial, there was danger
that they might forge further documents, issue
further illegal certificates, or cause further harm;
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28.23. Elected office is not an ordinary job. It is a trust
to represent the people and protect municipal
interests. Once that trust is broken, removal is
necessary;
28.24. Public confidence in municipal administration
requires that persons guilty of such serious
misconduct be removed immediately.
28.25. The petitioners correctly state that they are
"accused" but not "convicts" in the criminal case.
However,
this
administrative
does
not
action.
shield
For
them
from
administrative
purposes and removal from public office, a
person
need
not
be
convicted.
Evidence
supporting the charge is sufficient. The criminal
status
of
the
person
is
not
relevant
for
administrative action.
28.26. Disciplinary action against a public servant or
statutory office-bearer is legally distinct and
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independent from criminal prosecution. The
two proceedings operate in different fields,
are governed by different standards, and
serve different purposes.
28.27. In
criminal
must
proceedings,
establish
guilt
the
prosecution
beyond
reasonable
doubt. The object is to determine criminal
liability and impose penal consequences. In
contrast,
proceedings
disciplinary
are
or
administrative
concerned
with
the
suitability of a person to continue in public
office
and
with
maintaining
institutional
integrity. The standard of proof in such
proceedings is based on preponderance of
probabilities and formation of reasonable
satisfaction on available material.
28.28. It is well settled that even if a person is
acquitted in a criminal case, such acquittal
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does
not
automatically
entitle
him
to
reinstatement or continuation in service or
office if disciplinary proceedings have already
resulted in a finding of misconduct. An
acquittal may occur for various reasons,
including benefit of doubt or failure to meet
the strict criminal standard of proof. That
does not erase the findings recorded in
administrative
proceedings
based
on
independent assessment of material.
28.29. Therefore,
the
pendency
of
criminal
proceedings, or even a future
acquittal,
would not render the action taken under
Section
invalid,
provided
that
the
statutory authority has independently applied
its mind and reached a conclusion on the
basis of material available before it.
28.30. The removal under Section 41 is not founded
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solely on the existence of an FIR or charge
sheet.
It
municipal
is
based
records,
on
examination
discrepancy
in
of
the
resolution register, denial of signature by the
Commissioner, and overall conduct of the
petitioners.
The
administrative
criminal
action
case
are
and
the
parallel
but
independent. The validity of one does not
automatically depend upon the outcome of
the other.
28.31. The
petitioners
raise
the
consequence
of
disqualification under Section 16 of the KMA as a
reason why removal should not be allowed. The
Court
appreciates
the
gravity
of
the
consequence. However, grave consequences do
not excuse grave misconduct. In fact, they
highlight the need to remove from office persons
guilty of serious misconduct.
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28.32. The disqualification that follows removal from
elected
office
is
undoubtedly
a
serious
consequence. It affects not only the individual
concerned but also his future participation in the
democratic process. However, the seriousness of
the consequence cannot be used as a ground to
shield misconduct. On the contrary, when the
statutory
scheme
consequential
provides
for
disqualification,
it
removal
and
reflects
the
legislative intent that only persons who maintain
the integrity and dignity of the office should be
permitted
to
hold
it.
The
gravity
of
the
consequence, therefore, calls for careful scrutiny
of the allegations, not leniency towards proven
or prima facie established misconduct.
28.33. It is equally true that elections and public office
confer legitimacy through the mandate of the
people. But that mandate is not a licence for
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abuse. Democratic office is not an immunity
against accountability. If elected representatives
are found to have engaged in dishonest or
fraudulent conduct affecting public property or
institutional integrity, the law must respond
firmly. Otherwise, public office would become a
shield
behind
which
misconduct
could
be
perpetuated.
28.34. The seriousness of disqualification thus cuts both
ways. It demands strict procedural fairness
before removal, but it also demands that serious
breaches of trust be dealt with decisively. To
hold otherwise would dilute the very purpose of
statutory safeguards designed to protect public
institutions and public confidence.
28.35. From the above it is clear that:
28.35.1. Removal of an elected councillor CAN be
sustained
on
the
basis
of
proved
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misconduct without requiring a criminal
conviction;
28.35.2. The misconduct in the present case is
proved by documentary evidence on the
preponderance of probabilities;
28.35.3. The pendency of criminal proceedings is not
a bar to administrative action;
28.35.4. The standard of proof in administrative
proceedings
is
lower
than
in
criminal
proceedings;
28.35.5. Public
interest
administrative
requires
action,
not
immediate
deferment
pending criminal trial;
28.35.6. The consequences of disqualification do not
excuse the misconduct but emphasise the
need for removal.
28.36. I answer Point No.2 by holding that the
removal of an elected Councillor can be
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sustained based on proved misconduct in
the absence of a criminal conviction. In the
present case, the misconduct is proved.
29.
Answer to point No. 3 — Whether the alleged
acts attributed to the petitioners, relating to the
passing and use of resolution No.378 dated
09.02.2024,
constitute
"misconduct"
or
"disgraceful conduct" within the meaning and
scope
of
Section
of
the
Karnataka
Municipalities Act, 1964?
29.1. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners
submits that:
29.1.1. The
alleged
acts
do
not
constitute
"misconduct" or "disgraceful conduct". The
resolution was purportedly passed by the
entire Council. If any misconduct occurred,
it was collective, not individual;
29.1.2. The resolution relates to extension of lease
of
Wakharsal
substantive
properties.
policy
matter
This
is
a
on
which
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reasonable people can differ. It is not
criminal
conduct
but
merely
a
policy
decision;
29.1.3. The petitioners' conduct in passing the
resolution, if it occurred, was in accordance
with applicable law and procedure. The
Council has the power to extend leases.
The majority of the Council decided to
extend the lease with renewed rental terms
as per
market
conditions. This
is
not
misconduct;
29.1.4. The petitioners did not act for personal gain
but in the interest of the Municipality. The
extended
lease
would
have
brought
renewed rental income to the Municipality;
29.1.5. The allegation that the signature of the
Commissioner is forged is a matter that has
to be decided in the criminal court. In the
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absence of such decision, the petitioners
cannot be removed;
29.1.6. The
petitioners'
Wakharsal
actions
property
are
in
relation
not
"in
to
the
discharge of duties as councillors" in a
manner that warrants removal. The acts
are at most breaches of contract or civil
disputes,
not
criminal
or
disgraceful
conduct.
29.2. The learned Advocate General submitted that:
29.2.1. The acts clearly constitute misconduct and
disgraceful conduct. Forgery of documents,
forging of signatures, and fabrication of
resolutions are among the gravest forms of
misconduct;
29.2.2. The petitioners cannot hide behind the
argument that it is "collective decision".
The resolution itself does not exist. If it
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does
not
exist,
there
is
no
collective
decision, only collective fraud;
29.2.3. The alleged resolution is not a matter of
policy difference. It is a forged document.
This is not a difference of opinion but
dishonesty;
29.2.4. The conduct of the petitioners, forging
documents,
forging
signatures,
issuing
illegal possession certificates, is per se
disgraceful. It cannot be characterised as
an honest policy difference;
29.2.5. The conduct violates the trust reposed in
elected
representatives.
representatives
are
trustees
Elected
of
public
property. By forging documents to benefit
unauthorised
occupants,
the
petitioners
have betrayed that trust.
29.2.6. The conduct violates court orders. This
Court, in WP No. 112012/2019, had clearly
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directed
the
eviction
of
unauthorised
occupants. The forged resolution is a direct
affront to that court order;
29.2.7. The conduct is "in the discharge of duties
as
councillors"
resolution
because
purports
to
the
alleged
a
council
be
resolution, and the possession certificates
were issued in an official capacity;
29.2.8. Forgery
and
fraud
per
se
constitute
disgraceful conduct for any person, let
alone for an elected representative.
29.3. Black's Law Dictionary defines misconduct as:
"A transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of
duty, unlawful behaviour, willful in character,
improper or wrong behaviour."
29.4. It is well settled that even where the word
“misconduct” is not expressly defined in the
statute or rules, it carries a settled and judicially
recognised meaning. The absence of a definition
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does
not
render
the
expression
vague
or
uncertain.
29.5. The term “misconduct” ordinarily signifies a
transgression of an established and definite rule
of action. It refers to conduct that is contrary to
law, to prescribed procedure, or to the standards
expected of a person holding public office. It is
not confined merely to violation of an express
statutory provision; it extends to any unlawful or
improper behaviour by a person entrusted with
public responsibility.
29.6. Further, misconduct is not synonymous with
mere error. It implies a wrongful intention or a
conscious
disregard
of
duty.
It
must
be
something more than an innocent mistake, an
error of judgment, or a bona fide difference of
opinion. Where discretion is exercised honestly
within the bounds of law, even if the decision
later proves to be incorrect, it may not amount
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to
misconduct.
However,
where
an
act
is
deliberate, dishonest, or undertaken in disregard
of binding legal norms, it crosses the threshold
into misconduct.
29.7. Misconduct
also
includes
any
dishonest
or
improper conduct, breach of a prescribed code of
conduct, or behaviour that brings disrepute to
the
office
held.
In
the
context
of
elected
representatives, it encompasses conduct that
undermines public confidence, violates fiduciary
obligations, or is inconsistent with the dignity
and integrity expected of public office.
29.8. Thus, misconduct is not limited to criminal
conviction. It includes actions that are unlawful,
dishonest,
improper,
or
unbecoming
of
the
position held, particularly where such actions
affect public property, institutional integrity, or
the administration of justice.
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29.9. The acts of the Petitioners if not considered, in
my considered opinion would clearly constitute
misconduct:
29.10. The resolution does not exist in the Council's
official records. The petitioners have fabricated a
document, falsely claiming
that
the
Council
passed a resolution;
29.11. The Municipal Commissioner categorically states
that he never signed the alleged resolution. His
signature has been forged. Forging a signature is
a criminal act that goes to the root of honesty;
29.12. Based on the forged resolution, the petitioners
issued possession certificates to unauthorised
occupants, thereby trying to create legal rights
that do not exist;
29.13. As elected representatives, the petitioners were
entrusted with the care of municipal property
and interests. By forging documents to benefit
unauthorised occupants (this aspect having been
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decided by this court on several occasions) they
betrayed that trust;
29.14. The Rules of Procedure of the City Municipal
Council require that all resolutions be properly
recorded,
properly
signed,
and
properly
maintained. The petitioners violated these rules
by creating a forged document.
29.15. The expression “disgraceful conduct” must be
understood in its ordinary and contextual sense.
Though not specifically defined in the statute, it
denotes conduct that brings dishonour, shame,
or
discredit
upon the
individual and, more
importantly, upon the office held by him. It
refers to behaviour that is unbecoming of a
person
occupying
public
office
and
that
undermines the dignity of the institution.
29.16. Conduct is disgraceful if it would be regarded by
honest, reasonable and right-thinking members
of the public as disreputable or shameful. The
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test is objective. It is not whether the person
concerned believes his conduct to be justified,
but
whether
such
conduct
lowers
public
confidence in the office and the institution.
29.17. It is equally necessary to recognise that the
standard of conduct expected from an ordinary
individual is not the same as that expected from
an elected representative or a person holding
high public office. A private individual acts in his
personal capacity. His conduct, unless unlawful,
may
not
carry
institutional
consequences.
However, an elected representative acts in a
fiduciary capacity. He is a trustee of public
confidence. His actions reflect not merely upon
himself
but
upon
the
democratic
body
he
represents.
29.18. Therefore, conduct which may not amount to
disgrace in the case of an ordinary person may
assume a far more serious character when
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committed by a public office-holder. The office
carries
heightened
expectations
of
integrity,
honesty, and accountability. The higher the
office,
the
higher
the
standard
of
probity
required.
29.19. Disgraceful conduct thus includes any act that
violates basic principles of honesty and integrity,
any conduct that is dishonest, deceptive, or
improper,
and
disrepute
to
any
the
behaviour
that
brings
institution.
For
elected
representatives, who derive authority from the
mandate
of
the
people,
the
threshold
is
necessarily higher. An act that undermines public
trust, erodes institutional credibility, or reflects
disregard
for
fiduciary
obligations
legitimately
be
characterised
as
may
disgraceful
conduct within the meaning of the statute.
29.20. In short, public office magnifies responsibility.
What may be tolerated as a personal lapse in
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private
life
disqualifying
may
become
when
it
unacceptable
affects
public
and
trust,
institutional dignity, and the confidence of the
electorate.
29.21. Measured
against
these
definitions,
the
petitioners' conduct is undoubtedly disgraceful:
29.22. Forging documents is inherently shameful and
disgraceful.
It
is
conduct
condemned
by
any
honest
that
would
person
in
be
the
community;
29.23. Elected representatives are elected to serve the
public. Using their office to forge documents and
benefit unauthorised occupants is a betrayal of
public trust that brings shame on the institution;
29.24. Forging a document to circumvent a clear court
order
directing
eviction
of
unauthorised
occupants is particularly disgraceful. It shows
contempt for judicial authority;
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29.25. The forged resolution was produced before this
Court in WA No. 100488/2022. Using forged
documents to mislead the Court is conduct of the
highest degree of disgrace;
29.26. The petitioners' conduct has caused harm to the
Municipality by creating documents that might be
used to claim rights over valuable municipal
property.
This
harm
to
public
property
is
disgraceful;
29.27. The core of disgraceful conduct is dishonesty.
The
petitioners'
conduct
involves
deliberate
dishonesty, forging of documents, and deception.
No conduct can be more disgraceful than this.
29.28. Section 41(1)(d) provides that a councillor can
be removed if he is guilty of misconduct "in the
discharge of his duties as such councillor". The
petitioners argue that the acts were not in
discharge of duties but constitute breaches of
contract or civil disputes.
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29.29. This argument is without merit because:
29.29.1. The alleged resolution purports to be a
resolution of the City Municipal Council,
passed in an official capacity. If such a
resolution had been validly passed, it would
have been an exercise of Council powers;
29.29.2. The possession certificates were issued in
the official capacity of the petitioners as
councillors.
The
documents
themselves
reference the CMC and the authority of the
Council;
29.29.3. The forged resolution bore the seal and
insignia of the CMC, suggesting that the
petitioners used their official positions to
create these documents;
29.29.4. The forged resolution was used in official
proceedings before this Court in WA No.
100488/2022
to
assert
unauthorised occupants;
rights
of
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29.29.5. The
petitioners'
conduct,
if
successful,
would have affected the official function of
the
Council
to
manage
and
control
municipal property.
29.29.6. Therefore, the acts were clearly "in the
discharge
of
(attempted)
duties
as
councillors", and the misconduct/disgraceful
conduct occurred in that context.
29.30. The petitioners argue that since the resolution
was supposedly a collective decision, individual
councillors cannot be held responsible.
29.31. The fundamental point is that the resolution was
never validly passed by the Council. Therefore,
there is no collective decision. What exists is
collective
fraud
or
individual
fraud
by
the
petitioners;
29.32. Even if a collective decision were involved,
individual liability can be fixed if the individuals
acted dishonestly.
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29.33. Participation in a collective decision does not
automatically
shield
an
individual
from
accountability. Even where a decision is taken
collectively by a body or committee, individual
liability can still be fixed if it is shown that a
particular member acted dishonestly, mala fide,
or with improper intent. Collective functioning
cannot be used as a protective cover for acts
tainted by fraud or bad faith.
29.34. If a member consciously supports, signs, or
facilitates an action that is illegal or dishonest,
he
cannot
later
avoid
responsibility
by
contending that the decision was that of the
entire
body.
The
responsibility
does
accountability
where
doctrine
not
of
collective
obliterate
individual
there
is
material
to
establish personal involvement, knowledge, or
participation in wrongful conduct.
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29.35. Thus, if dishonesty or mala fides is prima facie
established against specific members, individual
consequences may follow notwithstanding that
the decision was recorded as a resolution of the
Council.
29.36. The evidence suggests that the petitioners were
the main movers behind the forged resolution.
They were not passive participants in a collective
decision but active participants in a dishonest
scheme, they have signed the forged resolution
and still contend that the same is a valid one,
therefore,
individual
liability
is
clearly
established.
29.37. The petitioners contend that extension of lease is
a matter of policy on which reasonable persons
can differ. This case is not about whether the
policy of extending the lease was right or wrong.
This
case
is
about
whether
the
resolution
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extending the lease existed or was forged. The
resolution is forged. This is not a matter of
opinion; it is a matter of fact established by
documentary evidence.
29.38. Extension of lease might be a matter of policy,
but forging a resolution about extension of lease
is not a matter of policy, it is fraud. There is a
fundamental difference between:
29.38.1. When
two
councillors
disagree
about
whether to extend a lease, that is an
honest policy difference;
29.38.2. When a councillor forges a resolution to
make
it
appear
as
if
the
lease
was
extended when it was not, that is dishonest
conduct.
29.39. The present case falls into the second category.
The petitioners did not attempt to persuade the
Council to extend the lease through proper
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procedures. They forged a resolution to achieve
their objective.
29.40. The
law
is
well-settled
that
elected
representatives are trustees of public property
and public interest. Laxmibai v. Collector of
Belgaum, which was extensively relied upon by
the petitioners' counsel, itself establishes the
principle of breach of trust:
"An elected representative is a trustee of public
property
and
public
interest.
When
that
representative betrays the trust, removal is not
merely justified but imperative."
29.41. By forging documents to benefit unauthorised
occupants and against the directions of this
Court,
the
petitioners
have
breached
the
fiduciary duty they owed to the Municipality and
the public.
29.42. This Court, in WP No. 112012/2019 (judgment
dated 12.08.2022), passed clear orders directing
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that unauthorised occupants of the Wakharsal
property be evicted and that the property be
utilised for public purposes. The alleged forged
resolution directly violates those orders by trying
to create rights in favour of the very occupants
whom the Court had ordered to be evicted.
29.43. Violation
of
binding
court
orders,
in
itself,
constitutes misconduct and, in appropriate cases,
amounts
to
disgraceful
conduct
within
the
meaning of the statute.
29.44. A court order is not a mere advisory direction; it
is a mandate issued under authority of law. All
authorities, including elected representatives and
statutory bodies, are constitutionally bound to
comply with judicial orders. Any deliberate act
that defeats, circumvents, or overreaches such
orders strikes at the rule of law.
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29.45. When an elected representative, in the discharge
of official duties, acts in a manner contrary to
binding
judicial
directions,
the
misconduct
assumes a heightened gravity. Such conduct
does
not
merely
administrative
involve
discipline;
it
a
breach
of
undermines
the
authority of courts and erodes constitutional
governance. In a democratic system founded
upon separation of powers, obedience to judicial
orders is a fundamental obligation.
29.46. Therefore, where there is material to show that
an elected representative has consciously acted
in violation of court orders, or has attempted to
nullify their effect through improper means, such
conduct would amount to serious misconduct.
Given the fiduciary nature of public office and the
higher
standard
expected
of
elected
representatives, such behaviour may legitimately
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be
characterised
as
disgraceful
conduct,
warranting statutory consequences.
29.47. From the above it is clear that
29.47.1. The acts attributed to the petitioners—
forgery of Resolution No. 378, forging of
the
Municipal Commissioner's signature,
and
issuance
of
illegal
possession
certificates—clearly constitute "misconduct"
within the meaning of Section 41(1)(d);
29.47.2. These
acts
also
constitute
"disgraceful
conduct" as they are inherently dishonest,
bring disrepute to the office, violate public
trust, and violate court orders;
29.47.3. The acts were done "in the discharge of
duties as councillors" as they involved the
use
of
official
documents;
capacity
and
official
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29.47.4. Individual liability is established despite any
collective aspect since the Petitioners have
admittedly signed the forged resolution;
29.47.5. The misconduct is among the gravest kinds
and warrants the most serious punishment,
which is removal from office.
29.48. I answer Point no.3 by holding that, the
alleged acts constitute both "misconduct"
and
"disgraceful
meaning
of
conduct"
Section
within
41(1)(d)
of
the
the
Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964.
30.
Answer to Point No. 4 — Whether the regional
commissioner, while exercising quasi-judicial
powers under Section 41 of the Karnataka
Municipalities Act, 1964, was required to conduct
a detailed enquiry with framing of specific
charges,
examination
of
witnesses,
and
consideration of defence evidence, in light of the
law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court?
30.1. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners
submitted that:
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30.1.1. The power under Section 41 is quasi-judicial
in
nature.
safeguards
Therefore,
applicable
all
to
procedural
quasi-judicial
proceedings must be followed;
30.1.2. Specific charges must be framed in writing.
Charge
memo
must
be
issued
to
the
petitioners;
30.1.3. All allegations must be detailed and clearly
communicated to the petitioners;
30.1.4. Witnesses, if any, must be examined and
cross-examined
in
the
presence
of
the
petitioners;
30.1.5. The petitioners must be given full opportunity
to examine and cross-examine witnesses;
30.1.6. A full-fledged inquiry is mandated by Ravi
Yashwant
Bhoir
v.
District
Collector,
Raigad, (2012) 4 SCC 407, particularly paras
30-36 extracted hereinabove;
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30.1.7. The Division Bench in WA No. 100124/2025
directed a "full-fledged enquiry", which has
not been conducted;
30.1.8. The petitioners were not given opportunity to
cross-examine the Municipal Commissioner or
to hear his oral testimony;
30.1.9. The Regional Commissioner has not complied
with
the
requirement
of
quasi-judicial
proceedings.
30.2. The learned Advocate General submitted that:
30.2.1. While the power under Section 41 is quasijudicial, the statutory language does not
prescribe
the
exact
procedure
to
be
followed;
30.2.2. The statute only requires "an enquiry at
which he has had a reasonable opportunity
of showing cause". It does not mandate
framing of formal charges, examination of
witnesses, or cross-examination;
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30.2.3. The nature and extent of enquiry depends
on
the
nature
evidence
is
conclusive,
of
evidence.
documentary
elaborate
When
and
the
virtually
examination
of
witnesses is not necessary;
30.2.4. Ravi
Yashwant
Bhoir
case
does
not
mandate a full-fledged trial-like inquiry with
examination of witnesses. It only requires
compliance with principles of natural justice;
30.2.5. The Division Bench did
not specifically
mandate examination of witnesses. It only
directed consideration of Ravi Yashwant
Bhoir principles;
30.2.6. The petitioners have been given ample
opportunity to explain their conduct. They
appeared personally before the Regional
Commissioner
submissions;
and filed
detailed
written
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30.2.7. The procedure followed by the Regional
Commissioner
is
adequate
and
in
compliance with principles of natural justice;
30.2.8. The allegations are based on documentary
evidence that is conclusive. Examination of
witnesses would not add anything to this
evidence.
30.3. It is well-established that the power to remove a
councillor under Section 41 is quasi-judicial in
nature.
30.4. However, the quasi-judicial nature of the power
does not necessarily mean that all procedural
safeguards applicable to court trials must be
followed.
The
Hon'ble
Supreme
Court
has
consistently held that the procedures applicable
to quasi-judicial proceedings are flexible and
context-dependent.
30.5. The proviso to Section 41(1)(d) states:
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"Provided that no councillor shall be removed under
clause (d) except after an inquiry at which he has
had a reasonable opportunity of showing cause
against his removal."
30.6. The statute prescribes two things:
30.6.1. An inquiry;
30.6.2. Reasonable opportunity to show cause.
30.7.
The statute does NOT prescribe:
30.7.1.
Framing of formal charges;
30.7.2.
Issuance of charge memo;
30.7.3.
Appointment of an inquiry officer separate
from the removing authority;
30.7.4. Examination of witnesses on oath;
30.7.5. Cross-examination of witnesses;
30.7.6. Any other specific procedural step.
30.8.
When
the
statute
does
not
prescribe
a
procedure, the removing authority has discretion
to adopt a suitable procedure consistent with
natural justice and the principles laid down by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
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30.9.
It is a settled principle of administrative law that
the requirements of natural justice are not rigid,
mechanical,
or
of
universal
application
in
identical form. The content and extent of natural
justice vary with the context in which the power
is exercised, the statutory framework governing
such exercise, the nature of the rights affected,
and the consequences that follow.
30.10. The core requirement is that the procedure
adopted must be “reasonable, fair and just.”
Fairness, however, is not synonymous with an
elaborate or trial-like process in every case. The
law does not mandate that all proceedings must
replicate the safeguards of a criminal trial. What
is required is that the person affected must be
given adequate notice of the case against him
and a meaningful opportunity to respond.
30.11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held
that natural justice is a flexible tool in the hands
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of courts. It is not an inflexible formula to be
mechanically applied irrespective of statutory
context. The rules of natural justice are not
embodied rules; they are principles evolved to
secure justice and prevent arbitrariness. Their
application depends to a great extent on:
30.11.1. the
facts
and
circumstances
of
the
particular case,
30.11.2. the nature of the enquiry,
30.11.3. the statutory scheme under which action is
taken,
30.11.4. the
character
and
composition
of
the
authority exercising power, and
30.11.5. the
degree
of
civil
or
statutory
consequences that may ensue.
30.12. In proceedings under a statute such as Section
41 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, the
legislature has prescribed issuance of notice and
consideration of explanation. The statute does
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not contemplate a formal adversarial trial with
framing of charges, examination and crossexamination of witnesses as a matter of right.
Therefore, importing the procedural model of
criminal jurisprudence into
such proceedings
would amount to rewriting the statute.
30.13. Where the affected party is informed of the
allegations,
supplied
with
relevant
material,
granted time to submit explanation, and afforded
opportunity of hearing and where the authority
applies its mind to the explanation and records
reasons the essential requirements of natural
justice stand satisfied. The emphasis is on
substance over form. What is impermissible is
arbitrariness, pre-determination, or denial of
meaningful opportunity; what is not required is
procedural
mandate.
excess
beyond
the
statutory
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30.14. It is equally well settled that natural justice
cannot be stretched to a point where it paralyses
administrative functioning or defeats statutory
purpose. The doctrine exists to secure fairness,
not to provide a tactical shield against legitimate
statutory action.
30.15. Therefore, the test that must be applied is
whether, in the totality of circumstances, the
procedure adopted was fair, reasonable and
proportionate to the nature of the allegations and
the statutory framework. If that test is satisfied,
the action cannot be invalidated merely because
more elaborate safeguards were not provided.
30.16. The petitioners heavily rely on Ravi Yashwant
Bhoir v. District Collector, Raigad. A careful
reading of that judgment shows that it does NOT
mandate a trial-like inquiry with examination and
cross-examination
mandates is:
of
witnesses.
What
it
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30.16.1. Strict
Adherence
to
Statutory
Provisions: The authority must strictly
follow the statutory procedure;
30.16.2. Principles of Natural Justice: Principles
of natural justice must be given "full play";
30.16.3. Full-Fledged Inquiry: There must be an
enquiry that is not cursory or perfunctory.
The exact words are:
"If a temporary government employee cannot
be removed on the ground of misconduct
without holding a full-fledged inquiry, it is
difficult to imagine how an elected officebearer can be removed without holding a fullfledged inquiry."
30.16.4. However, "full-fledged inquiry" does not
mean a trial-like inquiry. It means a proper,
thorough, and fair inquiry. This can be
conducted
through
examination
of
documentary
evidence,
hearing
of
the
removed,
and
person
proposed
to
be
consideration of the explanation offered.
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30.16.5. Reasonable
must
be
Opportunity:
given
"a
fair
The
person
opportunity
of
defence";
30.16.6. Application of Mind: "The decision must
show that the authority has applied its
mind to the allegations made and the
explanation furnished by the elected officebearer sought to be removed."
30.16.7. Proved
Misconduct:
"A
duly
elected
person is entitled to hold office for the term
for which he has been elected and he can
be removed only on a proved misconduct or
any
other
procedure
established
under
law."
30.16.8. None
of
these
requirements
mandate
framing of formal charges or examination
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of witnesses. They only mandate fairness,
thoroughness, and application of mind.
30.17. A critical distinction must be drawn between:
30.17.1. "Full-Fledged
Inquiry":
A
proper,
thorough inquiry where all relevant facts
are examined, all relevant evidence is
considered, and the authority applies its
mind to reach a decision. This is what Ravi
Yashwant Bhoir mandates.
30.17.2. "Trial-Like Inquiry": A procedure that
mirrors the procedures of a court, including
examination of witnesses on oath, crossexamination, and application of rules of
evidence.
30.17.3. The statute and the Supreme Court require
the former, not the latter.
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30.18. The expression “full-fledged inquiry” must be
interpreted in a manner consistent with the
statutory framework, the nature of the power
exercised, and the object sought to be achieved.
It cannot be equated mechanically with a judicial
trial or criminal prosecution.
30.19. A full-fledged inquiry does not mean a judicial
inquiry in the strict sense, nor does it require
replication of trial-like procedures such as formal
framing of charges in the manner of a criminal
court, examination and cross-examination of
witnesses in every case, adherence to strict rules
of evidence, or proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Those safeguards are characteristic of criminal
adjudication, where personal liberty is at stake.
Administrative
or
quasi-judicial
proceedings,
particularly under statutory provisions governing
removal from office, operate within a different
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legal framework and are governed by different
standards.
30.20. The requirement of a “full enquiry” signifies that
the authority must not act in a casual, summary,
or perfunctory manner. It must undertake a
serious, structured, and fair examination of the
allegations. The authority is required to:
30.20.1. Clearly inform the person concerned of the
allegations and the material relied upon.
30.20.2. Afford reasonable opportunity to submit
explanation and place relevant material in
defence.
30.20.3. Consider the explanation objectively and in
good faith.
30.20.4. Examine
the
relevant
records
and
surrounding circumstances.
30.20.5. Apply independent mind to the material on
record.
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30.20.6. Record reasons demonstrating that the
decision is based on relevant considerations
and not on extraneous factors.
30.21. The inquiry must be real and meaningful, not
illusory. The authority must reach its conclusion
on the basis of relevant material and logical
reasoning,
and
the
order
must
disclose
application of mind. That is what renders the
proceeding legally sustainable.
30.22. Importantly, the content of a full enquiry must
be understood in the context of the statute under
which action is taken. Where the statute requires
issuance
of
notice
and
consideration
of
explanation, compliance with those requirements
in a substantive manner satisfies the mandate of
a full enquiry. Courts have consistently held that
principles of natural justice are flexible and their
application depends upon the nature of the
proceeding and the statutory scheme.
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30.23. A contrary interpretation equating “full enquiry”
with a full-fledged judicial trial in every case
would amount to judicial legislation and would
frustrate the legislative intent behind conferring
administrative
powers
authorities.
would
It
upon
also
designated
render
statutory
provisions unworkable by importing procedural
requirements
not
contemplated
by
the
enquiry
means
a
legislature.
30.24. Therefore,
a
full
comprehensive, fair, and reasoned examination
appropriate to the nature of the proceeding. It
ensures substantive fairness, transparency, and
accountability
in
decision-making,
without
unnecessarily importing formalities that belong
exclusively
to
criminal
trials.
Such
an
understanding
is
consistent
with
established
principles
administrative
law
and
of
withstand appellate scrutiny.
would
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30.25. In the present case, examination of witnesses
was not necessary for the following reasons:
30.25.1. Documentary Evidence is Conclusive:
The
evidence
is
not
based
on
oral
testimony or matters of interpretation. The
evidence consists of:
30.25.1.1. Official records of the City Municipal
Council showing absence of the alleged
resolution;
30.25.1.2. Categorical
denial
Commissioner
by
that
he
the
Municipal
signed
the
resolution;
30.25.1.3. Obvious irregularities in the document
itself;
30.25.1.4. Expert
opinion
regarding
forged
signature.
When
documentary
conclusive,
examination
adds nothing.
evidence
of
is
witnesses
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30.25.2. The
Defence
is
Self-Evidently
Untenable: The petitioners' defence is that
"the resolution was validly passed by the
Council".
However,
this
defence
is
contradicted by the Council's own records.
No amount of oral testimony can overcome
this documentary contradiction.
30.26. The requirement of fairness under natural justice
does
not
mandate
unnecessarily
prolonged
proceedings in every case. The essence of
natural justice lies in affording a meaningful
opportunity to be heard and ensuring that the
authority applies its mind to the material placed
before it. It does not insist upon length for its
own sake.
30.27. Where
the
material
on
record
is
clear,
documentary in nature, and unambiguous, and
where the defence offered is either admitted,
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unsupported, or untenable on the face of the
record, the enquiry need not be elaborate. In
such circumstances, the authority is not required
to conduct an extended or ritualistic proceeding
merely to demonstrate procedural formality.
30.28. If:
30.28.1. The
relevant
documents
are
undisputed or verifiable from official
records,
30.28.2. The
allegations
are
specific
and
supported by documentary material,
30.28.3. The
given
person
notice
concerned
and
has
been
opportunity
to
respond, and
30.28.4. The explanation does not displace or
rebut the core material relied upon,
then a brief but reasoned decision would
satisfy the requirements of natural justice.
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30.29. The law does not require empty formalities. It
requires fairness in substance. Where the facts
speak for themselves and the defence fails to
raise any genuine or triable issue, insisting on
elaborate procedures would amount to elevating
form over substance.
30.30. Thus, when evidence is clear and unambiguous,
and the defence is legally untenable, an enquiry
that is concise yet reasoned does not violate
principles
of
natural
justice,
provided
the
affected party has been given a real opportunity
to present his case and the authority has
objectively considered it.
30.31. The Regional Commissioner conducted a "fullfledged inquiry" in the proper sense:
30.31.1. Notices
Issued:
The
petitioners
were
issued notices calling for explanation, with
specific allegations mentioned;
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30.31.2. Opportunity to Respond: The petitioners
were
given
not
one,
but
multiple
opportunities to respond, first by submitting
written
explanation,
personally,
then
then
by
by
appearing
submitting
detailed
written submissions after the Division Bench
order;
30.31.3. Examination of Materials: The Regional
Commissioner
carefully
examined
all
materials on record, including:
30.31.3.1.
Official records of the City Municipal
Council;
30.31.3.2.
The forged resolution document;
30.31.3.3.
The resolution register;
30.31.3.4.
The
original
resolution
(No.
378)
criminal
court
relating to SFC grant;
30.31.3.5.
The
order
of
the
declining to quash proceedings;
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30.31.3.6.
The dismissal order of the Supreme
Court regarding SLP;
30.31.4. Consideration
of
Explanation:
The
explanation offered by the petitioners was
carefully considered. The
Court
has no
reason
the
Regional
to
believe
Commissioner
that
ignored
or
dismissed
the
explanation without consideration, nor has it
been brought to the notice of this court as
to which of the explanation/s offered by the
petitioners was not considered;
30.31.5. Reasoned
Decision:
The
Regional
Commissioner passed a detailed reasoned
order explaining why the explanation was
not
acceptable
and
why
removal
was
warranted;
30.31.6. Application of Mind: The order shows
clear application of mind to the specific
allegations and the explanation offered.
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30.31.7. This constitutes a "full-fledged inquiry" in
the proper sense.
30.32. The
petitioners
argue
that
the
Municipal
Commissioner should have been examined as a
witness so that the petitioners could crossexamine him. This argument is without merit
because:
30.32.1. His Statement was on Record: The
Municipal Commissioner's denial of signing
the resolution is on record and was before
the Regional Commissioner. The petitioners
had full knowledge of this denial and
opportunity to rebut it;
30.32.2. Documentary Evidence Speaks Louder:
The fact that the resolution does not appear
in the Council's official records is more
conclusive than any oral testimony. Even if
the Municipal Commissioner admitted that
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he signed the resolution (which he does
not), the absence from official records
would speak volumes;
30.32.3. The
Petitioners
Did
Not
Deny:
The
petitioners did not formally deny that the
signature is forged. They merely contended
that the issue should be decided in the
criminal
court.
This
is
not
a
cross-
examination of the Municipal Commissioner
but avoidance of the issue;
30.32.4. Examination Would Serve No Purpose:
Even if the Regional Commissioner had
examined the Municipal Commissioner and
given opportunity for cross-examination,
what new fact would emerge? The evidence
would remain the same:
30.32.4.1. The resolution does not exist in official
records;
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30.32.4.2. The signatures of the petitioners are
undisputed;
30.32.4.3. The
document
has
obvious
irregularities.
30.33. None
of
these
facts
would
change
with
examination and cross-examination.
30.34. The
standard
of
proof
in
quasi-judicial
proceedings like removal under Section 41 is the
"balance of probabilities" or "preponderance of
probabilities", not "beyond reasonable doubt" as
in criminal proceedings.
30.35. The preponderance of probabilities test requires
that the evidence in support of the allegation
must outweigh the evidence against it. In the
present
case,
the
documentary
evidence
overwhelmingly establishes the allegations. The
petitioners
have
not
produced
any
credible
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counter-evidence. Therefore, the standard is
easily met.
30.36. From the above it is clear that
30.36.1. While the power under Section 41 is quasijudicial,
it
does
not
mandate
trial-like
procedures with examination and crossexamination of witnesses;
30.36.2. Ravi Yashwant Bhoir mandates fairness,
thoroughness, and application of mind, not
trial-like procedures;
30.36.3. "Full-fledged
inquiry"
means
proper,
thorough, and fair inquiry, not trial-like
inquiry;
30.36.4. The Regional Commissioner conducted a
full-fledged
inquiry
by
examining
all
materials, affording the petitioners multiple
opportunities to respond, and passing a
reasoned decision;
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30.36.5. In the present case, given the documentary
nature of the evidence, examination of
witnesses was not necessary;
30.36.6. The procedure followed by the Regional
Commissioner
Yashwant
fully
complies
with
Ravi
Bhoir
principles
and
with
principles of natural justice.
30.37. I answer Point No. 4 by holding that the
Regional Commissioner was not required to
conduct a detailed enquiry with framing of
specific
charges
witnesses.
The
and
examination
of
inquiry
conducted
was
adequate, proper, and in compliance with
law.
31.
Answer to point No. 5 — Whether the impugned
order of removal suffers from arbitrariness, mala
fides,
colourable
exercise
of
power,
or
extraneous considerations, particularly having
regard to the timing of the order vis-à-vis the
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scheduled election to the posts of president and
vice-president of the city municipal council?
31.1. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners
submits that:
31.1.1. The
impugned
order
suffers
from
arbitrariness and mala fides as evidenced
by the timing. The objections were filed on
27.02.2025 at 3 p.m., and the order was
passed at 6:30 p.m. on the same day. This
shows "mortal hurry and haste";
31.1.2. The elections to the posts of President and
Vice-President
were
scheduled
for
28.02.2025 (next day). The removal order
was passed in such haste to prevent the
petitioners from voting in those elections;
31.1.3. The removal of three elected councillors
results in reduction of the total number of
council members, which helps the ruling
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party by changing the composition of the
council in their favor;
31.1.4. The Regional Commissioner has passed an
order to benefit the ruling party and not in
public
interest.
This
is
extraneous
consideration vitiating the order;
31.1.5. The entire proceeding is a vendetta against
the petitioners for their political opposition
or for their vote in the council;
31.1.6. An order passed in such haste, within 3.5
hours of the written submissions, cannot be
a product of careful consideration;
31.1.7. The malice is evident from the fact that
such drastic action was taken only after the
scheduled elections were announced.
31.2. The learned Advocate General submits:
31.2.1. The timing of the order is explained by the
chronology of events and is not indicative
of
mala
fides.
The
proceedings
were
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initiated on 31.01.2025. By 27.02.2025,
the facts were already clear from the
documentary evidence;
31.2.2. The
order
was
passed
on
27.02.2025
because the written submissions were filed
on 27.02.2025 by 3 p.m., as directed by
this Court's order in WP No. 101414/2025;
31.2.3. The Regional Commissioner had a duty to
act once the misconduct was established.
Delaying action would have been dereliction
of duty, not good administration;
31.2.4. The
speed
commendable,
of
decision-making
not
suspicious.
A
is
quick
decision based on clear evidence is better
administration than a delayed decision;
31.2.5. Even if removing the petitioners benefited
the ruling party (which is not established),
it does not make the action mala fide if the
action was otherwise legally justified;
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31.2.6. The
petitioners'
political
alignment
or
political consequences are irrelevant to the
question
of
whether
misconduct
is
established;
31.2.7. The allegations of misconduct had surfaced
months earlier. It is not as if the action was
taken suddenly or arbitrarily.
31.3. To establish mala fides, the petitioners must
show that:
31.3.1. The
authority
acted
for
an
improper
purpose or with an improper motive;
31.3.2. The
authority
considerations
acted
on
unrelated to
extraneous
the
subject
matter;
31.3.3. There is clear evidence of an improper
motive that prompted the action.
31.4. It is a settled principle that mere suspicion,
conjecture, or inference is not sufficient to
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establish mala fides. Allegations of bad faith
are serious in nature and must be supported
by cogent, specific and convincing material.
Courts have repeatedly held that mala fides
cannot be presumed; they must be clearly
pleaded and strictly proved.
31.5. To establish mala fides, it is not enough to
demonstrate that the impugned action had an
incidental consequence of benefiting a third
party.
Administrative
actions
often
have
collateral effects. The mere fact that someone
derives advantage from a decision does not,
by itself, render the decision mala fide.
31.6. What must be established is that the action
was taken because of the desire to confer that
benefit, that the alleged improper purpose was
the real motive behind the decision. In other
words, the benefit to the third party must be
shown to be the express or dominant reason
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for the action, and not merely a consequential
or incidental outcome.
31.7. The burden of proving mala fides lies heavily
on the person who alleges it. The pleadings
must
be
credible,
specific,
and
inescapable.
the
material
the
inference
Bald
assertions,
must
be
must
be
general
allegations, or speculative conclusions do not
satisfy this requirement.
31.8. Thus,
unless
there
is
clear
material
to
demonstrate that the authority acted with an
improper motive or for an extraneous purpose,
the action cannot be invalidated on the ground
of mala fides merely because it incidentally
benefited or disadvantaged a particular party.
31.9. A careful examination of the timeline shows that
the action was neither hasty nor arbitrary:
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-
14.08.2024:
FIR
registered
against
the
petitioners and others for forgery;
-
24.01.2025:
Municipal
Commissioner
submitted proposal to Deputy Commissioner
for action against petitioners under Section
41;
-
28.01.2025:
forwarded
the
Deputy
Commissioner
proposal
to
Regional
Commissioner;
-
31.01.2025: Regional Commissioner issued
show-cause notice;
-
06.02.2025: Notice served on petitioners;
-
07.02.2025: Another notice issued fixing
hearing on 13.02.2025;
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-
13.02.2025:
Petitioners
Regional
Commissioner.
appeared
before
Regional
Commissioner passed an order removing the
petitioners;
-
14.02.2025: Order challenged in WP No.
101414/2025;
-
24.02.2025: WP No. 101414/2025 partly
allowed. Liberty granted to file reply by
27.02.2025 by 3 p.m.;
-
27.02.2025: Petitioners filed reply at 3 p.m.
Regional Commissioner considered the reply
and passed the impugned order at 6:30 p.m.;
-
28.02.2025: Elections to posts of President
and Vice-President scheduled.
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31.10. This timeline shows that the proceeding was
initiated in late January 2025, well before the
elections were scheduled. The final decision
came only after the petitioners had filed their
detailed reply. There was nothing hasty or
arbitrary about this timeline.
31.11. The petitioners argue that the order was passed
at 6:30 p.m. on the same day the reply was
filed, showing "mortal hurry and haste". This
argument is without merit because:
31.11.1. The
Facts
Were
27.02.2025,
the
Already
Regional
Clear:
By
Commissioner
had already examined the documentary
evidence
thoroughly.
The
resolution
register, the forged document, and the
official records were already before him;
31.11.2. The Reply Did Not Add Material Facts:
The petitioners' reply of 27.02.2025 did not
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introduce any new documentary evidence
that would require further investigation. It
was merely an explanation of their conduct;
31.11.3. Only 3.5 Hours But Clear Conclusion:
The decision to remove could be made
within 3.5 hours because the evidence was
clear and the law was settled. The Regional
Commissioner did not need days to reach
this conclusion;
31.11.4. Speed is Not a Vice: In administrative
law, speed of decision-making is not a vice.
In fact, delayed decision on clear facts is a
vice.
31.11.5. A prompt decision taken on the basis of
clear, undisputed and reliable material is
not only permissible but commendable.
Administrative
authorities
are
entrusted
with responsibility to act decisively when
the facts are evident and the legal position
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is
clear.
Unnecessary
delay
in
such
circumstances may defeat the purpose of
the statute and allow continuing harm to
public interest.
31.11.6. Where
records
documentary
are
evidence
unambiguous,
is
clear,
and
the
explanation offered does not displace the
material relied upon, the authority is not
required to prolong proceedings merely to
demonstrate procedural length. Efficiency
and fairness are not mutually exclusive. A
reasoned and timely decision based on
cogent
material
reflects
responsible
governance.
31.11.7. On the other hand, delay in acting upon
clear facts may amount to administrative
inertia. Prolonged inaction can result in
continued loss to public exchequer, erosion
of institutional credibility, or perpetuation
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of illegality. The
law does not
expect
authorities to remain passive when material
justifying action is available.
31.11.8. Thus, promptness, when accompanied by
due
consideration
and
observance
of
natural justice, is a virtue in administrative
decision-making.
What
is
prohibited
is
haste without application of mind; what is
encouraged is timely action grounded in
clear evidence and reasoned satisfaction.
31.11.9. The Reply Confirmed, Did Not Change,
the
Position:
The
reply
filed
by
the
petitioners, instead of offering a credible
defence, actually confirmed the allegations,
since the signatures were admitted passing
of the resolution was pleaded, even when
there was no such resolution on the records
of the Municipal Council. The reply having
admitted the facts and having failed to
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rebut them, the Regional Commissioner has
legitimately reached his conclusion quickly.
31.12. The petitioners argue that the removal "helps the
ruling party" by reducing the number of council
members. Even if this is true, it is irrelevant to
the question of whether the order is legal.
31.13. The legality of an administrative action must be
tested on the touchstone of statutory authority,
procedural
fairness,
and
relevance
of
considerations. It cannot be invalidated merely
because it has incidental political consequences.
31.14. In a democratic framework, many decisions
taken under law may incidentally alter political
equations or affect the strength of a party within
a body. Such consequences, by themselves, do
not
render
the
action
illegal.
The
decisive
question is not whether the action produces
political fallout, but whether it is justified on its
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merits under the governing statute.
31.15. If the authority acts within jurisdiction, follows
the prescribed procedure, considers relevant
material, and records reasons, the action must
be upheld even if it incidentally benefits or
disadvantages a political grouping. Courts do not
sit in judgment over political consequences; they
examine legality.
31.16. To
hold
otherwise
would
paralyse
statutory
governance. Any lawful action against an elected
representative could then be challenged merely
on the ground that it alters political balance.
That is not the test. The test is whether the
action is lawful, fair, and supported by material.
31.17. Therefore, where the impugned action is justified
on
its
merits
and
complies
with
statutory
requirements, the existence of incidental political
consequences does not vitiate it.
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31.18. Moreover, the petitioners have not established
that the reduction of council members would
indeed benefit the ruling party. The composition
of the council after removal would depend on
various factors, which the petitioners have not
analysed and submitted.
31.19. The petitioners allege that the action is a
vendetta
against
them
for
their
political
opposition. However, there is no evidence to
support this allegation. What is evident is:
31.19.1. Clear
Misconduct:
The
misconduct
(forgery of resolution, forged signature) is
clearly
established
by
documentary
evidence;
31.19.2. Independent Complaint: The complaint
was filed by the Municipal Commissioner,
not by any political party or political rival of
the petitioners;
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31.19.3. Criminal
Courts
Complaint:
The
Validated
criminal
court,
the
in
its
discretion, found the complaint credible
enough
to
require
investigation.
The
criminal court declined to quash the FIR;
31.19.4. The Supreme Court Did Not Interfere:
When
the
petitioners
challenged
the
criminal court order before the Supreme
Court, the Supreme Court dismissed the
challenge without finding the complaint to
be frivolous;
31.19.5. No Prior Pattern: This is not a case where
the
Regional
Commissioner
has
acted
arbitrarily against many people. There is no
evidence of a vendetta pattern.
31.20. The allegation of vendetta is a convenient but
unsubstantiated assertion.
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31.21. The petitioners argue that the order was passed
to prevent them from voting in the elections
scheduled for 28.02.2025. This argument suffers
from several defects:
31.21.1. Causal Relationship Not Established:
Merely
because
the
order
was
passed
before the elections does not establish that
it was passed because of the elections. The
Regional Commissioner had a duty to pass
the
order
once
the
misconduct
was
established;
31.21.2. Legitimate Purpose: Even if the order
prevented
the
petitioners
from
voting
(which is a consequence of removal), it was
a legitimate consequence flowing from the
removal, not the motive for the removal;
31.21.3. Decisions
Cannot
Be
Delayed
for
Elections: If the Regional Commissioner
had deferred action until after the elections,
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he might be accused of being guided by
extraneous
considerations
(giving
the
petitioners opportunity to vote). A court
cannot expect the Regional Commissioner
to defer a legally justified action because of
impending elections;
31.21.4. The Elections Were Scheduled Later:
The elections were not scheduled before
the
proceedings
elections
were
were
initiated.
scheduled
much
The
later
(28.02.2025), after the proceedings had
been underway for nearly a month;
31.21.5. The
Action
Was
Not
Timed
for
Elections: If the action was timed for
elections, the Regional Commissioner would
have
acted
earlier
(immediately
after
initiation of proceedings) or deferred action
until after elections. The fact that the action
came in between (late in the proceedings
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but before elections) does not suggest that
the action was timed for elections.
31.22. To establish mala fides, the petitioners must
prove it by clear and cogent evidence.
31.23. Mala fides is a serious allegation. It imputes
improper motive, bad faith, or abuse of power.
Such an allegation cannot be lightly made or
casually inferred.
31.24. It is well settled that mala fides cannot be
deduced merely from the consequences of an
action. An administrative decision may produce
adverse effects, benefit certain persons, or alter
existing
positions.
These
consequences,
by
themselves, do not establish bad faith. What
must be shown is that the action was motivated
by an improper purpose or was influenced by
extraneous
considerations
statutory object.
unrelated
to
the
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31.25. There must be clear, specific and cogent material
to demonstrate that the authority acted not for
the purpose contemplated by law, but for some
collateral
or
ulterior
motive.
Suspicion,
conjecture, or inference drawn from surrounding
circumstances is insufficient unless supported by
credible evidence.
31.26. The burden of proving mala fides lies heavily on
the
person
who
alleges
it.
Courts
have
repeatedly held that allegations of bad faith must
be pleaded with precision and proved with
convincing material. Vague or general assertions
do not meet this standard. Since mala fides is
often
alleged
exercise
but
caution
rarely
and
established,
do
not
courts
readily
infer
improper motive unless the evidence is clear,
unambiguous and compelling.
31.27. Therefore, in the absence of specific material
demonstrating
extraneous
considerations
or
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deliberate abuse of power, the action of a
statutory authority cannot be set aside merely on
allegations of mala fides.
31.28. In the present case, the petitioners have not
discharged this burden. They have merely raised
suspicions based on timing, which are inherently
ambiguous
and
susceptible
to
multiple
law,
the
evidence
interpretations.
31.29. In
administrative
when
supports the action and when there is a benign
interpretation consistent with the facts, courts
should adopt the benign interpretation.
31.30. If an impugned action is capable of being
explained consistently with statutory authority
and can be justified on its merits by reference to
relevant material, courts ought not to infer mala
fides
merely
because
another
possible
interpretation may suggest an improper motive.
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31.31. Administrative decisions often admit of more
than one interpretation. The existence of an
alternative narrative or a speculative inference of
bad faith does not, by itself, invalidate the
action. The court’s task is to examine whether
the decision is legally sustainable, supported by
relevant
considerations,
and
taken
within
jurisdiction.
31.32. Where the record discloses a lawful basis for the
action, and the reasons furnished are germane to
the
statutory
purpose,
the
court
will
not
substitute conjecture for evidence. Mala fides
cannot be presumed simply because the action is
adverse
to
the
petitioner
or
politically
inconvenient. It must be affirmatively established
by clear and cogent material.
31.33. Thus, if the action is objectively defensible in law
and
on
facts,
courts
should
refrain
from
attributing improper motive merely because a
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different
interpretation
is
conceivable.
The
doctrine of mala fides requires proof of deliberate
misuse of power, not the mere possibility of it.
31.34. In the present case, the action can be easily
explained consistently with the law:
31.34.1. The Regional Commissioner received the
proposal for action on 28.01.2025;
31.34.2. He initiated proceedings on 31.01.2025;
31.34.3. He heard the petitioners on 13.02.2025 and
passed an order, which was challenged;
31.34.4. The court partly allowed the challenge and
directed further opportunity;
31.34.5. The Regional Commissioner afforded that
opportunity
and
received the reply
on
27.02.2025;
31.34.6. He carefully considered the reply and the
materials
removal.
and
decided
to
uphold
the
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31.35. This is a straightforward, chronologically rational
sequence. There is no need to invoke mala fides
or extraneous considerations.
31.36. A careful reading of the impugned order shows
that the Regional Commissioner has:
31.36.1. Examined all the materials on record;
31.36.2. Considered the explanation offered by the
petitioners;
31.36.3. Applied the legal principles laid down by the
Supreme Court in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir
case;
31.36.4. Distinguished between the contentions of
the petitioners and the facts;
31.36.5. Reached a clear conclusion with reasons;
31.36.6. Shown that the statutory requirements of
Section 41 are satisfied.
31.37. The order does not appear to be the order of a
person acting arbitrarily or with mala fides. It
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appears to be the order of a person who has
applied his mind carefully to the materials.
31.38. From the above it is clear that
31.38.1. The
allegation
substantiated
of
mala
fides
is
not
by
clear
and
cogent
evidence;
31.38.2. The timing of the order is explained by the
chronology of events and is not suspicious;
31.38.3. The speed of decision-making (within 3.5
hours) is permissible when the facts are
clear;
31.38.4. The political consequences, even if they
exist, do not make a legally justified action
illegal;
31.38.5. The allegation of vendetta is not proved;
31.38.6. The
order
was
passed
because
the
misconduct was established, not because of
extraneous considerations;
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31.38.7. The Regional Commissioner applied
his
mind carefully to reach his decision;
31.38.8. The impugned order does NOT suffer from
arbitrariness,
mala
fides,
or
colourable
exercise of power.
31.39. I Answer Point No. 5 by holding that the
impugned
order
does
arbitrariness,
mala
exercise
power,
of
not
suffer
from
fides,
colourable
or
extraneous
considerations.
32.
Answer to Point No. 6 — Whether the drastic
consequence of removal and consequential
disqualification
of
the
petitioners
is
disproportionate and unsustainable in law,
having regard to the constitutional mandate
protecting democratic local self-government and
the rights of the electorate?
32.1. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners
submits that:
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32.1.1. Removal from office and disqualification for
four years is a drastic consequence. It
affects not just the petitioners but also the
electorate who have chosen them;
32.1.2. The doctrine of proportionality requires that
the punishment must fit the crime. Here,
the consequence is grossly disproportionate;
32.1.3. The
Constitution
government
protects
through
Part
local
self-
IX-A.
This
protection should not be lightly disregarded;
32.1.4. The
rights
of
the
electorate
to
be
represented by their chosen representatives
should be respected;
32.1.5. The disqualification prevents the petitioners
from contesting the elections scheduled for
January
2027,
which
is
a
grave
consequence;
32.1.6. The petitioners may ultimately be acquitted
in the criminal case. If they are acquitted,
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removal based on charges that are later
found to be baseless would be unjust;
32.1.7. The doctrine of proportionality, requires that
the
punishment
should
not
shock
the
judicial conscience.
32.2. The learned Advocate General submits:
32.2.1. The doctrine of proportionality must be
applied by comparing the gravity of the
misconduct
with
the
severity
present
case,
the
of
the
punishment;
32.2.2. In
the
(forgery
of
documents,
misconduct
forging
of
signatures, violation of court orders) is
among the gravest. It goes to the root of
honesty and integrity;
32.2.3. Removal
is
the
only
appropriate
punishment for such grave misconduct.
Lesser punishment would be inadequate;
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32.2.4. The constitutional protection for local selfgovernment is not a protection for persons
who abuse their office. It is a protection for
honest, accountable local self-government;
32.2.5. The petitioners have betrayed the trust of
the
electorate
Removal
serves
who
voted
the
for
interests
them.
of
the
electorate, not undermines it;
32.2.6. The doctrine of proportionality does not
require courts to be lenient with persons
guilty of grave misconduct;
32.2.7. The
disqualification
is
a
statutory
consequence under Section 16 of the KMA.
Once removal is justified, disqualification
follows automatically;
32.2.8. Even if the petitioners are acquitted in the
criminal
case,
the
administrative
proceedings stand on their own merits
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based on the administrative standard of
proof.
32.3. The doctrine of proportionality requires that the
punishment
misconduct.
must
be
proportionate
to
the
This doctrine does not require
courts to be lenient with wrongdoers. It requires
courts to ensure that the punishment is not
grossly out of proportion to the misconduct.
32.4. In the present case, removal is NOT grossly
disproportionate to the misconduct. Rather, it is
the only appropriate punishment.
32.5. To assess proportionality, one must first assess
the gravity of the misconduct. The misconduct in
the present case is extremely grave:
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32.5.1. Forgery of Official Documents: Creating
a forged resolution purporting to be passed
by the City Municipal Council is a serious
criminal
act.
It
involves
deliberate
dishonesty and fraud;
32.5.2. Forging
Signatures:
Forging
the
signature of the Municipal Commissioner is
an even more serious act. It is a criminal
offence under the Indian Penal Code;
32.5.3. Violation of Court Orders: By creating a
resolution contrary to this Court's orders in
WP No. 112012/2019, the petitioners have
shown contempt for judicial authority;
32.5.4. Betrayal
of
Public
representatives
are
Trust:
trustees
Elected
of
public
property and public interest. By forging
documents
to
benefit
unauthorised
occupants and defeat court orders, the
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petitioners have betrayed the public trust in
the most serious manner;
32.5.5. Harm
to
Municipal
Interests:
The
petitioners' conduct has caused substantial
harm
to
the
Municipality.
Unauthorised
occupants have obtained documents that
might be used to claim rights over valuable
municipal property;
32.5.6. Attempted
Deception
of
Court:
The
forged resolution was actually produced
before this Court in WA No. 100488/2022.
The petitioners tried to use the forged
document to mislead the Court;
32.5.7. Pattern of Misconduct: The misconduct is
not
a
one-time
error
but
a
planned,
deliberate scheme involving multiple acts—
creation
signature,
of
fake
resolution,
issuance
of
forging
of
possession
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certificates, production of forged document
before Court.
32.6. Measured against these factors, the misconduct
is among the gravest kinds of misconduct that
can be committed by an elected representative.
32.7. When we compare the misconduct in this case
with
other
cases
where
removal
has
been
upheld, we find that the present case involves
more serious misconduct:
32.7.1. In
Ravi
Yashwant
Bhoir
v.
District
Collector, Raigad, the removal was for
alleged
nepotism
and
improper
appointment. Removal was upheld;
32.7.2. In
Indrajit
Commission,
Barua
the
v.
Election
disqualification
corrupt electoral practices was upheld;
for
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32.7.3. In Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of
Punjab,
the
removal
for
improper
proceedings was upheld;
32.8. In the present case, the misconduct (forgery and
fraud) is more serious than nepotism, improper
appointment,
or
administrative
default.
Therefore, removal is certainly justified.
32.9. The doctrine of proportionality requires courts to
ask the following questions:
32.9.1.
Is the punishment authorized by law?
YES. Section 41 authorizes removal, and
Section 16 provides for disqualification.
32.9.2.
Is
the
punishment
legitimate
YES.
linked
governmental
Removal
from
to
a
objective?
office
and
disqualification are linked to the objective
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of
maintaining
integrity
of
local
self-
government and protecting public trust.
32.9.3.
Is there a rational connection between
the punishment and the objective? YES.
A person guilty of forgery and fraud cannot
be allowed to continue in a position of
public trust. Removal and disqualification
maintain
the
integrity
of
local
self-
government.
32.9.4.
Is the punishment minimally impairing
of rights? The answer is more nuanced
here. Removal is severe, but it is the only
punishment that adequately addresses the
gravity
of
the
misconduct.
Lesser
punishment (like suspension or demotion)
would
be
inadequate
for
crimes
like
forgery.
32.9.5.
Is
the
effect
proportionate
to
the
important objective? YES. The objective,
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maintaining
integrity
of
local
self-
government, is critical to democracy. The
effect,
removal
proportionate
and
to
disqualification,
the
gravity
of
is
the
misconduct that undermines this objective.
32.10. In
conclusion,
when
the
doctrine
of
proportionality is properly applied, removal is
found to be proportionate and justified.
32.11. The
petitioners
invoke
the
constitutional
protection for local self-government under Part
IX-A
of
the
Constitution.
acknowledges
the
constitutional
mandate.
This
importance
However,
Court
of
this
the
Court
notes:
32.11.1. The Protection is Not Absolute: The
constitutional
protection
for
local
self-
government
is
protection
for
not
a
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dishonest or fraudulent self-government. It
is a protection for honest, accountable, and
transparent local self-government;
32.11.2. The Constitution Assumes Integrity:
The Constitution's mandate for local selfgovernment is based on the assumption
that local representatives will be honest
and accountable. When that assumption is
violated,
the
constitutional
protection
cannot shield the wrongdoer;
32.11.3. The Constitution Also Protects Public
Interest: The Constitution protects both
local self-government and public interest.
When they conflict, public interest prevails.
Here, public interest requires removal of
persons guilty of forgery;
32.11.4. Democratic
Legitimacy
is
Not
Unlimited: While elected representatives
have democratic legitimacy, that legitimacy
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is conditional on discharging their duties
honestly and lawfully. When that condition
is violated, removal is not only justified but
necessary.
32.12. The petitioners argue that removal violates the
rights
of
the
electorate
who
chose
them.
However,
this
argument
is
fallacious.
The
electorate's right is to honest representation, not
to representation by persons guilty of forgery
and fraud. When elected representatives betray
the trust placed in them, removal serves the
interests of the electorate, not undermines it.
32.13. The
petitioners
were
not
elected
to
forge
documents and defraud the electorate. They
were elected to serve the electorate. When they
engage in forgery, removal is in the interest of
the electorate.
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32.14. The
petitioners
argue
that
they
might
be
acquitted in the criminal case, and if they are,
removal
would
be
unjust.
However,
this
argument is without merit because:
32.14.1. Independence
of
Proceedings:
The
administrative proceedings stand on their
own merits. They are not dependent on the
outcome of criminal proceedings;
32.14.2. Different Standard of Proof: Even if the
petitioners are acquitted in the criminal
case
(which
requires
proof
"beyond
reasonable doubt"), they can still be found
guilty in administrative proceedings (which
requires
proof
on
the
"balance
of
The
objective
of
probabilities");
32.14.3. Different
Objective:
criminal proceedings is to punish crime. The
objective of administrative proceedings is
to determine whether the person is fit to
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hold
public
office.
A
person
may
be
acquitted of crime but still be found unfit to
hold public office;
32.14.4. Unlikely Acquittal: In the present case,
the
evidence
conclusive.
An
of
forgery
is
acquittal
virtually
would
be
surprising. Even if an acquittal occurs, it
would not affect the present order;
32.14.5. It
is
a
criminal
well-established
proceedings
principle
and
that
disciplinary
proceedings operate in distinct spheres and
are governed by different standards and
objectives.
32.14.6. In a criminal case, the prosecution must
establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The object is to determine penal liability
and impose punishment under criminal law.
In contrast, disciplinary proceedings are
concerned
with
the
conduct
of
the
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individual in relation to service, office, or
statutory responsibility. The standard of
proof in such proceedings is based on
preponderance
of
probabilities
and
reasonable satisfaction of the authority.
32.14.7. Therefore, a person may be acquitted in a
criminal case for want of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, and yet be found guilty
in disciplinary proceedings on the basis of
material that satisfies the lesser standard
applicable therein. An acquittal, particularly
one based on benefit of doubt or technical
grounds, does not automatically nullify or
invalidate disciplinary action already taken.
32.14.8. The two proceedings are independent. The
outcome
of
one
does
not
necessarily
conclude the other. What is decisive in
disciplinary action is whether the authority
has,
after
following
due
procedure,
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independently assessed the material and
arrived at a reasoned conclusion regarding
misconduct.
32.14.9. Accordingly, acquittal in a criminal case
does not ipso facto wipe out disciplinary
findings nor does it mandate reinstatement
or restoration of office, if the disciplinary
action is otherwise lawful and supported by
evidence.
32.15. A comparative harm analysis shows that removal
is justified:
32.16. Harm if Petitioners Continue in Office:
32.16.1. Erosion of public confidence in municipal
administration;
32.16.2. Continued danger that petitioners might
engage in further misconduct;
32.16.3. Signal to other elected representatives that
forgery and fraud are tolerated;
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32.16.4. Violation of court orders (if the petitioners
continue
to
benefit
the
unauthorised
occupants);
32.16.5. Loss of valuable municipal property through
fraudulent documents.
32.17. Harm if Petitioners are Removed:
32.17.1. The petitioners are removed from office
(which they have abused);
32.17.2. The petitioners are disqualified for four
years (which is the statutory consequence
of removal);
32.17.3. The
electorate
representatives
loses
(but
they
the
specific
are
replaced
through democratic processes).
32.18. Comparing the two sets of harms, it is clear that
allowing the petitioners to continue would cause
more serious harm.
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32.19. Removal is not merely justified but necessary
and urgent because:
32.19.1. Prevention
of
Future
Harm:
If
the
petitioners are allowed to continue, they
might attempt further misconduct;
32.19.2. Maintenance
of
Public
Confidence:
Continued presence of persons guilty of
forgery would erode public confidence in
municipal administration;
32.19.3. Restoration of Rule of Law: Allowing
persons
who
violate
court
orders
to
continue in office would undermine the rule
of law;
32.19.4. Deterrence: Removal sends a signal to
other elected representatives that forgery
and fraud will not be tolerated.
32.20. From the above it is clear that
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32.20.1. The misconduct (forgery, fraud, violation of
court orders) is among the gravest kinds;
32.20.2. Removal is proportionate and justified when
compared to the gravity of the misconduct;
32.20.3. The doctrine of proportionality does not
require leniency with persons guilty of
grave misconduct;
32.20.4. The constitutional protection for local selfgovernment
does
not
shield
dishonest
representation;
32.20.5. The rights of the electorate are best served
by the removal of unfit representatives;
32.20.6. The
possible
acquittal
in
criminal
proceedings does not affect the validity of
administrative action;
32.20.7. Removal is necessary to maintain public
confidence and rule of law;
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32.20.8. The
consequence
of
removal
and
disqualification is proportionate and not
shocking to the judicial conscience.
32.21. I Answer Point No.6 by holding that the
consequence
of
removal
and
disqualification is not disproportionate. It is
proportionate
to
the
gravity
of
the
misconduct and necessary in the interest of
public and democratic governance.
33.
Answer to Point No. 7:— Whether the notification
dated 29.07.2024 appointing an administrator to
the city municipal council, gadag-betageri, is
valid and in accordance with Sections 3 and 315
of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964?
33.1. The learned Advocate General submits:
33.1.1. The appointment of an administrator was
made under Section 315 of the KMA, which
permits the Government to appoint an
administrator in specified circumstances;
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33.1.2. The
term
of
the
President
and
Vice-
President
of
the
CMC
expired
on
24.07.2024;
33.1.3. Elections to these posts could not be held
immediately due to various reasons;
33.1.4. The Government, in exercise of power
under
Section
administrator
315,
to
appointed
ensure
an
continuity
of
municipal administration;
33.1.5. The appointment was temporary in nature,
pending elections;
33.1.6. The
appointment
was
within
the
legal
powers of the Government.
33.2. Section 315 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act,
1964,
provides
administrator
in
reads as under:
for
the
appointment
of
an
specified circumstances and
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315. Power to appoint administrator in certain
cases.—(1) Whenever,—
(a) any general election to a municipal council under this
Act or any proceedings consequent thereon have been
stayed by an order of a competent court or authority, or
(b) the election of all the councillors or more than twothirds of the whole number of councillors of the municipal
council has been declared by a competent court or
authority to be void, or
(c) Omitted
(d) all the councillors or more than two-thirds of the
whole number of councillors of the municipal council have
resigned, so however, the total period of such
appointment shall not exceed six months the State
Government shall by notification in the official Gazette,
appoint an administrator for such period as may be
specified in the notification and may, by like notification,
curtail and extend either prospectively or retrospectively
the period of such appointment.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, on the
appointment of an administrator under sub-section (1),
during the period of such appointment, the said municipal
council and committees thereof and the President and
Vice-president charged with carrying out the provisions of
this Act, or any other law, shall cease to exercise any
powers and perform and discharge any duties or functions
conferred or imposed on them by or under this Act or any
other law and all such powers shall be exercised and all
such duties and functions shall be performed and
discharged by the administrator.
(3) The State Government may, if it thinks fit, appoint an
advisory council to advise and assist the administrator
appointed under sub-section (1) in the exercise of the
powers and the performance and discharge of the duties
and functions conferred or imposed on him under this Act
or any other law. The members of the advisory council
shall hold office during the pleasure of the State
Government
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33.3. Section 315 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act,
1964, confers statutory authority upon the State
Government
specified
to
appoint
contingencies
an
Administrator
where
the
in
normal
functioning of a Municipal Council is disrupted.
The provision is a safeguard mechanism intended
to prevent administrative vacuum and ensure
continuity of civic governance.
33.4. It contemplates situations where elections are
stayed, declared void, or where the Council
becomes non-functional in terms of its elected
composition.
Upon
appointment
of
an
Administrator, the powers and duties of the
Council and
its
executive
office-bearers are
temporarily vested in the Administrator.
33.5. The provision must be construed purposively. Its
object is not punitive; it is institutional and
functional. It exists to ensure that municipal
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administration, which concerns essential public
services, does not collapse due to transitional or
exceptional circumstances.
33.6. The material facts are undisputed and form the
foundation of the State’s action:
33.6.1.
The President and Vice-President of the City
Municipal
Council
were
elected
on
24.01.2022 for a statutory tenure of two
and a half years;
33.6.2.
Their term expired on 24.07.2024 by efflux
of time;
33.6.3.
Upon such expiry, the Council was left
without its executive leadership;
33.6.4.
Elections
to
immediately
these
conducted
posts
upon
were
not
expiry
of
tenure.
33.7. Thus, from 24.07.2024 onward, the statutory
offices of President and Vice-President stood
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vacant.
The
Council,
though
composition,
lacked
its
continuing
executive
in
head
responsible for implementing statutory functions.
33.8. It is a well-recognised principle of municipal law
that executive continuity is indispensable to
governance. The President and Vice-President
are
not
ceremonial
figures;
they
perform
statutory and administrative functions necessary
for day-to-day operations. In the absence of
elected executive office-bearers, the machinery
of administration cannot function effectively.
33.9. Where elections cannot be held immediately,
whether
procedural
due
to
administrative
requirements,
or
reasons,
ongoing
proceedings, the Government is not merely
empowered but obligated to ensure continuity.
Failure to act would amount to abdication of
constitutional responsibility.
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33.10. It is crucial to distinguish between removal of
elected
Councillors
under
Section
and
appointment of an Administrator under Section
315. The former is punitive and individual in
character; the latter is structural and temporary.
Appointment
of
an
Administrator
does
not
dissolve the Council in the present case, nor does
it extinguish the democratic mandate. It merely
vests executive powers in a neutral authority
until elections are conducted.
33.11. Thus,
the
impugned
notification
does
not
constitute removal of elected representatives but
is
a
stop-gap
institutional
arrangement
to
prevent paralysis of municipal administration.
33.12. The notification dated 29.07.2024 is explicitly
temporary in character:
33.12.1. It was issued immediately after expiry of
tenure to avoid administrative vacuum;
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33.12.2. It was made pending conduct of elections
to
the
posts
of
President
and
Vice-
President;
33.12.3. It
does
not
purport
to
permanently
substitute elected governance;
33.12.4. The statutory scheme itself contemplates
curtailment or extension depending upon
circumstances.
33.13. Therefore,
the
character
of
the
action
is
transitional, not structural.
33.14. The necessity of the appointment cannot be
overstated:
33.14.1. Municipal
Councils
are
constitutional
entities under Part IX-A of the Constitution;
33.14.2. They discharge essential public functions
including
sanitation,
maintenance,
licensing,
infrastructure
taxation,
planning, and regulation of markets;
urban
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33.14.3. These functions are continuous and cannot
be suspended merely because executive
offices fall vacant;
33.14.4. The State, under the constitutional scheme,
bears supervisory responsibility to ensure
that
municipal
institutions
function
effectively;
33.14.5. In
the
absence
leadership,
of
elected
appointment
executive
of
an
Administrator is the only legally viable
mechanism to ensure continuity.
33.15. The
petitioners
contend
that
the
conditions
precedent under Section 315 were not satisfied.
However:
33.15.1. The challenge is vague and lacks specificity
as to which statutory precondition was
violated;
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33.15.2. The undisputed factual position is that the
executive offices stood vacant and elections
were not immediately held;
33.15.3. The power under Section 315 must be
interpreted
pragmatically
to
address
precisely such situations;
33.15.4. No
material
has
been
placed
to
demonstrate that the State acted without
jurisdiction or beyond statutory limits.
33.15.5. No material is places on record to indicate
that the elections were not held due to
malafide reasons.
33.16. As
regards
duration
of
the
Administrator’s
tenure, the Court must examine the surrounding
circumstances:
33.16.1. The
initial
appointment
immediately upon expiry of tenure;
followed
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33.16.2. Elections were notified on 20.02.2025 and
scheduled for 28.02.2025;
33.16.3. Legal
proceedings
initiated
by
the
petitioners, including challenges to removal
and related matters, contributed to delay in
stabilising executive functioning;
33.16.4. The
tenure
of
the
Administrator
must
therefore be viewed in context, not in
isolation;
33.16.5. No
evidence
has
been
produced
to
demonstrate deliberate delay or mala fide
intent on part of the Government.
33.17. The constitutional challenge under Part IX-A is
unsustainable.
33.17.1. Part IX-A guarantees democratic local selfgovernment but does not render the State
powerless in transitional situations;
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33.17.2. Article 243E itself contemplates tenure,
dissolution, and reconstitution mechanisms;
33.17.3. The
Constitution
governance
must
recognises
continue
even
that
during
transition between elected bodies;
33.17.4. A temporary appointment pending elections
preserves,
rather
than
destroys,
the
constitutional structure;
33.17.5. The power exercised here is regulatory and
supervisory, not destructive.
33.18. Judicial
limited
scrutiny
to
of
administrative
examining
legality,
action
is
jurisdiction,
procedural fairness, and absence of mala fides.
The present notification satisfies each of these
tests:
33.18.1. It
is
traceable
to
express
authority under Section 315;
statutory
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33.18.2. It addresses an undisputed administrative
vacuum;
33.18.3. It is temporary and transitional in nature;
33.18.4. It
does
not
dissolve
the
Council
nor
extinguish the democratic mandate;
33.18.5. It does not violate constitutional provisions;
33.18.6. There
is
arbitrariness
no
material
or
mala
fide
to
establish
exercise
of
power.
33.19. The appellate court, while reviewing such action,
would examine whether the State acted within
jurisdiction
and
whether
the
decision
is
reasonable in the Wednesbury sense. On the
facts
presented,
the
decision
cannot
be
characterised as irrational, disproportionate, or
extraneous to statutory purpose.
33.20. Accordingly, the notification dated 29.07.2024
appointing an Administrator is a lawful exercise
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of statutory power, justified by administrative
necessity,
consistent
with
constitutional
structure, and not liable to be quashed.
33.21. I Answer Point No.7 by holding that the
notification dated 29.07.2024 appointing an
Administrator is valid and in accordance
with law. The appointment was necessary
and
temporary,
pending
conduct
of
elections.
34.
Answer to Point No. 8 :— What Order?
34.1. In view of my answers to Point No. 1 to 8 I pass
the following
ORDER
i.
Writ Petitions are DISMISSED.
ii.
The impugned order dated 27.02.2025
passed by the Regional Commissioner,
Belagavi Division, under Section 41 of the
Karnataka
Municipalities
Act,
1964,
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removing the petitioners (in WP No.
101601/2025)
from
their
office
as
Councillors of the City Municipal Council,
Gadag-Betageri, is upheld as valid, legal,
and within jurisdiction.
iii.
The
notification
dated
29.07.2024
appointing an Administrator to the City
Municipal
Council,
Gadag-Betageri
(challenged in WP No. 105810/2025) is
upheld as valid and in accordance with law.
iv.
Elections to the posts of President and VicePresident of the City Municipal Council,
Gadag-Betageri,
are
directed
to
be
conducted within a period of 45 days from
the date of this judgment.
Sd/(SURAJ GOVINDARAJ)
JUDGE
LN/List No.: 19 Sl No.: 1
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