Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
*
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 22.09.2026
#
CNR No. DLHC010918922024
+
RC.REV. 377/2024
SMT. SHAIL AGGARWAL AND ANR
.....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Smiti Verma and Mr.
Nimish Sharma, Advocates.
versus
SHRI GIAN CHAND GARG AND ORS
Through: None.
.....Respondents
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
%
JUDGEMENT (Oral)
CM APPL. 65205/2026 (By Petitioner seeking Early Haring)
1.
The present Application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, [“CPC”] has been filed by the Applicants/Petitioners
seeking an early hearing of the captioned Petition.
2.
For the reasons stated in the present Application, the
Application is allowed.
3.
Accordingly, the present Application stands disposed of.
RC.REV. 377/2024
4.
With the consent of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Petitioners, the present matter is taken up for final hearing today.
5.
The present Petition has been filed under Section 25-B(8) of the
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 [“DRC Act”] read with Section 151 of
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:25:55
RC.REV. 377/2024
the CPC, assailing the Order dated 07.08.2024 [“Impugned Order”]
passed by the learned SCJ-cum-RC, South-West District, Saket
Courts, New Delhi [“learned RC”], in RC ARC 30 of 2023, titled
“Gian Chand Garg versus Manoj Kumar and Ors.” whereby the
Application
seeking
leave
to
defend
[“Leave
to
Defend
Application”] filed by the Petitioners was dismissed.
6.
Vide the Impugned Order, the Application dated 05.03.2024
[“Condonation of Delay Application”] seeking condonation of delay
in filing the Leave to Defend Application was rejected and,
consequently, the Leave to Defend Application was not taken on
record.
7.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners submits
that the Petitioner no. 1 is not an educated person and, therefore, did
not understand the significance of the time-bound nature of
proceedings in eviction petitions.
8.
She further submits that the Petitioner no. 1 is a widow and that
her son, i.e., Petitioner no. 2 in the present proceedings, has not been
assisting her in pursuing the various litigations pending before
different Courts.
9.
It is, therefore, submitted that there was sufficient cause for
condoning the delay in filing the Leave to Defend Application.
Learned counsel for the Petitioners places reliance upon the Judgment
of the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in Director, Directorate
of Education & Anr. versus Mohd. Shamim & Ors.1 in support of the
aforesaid submission.
10.
This Court has heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
2019 SCC OnLine Del 11490
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:25:55
RC.REV. 377/2024
Petitioners and, with her able assistance, perused the Impugned Order
as also the Condonation of Delay Application.
11.
Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged
on behalf of the Petitioner, it would be apposite to advert to the scope
and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.
12.
The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance
Co. Ltd.2, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar
Singh3, and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua4, has
consistently held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court
under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory
and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction.
13.
The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied
upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia, in Pankaj
Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors.5, and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny
Grover6.
14.
In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while
elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25(B) of the
DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against
an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and
deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is,
therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process,
(1998) 8 SCC 119
(2014) 9 SCC 78
(2022) 6 SCC 30
2024:DHC:9322
2025:DHC:11285
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:25:55
RC.REV. 377/2024
including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the
High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent
Controller merely because another view on the material available on
record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court read as under:
“23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive
power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller,
being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the
decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance.
Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its
views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate
jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The
scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and
except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the
record, which would only mean that in the absence of any
adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb
such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in
such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the
power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act,
totally forbidden by the legislature.”
15.
In Pankaj Pahwa (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court,
upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra),
reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that
this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of
the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the
decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned
Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an
absence of adjudication warranting interference.
16.
In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges
is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section
25B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to
undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:25:55
RC.REV. 377/2024
arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute.
Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Order
suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material
irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the
learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous
premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left
unconsidered, or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an
error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional
jurisdiction may be warranted.
17.
It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional
scrutiny that the grounds urged by the learned counsel on behalf of the
Petitioner against the Impugned Order are required to be examined.
18.
In order to appreciate the challenge raised by the Petitioner, this
Court deems it appropriate to extract the Condonation of Delay
Application in its entirety. The relevant portion of the aforesaid
Application reads as under:
“APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 151 OF CODE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908 ON BEHALF OF THE
RESPONDENT NO. 4 AND 5 SEEKING CONDONATION
OF DELAY.
The Respondent no. 4 and 5 Most Respectfully State and Submit
As Under:
1. The Respondent no. 4 and 5 submits that there is a delay in
filing the application seeking leave to defend. The Applicant,
Smt. Shail Aggarwal submits that she has lost her husband
during Covid-19 and is now is handicapped since her husband
was looking-after the works as also various litigations.
2. The Applicant, Smt. Shail Aggarwal has a son who keeps
himself confine to the shop and does not take any interest in the
litigation which the Applicant has dealt with.
3. The Applicant, Smt. Shail Aggarwal suffers from various
ailments and therefore when she received copy of the summon
could only approach her lawyer on 3rd March, 2024 requesting
him to appear on 6.3.2024 and to take a date to file reply.
However she has advised that there is a delay in filing the
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:25:55
RC.REV. 377/2024
application and foremost the leave has to obtain from filing
reply to the petition only thus the Applicant could not file the
application within time.
4. The Applicant suffers from various ailments and severally
handicapped due to her day to day activities after demise of her
husband.
5. That there exists a prime facie case in favour of the
Applicants inasmuch as the Petitioner is not the landlord of the
property.
6. That grave prejudice shall be caused to the Respondents
herein in the event the reliefs prayed for herein are declined
whereas no prejudice shall be caused to the Petitioner in the
event the same are granted inasmuch as the alleged title of the
subject property is as such in serious dispute before Hon'ble
High Court and the other competent Courts and that there is
already an order of status quo granted by the Hon'ble High
Court of Delhi.
7. The present application is bonafide and is being made in the
interest of justice.
WHEREFORE IT IS PRAYED THAT THIS HON'BLE
COURT MAY BE PLEASED TO:
A. Condone the delay in filing the application seeking leave to
defend;
B. Pass such further and/or other orders as this Hon'ble Court
may deem fit and property in the facts and circumstances of the
present case.”
19.
A perusal of the Condonation of Delay Application shows that
the explanation furnished for the delay rests essentially upon the
Petitioner no. 1's personal circumstances, namely, the demise of her
husband, the alleged lack of assistance from her son, i.e., Petitioner
no. 2, her alleged ailments and the assertion that she was not
conversant with the legal process. The aforesaid Application,
however, does not set out any specific particulars explaining the
period of delay or the circumstances which prevented the Petitioner
no. 1 from approaching the Court or her counsel within the prescribed
period.
20.
It is also pertinent to note that the Respondents had filed a
Reply dated 12.02.2024 opposing the Condonation of Delay
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:25:55
RC.REV. 377/2024
Application. The said Reply was duly placed on record before the
learned RC. Significantly, no Rejoinder or response to the said Reply
was filed on behalf of the Petitioners.
21.
The stand taken by the Respondents in their Reply also
specifically disputed the explanation furnished by the Petitioner no. 1
for the delay. In the absence of any Rejoinder by the Petitioners, the
factual assertions contained in the Reply remained unanswered. This
Court, therefore, has to examine the sufficiency of the explanation on
the basis of the material actually placed on record.
22.
In the considered view of this Court, the question is not merely
whether the circumstances pleaded by the Petitioner no. 1 are
sympathetic in nature, but whether the Condonation of Delay
Application discloses, with reasonable particulars, the circumstances
which prevented the Petitioners from filing the Leave to Defend
Application within the prescribed period. The Condonation of Delay
Application contains broad assertions regarding the Petitioner no. 1's
personal circumstances, but does not disclose the necessary particulars
or supporting material to establish a continuous or sufficient cause for
the delay.
23.
Furthermore, the reliance placed upon the judgment of the
Hon’ble Division Bench in Director, Directorate of Education
(supra) does not, in the facts of the present case, advance the case of
the Petitioners. The exercise of discretion for condonation of delay
necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances placed before
the Court. In the present case, the explanation furnished in the
Application is vague and lacks the particulars necessary for the Court
to arrive at a finding that the delay stood satisfactorily explained.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:25:55
RC.REV. 377/2024
24.
It is also pertinent to note that the learned RC, while passing the
Impugned Order, has duly considered the explanation furnished by the
Petitioners for the delay as also the applicable legal position. The
conclusion arrived at by the learned RC was, therefore, not without
consideration of the material placed on record, but was based upon an
examination of the explanation furnished and the legal position
governing the filing of an application seeking leave to defend under
Section 25-B of the DRC Act.
25.
In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no reason
to differ from the conclusion arrived at by the learned RC that the
explanation furnished for the delay was vague and unsupported by
material particulars. The circumstances pleaded by the learned counsel
for the Petitioners, in the absence of any specific explanation
accounting for the delay, do not constitute sufficient cause for
condoning the same.
26.
Thus, there is no infirmity or perversity in the Impugned Order
warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act. The jurisdiction of this Court
under the said provision is limited and is not intended to substitute the
view of the learned RC merely because another view may be possible.
In the absence of any such material or particulars demonstrating
sufficient cause for the delay, this Court finds no ground to take a
different view from that taken by the learned RC.
27.
For the reasons as stated above, this Court finds no merit in the
present Petition. The present Petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
28.
In view thereof, the present Petition, along with pending
Application(s), if any, stands disposed of in the above terms.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:25:55
RC.REV. 377/2024
29.
The date already fixed, i.e., 05.11.2026 stands cancelled.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J
SEPTEMBER 22, 2026/nd/ma
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:25:55
RC.REV. 377/2024
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review