Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
2026:JHHC:4264
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
C.M.P. No. 1205 of 2025
Smt. Megha Singh, aged about 25 years, wife of Anikt Kumar Singh and
daughter of Rajesh Kumar Singh, resident of Abhishek Enclave, Flat No. 302,
Hesag, near Devi Mandir, P.O. Hatia, P.S. Jagannathpur, District Ranchi,
Jharkhand-834003, Hatia, presently residing at Village Dumri Bujurg, P.O. &
P.S. Nayagaon, District - Saran (Bihar).
…....... Petitioner(s)
Vrs.
Sri Ankit Kumar Singh, son of Anil Kumar Singh resident of Abhishek
Enclave, Flat No. 302, Hesag, Hatia, near Devi Mandir, P.O.- Hatia, P.S.Jagannathpur, District-Ranchi, Jharkhand-834003
.......... Opposite Party(s)
…....
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR
For the Petitioner(s)
: Mr. Anurag Kashyap, Advocate
For the Opposite Party(s)
: Mr. Rohit Sinha, Advocate
Mr. Vijay Shankar, Advocate
Mr. Paritosh Rai, Advocate
Mr. M.I. Hassan, Advocate
Mr. Andai Brahma, Advocate
Mrs. Neha Priya, Advocate
04/16.02.2026
Learned counsel for the opposite party at the outset has made
objection regarding maintainability of the present C.M.P. and
submitted that in view of the issue involved a first appeal is
maintainable and not a C.M.P.
2.
In support of his contention he has relied upon judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vimlendu Kumar Jha Vrs.
Minal Bhatnagar passed in Special Leave to Appeal(C) Nos. 2817428175/2025 dated 09.10.2025, which is quoted hereunder:
Leave granted.
Learned counsel for the appellant as well as learned
counsel for the respondent(s) submitted that CM(M) No.2800
of 2024 was filed prior to the pronouncement of the judgment
of the full bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of Dr.
Geetanjali Aggarwal vs. Dr.Manoj Aggarwal (2024 SCC
Online Del 7220}.
On the day this CM(M) NO.2800 of 2014 was filed,
there was no bar to file a Writ Petition under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India inasmuch as such a bar, if any
C.M.P. No. 1205 of 2025
2026:JHHC:4264
created by the pronouncement of the Full Bench, had not yet
come into existence. In the circumstances, the question of
maintainability of the Writ Petition filed by the petitioner
herein does not arise in the instant case.
Consequently, we set aside the impugned order dated
11.09.2025. We request the High Court to consider CM(M)
No.2800 of 2024 on merits and dispose of the same as
expeditiously as possible and in accordance with law.
Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the
order dated 30.05.2025 need not be gone into on merits, as
the said order pertains to visitation rights during the summer
vacation and owing to passage of time, the issue has been
rendered infructuous for the present.
His submission is placed on record.
The Appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
3.
Learned counsel for the opposite party has also relied upon the
judgment rendered by the High Court of Delhi in the Dr. Geetanjali
Aggarwal Vrs. Dr. Manoj Aggarwal reported in 2024 SCC Online
Del 7220, the relevant para nos. 15, 19 to 24, 26, 27, 28, 30 and 34 are
quoted hereunder:
15. From the aforesaid submissions of the parties, we find that
to decide the question as to whether an order passed under
Section 12 of the GW Act would be appealable under Section
19 of the FC Act, it would be necessary to decided two issues ;
the first being as to whether the provisions of Section 19(1) of
the FC Act can be read independently of the provisions of the
GW Act. Depending upon the answer to this issue, the next
issue which is required to be determined would be as to
whether, taking into account the nature of the order passed by
the learned Family Court under Section12 of the GW Act, the
said order, which is as an interlocutory order under the GW
Act, has to be tread as an interlocutory order for the purposes
of the FC Act as well, thereby rendering it unappealable."
19. From a cumulative reading of Sections 7, 19 and 20 of the
FC Act, it clearly emerges that the Act provides for a
composite jurisdiction by laying down a complete procedural
Code for filing of appeals in respect of orders passed under
various enactments dealing with marriage and family affairs.
This includes appeals against orders passed under the GW
Act. It, thus, becomes evident that the FC Act bestows the
Family Courts with multifarious jurisdictions arising out of
marriage and family affairs and matters connected therewith,
and was clearly intended to consolidate the jurisdictions
which were available with different courts/tribunals under the
relevant statutes, in one specialised court i.e. the Family
C.M.P. No. 1205 of 2025
2026:JHHC:4264
Court. It is, for this reason, that while introducing one single
appellate provision under the FC Act, a non-obstante clause
has been used to avoid the confusion which was earlier
arising from multiple appellate provisions spread over various
pre-existing statutes.
20. We may also note that in order to emphasise that the scope
of the appellate and revisional provisions under the FC Act
was always intended to be very wide, the learned amicus
curiae has painstakingly drawn our attention to the Family
Courts (Amendment) Bill, 1991. He has contended that though
initially even an interim maintenance order passed under
Section 125 CrPC was appealable under Section 19 of the FC
Act, it was only when it was realised that some States had not
adopted the FC Act and, therefore, an interim maintenance
order was only revisable in those States, that Section 19 was
amended to make the said order revisable under the FC Act as
well. This amendment, he has urged, clearly shows that the
provisions of Section 19 of the FC Act was always meant to be
much wider and extensive, vis-à-vis the limited
appellate/revisable jurisdictions provided for under other
statutes.
21. In order to appreciate this plea of the learned amicus
curiae, even though it is not necessary to refer to the
amendment to Section 19 of the FC Act, as introduced in 1991,
it would still be useful to refer to the relevant extracts of the
opening remarks made by the Minister of Law, Justice and
Company Affairs while introducing the bill for amendment,
which throw light on the reasons as to why an order passed
under Section 125 CrPC, though initially appealable, was
made revisable. We are, therefore, reproducing hereinbelow
the relevant extracts of these remarks:
"After the enactment of the Family Courts Act, 1984, a
proceeding relating to the maintenance of wife,
children and parents under Chapter IX (which includes
Section 125) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973
(CrPC) falls within the jurisdiction of the Family
Courts. An anomalous situation has arisen inasmuch
as the States where the Family Courts Act has not been
extended, there will be no appeal against the
maintenance order passed by the Magistrate under
Section 125 CrPC and only the general provisions in
CrPC regarding filing of revision petition would apply,
while in those States where the Family Courts Act has
been extended, an appeal under Section 19 of that Act
would lie to a Division Bench of a High Court against
the maintenance order passed by the Family Court
under Section 125 CrPC.".
22. From a bare perusal of the aforesaid, it is evident that
when the FC Act was enacted in 1984, the legislature intended
to make all those orders passed by the Family Court as
appealable as were affecting the vital rights of the parties,
including orders pertaining to interim maintenance passed
under Section 125 CrPC. Even though through a conscious
C.M.P. No. 1205 of 2025
2026:JHHC:4264
under Section 125 CrPC. Even though through a conscious
amendment introduced in 1991, the interim/interlocutory
maintenance orders passed under Section 125 CrPC were
excluded from the ambit of Section 19(1), they were
simultaneously included under the revisional powers of the
High Court by way of Section 19(4) of the FC Act, clearly
indicating that the scope of the appellate/revisional
jurisdiction under the FC Act was always envisaged to be very
wide.
23. What, therefore, emerges is that while enacting the FC Act,
the legislature had consciously introduced a provision
providing for appeals to the High Court against orders passed
under different statutes relating to marriage and family
affairs. The purpose of this appellate provision by way of
Section 19(1) of the FC Act was, therefore, meant to provide
for an appeal against all orders passed by the learned Family
Court, irrespective of the fact as to whether the said order is
appealable or not under the parent statute, the only rider
being that the order should not be an interlocutory order. We
are, therefore, of the opinion that the ambit and scope of this
wide provision under the FC Act which streamlines the
appellate provisions pertaining to marital and family matters
by providing for an appeal to the High Court, cannot be
controlled or curtailed in any manner by the mechanism
available under other statutes.
24. In the light of the aforesaid, we are of the considered view
that the appellate jurisdiction under the FC Act was always
envisaged to be exercised independently of the
appellate/revisional powers under specific statutes relating to
marriage and family affairs. Once the provisions of the FC
Act, especially Sections 7 and 20 clearly indicate that the Act
will have an overriding effect on all other statutes relating to
marital and family matters, the effect and ambit of the
provisions of the FC Act, including that of the appellate
provision under Section 19 (1), which conceptualises a
common appellate forum, cannot be controlled by the
provisions of the parent statute, including the GW Act which
was enacted about 94 years before the FC Act. We are,
therefore, in agreement with the learned Amicus Curaie as
also the appellant, that the provisions of the GW Act could not
curtail the right of appeal available to the appellant under
Section 19 of the FC Act.
26. From a perusal of the aforesaid, it is clear that the Family
Court while exercising powers under Section 12 of the GW
Act, cannot only direct that the minor child be produced before
court but can also direct that the minor child be produced
before any person as the court deems appropriate; this may
include a counsellor or a psychologist. In fact, the court may
also direct that the temporary custody of the minor child be
handed over to any party as it deems appropriate. Taking into
account the far-reaching effects that directions issued under
C.M.P. No. 1205 of 2025
2026:JHHC:4264
Section 12 of the GW Act can have, it is evident that the orders
passed under Section 12 of the said Act not only impact the
rights of the parties, but also have a huge impact on the minor
child. Furthermore, these orders can be passed by the Family
Court only after examining the merits of the rival submissions
of the parties and are, therefore, necessarily adjudicatory in
nature.
27. However, despite the far-reaching effects which orders
passed under Section 12 of the GW Act can have on the
parties as also on the minor child, this provision describes
such orders as interlocutory orders. Learned counsel for the
respondent has, therefore, urged that even if the provisions of
the FC Act are treated as being overriding in nature, once an
order passed under Section 12 of the GW Act has been
described as an interlocutory order under the GW Act, the
said order must be treated as an interlocutory order under the
FC Act as well. Learned counsel for the appellant has,
however, urged that taking into account the impact orders
passed under Section 12 of the GW Act can have, they, despite
being interim in nature, cannot be treated as mere
interlocutory orders from which no appeal would lie.
28. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the rival
submissions of the parties as also the erudite submissions
made by the learned amicus curiae, we are unable to agree
with the respondent. Once we have come to the conclusion
that the provisions of the FC Act cannot be controlled by the
provisions of the GW Act, the description of an order as an
interlocutory order under the GW Act, cannot, in our view, be
a ground to treat the said order as an interlocutory order for
the purposes of the FC Act as well. In our opinion, an order
like the order impugned in the present appeal, which
undoubtedly impinges on the substantive rights of the parties
and can also have an effect on the final determination of their
rights as also the welfare of the child, cannot be treated as
merely being interlocutory in nature. It is necessarily an order
touching upon matters of moment and certainly has the
trappings of a final order.
30. In the light of the aforesaid, we are inclined to agree with
the appellant that the nomenclature of an order in itself cannot
be determinative of the nature of that order. Merely because an
order, despite affecting the vital rights of the parties, is
labelled as an Interlocutory order under a particular statute,
cannot imply that the same must always be treated as an
interlocutory order. In the present case, the FC Act which
provides for this appellate provision, neither defines the
expression "interlocutory order" nor contains any ouster
provision as contained in the Commercial Courts Act, 2015,
and therefore, it would be against the very object and spirit of
the said Act to exclude orders that pertain to matters of
moment from the ambit of the appellate provision under
Section 19(1) of the FC Act. It is only those orders which are
C.M.P. No. 1205 of 2025
2026:JHHC:4264
merely procedural and do not have trappings of finality which
can be treated as interlocutory orders and would, therefore,
not be amenable to appeal under the FC Act.
34. As we have already held hereinabove that the powers
exercisable under the FC Act, could not be controlled by the
provisions of other statutes, we are of the view that the criteria
prescribed under the GW Act, could not be applied to test
whether an order should be treated as an interlocutory order
for the purposes of the FC Act. The mere fact that an order
under Section 12 of the GW Act has been labelled as an
interlocutory order under the said Act, cannot, therefore, be a
ground to hold the same as an interlocutory order under the
FC Act, which Act was enacted 94 years later and was
intended to provide a much wider window for appeal. In our
view, in every case, when an order passed by the Family
Court, is taken in appeal before the High Court, it would be
incumbent upon the court to examine the nature of the
impugned order in its entirety to determine whether the same
is in the nature of an adjudicatory order which decides
valuable rights of the parties. Whenever the court finds that an
order touches upon the vital rights of the parties in
contradistinction to an order which is merely a procedural
order, an appeal ought to be entertained, irrespective of the
fact that the order was passed during the pendency of the
proceedings before the learned Family Court.
3.
In view of the legal position, learned counsel for the petitioner
seeks to withdrawn the present C.M.P. with a liberty to file first
appeal.
4.
With the aforesaid liberty, the present CMP is hereby disposed
of as withdrawn. Needless to say, the certified copy annexed in the
present CMP may be utilized by the petitioner while filing appropriate
appeal.
(Rajesh Kumar, J.)
16.02.2026
A. Mohanty
Uploaded
____/____/2026
C.M.P. No. 1205 of 2025
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review