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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+
FAO(OS) 179/2024
SMT MANJU VARMA & ORS.
Through:
.....Appellants
Mr. Sumit R. Sharma, Advocate
versus
NARESH VERMA & ANR.
.....Respondents
Through:
Mr. Madan Lal Sharma, Ms.
Tejaswini Verma, Ms. Manika
Gaba, Mr. Vikrant Malwal &
Mr. Abhay Singh, Advs./R1.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIVEK CHAUDHARY
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE RENU BHATNAGAR
ORDER
08.01.2026
%
1.
The present appeal has been filed under Order XLIII Rule 1 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “CPC”)
read with Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966 challenging
the Order dated 16.10.2024 (hereinafter referred to as “impugned
order”) passed by the learned Single Judge in interim application
being I.A No. 41937 of 2024 in CS(OS) No. 72 of 2024 titled as
Naresh Verma v. Manoj Kumar Jain & Ors.
2.
The
Civil
Suit
was
originally
instituted
by
the
Plaintiff/Respondent No. 1 seeking declaration/cancellation of the
Sale Deed dated 28.01.2021 executed by the Appellants herein in
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favour of Defendant no. 1 (Respondent No. 2 herein) as well as
consequent decree of declaration, pre-emption and declaration
directing Defendant No. 1 to transfer Second Floor of property bearing
No. 91, Jain Cooperative House Building Society Limited, known as
Bahubali Enclave, Karkardooma, Delhi - 110092 (‘suit property’) and
deliver actual physical possession thereof to the Plaintiff/Respondent
No. 1 along with a decree for mesne profits and permanent injunction.
3.
By way of the impugned order, the learned Single Judge
dismissed the application under Order VIII Rule 1 of the CPC, filed
by the Appellants seeking condonation of delay in filing their written
statement in the aforementioned Civil Suit.
4.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellants submits
that when the aforementioned suit was listed for hearing before this
Court, the learned Single Judge, vide Order dated 31.10.2024, issued
summons to the Appellants in the same. He submits that upon
receiving the summons on 09.04.2024, the Appellants, through their
counsel, appeared before the learned Joint Registrar whereby, on
instructions of the Appellants, a request was made to supply a
complete set of copy of the plaint and documents to them.
5.
Learned counsel for the Appellants further submits that on the
morning of 28.06.2024, his office, situated at D-220 on the lower
ground floor at Defence Colony, Delhi, was flooded due to heavy
rainfall, due to which, all his files, documents, laptops and computer
were destroyed. He submits that due to this unforeseen circumstance,
the draft written statement prepared by his office in the present matter
got destroyed and remained untraceable and unretrievable. In support
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of his contentions, learned counsel for the Appellants has relied upon
the photographs of the incident evidencing the said damage which has
been annexed as Annexure A-6 to the present appeal.
6.
He submits that on apprising this Court about the incident, the
learned Single Judge, vide order dated 25.07.2024, further granted ten
days’ time to file the written statement on behalf of the Appellants in
light of the losses suffered by him, and subsequently thereafter, the
written statement was filed on 27.08.2024 along with the application
being I.A No. 41937 of 2024.
7.
Learned counsel for the Appellants submits that when the
aforesaid application came up for consideration before this Court, the
learned Single Judge erroneously recorded that there was a delay of
140 days in filing the written statement, thereby, dismissing the
application seeking condonation of delay in view of Chapter VII Rule
4 of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018.
8.
He submits that the repercussions of the dismissal of the
application seeking condonation of delay has caused severe prejudice
to the Appellants in defending their case. He also submits that the
delay caused in filing the written statement was unintentional,
unforeseen and solely on account of his personal difficulty as his
office was flooded in heavy rains.
9.
He further submits that the learned Single Judge erred in
calculating the actual amount of delay which is amounting to 96 days
instead of 140 days and this period of delay could be condoned in the
interest of justice.
10.
In view of the foregoing submissions, learned counsel for the
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Appellants prays for setting aside of the impugned order as well as to
condone the delay in filing the written statement and consequentially,
allow the written statement to be taken on record.
11.
Per Contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondent No. 1 vehemently opposes the present appeal and submits
that the learned Single Judge has rightly applied the law with regard to
filing of written statement which shall be filed by the Defendant
within a period of thirty days and may be extended for a period not
exceeding ninety days. He submits that since there is a delay of 140
days by the Appellants in filing their written statement in the Civil
Suit, the learned Single Judge has rightly dismissed their application
under Order VIII Rule 1 of the CPC. In view of the same, he prays
that the present appeal be dismissed being devoid of any merit.
12.
In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for
Respondent No. 1 has placed reliance upon the judgments passed in
Ram Sarup Lugani v. Nirmal Lugani & Ors. 2020 SCC Online Del
1353 and Manhar Sabharwal v. High Court of Delhi, 2024 SCC
OnLine Del 5945.
13.
Heard the learned counsels for the parties and perused the
material placed on record.
14.
Before delving into the merits of this case, this Court deems it
appropriate to discuss the law governing the maximum time period
within which the written statement is supposed to be filed.
15.
Chapter VII Rule 4 of the Delhi High Court (Original Side)
Rules, 2018, which is applicable to the Original Side proceedings filed
before the Delhi High Court by virtue of Section 129 of the CPC,
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provides as under:
“4. Extension of time for filing written
statement—If the Court is satisfied that the
defendant was prevented by sufficient cause
for exceptional and unavoidable reasons in
filing the written statement within 30 days, it
may extend the time for filing the same by a
further period not exceeding 90 days, but not
thereafter. For such extension of time, the
party in delay shall be burdened with costs as
deemed appropriate. The written statement
shall not be taken on record unless such costs
have been paid/ deposited. In case the
defendant fails to file the affidavit of
admission/ denial of documents filed by the
plaintiff, the documents filed by the plaintiff
shall be deemed to be admitted. In case, no
written statement is filed within the extended
time also, the Registrar may pass orders for
closing the right to file the written statement.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
16.
It is now settled that the phrase ‘but not thereafter’ used in Rule
4 makes it crystal clear that the Rule is mandatory in nature and the
Court cannot permit the written statement to be taken on record after
the Defendant has exhausted the maximum prescribed statutory limit
of 120 days.
17.
A similar question arose before the Co-ordinate Bench of this
Court in the case of Ram Sarup Lugani (supra), which judgment was
made final uptil the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Though the said case
deals with condonation of delay in filing replication beyond 45 days
but Rules 4 and 5 of the Chapter VII of the Delhi High Court (Original
Side) Rules, 2018, are pari materia as Rule 4 deals with the limitation
of filing written statement whereas Rule 5 deals with the timeline for
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filing replication.
18.
In the said case, the Division Bench had the occasion to
interpret the words ‘but not thereafter’, on the basis of judgments of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in other provisions of Acts such as the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; the Central Excise Act, 1944,
etc. where similar words were used. The relevant portion of the
aforesaid judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
“15. This is not the first time that the phrase,
“but not thereafter” have been used in the
statute. The said preemptory words have been
used in other provisions that have come up for
interpretation before the Supreme Court.
In Union of India v. Popular Construction Co.,
reported as (2001) 8 SCC 470, the words “but
not thereafter” were used in relation to the
power of the court to condone the delay in
challenging the award beyond the period
prescribed under Section 34 of the Arbitration
and Concilliation Act, 1996 and the Supreme
Court observed as below:—
“12. As far as the language of Section
34 of the 1996 Act is concerned, the
crucial words are “but not thereafter”
used in the proviso to sub-section (3).
In our opinion, this phrase would
amount to an express exclusion within
the meaning of Section 29(2) of the
Limitation Act, and would therefore
bar the application of Section 5 of that
Act. Parliament did not need to go
further. To hold that the court could
entertain an application to set aside the
award beyond the extended period
under the proviso, would render the
phrase “but not thereafter” wholly
otiose. No principle of interpretation
would justify such a result.
FAO(OS) 179/2024
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16. Furthermore, Section 34(1) itself
provides that recourse to a court against
an arbitral award may be made only by
an application for setting aside such
award “in accordance with” subsection (2) and sub-section (3). Subsection (2) relates to grounds for setting
aside an award and is not relevant for
our purposes. But an application filed
beyond the period mentioned in Section
34, sub-section (3) would not be an
application “in accordance with” that
sub-section. Consequently by virtue of
Section 34(1), recourse to the court
against an arbitral award cannot be
made beyond the period prescribed.
The importance of the period fixed
under Section 34 is emphasised by the
provisions of Section 36 which provide
that
“where the time for making an
application to set aside the
arbitral award under Section 34
has expired … the award shall
be enforced under the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 in the
same manner as if it were a
decree of the court”.
This is a significant departure from the
provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940.
Under the 1940 Act, after the time to set
aside the award expired, the court was
required to “proceed to pronounce
judgment according to the award, and
upon the judgment so pronounced a
decree shall follow” (Section 17). Now
the consequence of the time expiring
under Section 34 of the 1996 Act is that
the award becomes immediately
enforceable without any further act of
the court. If there were any residual
doubt on the interpretation of the
language used in Section 34, the scheme
of the 1996 Act would resolve the issue
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in favour of curtailment of the court's
powers by the exclusion of the operation
of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.”
(emphasis supplied)
16. In Singh Enterprises v. Commissioner of
Central Excise, Jamshedpur, reported
as (2008) 3 SCC 70, on interpreting Section 35
of the Central Excise Act, which contains
similar provisions, the Supreme Court has
observed as under:
“8. The Commissioner of Central
Excise(appeals) as also the Tribunal
being creatures of statute are not vested
with jurisdiction to condone the delay
beyond the permissible period provided
under the statute. The period up to
which the prayer for condonation can
be accepted is statutorily provided. It
was submitted that the logic of
Section 5 of
the Limitation
Act,
1963 (in short “the Limitation Act”)
can be available for condonation of
delay. The first proviso to Section 35
makes the position clear that the appeal
has to be preferred within three months
from the date of communication to him
of the decision of order. However, if
the Commissioner is satisfied that the
appellant was prevented by sufficient
cause from presenting the appeal
within the aforesaid period of 60 days,
he can allow it to be presented within a
further period of 30 days. In other
words, this clearly shows that the
appeal has to be filed within 60 days
but in terms of the proviso further 30
days time can be granted by the
appellate authority to entertain the
appeal. The proviso to sub-section(1) of
Section 35 makes the position crystal
clear that the appellate authority has
no power to allow the appeal to be
presented beyond the period of 30 days.
FAO(OS) 179/2024
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The language used makes the position
clear that the legislature intended the
appellate authority to entertain the
appeal by condoning delay only up to
30 days after the expiry of 60 days
which is the normal period for
preferring appeal. Therefore, there is
complete exclusion of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act. The Commissioner and
the High Court were therefore justified
in holding that there was no power to
condone the delay after the expiry of 30
days' period.”
(emphasis supplied)
17. After referring to the above decision,
in Commissioner of Customs and Central
Excise v. Hongo India Private Limited,
reported as (2009) 5 SCC 791, the Supreme
Court went on to observe as under:
“30. In the earlier part of our order, we
have adverted to Chapter VI-A of the
Act which provides for appeals and
revisions to various authorities. Though
Parliament has specifically provided an
additional period of 30 days in the case
of appeal to the Commissioner, it is
silent about the number of days if there
is sufficient cause in the case of an
appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. Also
an additional period of 90 days in the
case of revision by the Central
Government has been provided.
However, in the case of an appeal to the
High Court under Section 35-G and
reference application to the High Court
under Section 35-H, Parliament has
provided only 180 days and no further
period for filing an appeal and making
reference to the High Court is
mentioned in the Act.
XXXX
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32. As pointed out earlier, the language
used in Sections 35, 35-B, 35-EE, 35-G
and 35-H makes the position clear that
an appeal and reference to the High
Court should be made within 180 days
only from the date of communication of
the decision or order. In other words,
the language used in other provisions
makes the position clear that the
legislature intended the appellate
authority to entertain the appeal by
condoning the delay only up to 30 days
after expiry of 60 days which is the
preliminary limitation period for
preferring an appeal. In the absence of
any clause condoning the delay by
showing sufficient cause after the
prescribed period, there is complete
exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation
Act. The High Court was, therefore,
justified in holding that there was no
power to condone the delay after expiry
of the prescribed period of 180 days.
XXXX
35. It was contended before us that the
words “expressly excluded” would
mean that there must be an express
reference made in the special or local
law to the specific provisions of the
Limitation Act of which the operation
is to be excluded. In this regard, we
have to see the scheme of the special
law which here in this case is the
Central Excise Act. The nature of the
remedy provided therein is such that
the legislature intended it to be a
complete code by itself which alone
should govern the several matters
provided by it. If, on an examination of
the relevant provisions, it is clear that
the provisions of the Limitation Act are
necessarily excluded, then the benefits
conferred therein cannot be called in
aid to supplement the provisions of the
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Act. In our considered view, that even
in a case where the special law does not
exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to
24 of the Limitation Act by an express
reference, it would nonetheless be open
to the court to examine whether and to
what extent, the nature of those
provisions or the nature of the subjectmatter and scheme of the special law
exclude their operation. In other
words, the applicability of the
provisions of the Limitation Act,
therefore, is to be judged not from the
terms of the Limitation Act but by the
provisions of the Central Excise Act
relating to filing of reference
application to the High Court.”
***
***
***
19. In P. Radhabai v. P. Ashok Kumar,
reported as (2019) 13 SCC 445, while
construing
the
phrase,
“but
not
thereafter” used in the proviso to sub section
(3) of Section 34 of the Arbitration and
Concilliation Act, the Supreme Court held
thus:
“32.4. The limitation provision in
Section 34(3) also provides for
condonation of delay. Unlike Section 5
of the Limitation Act, the delay can only
be condoned for 30 days on showing
sufficient cause. The crucial phrase
“but not thereafter” reveals the
legislative intent to fix an outer
boundary period for challenging an
award.
XXXX
33.2. The proviso to Section 34(3)
enables a court to entertain an
application to challenge an award after
the three months' period is expired, but
only within an additional period of
thirty dates, “but not thereafter”. The
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use of the phrase “but not thereafter”
shows that the 120 days' period is the
outer boundary for challenging an
award. If Section 17 were to be applied,
the outer boundary for challenging an
award could go beyond 120 days.
The phrase “but not thereafter” would
be rendered redundant and otiose. This
Court has consistently taken this view
that the words “but not thereafter” in
the proviso of Section 34(3) of the
Arbitration Act are of a mandatory
nature, and couched in negative terms,
which leaves no room for doubt. (State
of H.P. v. Himachal Techno Engineers
[State of H.P. v. Himachal Techno
Engineers, (2010) 12 SCC 210 : (2010)
4 SCC (Civ) 605], Assam Urban Water
Supply & SewerageBoard v. Subash
Projects & Mktg. Ltd. [Assam Urban
Water
Supply
&
Sewerage
Board v. Subash Projects & Mktg.
Ltd., (2012) 2 SCC 624 : (2012) 1 SCC
(Civ) 831] and Anilkumar Jinabhai
Patel v. Pravinchandra Jinabhai Patel
[Anilkumar
Jinabhai
Patel v. Pravinchandra
Jinabhai
Patel, (2018) 15 SCC 178 : (2019) 1
SCC (Civ) 141].)
34. In our view, the aforesaid
inconsistencies with the language of
Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act
tantamount to an “express exclusion” of
Section 17 of the Limitation Act.”
***
***
***
21. A conspectus of the decisions referred to
above leaves no manner of doubt that where
ever the phrase “but not thereafter” has been
used in a provision for setting a deadline, the
intention of the legislature is to treat the same
as a preemptory provision. Thus, if Rule 15 of
the DHC Rules mandates filing of a
replication within a period of 30 days
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reckoned from the date of receipt of the written
statement, with an additional period of 15 days
provided and that too only if the court is
satisfied that the plaintiff has been able to
demonstrate that it was prevented to do so by
sufficient cause or for exceptional and
unavoidable reasons, can the time for filing
the replication be extended for a further
period not exceeding 15 days in any event,
with costs imposed on the plaintiff. The critical
phrase “but not thereafter” used in Rule 15
must be understood to mean that even the
court cannot extend the period for filing the
replication beyond the outer limit of 45 days
provided in the DHC Rules. Upon expiry of the
said period, the plaintiff's right to file the
replication would stand extinguished. Any
other meaning sought to be bestowed on the
above provision, would make the words “but
not thereafter”, inconsequential.
***
***
***
31. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is
held that in case of any inconsistency, the
provisions of the Delhi High Court (Original
Side) Rules, 2018 will prevail over the Civil
Procedure Code. The inherent powers
contemplated in Rule 16 are not to be
exercised to overcome the period of limitation
expressly prescribed in Rule 5 for filing the
replication. Nor can Rule 5 be circumvented
by invoking any other provision or even the
inherent powers of the court, contrary to the
scheme of the Rules. The phrase, “but not
thereafter” used in Rule 5 makes it crystal
clear that the Rule is mandatory in nature and
the court cannot permit the replication to be
taken on the record after the plaintiff has
exhausted the maximum prescribed period of
45 days. Any other interpretation will result in
causing violence to the DHC Rules.”
19.
The above said judgment was followed by the Division Bench
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of this Court in other case of Manhar Sabharwal (supra) in relation to
the limitation of filing the written statement wherein the constitutional
validity of the above said Rule 4 was challenged. While upholding the
constitutional validity, the Court referred to the decision of the
Division Bench of this Court in Ram Sarup Lugani (supra).
20.
In the present case, it is relevant to note that the Appellants
received summons for the Civil Suit on 09.04.2024. However, as the
office of the learned counsel for the Appellants flooded due to heavy
rains on 28.06.2024, the learned Single Judge, vide Order dated
25.07.2024, extended the aforesaid time period by ten days.
21.
Admittedly, the written statement was filed on behalf of the
Appellants on 27.08.2024, which is after the stipulated period of 120
days from the date of service of summons, i.e., from 09.04.2024.
Keeping in view the provision of Chapter VII Rule 4 of the Delhi
High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018, this Bench notes that there is
no perversity in the findings as well as in the calculation of the time of
delay in filing the written statement by the appellant, holding that,
there is a delay of 140 days in filing the written statement which is
beyond the stipulated time of 120 days.
22.
In view of the above, we find no infirmity in the reasoning of
the learned Single Judge in dismissing the application seeking
condonation of delay and thus, this Court is of the view that the
Impugned Order has been passed in consonance with the settled
position of law.
23.
Accordingly, the present appeal stands dismissed being devoid
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of any merit. The pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed
of.
VIVEK CHAUDHARY, J
RENU BHATNAGAR, J
JANUARY 8, 2026/p/sm
FAO(OS) 179/2024
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