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Serial No. 01
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
CRP. No. 15 of 2023
Date of Decision: 23.02.2024
Smti. Sikha Naug
Vs.
Meghalaya Hindu Mission
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s)
: Mr. S. Jindal, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
: Mr. S.D. Upadhaya, Adv.
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
JUDGMENT
1.
An order dated 15.06.2023 passed by the learned Assistant to the
Deputy Commissioner, Shillong in Misc Case No. 79(T) 2021 is under
challenge herein by the petitioner who has approached this Court with
this application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India read with
Rule 36A of the Rules for the Administration of Justice and Police in the
Khasi and Jaintia Hills, 1937.
2.
The background of the case is that the respondent herein had
instituted a civil suit being T.S. No. 15(T) of 2008, subsequently
renumbered as T.S. No. 110(T) of 2013 in the court of the learned
Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner, Shillong. The suit was filed
apparently on the ground that the petitioner/defendant had encroached
upon the property of the respondent/plaintiff. The petitioner/defendant
has then filed the written statement and the case is at the evidence stage
with three witnesses already examined as plaintiff‟s witnesses.
3.
It is the contention of the petitioner/defendant that the plaint did
not disclose any cause of action and it is therefore liable to be rejected by
the learned trial court. Accordingly, the petitioner filed an application
under Order 7 Rule 11(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure with a prayer
for rejection of the plaint. The same was registered as Misc. Case No.
79(T) of 2021.
4.
The learned trial court upon hearing the parties, vide the
impugned order dated 15.06.2023 had disposed of the said application by
rejecting the prayer made therein. Hence this revision petition.
5.
Mr. S. Jindal learned counsel for the petitioner in his submission
has taken up the issue of maintainability of this petition since this issue
was raised by the learned counsel for the respondent as a preliminary
objection.
6.
In this regard, the learned counsel has pointed out that the
impugned order was passed in an application under Order 7 Rule 11(a)
of the Code of Civil Procedure which is not an order appealable under
Order 43 CPC. Therefore, the only remedy for the petitioner is to prefer
a revision under Article 227 of the Constitution.
7.
It is also submitted that under Article 227, the High Court
exercises the power of superintendence over the lower courts and in view
of the findings of the learned Lower Court at para 29 of the impugned
order that the petitioner had encroached over the land of the respondent,
such finding touching upon the merits of the suit being the main relief
sought for by the respondent, the same ought not to have been done so
by the learned Lower Court in a miscellaneous proceeding. This,
therefore, is an action without jurisdiction which can only be corrected
under Article 227.
8.
Yet again, it is submitted that the recourse to Rule 36A of the
1937 Rules, wherein it can be seen that the said rule is in two parts, the
first part dealing with the revisional power of the High Court and the
Deputy Commissioner, the second part deals with the appellate powers.
Both these parts are mutually exclusive and depending on the
circumstances of a case, either of these two jurisdictions, that is, revision
or appeal can be invoked. In the present case, as has been indicated
above, since it is clear that the learned Lower Court has overstepped its
jurisdiction by deciding the entire suit in a miscellaneous application,
revisional power of this Court can be resorted to.
9.
The learned counsel has then led this Court to the provision of
Order 6 Rule 2(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure to say that under this
provision what is required to be set out in a plaint is that the pleadings
therein must state material facts. However, in the petition before the
learned trial court, the plaint filed by the respondent/plaintiff did not
contain any material facts against the petitioner/defendant herein.
10.
The learned counsel has further submitted that a perusal of the
plaint in question would show that at para 5 of the same, reference has
been made to Patta No. 18 of 2003 issued by the Syiem of Mylliem
covering the property of the respondent for an area of 1,63,306 sq. ft.
However, the respondent at para 6 had admitted that “…some more land
was ceded by the plaintiff in between which were not property taken into
consideration…”. Again, it is the admission of the respondent that an
area of 2000 sq. ft. was utilized in “Straightening the boundaries with
neighbours in the Southern side of the Mission Compound”. Since the
land of the petitioner is also on the said southern side, this according to
the learned counsel can be assumed that some portion of the land has
been ceded to the petitioner and as such, there is no question of any
encroachment upon the property of the respondent by the petitioner,
more so, in absence of any verifiable details.
11.
It is also the claim of the respondent that out of the total area of
1,63,306 sq. ft., after taking into account the land ceded by the
respondent, including straightening of the boundaries with neighbours in
the southern side of the Mission Compound, the total area left should
have been 1,56,511 sq. ft. After the respondent had allegedly engaged a
private surveyor to survey the land, it is said that the total area found was
1,47,416 sq. ft. more or less. The short fall in the area was attributed to
illegal possession by some of the respondent‟s neighbours, particularly
on the southern side of the property and the area found occupied by the
petitioner/defendant is said to be one of such trespassers. This, according
to the learned counsel for the petitioner is a vague assertion which
reflected uncertainty on the part of the respondent and an action in a
court of law cannot be based on such ambiguous and vague contentions
which are founded on nothing a presumptions and conjectures, material
facts not having been stated in the plaint.
12.
On what is meant by material facts, the learned counsel has
referred to the case of Udhav Singh v. Madhav Rao Scindia reported in
(1977) 1 SCC 511, paras 41 and 42. Another judgment cited in this
regard is the case of D.M. Deshpande & Ors. v. Janardhan Kashinath
Kadam (Dead) By LRS & Ors., (1998) 8 SCC 315, paras 8 and 10.
13.
The petitioner on the basis of whatever has been stated or not
stated in the plaint finding that no cause of action has at any point of
time arisen against the petitioner, the appropriate application under
Order 7 Rule 11(a) CPC was preferred before the learned trial court.
14.
However, the learned trial court had rejected the petition vide
impugned order dated 15.06.2023 wherein it was opined that cause of
action exist in the plaint based on the averments made at paras 5 and 6 of
the said plaint which clearly indicated that the area of the property
belongs to the respondent/plaintiff. To this, the learned counsel has
submitted that there is no clear indication of the areas of the property of
the respondent/plaintiff and the language employed in these paragraphs
like „should‟ and „could‟ only goes to show that the claim or assertion of
the respondent as far as the area of the suit property is vague. No cause
of action has therefore arisen.
15.
The learned counsel went on to submit that what is more
damaging is the fact that at paras 28 and 29 of the impugned order the
learned trial court, when the issue of encroachment is still pending final
adjudication in the suit the unqualified and unambiguous reference to
“…paragraph 7 of the plaint clearly indicates the encroachment.” and
“The encroachment by the defendant in the suit property…” has
amounted to prejudging of the issue, when in effect the learned trial
court had already concluded that the petitioner herein had indeed
committed encroachment into the property of the respondent. This is
nothing but an action committed in excess of jurisdiction which requires
immediate corrective interference by this Hon‟ble Court, if nothing else,
the said last line of para 28 and the entire para 29 of the impugned order
ought to be expunged.
16.
The learned counsel has submitted that for the reasons
abovementioned the impugned order was passed without any basis and is
accordingly liable to be dismissed which is prayed so herein.
17.
Finally, the learned counsel has submitted that the following
authorities may be considered by this Court while deciding this matter.
i.
Manish Kumar Mishra v. Union of India & Ors., 2020 SCC
Online All 535, para 57;
ii.
Canara Bank v. P. Selathal & Ors., (2020) 13 SCC 143,
paras 9.1, 9.2, 9.4 and 9.5;
iii.
Church of North India v. Lavajibhai Ratanjibhai & Ors.,
(2005) 10 SCC 760, para 39; and
iv.
Shri H.D. Vashishta v. Glaxo Laboratories (I)(P)Ltd.,
(1978) 1 SCC 170, para 1.
18.
Per contra, Mr. S.D. Upadhaya, learned counsel for the
respondent raising the preliminary objection on the maintainability of
this petition herein has submitted that by preferring a revision petition
before this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution read with Rule
36A of the Rules of Administration of Justice and Police in the Khasi
and Jaintia Hills, 1937 against the impugned order, the same is not
maintainable inasmuch as under the said rules an alternative remedy for
filing an appeal or revision lies before the court of the Deputy
Commissioner.
19.
In this regard, the learned counsel has submitted that under sub-
para 1 of Rule 36-A, it is provided that “…The Deputy Commissioner
shall be a Court of appeal from a decision of an Assistant…”. In the case
of Nandita Das & Anr. v. Patrisha Simpli reported in (2014) 1 MJ 1,
paras 8 and 9, this Court had confirmed and reiterated the aforesaid
provision. Therefore, this petition is not maintainable in its present form
and the same is liable to be dismissed, further submits the learned
counsel.
20.
As to the challenge that no cause of action was disclosed in the
plaint filed by the respondent/plaintiff before the learned trial court, the
learned counsel has submitted that the learned trial court taking into
account the plaint as a whole and more particularly the averments made
at paras 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 15 had come to the conclusion that
the cause of action and material facts were stated in the plaint and in
course of passing the impugned order relevant authorities have been
cited, for instance, the case of A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. v. A.P.
Agencies, Sale, (1989) 2 SCC 163, para 12 and also the case of Church
of Christ Charitable Trust and Educational Charitable Society v.
Ponniamman Educational Trust, (2012) 8 SCC 706, para 13.
21.
The learned counsel has further submitted that there are also
other authorities which would support the decision taken in the
impugned order as far as the issue of cause of action or rather as far as
the provision of Order 7 Rule 11(a) CPC is concerned. In this regard, the
case of G. Nagaraj & Anr. v. B.P. Mruthunjayanna & Ors., 2023 SCC
Online SC 1270, paras 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10; Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. & Ors.
v. Owners and Parties, Vessel M.V. Fortune Express & Ors., (2006) 3
SCC 100, para 12; Bhau Ram v. Janak Singh & Ors., (2012) 8 SCC 701,
para 15; and also the case of Liverpool & London S.P. & I Association
Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I & Anr., (2004) 9 SCC 512, paras 146, 151
and 152 have been cited.
22.
In view of the authorities cited above, the learned counsel has
submitted that this petition is devoid of merits and the same is liable to
be dismissed which is prayed so herein.
23.
This Court having considered the respective contention and
submission of the parties, even before taking up the issue of
maintainability of this instant petition, what is understood is that the
challenge of the petitioner is directed to the said impugned order dated
15.06.2023, the subject matter of the rejection of an application filed by
the petitioner/defendant under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil
Procedure seeking for rejection of the plaint therein on the ground that
there was no disclosure of any cause of action on institution of the said
suit.
24.
For the sake of brevity, it would therefore be convenient for this
Court to look into the issue of whether any cause of action exists which
has compelled the respondent/plaintiff to institute the said Title Suit.
25.
Again, as has been submitted by the learned counsel for the
petitioner, a perusal of the plaint and the annexures thereto is required to
be examined as to whether any material facts or material particulars are
present therein.
26.
The provision of Order 6 Rule 2(1) has been referred to which is
reproduced herein as follows: “ORDER 6
2. Pleading to state material facts and not evidence.–(1) Every
pleading shall contain, and contain only, a statement in a concise
form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for
his claim or defence, as the case may be, but not the evidence by
which they are to be proved.”
27.
In the case of Udhav Singh(supra) cited by the petitioner at paras
41 and 42 of the same the Hon‟ble Supreme Court has observed as
follows: “41. Like the Code of Civil Procedure, this section also envisages
a distinction between “material facts” and “material
particulars”. Clause (a) of sub-section (1) corresponds to Order
6 Rule 2, while clause (b) is analogous to Order 6 Rules 4 and 6
of the Code. The distinction between "material facts" and
"material particulars" is important because different
consequences may flow from a deficiency of such facts or
particulars in the pleading. Failure to plead even a single
material fact leads to an incomplete cause of action and
incomplete allegations of such a charge are liable to be struck off
under Order 6 Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If the
petition is based solely on those allegations which suffer from
lack of material facts the petition is liable to be summarily
rejected for want of a cause of action. In the case of a petition
suffering from a deficiency of material particulars the court has
a discretion to allow the petitioner to supply the required
particulars even after the expiry of limitation.
42. All the primary facts which must be proved at the trial by a
party to establish the existence of a cause of action or his
defence, are "material facts". In the context of a charge of
corrupt practice, "material facts" would mean all the basic facts
constituting the ingredients of the particular corrupt practice
alleged, which the petitioner is bound to substantiate before he
can succeed on that charge. Whether in an election-petition, a
particular fact is material or not, and as such required to be
pleaded is a question which depends on the nature of the charge
levelled, the ground relied upon and the special circumstances of
the case. In short, all those facts which are essential to clothe the
petitioner with a complete cause of action, are "material facts"
which must be pleaded, and failure to plead even a single
material fact amounts to disobedience of the mandate of Section
83(1) (a).”
28.
It is the contention of the petitioner that there ought to be details
to back up the allegation made in the plaint to constitute cause of action.
However, in the plaint there was only a vague and bare plea of
encroachment with absolutely no details and particulars given of the
alleged encroachment.
29.
The key word to be noted here is „vague plea‟ whereupon hinges
the objection of the petitioner/defendant. Instances found in the plaint
like the reference to the total boundary of the land of the respondent
which initially stood at 1,63,306 sq. ft. but which in course of time due
to ceding of some part of the land to other parties including loss of land
of about 2000 sq. ft. in the process of straightening of the boundaries
with neighbours, particularly in the southern side of the Mission
Compound adjacent to the land of the petitioner herein which process
should have cost some loss of land of the respondent and on calculation,
the total of which should have come to 1,56,551 sq. ft. but instead, on the
land being surveyed, the total area measured only about 1,47,416 sq. ft.
which have raised a presumption on the part of the respondent/plaintiff
that some portion of the land have been illegally possessed and
encroached upon by some of the respondent‟s neighbours, particularly in
the southern side of the boundary, have been cited to emphasize such
contention.
30.
Again, on a perusal of the plaint in Title Suit No. 15(T) of 2008
at paras 7, 8 and 9 what is understood is that the respondent/plaintiff has
alleged that the petitioner along with her deceased husband had started
erection of a pakka type structure/house within the boundary of the land
of the respondent/plaintiff for which an FIR was filed before the
Lumdiengjri Police Station. The Syiem of Mylliem who was arrayed as
defendant No. 3 in the said suit and who is the traditional authority to
issue patta had also, on a complaint by the respondent, issued letter dated
07.12.2004 to the petitioner and her deceased husband under the subject
heading of „Encroachment of Mission Land‟ with further request to stop
any construction work in the said land property.
31.
The above, as pointed out, would only lead to the conclusion that
there
are
some
elements
of
factual
situation
cited
by
the
respondent/plaintiff and the allegation of an illegal construction within
the boundary of the land of the respondent have been made out.
Therefore, in the opinion of this Court, cause of action do exists to
enable the respondent/petitioner to institute the suit with the reliefs
sought for. In this regard, as to the meaning of cause of action, the case
cited by the petitioner, that is, Manish Kumar Mishra(supra) is found
relevant wherein at para 57 the following is found:
“57. The judicially settled meaning which the expression "cause
of action" has acquired, has been summarised in Mulla's Code of
Civil Procedure17, in the following words:"In the restricted sense, 'cause of action', means the
circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the
immediate occasion for the action. In the wider sense it
means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the
suit, including not only the infraction of the right, but the
infraction coupled with the right itself. Compendiously the
expression means every fact which it would be necessary for
the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his
right to the judgment of the court. Every fact which is
necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of
evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, comprises
'cause of action'. It has to be left to be determined in each
individual case as to where the cause of action arises. The
cause of action means the circumstances forming infraction
of the right or immediate occasion for action. It is left to be
determined in each individual case as to where the cause of
action arises. The cause of action in suit/petition has no
reference to the defence taken in the suit nor is it related to
the evidence by which the cause of action is established.
A suit is always based on a cause of action. There can be no
suit without a cause of action and such cause of action
having accrued to the plaintiff, the jurisdiction of the court
in a matter of contract will depend on the situs of the
contract and the cause of action arising through connecting
factors. A cause of action is a bundle of facts which taken
with the law applicable, gives the plaintiff a right to relief
against the defendant. It must include some act done by the
defendant since in the absence of an act no cause of action
can possibly accrue. It is not limited to actual infringement
of right sued on, but includes all the material facts on which
it is founded. It does not comprise evidence necessary to
prove such facts, but every fact necessary for the plaintiff to
prove to enable him to obtain a decree. Everything which if
not proved would give the defendant a right to immediate
judgment must be part of the cause of action; but it has no
relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the
defendant nor does it depend upon the character of the
relief prayed for by the plaintiff. 'A cause of action' means
every fact, which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the
plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment
of the court. It is a media upon which the plaintiff asks the
court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour. In legal
parlance the expression 'cause of action' is generally
understood to mean a situation or a state of facts that entitle
a party to maintain an action in a court or a tribunal; a
group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for
suing; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a
remedy in court from another person."
32.
Having established the fact that material facts and material
particulars
have
been
cited
in
the
suit
instituted
by
the
respondent/plaintiff, the findings of the learned trial court in the
impugned order in this regard cannot be faulted.
33.
However, this Court would agree with the submission of the
learned counsel for the petitioner that the observations made at paras 28
and 29 of the impugned order wherein is found the observations or even
findings of the learned trial court that there has been encroachment upon
the suit property by the petitioner/defendant, has substance inasmuch as
in a miscellaneous application and that too, not in the main case,
observation of such kind has indeed conveyed the impression that the
defendant is already guilty of encroachment even without evidence being
led and appreciated in such respect.
34.
Accordingly, while declining to interfere with the impugned
order, the observations made at paras 28 and 29 of the same as far as
reference to the assertion that there has been encroachment upon the suit
property by the defendant/petitioner herein, such observations are hereby
expunged from the said impugned order.
35.
As to the issue of maintainability of this petition, in view of the
observations and findings made above, the same is not necessary to be
discussed.
36.
The authorities cited by the respective parties have been perused
by this Court and only what are relevant and necessary for the
determination of the matter in hand have been taken into account.
37.
To the extent indicated above, this petition is accordingly
disposed of. No costs.
Judge
Meghalaya
23.02.2024
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