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Serial No. 01
Supplementary
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HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
W.A. No. 17 of 2020
Date of Decision: 11.05.2022
Smti. Sibilish M. Sangma & Anr
Vs.
G.H.A.D.C & 3 Ors.
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Sanjib Banerjee, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Appellants
:
For the Respondents
:
Mr. A.S. Siddiqui, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. A.G. Momin, Adv.
Mr. S. Dey, SC, GHADC for R 1-3.
Mr. K.S. Kynjing, Sr. Adv. with
Ms. A.D. Syiem, Adv. for R 4.
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
Judgment (Per W.Diengdoh, J)
1.
The appellants are said to be members of the Mangsang
Khalcheng clan and the respondent No. 4 herein is a member of the
Chambugong Wage clan. The dispute is primarily between the
abovementioned.
2.
What could be gleaned from the records is that, in the year 2001
after the death of the last recorded Nokma, Shri Train Marak of the
Mangsang clan, the appellant, Smti. Sibilish M. Sangma representing the
female line of the Mangsang Khalcheng clan had filed a petition before the
Garo Hills Autonomous District Council (GHADC) to get her name
registered as a joint Nokma of the Daronggre II-20(16) Akhing and the
same was registered as GDC/REV/Case No. 8 A/C of 2001-2002.
3.
At this juncture, it may be pointed out that the assertion of the
appellants is that many years ago the Daronggre II-20(16) Akhing land was
acquired by way of purchase from the Koches by the predecessors of the
appellants and the respondent No. 4 jointly. The said Akhing was, since
1926, jointly represented continuously by Nokmas from the Mangsang
clan firstly by Shri Jingran Marak and his wife Smti. Megan Sangma and
now by Shri Dipson Ch. Marak along with Smti. Sibilish M. Sangma and
Shri. Ringa Sangma from the Chambugong clan now represented by Smti.
Somjimoni Ch. Marak who is the wife of late Ballendro Sangma since
deceased.
4.
For the purpose of elucidation, it would be proper to understand
the subject matter of the controversy, that is, the dispute as regards the joint
Nokmaship of the Akhing land. An Akhing has been defined in Garo Hills
Regulation No. II of 1954 and Act No. 1 of 1960 as:“(a)
any land held by a clan or ‘machong’ under the custody
of the head of the clan or ‘machong’ called ‘Nokma’
recognized as such by the District Council;
(b)
any land held collectively by a particular community of
a particular village or group of villages which is under
the custody of the head of the said community or group
of villages called ‘Nokma’ recognized as such by the
District Council”.
5.
On consideration of the GDC/REV/Case No. 8 of 2001-2002, the
Executive Member, Incharge Revenue rejected the claim of the appellants
as petitioners vide order dated 07.01.2009. Being aggrieved by this order,
the appellants herein then preferred an appeal before the Chief Executive
Member (CEM), GHADC, who vide order dated 05.02.2010 refused to
interfere with the said order of the Executive Member.
6.
Not being satisfied with the order passed by the Executive
Member and the order passed in the related appeal before the Chief
Executive Member, the appellants as petitioners then approached this
Court by way of a writ petition being WP(C) No. 96(SH) of 2010 and vide
order dated 14.09.2011, this Court set aside the order dated 07.01.2009
passed by the Executive Member and the order dated 05.02.2010 passed in
the related appeal and remanded the matter to the Executive Member,
GHADC for fresh trial.
7.
On remand, the matter was registered as GHADC/REV 25 A/C
of 2011 and was duly taken up by the Executive Member, Incharge
Revenue who, upon appearance of the parties, framed as many as eleven
issues. After examination of witnesses and upon hearing the parties, vide
order dated 30.07.2015, the Executive Member came to a finding that the
petitioners/appellants herein were never registered or got themselves
recorded as Nokmas at any point of time and as such, no case had been
made out in their favour. However, inspite of this finding, the Executive
Member observed that due to the existence of an order dated 11.01.1956
passed by the then Chief Executive Member who has acknowledged that
the Daronggre II 20(16) Akhing was the joint Akhing of the Chambugong
and Mangseng clan, maintenance of status was directed to be observed.
8.
The respondent No. 4 being dissatisfied with the order dated
30.07.2015 then preferred an appeal before the Chief Executive Member,
GHADC in GHADC/REV. Appeal No. 54 A/C of 2015 and after
consideration of the same, the Chief Executive Member vide order dated
08.06.2016 allowed the same holding that Daronggre II-20 (16) Akhing as
A’Mate (Single) Akhing of Chambugong clan only.
9.
Responding to the said order dated 08.06.2016 passed by the
Chief Executive Member, GHADC, the appellants as petitioners have
approached this Court by way of writ petition being WP (C) No. 210 of
2016 and this Court after hearing the parties has, vide order dated
11.03.2019 upheld the same.
10.
The appellants have now come before us on appeal against the
order dated 11.03.2019 referred to above and has also simultaneously
assailed the order dated 04.03.2020 passed by the learned Single Judge in
MC(Review Pet) No. 7 of 2019 which is an application for review of the
order dated 11.03.2019 and which was dismissed.
11.
We have heard Mr. A.S. Siddiqui, learned Sr. counsel for the
appellants along with Mr. A.G. Momin, learned counsel, who at the outset,
has asserted that as far as the Daronggre II-20(16) Akhing land is
concerned, it was under the control and possession of the joint Nokmas of
the Mangseng and Chambugong clans. This was fortified by the map of
the said Akhing which map bears the signature of G.D. Walker, the then
Deputy Commissioner dated 15.6.26 and of Asansing Marak, Mouzadar,
dated 13.5.26. The said map purportedly described the location of
Daronggiri Aking of Ringa Sangma and Jingsan Marak Nokma. The
boundaries of the said Akhing was also detailed and confirmed by W.
Shaw, the then Deputy Commissioner on 9-6-32. Yet another document
relied upon by the appellants is the genealogical tree of Jingran Nokma of
II-20(16) Daronggiri village said to have also been confirmed by W. Shaw,
Deputy Commissioner on 16/3/33.
12.
Coming to the order dated 11.01.1956, wherein on an application
for partition of the said Akhing Daronggre Akhing land II-20(16), an
observation was clearly made by the then Chief Executive Member,
GHADC that the Nokmas, that is, Ringa Nokma and Jinsang Nokma are
the joint Nokmas of the same Akhing land which is indisputable, the same
has been brought to the fore by the appellants to say that although the said
order was challenged by the respondent No. 4 before the Executive
Member, who has held that the Chief Executive Member who is an
appellate authority could not have passed the said order, however, only the
issue of the authority of the Chief Executive Member to pass the order was
decided, but the contents of the order itself was not challenged nor the
question answered as far as the joint Nokmaship of the parties over the said
Akhing is concerned, further submits Mr. Siddiqui.
13.
Mr. Siddiqui has again submitted that in case of succession of
Nokma, the District Council is empowered to decide the same in
accordance with the relevant provisions of the Garo Hills Autonomous
District Council (Social Custom and Usages) Validating Act, 1958. Before
the year 1951, the Deputy Commissioner is the competent authority to
decide such issues, by this Act, the Chief Executive Member is the
appellate authority in this regard. However, the respondent No. 4 while
contending that the Chief Executive Member could not have passed the
order in the year 1956 as he is an appellate authority for which reliance
was placed on two decisions of the Assam High Court, which judgments
are of the year 1953 and 1954, the same belies logic as the Chief Executive
Member was designated as an appellate authority only under the provision
of the 1958 Act, while the order in question was of the year 1956.
Therefore, the decisions relied upon has no relevance to the matter in issue.
14.
The appellants has also questioned the observation of the learned
Single Judge at paragraph 20 of the impugned judgment to the extent that
it was concluded that when a joint Akhing is established, Nokmas of both
clans are mentioned and their family tree is also incorporated therein. This
according to the appellant is not correct, inasmuch as, it was contented that
it has been the practice in the District Council in some cases to register the
names of the Nokma in a separate register as was done in the case of the
appellant’s clan while listing the genealogical tree of Jingran Nokma,
authenticated by W. Shaw, Deputy Commissioner, on 16.03.33. It is
further submitted that this document dated 16.03.33 was never challenged
as to its authenticity.
15.
That the authenticity of the certificate issued by the Executive
Member Incharge Revenue dated 13.12.2003 was not verified from the
original records with the District Council, thereby leading the learned
Single Judge to come to the conclusion that the basis of issuance of the
same could not be substantiated by the appellants is also not a correct
finding asserts the appellants, as apart from the said certificate, the map
dated 13.2.26 as well as the genealogical tree of Jingsan Nokma dated
16.03.33 are very much part of the records available with the District
Council.
16.
Per contra, Mr. K.S. Kynjing, learned Sr. counsel along with Ms.
A.D. Syiem, learned counsel for the respondent No. 4 in reply has reverted
to the findings of the Court of the first instance, that is, the Executive
Member Incharge Revenue who, after taking into consideration the
petition, the written statement and more importantly, the documents and
on relevant issues having been framed, the very first issue itself, that is,
“Whether Daronggre/Daronggiri A’khing was jointly acquired by two
clans viz, Chambugong and Mansang clans or not?” was discussed and
the finding is that the said Akhing was never jointly acquired but was all
along in the possession of the Chambugong clan.
17.
Mr. Kynjing has further submitted that the claim of the appellants
as joint Nokmas along with the Chambugong clan was never substantiated
by relevant documents. On the other hand, the fact that the Chambugong
clan has been held to be the owner of the said Daronggre Akhing land by
relevant and authentic documents has also been proved by referring to the
first official document of 30.04.1921 which is an order by the Arbitrators
which had indicated that though Jingran Marak was a party in that case,
the Akhing was however given only to Ringa Nokma and there was no
complaint by Jingran Marak to this. In the same year, the map of the said
Daronggre II-20(16) Akhing was prepared and only the name of Ringa
Sangma Nokma was shown.
18.
As opposed to this, that the appellants/petitioners have tried to
prove that the Mangsang clan are the joint Nokma of the said Akhing and
in this regard have produced the document dated 13.5.1926 which is a
report of the Mouzadar indicating that Ringa Sangma Nokma has no
objection to joint Nokmaship with Jingran Marak over Daronggre II20(16) Akhing. However, this document is doubtful as to its authenticity
as on the body of the said report, the signature of Ringa Sangma Nokma is
missing. Even the countersignature of the clan elders (Maharis) of the
Chambugong clan could not be seen in the said document, which only goes
to show that the said document is a fabricated and false one, further
submits Mr. Kynjing.
19.
The final submission of Mr. Kynjing is that as per Garo customs
and practice, the Nokma must reside in his Akhing. This custom has also
found mention in the book on the “Principles of Garo Law” by Jangsan
Sangma, wherein at page 24-25 under Chapter IX it has been written as
follows:
“58. NOKMA AND HIS RIGHT. - Though the land belongs
also to the community the nokma and his wife are looked upon
as the owners of the land and the nokma would jealously
guard even the smallest patch of his akhing. It is the duty of
the nokma to distribute akhing land for jhumming amongst
the families lying in the village under him. His family is the
pith of the clan. Certain social festival must start at his house.
He must reside in a village which is in his akhing.”
It is evident from the records that Jingran Marak Nokma from
the Mansang clan has fled to Goragre with his wife Megan Sangma, though
Megan Sangma came back after the death of Jingran Marak, but as they
had abandoned the Akhing, whatever rights they possessed stood
relinquished by the operation of Garo customary law and practice.
20.
Mr. S. Dey, learned counsel for the respondents No. 1-3, the
Garo Hills Autonomous District Council (GHADC) has made only one
submission that according to Garo custom, there are four classes of Akhing
land, but nowhere in the records is it shown that an Akhing can be jointly
acquired by purchase.
21.
Having heard the parties, we have given considerable thought to
the submission and contention advanced and since the fight is basically
over the control of the Akhing land known as Daronggre -20(16), the first
question is whether the clan of the appellants, that is, the Mangsang clan
have jointly acquired the said Akhing land Daronggre and therefore, the
Nokmas of the two clans, Chambugong and Mangsang can be said to be
joint Nokmas over the same.
22.
It is an admitted fact that the said Akhing land was originally
acquired by Darong Sangma and his wife Khimdi Marak from one Breko
Bachan Satri Batri who has borrowed ₹ 200/- and two pairs of ploughing
bulls from Darong Sangma. Since the land was not suitable for wet
cultivation, the said Breko Bachan Satri Batri who is from the Koch
community had handed over the said land to Darong Sangma as a
repayment of the said debt owed.
23.
The land formerly called ‘Allagiri’ was then known as
‘Daronggre’ in honour of Darong Sangma. It can be said that this Akhing
falls under the category of ‘A.Mate Land’. According to Dr. Julius L.R.
Marak, in his book on ‘Garo Customary Laws and Practices’ (revised and
enlarged edition 2000) at page 174 it has been noted as under:
“…The A.king Lands of the Garos can be divided mainly into
four classes as folows (sic follows) according to the nature of
the right that one has to possess:
(i)
A.Mate Land
(a) A.Mate A.king land is a plot of land acquired by an
individual by the right of purchase or through donation to
some individual…..”
24.
The twist in the tale in this whole episode is that the appellants
claim that the said Akhing is a joint property initially based only on the
fact that their first Nokma was Darong Marak whose wife was Midi
Sangma. Apparently, because the name Darong Sangma who is from the
Chambugong clan is similar to the name of Darong Marak who is from the
Mangsang clan, the appellants laid claim to the said Akhing land based on
this premise claiming that it was their fore parents who has acquired the
said Akhing.
25.
As noted by the Executive Member, the first recorded document
of 30.4.1921 shows that the said land was under the control of Ringa
Sangma of the Chamburong clan and though Jingran Marak was party to
the case, no objection was made thereto, therefore the matter should have
ended there. Even in the recorded map of the said Daronggre II-20(16)
Akhing made in the year 1921 along with the boundaries encompassing
the land, the only name that appears is that of Ringa Sangma and nowhere
does the name of Jingran Marak appeared in the said map.
26.
The said Daronggre Akhing was however officially registered in
favour of Ringa Sangma only on 29.5.1925 which was witnessed by as
many as eight important authorities like Laskers, Nokmas and Sardars who
were present at the time of demarcation of the boundary. The same has
been approved by the Deputy Commissioner.
27.
As opposed to this, the appellants have relied on the report dated
13.5.1926 which is a purported report of the Mouzadar stating that Ringa
Sangma Nokma has no objection to Jingran Marak being the joint Nokma
of the Daronggre Akhing. However, in evidence, it has been proved that
the alleged report does not have the signature of Ringa Sangma as well as
the important Chra (male members) of the Chambugong clan. The said
report was also not clear as to the basis on which it was made, whether on
a complaint or on the order from a competent authority. This proved that
the said report was prepared only on the own initiative of the said
Mouzadar which has no relevance in law.
28.
The claim of the appellants on the issue of joint Nokmaship has
been demolished in evidence both ocular and documentary and
accordingly, the Executive Member while deciding the issue of joint
Nokmaship have come to the conclusion that the claim of the respondent
No. 4 is more genuine and acceptable.
29.
On the order dated 11.01.1956 passed by the Chief Executive
Member (C.E.M.) wherein in an application for partition of the said
Daronggre Akhing, it was observed that both parties are present, that is,
Ringa Nokma and Jasang (sic Jingsan) Nokma. However, while coming to
the decision that the said partition could not be affected as both the parties
and the Maharis have to agree, to which Ringa Nokma is not in favour of
partition, an observation in the order was made to the effect that “…The
Nokmas are the joint nokmas of the same aching land. This is
indisputable…” It is this observation that has given a lifeline to the
appellants to pursue their case contending that the issue of joint
Nokmaship of the said Akhing land was decided by an authority who is no
less than the Chief Executive Member of the District Council.
30.
However, as has been held by the Executive Member, vide order
dated 30.07.2015, the order dated 11.01.1956 cannot be considered an
order at all since the CEM does not have original jurisdiction being an
appellate court. This finding of the said Executive Member was however
attacked by the appellants who has contended that the authority of the
Chief Executive Member as an appellate authority was derived as a
consequent of section 8(2) of the Garo Hills Autonomous District (Social
Customs and Usages) Validating Act, 1958 which provides as follows: “8. (1) Whenever a vacancy occurs in the office of a Nokma
of any Akhing or there arises any dispute in the matter of
succession of Nokmaship of any Akhing or any dispute with
regard to any other matter relating to or connected with, any
Akhing and the boundaries thereof, the matter shall be
referred, in the first instance, to the Revenue Member for
disposal in accordance with the customary practice and
usages of the Garos.
(2) Any person aggrieved at the order of the Revenue
Member under sub-section (1) above may prefer an appeal to
the Chief Executive Member within 60 days from the date of
order.”
Therefore, in the year 1956, the appellate power has not yet been
conferred upon the Chief Executive Member, the finding of the Executive
Member is accordingly flawed.
31.
Irrespective of the findings of the Executive Member as regard
the appellate authority of the Chief Executive Member, in the order dated
08.06.2016 which is an appeal before the Chief Executive Member against
the order dated 30.07.2015 passed by the Executive Member in Case No.
25 A/C of 2011, the learned Chief Executive Member while referring to
the order dated 11.01.1956, has specifically referred to the Hon’ble High
Court’s order dated 12.05.1954 passed in Civil Rule No. 172 of 1953,
published in ‘The Unreported Cases [Assam High Court 1994-96 (sic
1954-1956)] Vol.2, page 191’ wherein in a case between the predecessorin-interest of the relevant parties herein, the Assam High Court has held
that the Chief Executive Member has no jurisdiction to hear a partition
suit. In such an instance, it was held that the order dated 11.01.1956 was
passed without jurisdiction and is therefore void. This Court, on
consideration of the same having noticed the order passed by the Assam
High Court as indicated herein is also inclined to agree that the order dated
11.01.1956 (supra) would not have any relevance, as far as the claim of the
appellant is concerned, inasmuch as, once the authority who has passed the
order is deemed to have done so without jurisdiction, notwithstanding the
fact that the essence of the order was not challenged, the order by itself
having failed to withstand the scrutiny of law, it cannot be said that only
the authority of the Chief Executive Member is questioned, but the order
passed by him not having been challenged is maintained. This is the
proposition of the learned counsel for the appellant which cannot be
sustained by this Court.
32.
In the considered view of this Court, the learned Single Judge
has delved into the matter extensively and has covered all the bases and,
therefore, the judgment impugned cannot be faulted in any way.
33.
In view of the observations made above, this Court finds that the
appellants have not been able to make out a case for interference with the
impugned judgment. The appeal fails. W.A. No. 17 of 2020 is hereby
dismissed. The related challenge to the order in the review petition is also
dismissed.
34.
There shall be no order as to costs.
(W. Diengdoh)
Judge
(Sanjib Banerjee)
Chief Justice
Meghalaya
11.05.2022
“D. Nary, PS”
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