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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 10875 of 2026
Shyamu Yadav And Another
.....Appellant(s)
Versus
State of U.P. and Another
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s)
Counsel for Respondent(s)
: Saurabh Kumar Gond, Sujit Kumar
Yadav
: G.A., Ravindra Bind, Vinod Kumar
Bind
Court No. - 91
HON'BLE SANTOSH RAI, J.
1. Heard Shri Sujit Kumar Yadav, learned counsel for the appellants, Shri
Vinod Kumar Bind, learned counsel for O.P. No.2 and learned AGA for
the State.
2. The present criminal appeal has been filed by the appellants to set aside
the summoning/cognizance order dated 20.01.2026 passed by learned
Special Judge (S.C./S.T. Act), Mirzapur in Special Session Trial No.92 of
2026 (State vs. Shyamu Yadav and others) arising out of Case Crime No.
386 of 2025 under Sections 352 and 351(3) BNS and Sections 3(1)(r),
3(1)(s) and 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act, P.S.- Lalganj, District- Mirzapur.
3. In the FIR, Swamu Yadav and Jitendra Yadav are named as accused.
The allegation against the accused-appellants is that they were raising
illegal construction over the disputed land and, when the complainant
objected, they used caste-based abusive language against her, her uncle
and her aunt.
4. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the dispute between the
parties is essentially civil in nature and relates to ownership and
possession of land bearing Khata No. 266. The complainant is not the
tenure-holder of the disputed land, and a revenue inquiry report dated
15.06.2026 indicates that the appellants’ father is in possession of the land
on the basis of a registered sale deed. It is further submitted that the FIR
was lodged after a delay of about eight days, without any plausible
CRLA No. 10875 of 2026
explanation, and does not disclose the specific caste-based words
allegedly used by the appellants. The investigating officer filed the charge
sheet without proper investigation, and the learned court below passed the
impugned cognizance/summoning order without considering these
material aspects. Hence, the impugned order and the consequential
proceedings are liable to be quashed.
5. Learned AGA and learned counsel for opposite party no.2 oppose the
appeal and submit that the appellants were raising construction over the
disputed land, and when the complainant and her relatives objected, the
appellants abused them using caste-indicative words and threatened them.
It is submitted that, after investigation, a charge sheet was filed and the
learned court below rightly took cognizance and summoned the
appellants. The allegations disclose offences under the relevant provisions
of the B.N.S. and the SC/ST Act, and the disputed questions relating to
the land cannot, by themselves, justify quashing the criminal proceedings
at this stage. Learned counsel for O.P. No.2 relied upon the judgement of
Apex Court in Accamma Sam Jacob vs. State of Karnataka and
another, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 585 stating that mere existence of a civil
dispute does not preclude criminal proceedings if the allegations prima
facie disclose a cognizable offence. Hence, the appeal is liable to be
dismissed.
6. The incident is alleged to have occurred on 28.09.2025, whereas the
FIR was registered on 06.10.2025, after a delay of about eight days. It is
stated in the FIR that complainant Radhika Beldar is the tenure-holder of
Gata No. 266, however, learned counsel for opposite party no. 2 admits
that the tenure-holder of the disputed land is her uncle, Panchraj Beldar,
and not the complainant herself. The FIR further states that no
demarcation (fatbandi) of the disputed gata had been carried out. The
accused-appellants are also stated to be co-sharers in the disputed land on
the basis of sale deeds executed in their favour, though they are alleged to
have raised illegal construction thereon. In connection with the civil
dispute between the parties, Panchraj Beldar, the complainant's uncle,
moved an application before the SDM/Tehsildar, Madihan, Mirzapur
pursuant to which the concerned revenue authority conducted an inquiry.
Admittedly, no civil or revenue suit has been instituted in this regard
CRLA No. 10875 of 2026
before the competent civil/revenue court. A perusal of the FIR reveals that
no specific caste-based slur has been attributed to the accused-appellants
to prima facie establish an intention to insult or humiliate the complainant
on the ground of her caste. Likewise, no specific words constituting an
offence under Section 504 IPC have been mentioned in the FIR. Learned
counsel for O.P. No.2 has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex
Court in Accamma Sam Jacob (supra), however, the factual
circumstances of the present case are distinguishable from those of the
cited judgment, and the same is not applicable to the facts of the present
case. This is a no injury case. Thus, considering the facts and
circumstances of the case in their entirety, the dispute appears to be
primarily civil in nature, and the criminal proceedings seem to have been
initiated to give a criminal colour to the existing civil controversy.
7. So far as the offence under Section 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes
and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 is
concerned, on a careful consideration of the material placed on record,
this Court finds that the essential foundational ingredients of the said
provision are not prima facie established. Section 3(2)(va) is attracted
where a person, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled
Tribe, commits an offence specified in the Schedule to the Act against a
person or property belonging to a member of a Scheduled Caste or
Scheduled Tribe, while knowing such status. Thus, the mere fact that the
alleged victim belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe does not,
by itself, attract Section 3(2)(va). There must be prima facie material
connecting the alleged substantive offence with the requirements of the
said provision, including the commission of an offence specified in the
Schedule and the requisite knowledge contemplated by the statute. In the
present case, the material relied upon by the prosecution, even if taken at
its face value, does not disclose such foundational facts.
8. Thus, there is no prima facie material demonstrating that the alleged
offence falls within the Scheduled offence contemplated by Section
3(2)(va), nor is there sufficient material at this stage to establish the
requisite knowledge on the part of the appellants regarding the Scheduled
Caste/Scheduled Tribe status of the alleged victim/injured in the manner
contemplated by the provision. The statutory presumption under Section
CRLA No. 10875 of 2026
8(c) cannot be invoked in the absence of the foundational factual
circumstances necessary for its application.
9. In the case of Swaran singh Vs State (2008) 8 SCC 435, the Hon'ble
Apex Court drew a clear distinction between the expressions "public
place" and "any place within public view." A private place may still be a
place within public view if the incident is visible to members of the
public. Conversely, merely because an incident occurs in a public
building does not automatically satisfy the requirement if it is not within
public view. The Supreme Court held that words such as "Chamar",
though originally denoting a caste, may amount to an offence if used as a
casteist abuse with intent to humiliate a member of the Scheduled Castes.
The Court emphasized that words should be understood in their popular
and social meaning, not merely their etymological meaning. For attracting
Section 3(1)(x) (now Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s)), there must be
intentional insult or intimidation, and intent to humiliate the victim
because he or she belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. Mere
abuse or quarrel, without the requisite intention contemplated by the Act,
is insufficient. The Court reiterated that criminal proceedings should
continue only where the allegations disclose a prima facie offence against
the particular accused. Proceedings may be quashed where the FIR does
not disclose the essential ingredients against an accused.
10. In Gorige Pentaiah Vs state of AP & Ors 2009 Cri.L.J. 350,
Honble Apex court held "when the basic ingredients of the offence are
missing in the complaint, then permitting such complaint to continue and
to compel the appellant to face the rigmarole of the criminal trial would
be totally unjustified leading to abuse of process of law." In the case of
Hitesh Verma vs. State of Uttarakhand (2020) 10 SCC 710, the Hon'ble
Suprme Court held that 'a dispute that arose inside the private house of a
complainant over the possession of the land without the presence of
independent public witnesses, does not satisfy the statutory threshold of
Section 3(1)(r).
11. In the case of Shajan Skraria vs. State of Kerala and another, 2024
SCC Online SC 2249, the Hon'ble Apex Court by quoting the cases of
Hitesh Verma (Supra) has held as under:
CRLA No. 10875 of 2026
"13. The offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act would indicate
the ingredient of intentional insult and intimidation with an intent
to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled
Tribe. All insults or intimidations to a person will not be an
offence under the Act unless such insult or intimidation is on
account of victim belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled
Tribe. The object of the Act is to improve the socio-economic
conditions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes as
they are denied number of civil rights. Thus, an offence under the
Act would be made out when a member of the vulnerable section
of the society is subjected to indignities, humiliations and
harassment. The assertion of title over the land by either of the
parties is not due to either the indignities, humiliations or
harassment. Every citizen has a right to avail their remedies in
accordance with law. Therefore, if the appellant or his family
members have invoked jurisdiction of the civil court, or that
Respondent 2 has invoked the jurisdiction of the civil court, then
the parties are availing their remedies in accordance with the
procedure established by law. Such action is not for the reason
that Respondent 2 is a member of Scheduled Caste."
In Khuman Singh v. State of M.P., (2020) 18 SCC 763
"15. As held by the Supreme Court, the offence must be such so
as to attract the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act. The
offence must have been committed against the person on the
ground that such person is a member of Scheduled Caste and
Scheduled Tribe. Thus, the dictum as laid aforesaid is that the
offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 is not established
merely on the fact that the complainant is a member of a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, unless there is an
intention to humiliate such a member for the reason that he
belongs to such community. In other words, it is not the purport
of the Act, 1989 that every act of intentional insult or intimidation
meted by a person who is not a member of a Scheduled Caste or
Scheduled Tribe to a person who belongs to a Scheduled Caste or
Scheduled Tribe would attract Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989
CRLA No. 10875 of 2026
merely because it is committed against a person who happens to
be a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. On the
contrary, Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 is attracted where the
reason for the intentional insult or intimidation is that the person
who is subjected to it belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled
Tribe. I say so because the object behind the enactment of the
Act, 1989 was to provide stringent provisions for punishment of
offences which are targeted towards persons belonging to the
SC/ST communities for the reason of their caste status."
12. In Inder Mohan Goswami & Another v. State of Uttaranchal &
Others, AIR 2008 SC 251, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that criminal
prosecution should not be permitted to be used as an instrument of
harassment, oppression or private vendetta. Where criminal proceedings
are initiated with an ulterior motive to exert pressure or to settle personal
scores arising out of a dispute predominantly civil in nature, the High
Court is justified in exercising its inherent jurisdiction to quash such
proceedings
13. In Ganga Dhar Kalita v. State of Assam, (2015) 9 SCC 647, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that criminal proceedings should not be
allowed to continue where they are instituted merely to harass the accused
or to exert pressure in a civil dispute relating to property. The Court held
that giving a criminal colour to a dispute which is essentially civil in
nature amounts to an abuse of the process of law. At the same time, the
Court clarified that the existence of a civil dispute by itself is not a ground
for quashing criminal proceedings if the complaint prima facie discloses
the commission of a cognizable offence.
14. Having considered the rival submissions, the material brought on
record, and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
aforesaid decisions, this Court finds that the allegations contained in the
First Information Report and the material collected during investigation
do not prima facie disclose the essential ingredients of the offences
punishable under Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) and 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act.
This is a no injury case and civil controversy between the parties is an
admitted fact. In the absence of any specific allegation of intentional
CRLA No. 10875 of 2026
caste-based insult or humiliation attracting the provisions of the SC/ST
Act, permitting the criminal proceedings to continue would amount to an
abuse of the process of law. Consequently, the impugned
cognizance/summoning order cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.
15. Consequently, the summoning/cognizance order dated 20.01.2026
passed by learned Special Judge (S.C./S.T. Act), Mirzapur in Special
Session Trial No.92 of 2026 (State vs. Shyamu Yadav and others) arising
out of Case Crime No. 386 of 2025 under Sections 352 and 351(3) BNS
and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) and 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act, P.S.- Lalganj,
District- Mirzapur, is hereby set aside.
16. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed.
17. Registrar (Compliance) is directed to communicate the instant order to
the court concerned through District and Sessions Judge, Mirzapur by email/FAX within three days.
(Santosh Rai,J.)
October 24, 2026
Ankit.
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
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