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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW
DELHI
Reserved on : 23rd May 2026
Pronounced on : 18th August 2026
Uploaded on : 19th August 2026
%
#
CNR No. DLHC010283092023
+
W.P.(C) 9799/2023 CM APPL. 37694/2023 CM APPL.
41091/2023 CM APPL. 41093/2023 CM APPL. 63634/2023, CM
APPL.39648/2024 CM APPL. 39655/2024 CM APPL. 66253/2024 CM
APPL. 66263/2024 CM APPL. 55597-55598/2025 CM APPL. 6519665197/2025 CM APPL. 79956/2025 CM APPL. 5050/2026, CM APPL.
5076/2026
KANCHANA RAI
.....Petitioner
versus
DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT NEW DELHI & ORS.
....Respondents
#
CNR No. DLHC010768112025
+
W.P.(C)15405/2025, CM. APPL. 63095/2025, CM. APPL.
68405/2025, CM. APPL. 79970/2025 CM.APPL.5055-5057/2026
ARADHYA RAI
....Petitioner
versus
DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT NEW DELHI & ANR.
.....Respondents
#
CNR No. DLHC010768122025
+
W.P.(C) 15406/2025, CM. APPL. 63097/2025, CM.
APPL.68428/2025, CM APPL. 80061/2025CM APPL. 5058/2026
T.R. NARAYANAN
.....Petitioner
versus
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR
W.P.(C) 9799/2023 & connected petitions
10:36:56
Page 1/115
DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT NEW DELHI ANR
...Respondents
#
CNR No. DLHC010767942025
+
W.P.(C) 15407/2025CM APPL. 63100/2025, CM APPL.
68424/2025, CM APPL. 80063/2025CM APPL. 5053/2026
UMA DEVI
....Petitioner
versus
DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT AND ANR
.....Respondents
#
CNR No. DLHC010767922025
+
W.P.(C) 15408/2025 CM APPL. 63103/2025, CM APPL.
68422/2025, CM APPL. 79977/2025, CM APPL. 5052/2026
UMESH SHARMA
.....Petitioner
versus
DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT NEW DELHI AND ANR.
.....Respondents
#
CNR No. DLHC010792072025
+
W.P.(C) 15886/2025, CM APPL. 64980/2025, CM APPL.
68255/2025, CM APPL. 80171/2025, CM APPL. 5051/2026
MUKESH KUMAR
....Petitioner
versus
DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT NEW DELHI AND ANR.
.....Respondents
#
CNR No. DLHC010792302025
+
W.P.(C) 15909/2025, CM APPL. 65034/2025, CM APPL.
68441/2025, CM APPL. 79960/2025, CM APPL. 5054/2026
SHRINATH BANERJEE
.....Petitioner
versus
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR
W.P.(C) 9799/2023 & connected petitions
10:36:56
Page 2/115
DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT NEW DELHI
#
+
.....Respondents
CNR No. DLHC010021612026
W.P.(C) 1021/2026, CM APPL. 4984/2026, CM APPL.
4986/2026
VIRENDRA SHARMA
.....Petitioner
versus
DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT NEW DELHI
#
+
.....Respondents
CNR No. DLHC010023402026
W.P.(C) 1092/2026, CM APPL. 5332-5334/2026
ACHINTYA RAI
.....Petitioner
versus
DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT NEW DELHI & ANR.
.....Respondents
Appearance :
Mr. Anurag Jain, Special Counsel for ED with Mr. Sagar Singh & Ms.
Vaishali Gujjar, Advs.
Mr. Vikas Singh, Sr. Advocate, with Mr. Varun Singh, Adv. Ms. Deepeika
Kalia, Adv. Ms. Alankriti Dwivedi, Adv. Ms. Somesa Gupta, Adv. Mr.
Sudeep Chandra and Ms. Khushi, Adv for Intervenor/complainant.
Mr. N. Hariharan, Sr. Adv. with B. Shravanth Shanker, Ms. Prerna Robin,
Mr. I.V. Nikhil, Mr. Shiv Nath, Advocates for petitioner.
Mr. Siddharth Agarwal, Sr. Adv. with Mr. D. Abhinav Rao, Advocates for
petitioner.
Mr. Kshitij Mudgal and Mr. Ansh Mittal, Advocates for Intervener.
Mr. Dayan Krishnan, Sr. Adv. with Mr. B. Yeshwanth Raj, Adv. for
petitioner.
Mr. Mahesh Jethmalani, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Ravi Sharma, Adv.,
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR
W.P.(C) 9799/2023 & connected petitions
10:36:56
Page 3/115
Mr. Anjani Kumar Rai, Adv., Mr. Sarthak Chhilwar, Adv., Mr. Satish
Kumar Shukla, Adv, and Mr. Praphull Kumar, Adv for Intervenors (Rajeev
Sharma).
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANISH DAYAL
INDEX
Sr No.
Title
A. Factual Background
B. Issues for Determination
C. Submissions made on behalf of petitioners
by Mr. Siddharth Agarwal, Sr. Adv.
D. Submissions made on behalf of petitioners
by Mr. Dayan Krishnan, Sr. Adv.
E. Submissions made on behalf of petitioners
by Mr. N. Hariharan, Sr. Adv.
F. Submissions made on behalf of the
Directorate of Enforcement by Mr. Anurag
Jain, Advocate
G. Submissions on behalf of Complainant by
Mr. Vikas Singh, Sr. Adv.
H. Submissions on behalf of Intervenor by
Mr. Mahesh Jethmalani, Sr. Adv.
I.
Submissions
on
the
issue
of
maintainability of the Civil Writ Petitions
I.A
I.B
I.C
I.D
Submissions by Mr. Siddharth Agarwal,
Sr. Adv. for the petitioners
Submissions by Mr. Dayan Krishnan, Sr.
Adv. for the petitioners.
Submissions by Mr. N. Hariharan, Sr. Adv.
for the petitioners
Submissions on behalf of the Directorate
Page No.
5-10
12-18
18-25
25-27
27-32
33-38
38-39
39-41
41-44
44- 47
47-48
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR
W.P.(C) 9799/2023 & connected petitions
10:36:56
Page 4/115
of Enforcement by Mr. Anurag Jain,
Advocate
I.E
Submissions on behalf of the complainant
by Mr. Vikas Singh, Sr. Adv.
J. Analysis : Maintainability
K. Analysis : Alternate Remedy
L. Analysis: Cancellation of Second FIR
M. Analysis : Addendum to include First FIR
N. Conclusion
49-60
61-65
65-88
88-114
114-115
JUDGMENT
ANISH DAYAL, J.
1.
This batch of writ petitions has been filed by the petitioners seeking
quashing of ECIR No. ECIR/DLZO-II/72/2021 [“ECIR”] and all
consequential proceedings emanating therefrom, including the order dated 28th
June 2023 passed under Section 17 (1-A) of the Prevention of the Money
Laundering Act, 2022 [“PMLA”]. The present challenge primarily arises from
the continuation of the proceedings under the PMLA and the consequential
actions undertaken by respondent pursuant to ECIR, including the subsequent
inclusion of FIR No. 279/2019 by way of an addendum dated 20th August
2025, after the closure of the original predicate offence basis which the ECIR
had originated.
A.
Factual Background
A.1. The Aristo Group of Companies, comprising Aristo Pharmaceuticals,
Aristo Laboratories and Mapra Laboratories, was established by Late Dr.
Mahendra Prasad, a seven-time Member of Parliament. Petitioners comprise
members of the family of Late Dr. Mahendra Prasad as well as Directors and
senior management of the Aristo Group of Companies.
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR
W.P.(C) 9799/2023 & connected petitions
10:36:56
Page 5/115
A.2. Dr. Mahendra Prasad, former Member of Parliament and the Chairman,
Managing Director and promoter of M/s Aristo Pharmaceutical Pvt. Ltd.
(“Aristo”) passed away on 27th November 2021, leaving behind a registered
will dated 18th July 2011.
A.3. The dramatis personae involved in these petitions are as follows:
(i)
Dr. Mahendra Prasad was married to Smt. Satula Devi with whom he
had three sons namely Rajeev Sharma, Devendra Rai and Ranjeet
Sharma. Devendra Rai’s second wife was Kanchana Rai (petitioner in
W.P.(C) 9799/2023) i.e. the daughter-in-law of Smt. Satula Devi and Dr.
Mahendra Prasad
(ii)
Kanchana Rai has two children namely Achintya Rai and Aradhya Rai
i.e. grandson and granddaughter of Smt. Satula Devi and Dr. Mahendra
Prasad and petitioners in W.P.(C)1092/2026 and W.P.(C)15405/2025
respectively.
(iii)
Umesh Sharma is the brother of Late Dr. Mahendra Prasad and
Managing Director of Aristo (petitioner in W.P.(C) 15408/2025).
(iv)
Mukesh Kumar is the brother of Kanchana Rai and employee of Aristo
and petitioner in W.P.(C) 15886/2025.
(v)
T.R. Narayan was the Personal Assistant to Dr. Prasad (petitioner in
W.P.(C)15406/2025).
(vi)
Virendra
Sharma
was
a
Director
in
Aristo
(petitioner
in
W.P.(C)1021/2026).
(vii)
Shrinath Banerjee was an employee in Aristo (petitioner in
W.P.(C)15909/2025).
All the above are sought to be implicated in the PMLA proceedings by the
complainants, who are as under:
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR
W.P.(C) 9799/2023 & connected petitions
10:36:56
Page 6/115
(i)
Smt. Satula Devi, who was married with Late Dr. Mahendra Prasad.
(Smt. Satula Devi passed away on 12th June 2022).
(ii)
Rajeev Sharma and Ranjit Sharma, other two sons besides Devendra Rai,
of Late Smt. Satula Devi and Late Dr. Prasad.
A.4. On 21st September 2019, FIR No. 279/2019 [“first FIR”] was registered
at Police Station Crime Branch on allegations relating to the alleged wrongful
confinement of Late Smt. Satula Devi, removal of certain jewellery and
offences under the Passports Act 1967. Upon completion of investigation, a
chargesheet dated 31st October 2019 was filed for offences under Sections
323/344/406/509/411/34/420 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 [IPC] and Section
12 Passport Act 1967. Charges have not yet been framed and the matters are
still pending. Said FIR was never relied upon as the scheduled offence while
subsequently registering ECIR No. DLZO-II/72/2021 in December 2021.
A.5. Subsequently, on 10th February 2021, the Economic Offences Wing
[“EOW”], Delhi, registered FIR No. 27/2021 [“second FIR”] under Sections
403/409/411/ 420/423/424/463/465/467/468/472/474 and 120 B of the Indian
Penal Code 1860 [“IPC”]. Since Aardhya Rai and Achintya Rai were minors at
that time, the FIR was registered against all petitioners on allegations that
certain share transfers and bank transactions had been effected by forging the
signatures of Late Smt. Satula Devi on share transfer forms and cheques. The
FIR came to be registered against several of the present petitioners and
complaints by Rajeev Sharma regarding the “same transaction” were
investigated together.
A.6. On 28th December 2021, the Respondent registered ECIR No. DLZOII/72/2021 exclusively on the basis of second FIR, which constituted the sole
“scheduled offence” for the purposes of PMLA investigation.
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR
W.P.(C) 9799/2023 & connected petitions
10:36:56
Page 7/115
A.7. Upon completion of investigation in second FIR, the Economic Offence
Wings [“EOW”] filed a Cancellation Report dated 8th December 2022,
concluding that no offence was made out. The Investigating Agency relied upon
the opinion of the Forensic Science Laboratory, which confirmed that the
disputed signatures on the share transfer forms and cheques were genuine.
A.8. A Protest Petition against the Cancellation Report was filed on 29 th
March 2023 by the legal representatives of Late Smt. Satula Devi.
A.9. In the meantime, on 28th June 2023, respondent issued an order under
Section 17(1A) of PMLA directing freezing of certain bank accounts. Said
action was challenged before this Court in W.P.(C) No. 9799/2023, wherein,
by order dated 12th December 2023, this Court stayed the proceedings before
the Adjudicating Authority [“AA”] arising from the freezing order.
A.10. Vide judgment dated 12th June 2025, the Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate (ACJM), Patiala House Courts, dismissed the Protest Petition and
accepted the Cancellation Report, thereby accepting the Cancellation Report
and bringing the investigation in second FIR to a close.
A.11. More than two months after the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate
(ACJM), Patiala House Courts accepted the Cancellation Report in second FIR,
respondent, on 20th August 2025, issued an addendum to ECIR No. DLZOII/72/2021 incorporating first FIR as an additional scheduled offence.
A.12. Following the said addendum, on 25th September 2025, respondent
conducted searches under Section 17 of the PMLA at the premises of certain
petitioners and seized various articles. On 30th September 2025, summons
under Section 50 of PMLA were issued to petitioners.
A.13. By interim orders dated 9th October 2025 and 15th October 2025, this
Court directed that no coercive steps shall be taken against the petitioners
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR
W.P.(C) 9799/2023 & connected petitions
10:36:56
Page 8/115
during the pendency of the present proceedings.
A.14. On 16th January 2026, respondent issued further summons calling upon
the petitioners to furnish extensive information concerning their movable and
immovable assets and bank accounts dating back to the year 1998.
A.15. During the pendency of the present writ petitions, respondent also
instituted Original Application (OA) No. 319/2025 before AA under Section
17(4) of PMLA seeking retention of the properties seized during the search
conducted on 25th September 2025. By order dated 12th March 2026, this Court
directed that further proceedings in the said Original Application shall remain
stayed.
A.16. There are a number of writ petitions which form part of this batch,
W.P.(C) 9799/2023 is the lead petition, which seeks relief of quashing of
ECIR/DLZO/II/72/2021 and all proceedings emanating therefrom. The other
petitions filed earlier also include relief against an alleged illegal search
conducted on 25th September 2025 under Section 17 of PMLA, besides other
attendant reliefs, though they are not required to be discussed in detail at this
stage.
A.17. For ease of appreciation and reference of the issues involved, particulars
of each writ petitions are set out in the following table:
Cause Title
KANCHANA
RAI
V.
WP(C) NO.
RELIEF SOUGHT
9799/2023
Quash ED proceedings [ECIR/DLZO-
DIRECTORATE
OF
II/72/2021] along with proceedings
ENFORCEMENT
NEW
emanating from order dt 28.06.2023
DELHI & ORS.
under Section 17(1) of PMLA w.e.f to
freezing of bank accounts and deposits
ARADHYA
RAI
DIRECTORATE
V.
OF
15405/2025
Quash
Section
17(1)
PMLA
proceedings including seizures; and
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR
W.P.(C) 9799/2023 & connected petitions
10:36:56
Page 9/115
ENFORCEMENT
NEW
Quash ECIR/DLZO-II/72/2021 and
DELHI & ANR.
T.R.
inquiry conducted by ED
NARAYANAN
V.
15406/2025
Quash
Section
17(1)
PMLA
DIRECTORATE
OF
proceedings including seizures; and
ENFORCEMENT
NEW
Quash ECIR/DLZO-II/72/2021 and
DELHI AND ANR
UMA
inquiry conducted by ED
DEVI
V.
15407/2025
DIRECTORATE
OF
proceedings including seizures; and
ENFORCEMENT
AND
Quash ECIR/DLZO-II/72/2021 and
ANR.
UMESH
Quash
Section
17(1)
PMLA
inquiry conducted by ED
SHARMA
V.
15408/2025
Quash
Section
17(1)
PMLA
DIRECTORATE
OF
proceedings including seizures; and
ENFORCEMENT
NEW
Quash ECIR/DLZO-II/72/2021 and
DELHI AND ANR.
MUKESH
inquiry conducted by ED
KUMAR
V.
15886/2025
Quash
Section
17(1)
PMLA
DIRECTORATE
OF
proceedings including seizures; and
ENFORCEMENT
NEW
Quash ECIR/DLZO-II/72/2021 and
DELHI AND ANR.
inquiry conducted by ED
SHRINATH BANERJEE V.
15909/2025
Quash
Section
17(1)
PMLA
DIRECTORATE
OF
proceedings including seizures; and
ENFORCEMENT
NEW
Quash ECIR/DLZO-II/72/2021 and
DELHI
inquiry conducted by ED
VIRENDRA SHARMA V.
1021/2026
Quash ED proceedings [ECIR/DLZO-
DIRECTORATE
OF
II/72/2021] along with proceedings
ENFORCEMENT
NEW
emanating from summons order dated
DELHI
16.01.2026 [PMLA/SUMMON.HIUII/2026/3654]
ACHINTYA
RAI
V.
DIRECTORATE
OF
ENFORCEMENT
NEW
1092/2026
Quash ECIR/DLZO-II/72/2021 and all
inquiry conducted by ED
DELHI & ANR.
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR
W.P.(C) 9799/2023 & connected petitions
10:36:56
Page 10/115
B.
Issues for Determination
B.1. Before adverting to the rival submissions, it would be apposite to identify
the principal questions which arise for consideration in the present batch of
petitions. The controversy between the parties broadly centres around four
issues, which can be categorized as under:
i)
Maintainability:
Whether the present petitions are maintainable as Civil Writ Petitions
under Article 226 of the Constitution, having regard to the nature of the
challenge raised?
ii)
Alternate Remedy:
Whether the petitioners ought to be relegated to the statutory remedies
available under PMLA, or whether the present challenge warrants the
exercise of writ jurisdiction?
iii)
Cancellation of Second FIR:
Whether the proceedings initiated under ECIR No. ECIR/DLZOII/72/2021 could lawfully continue after the acceptance of the
Cancellation Report in FIR No. 27/2021, which admittedly constituted
the original scheduled offence forming the basis of the ECIR?
iv)
Addendum to include First FIR:
Whether the subsequent addendum dated 20th August 2025
incorporating FIR No. 279/2019 as an additional scheduled offence is
legally sustainable and capable of validating or continuing the
proceedings under the ECIR?
The rival submissions are accordingly considered under the aforesaid
heads.
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR
W.P.(C) 9799/2023 & connected petitions
10:36:56
Page 11/115
C.
Submissions made on behalf petitioners by Mr. Siddharth Agarwal,
Senior Advocate in W.P.(C) 9799/2023, W.P.(C)15405/2025 & W.P.(C)
1092/2026
C.1. Mr. Siddharth Agarwal contended that it was quite strange that the first
FIR registered six years back was sought to be included in the ECIR, which had
no relation with the first FIR moreover, was within the knowledge of the ED.
He pointed out the false statement made by ED in the written submissions in
paragraph 4, filed before this Court on 11th February 2026, wherein it stated
that it came to know of the first FIR only in July 2025.
C.2. Senior Counsel pointed out to the following documentation, which
showed that there was no reason why ED would not have knowledge of the first
FIR much earlier : first, the application under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. filed by
Smt. Satula Devi, particularly in paragraph 6, stated that the first FIR had been
registered and that a chargesheet had also been filed against Smt. Uma Devi;
second, the second FIR itself, on the basis of which instant ECIR has been
registered, clearly stated that the first FIR had been filed and subsequently a
chargesheet was filed against Smt. Uma Devi; third, Cancellation Report filed
with respect to the second FIR also stated the same; fourth, the counteraffidavit in W.P.(C) 9799/2023 filed on 8th August 2023, also notes that the first
FIR had been registered and reflected in charge-sheet.
C.3. He therefore contended that it was “beyond doubt” that the knowledge
of the first FIR was always with the ED and the statement made in the written
submissions therefore, exemplifies mala fide in introducing the addendum to
the ECIR.
C.4. Despite the knowledge of the first FIR, no action was ever taken by the
ED and no proceedings were initiated. However, it is contended that it was a
malevolent exercise of power inasmuch as once the predicate offence through
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR
W.P.(C) 9799/2023 & connected petitions
10:36:56
Page 12/115
the second FIR was extinguished, by virtue of the Protest Petition being
dismissed and the Cancellation Report being accepted, the ED, for extraneous
reasons, decided to incorporate the first FIR despite the fact that there were no
“proceeds of crime” emanating out of the first FIR proceedings.
C.5. Mr. Siddharth Agarwal referred to his written submissions focussing on
the point that the ECIR is extinguished upon filing/ acceptance of closure report
in second FIR. Relying upon decision in Vijay Madan Lal Choudhary (2023)
12 SCC 1, Yash Tuteja v. UOI (2024) 8 SCC 465, and Pavana R Dibbur (2023)
SCC OnLine SC 1586, the Supreme Court has held that in absence of any
scheduled offence, there cannot be any “proceeds of crime” and an enquiry
under PMLA commences or continues only upon existence of “proceeds of
crime” generated from a criminal activity being a scheduled offence.
C.6. Once closure report was filed on 8th December 2022 with respect to
second FIR, accepted by the ACJM on 12th June 2025, ECIR and all
proceedings become void and non-est in law.
C.7. Order dated 12th June 2025, when the closure was accepted, was
challenged, before this Court in Crl.M.C. 4884/2025 and Crl.M.C. 4485/2025
however no stay order was passed nor has it been set aside. Pendency of a
challenge does not give jurisdiction to ED to continue their investigation in the
matter. To this extent he relied upon decisions cited by High Court of Calcutta
in Future Gaming of Hotels Services Pvt. Ltd. v. ED Kolkata (2025) SCC
OnLine Cal 10189 which are listed as under:
(i)
The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement v.
EMTA Coal Ltd., Supreme Court deciding SLP (Civil) Diary no.
15235/2023 on 06th July 2023;
(ii)
Directorate of Enforcement v. Obulapuram Mining Co.
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR
W.P.(C) 9799/2023 & connected petitions
10:36:56
Page 13/115
pvt. Ltd., Criminal Appeal no. 1269 of 2017 order dated 02nd
December 2022;
(iii)
Naresh Kumar Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement,
Criminal Appeal no. 1262 of 2023 order dated 25th April, 2023
C.8. Relying on the same, Mr. Agarwal pointed out that at best there could be
revival of proceedings in case closure of FIR is set aside, but during the
pendency of any appellate proceedings, ECIR cannot subsist.
C.9. In the issue of addendum dated 20th August 2025 to the ECIR, it was
submitted that it was contrary to law. Not only that was made in a malicious
and arbitrary manner since first FIR was already in existence at the time of
registration of the ECIR and it was not included as a scheduled offence till the
closure of second FIR, but, more importantly it had no link or nexus with
transactions in the second FIR since no “proceeds of crime” were generated
from the first FIR.
C.10. Mr. Agarwal, highlighted that there could be a possibility of including
another FIR as part of ECIR where the transactions are connected, like in
complaints against a real estate builder by homebuyers where settlements with
some homebuyers results in closure of FIR whereas subsequent FIRs from other
homebuyers may revive the investigation under the ECIR. However, in this case
not only was this a case of subsequent FIR but a previous FIR registered six
years prior to the ECIR addendum. At the very worst, if it was held that ECIR
continues to subsist / can subsist, even after the addendum, there can be no
investigation with respect to the second FIR qua which closure report has been
accepted. For this reliance was placed on decision on Coordinate Bench of this
Court in Rajinder Singh Chadha v. Union of India Ministry of Home Affairs
Through its Chief Secretary, 2023:DHC:8429 in particular paragraphs 4, 5, 6,
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR
W.P.(C) 9799/2023 & connected petitions
10:36:56
Page 14/115
25, 27 31, 33, 35 and 36.
C.11. This Court had held in Rajinder Singh Chadha (supra) that in relation
to two FIRs which have been closed, investigation could not be carried out
under ECIR registered on basis of those two FIRs. However, the ECIR was not
quashed with respect to a subsequent third FIR which had been registered
relating to the “same transaction”.
C.12. The decision in Rajinder Singh Chadha (supra) was noticed by the
Kolkata High Court in Future Gaming (supra), however was distinguished on
the facts.
C.13. Mr. Agarwal, further placed three propositions, which are as under:
i) Without the existence of a scheduled offence or a predicate
offence, there cannot be either initiation of or the continuation of
any proceedings under money laundering. This is the overarching
proposition. Every enforcement action under PMLA concerns
“proceeds of crime” generated out of a scheduled offence. There
exists an umbilical cord between a money laundering investigation
and the crime which has given birth to such “proceeds of crime”.
Merely because a file has been opened with ED does not mean that
an FIR stands registered with the Delhi Police and an overarching
investigation can be carried out.
ii) Even in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), the Supreme Court
observed that if the ED is investigating a person for undisclosed
cash and various other things are found, action cannot be taken
until the same becomes part of another case. Though the ED may
write to jurisdictional authorities under Section 66 of the PMLA
Act, the same would have to be registered as a separate case from
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR
W.P.(C) 9799/2023 & connected petitions
10:36:56
Page 15/115
which the authority of ED emanates. The original crime and the
process by the ED cannot become a continuing process; otherwise,
it would have no boundaries and would become indeterminate and
infinite. It has to remain confined to the “proceeds of crime”
generated out of the scheduled offence in question.
These two propositions are reflected in both Future Gaming (supra) and
Rajinder Singh Chadha (supra). The judgment in Rajinder Singh
Chadha (supra), relied upon by ED to contend that investigation can
continue, does not confer any mandate to commence investigation into any
predicate offence. In Rajinder Singh Chadha (supra), the connection
existed because the matters arose out of the “same transaction”. The
addendum was accepted because it arose out of the same project, albeit
involving different home buyers.
C.14. Mr. Agarwal emphasized that merely because this Court has issued
notice in the challenge to the closure of the case arising from the second FIR, it
cannot imply that the second FIR is alive. On the contrary, it means that the
proceedings stand closed, the closure having been accepted, and only leaves
open a possibility for revival by ED in the event the second FIR is revived. To
that extent, Mr. Agarwal submitted that liberty may be granted to ED in that
regard, to which petitioners have no quarrel.
C.15. It was, therefore, not permissible to place reliance upon an addendum
pertaining to an FIR lodged in 2019, being a prior FIR in point of time on a
completely distinct and different cause of action, giving rise to entirely separate
“proceeds of crime”. The same cannot be clubbed through an amendment in
order to continue the investigation. Mr. Agarwal admitted that if ED intended
to register a separate ECIR in relation to the first FIR, ED would have the legal
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bandwidth to do so; however, the same would necessarily have to remain
confined to the “proceeds of crime” generated from that FIR. The amendment,
however, amounts to malice in law, intended to resurrect a dead investigation.
C.16. Mr. Agarwal further submitted that the argument was not that addendums
cannot be added by ED, but merely that they may be added if they form part of
the “same transaction”. The first FIR related to the alleged wrongful
confinement of a lady at the instance of the complainant and one of the
petitioners, as well as the alleged expropriation of certain jewellery. The
incidents narrated in the FIR pertain to the period between 2015 and 2019. In
contrast, the second FIR pertained to financial transactions dating back to the
1990s, involving transfer of share money, etc. Even the notices being issued are
relatable to transactions of the years 1995 and 1997.
C.17. He further contended that, for the first time, the ED has dipped itself into
a private dispute, and such an exercise is anathema to the very purpose for
which the PMLA was enacted.
C.18. Essentially, Mr. Agarwal summarized his arguments by stating that:
i)
Firstly, ECIR would automatically stand quashed with
respect to second FIR once its closure report was accepted;
ii)
Secondly adding first FIR as addendum to ECIR was
without jurisdiction and malafide considering ED had
knowledge of first FIR but never included the same;
iii) Thirdly, there was no nexus of “proceeds of crime” in first
FIR which could have nexus with second FIR;
iv) Fourthly, in any event if closure proceedings are set aside,
the right of revival of ECIR is always there;
v)
Fifthly, without prejudice to other if ECIRs had to subsist,
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it cannot mandate any investigation with respect to second
FIR.
C.19. Senior Counsel submitted that an addendum is merely an amendment
to the principal document, which itself stands under challenge. According to
them, an addendum relates back to the date of the original document and there
was no requirement for a specific prayer against the amendment. It was
submitted that a ground in this regard had already been taken and once the
amendment was disclosed in the counter affidavit, submissions in rejoinder
specifically assailed the legality of the addendum. Thus, according to them, the
addendum clearly forms part of the dispute in the present proceedings. On the
issue of finality, reliance upon Rajinder Singh Chadha (supra) was reiterated
in support of the petitioners. It was further submitted that the order of the
Supreme Court merely issuing notice and directing status quo regarding
properties does not dilute the effect of the Trial Court’s order accepting the
closure report, which admittedly has not been stayed by this Court.
C.20. Mr. Agarwal, further submitted that the predicate offence and
chargesheet alone would govern the proceedings. They contended that no
jewellery was being sought by the petitioners and, in any event, the ECIR itself
related to mutual funds, stocks, and other financial documentation rather than
jewellery.
D.
Submissions made on behalf of petitioners by Mr. Dayan Krishnan,
Senior Advocate in W.P.(C) 15406/2025, W.P.(C) 15408/2025, W.P.(C)
15886/2025, W.P.(C) 15909/2025 & W.P.(C) 1021/2026
D.1. Mr. Dayan Krishnan, Senior Advocate, appeared on behalf of Mr. Umesh
Sharma, who was a Director of M/s Aristo Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. since
1978 and its Managing Director since 1981. He was arrayed as an accused in
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the second FIR. The second FIR pertained to allegations of fraudulent bank
transfers, forgery of signatures, transfer forms, cheques, etc., in which he stood
exonerated, since the EOW filed a Cancellation Report which came to be
accepted. The ECIR was registered against Umesh Sharma and others.
D.2. The Cancellation Report was accepted by the Trial Court on 12th June
2025, which brought to an end the jurisdiction of ED to proceed under the
ECIR. However, more than 2.5 years after filing of the Cancellation Report and
over two months after its acceptance by the Trial Court, the impugned
addendum came to be made to the non-existent ECIR so as to include the first
FIR, in which Umesh Sharma and others were not even accused and only Smt.
Uma Devi, is the principal accused in the said chargesheet. The other petitioners
were neither named as accused nor attributed any role. The first FIR was wholly
unrelated to the second FIR and did not form part of the “same transaction”.
D.3. In the first FIR, the complainant was Smt. Satula Devi, who alleged
unlawful confinement by Smt. Uma Devi and domestic staff, and further alleged
that certain ornaments belonging to her Smt. Satula Devi and Renuka Devi had
been taken over by Smt. Uma Devi.
D.4. It was also alleged that Smt. Uma Devi had obtained a passport by falsely
representing to the passport authorities that she was the wife of Late Dr.
Mahender Prasad. Consequently, Section 420 of Indian Penal Code 1860
[“IPC”] read with Section 12 of the Passport Act 1967 [“Passport Act”] was
invoked. As per the charge sheet, the jewellery stood fully recovered and, in
any event, there existed no surviving “proceeds of crime” which could form
the basis of investigation.
D.5. In the second FIR and in the Cancellation Report dated 08th December
2022, reference was also made to the first FIR. ED, in its counter affidavit in
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W.P. (C) 9799/2023, had also referred to the first FIR, thereby making it
evident that the ED was aware of the existence of the said FIR in the year 2023
itself. The plea taken by ED in its written submissions that it came to know of
the first FIR only in July 2025, following which it was added to the ECIR in
August 2025, was stated to be wholly false and untenable.
D.6. Mr. Krishnan submitted that while the second FIR remained alive and
the ECIR was subsisting prior to the closure report, petitioners were never
summoned by ED. However, post amendment to ECIR, a search came to be
initiated and two summons were issued, one dated 30th September 2025 and the
second dated 16th January 2026. It was highlighted that despite being arrayed
as an accused in the second FIR, ED never sought to investigate them.
D.7. The nature of the questioning being undertaken, as evident from the
notice dated 16th January 2026, was highlighted to include demands for
passport-size photographs, Aadhaar cards, passports, details of all movable and
immovable properties held since 1998, details of all bank accounts maintained
since 1998, details of entities with which the petitioners have been associated
in India and abroad since 1988, as well as balance sheets, profit and loss
statements, and income tax returns of all entities associated with the petitioners
in India and abroad from Financial Year [FY] 2011–2012 till date.
D.8. Mr. Krishnan, submitted that despite the aforesaid documents having no
relevance to the surviving first FIR, which was registered in 2019, ED filed an
Original Application [OA No. 319/2025] before AA under Section 17(4) of
PMLA, seeking retention of properties seized during the search and seizure
conducted in September 2025. Even in the said Original Application, the case
of ED is not that the seized items constitute “proceeds of crime”. In any event,
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by interim order dated 12th March 2026, this Court directed that proceedings
before AA in OA No. 319/2025 shall remain stayed.
D.9. Mr. Krishnan submitted that the second FIR no longer survives and the
first FIR, which has been included by way of an amendment, ex facie, discloses
no “proceeds of crime”. He adverted to the charge sheet and drew attention to
certain portions thereof, wherein it was stated that on 11 th October 2019, when
a search was conducted at the farmhouse in the presence of Smt. Satula Devi
and Renuka Devi, most of their books were recovered and all jewellery and
other articles were recovered at the instance of Smt. Uma Devi from an unlocked
wooden almirah in a room stated to be used by Smt. Satula Devi and Renuka
Devi.
D.10. The other allegation in the first FIR pertained to issuance of a passport,
in relation to which Smt. Uma Devi had allegedly furnished incorrect
information to the passport authorities by stating that she was the wife of Late
Dr. Mahinder Prasad, whereas there was no evidence to show that they had
ever been married. Therefore, it was submitted that there was no question of
any “proceeds of crime” being involved.
D.11.
It was further submitted by the Senior Counsel that ED would be at
liberty to revive ECIR in the event, when predicate offence is revived.
However, owing to the closure of the predicate FIR, the ECIR deserves to be
quashed in view of the settled legal position. In support thereof, reliance was
placed on the following decisions of the Supreme Court:
(i)
M. Nagarajan v. ED and Others, order dated 23rd January
2023 in SLP (Crl.) No. 10917/2022;
(ii)
ED v. Nik Nish Retail Limited and Others, order dated 14th
July 2022 in SLP (Crl.) No. 24321/2023; and
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(iii)
Directorate of Enforcement v. Omkar Realtors and
Others, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 2182.
D.12. The argument of ED that a person not named in the predicate offence
may nonetheless be proceeded against by ED would apply only where such
person is, in some manner, connected with or involved in the “proceeds of
crime”. In this regard, reliance was placed on Pavana Dibbur v. Enforcement
Directorate (supra), particularly paragraphs 15 and 16.
D.13. It was further submitted that the first FIR pertains to an entirely different
transaction and, therefore, cannot form the basis of an addendum to the ECIR.
D.14. Mr. Krishnan addressed the issue of “clubbing of cases” by adverting to
T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala (2001) 6 SCC 181, wherein the Supreme Court
held that a single FIR ought to be registered in respect of offences committed
in the course of the “same transaction” and permitted clubbing of FIRs relating
to the “same transaction”. It was submitted that since the two FIRs pertain to
entirely different transactions, there was no question of clubbing either the FIRs
or the ECIR.
D.15. He submitted that there exists a distinction between “clubbing of cases”
and “clubbing of FIRs”. In the context of clubbing of cases, reliance was placed
on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of A.P. v. Cheemalapati
Ganeswara Rao, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 38, wherein the Supreme Court laid
down the test for determining when offences may be said to form part of the
“same transaction”. The Supreme Court held that “same transaction” would
imply unity of purpose and design; or proximity of place and time; or continuity
of action.
D.16. In State of Jharkhand v. Lalu Prasad Yadav, (2017) 8 SCC 1, while
considering various defalcations and fraudulent transactions in the Animal
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Husbandry Department, the Supreme Court held that the various defalcations
did not form part of the “same transaction”, since they involved different sets
of accused persons, different treasuries, different periods of time, and distinct
supply orders and development factors.
D.17. In the context of the present case, it was submitted that the first FIR
pertained to theft of jewellery and false representations before the passport
authorities, whereas the second FIR pertained to transfer of money and shares.
The sets of accused persons are different, the principal accused in the second
FIR being Kanchana Rai and the principal accused in the first FIR being Smt.
Uma Devi, and the two FIRs are separated by a period of two years. Reliance
was also placed on the following decisions:
i) Sagar Maruti Suryawanshi v. Enforcement Directorate,
2024 SCC OnLine Bom 3348, wherein the High Court of
Bombay held that the test for inclusion of subsequent FIRs in
the ECIR would be if subsequent FIRs have a genesis from the
“same transaction”.
ii) Future Gaming of Hotels Services Pvt. Ltd. (supra), wherein
the High Court of Calcutta took the view that there has to be
some nexus between proceeds of different FIRs for addition to
the ECIR.
iii) Reliance by ED on Rajinder Singh Chadha (supra), pertained
to cases where additional FIRs were subsequent in time and
related to the “same transaction” and same “proceeds of
crime”.
D.18. Mr Dayan Krishnan, further submitted that proceedings under ECIR
failed the standards on which administrative actions are tested, the legal
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standard applicable in proceedings involving judicial review. He submitted that
the
“basic
tenets
of
administrative
law”
would
apply,
namely,
unreasonableness, irrationality, and actions not being within the four corners of
the statute, as also mala fides, both legal and factual, and oblique motive.
D.19. Despite the closure of predicate offence, ED chose to add to the ECIR,
something which is wholly unconnected, after a period of two years from the
closure of the predicate offence, based upon a six-year-old FIR, despite there
being no “proceeds of crime”, which is fundamental for initiation of any inquiry
under PMLA.
D.20. In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), the Supreme Court observed
that the actions of ED must be tested on well-established principles of judicial
review and administrative action. Reliance in this regard was also placed upon
the following decisions:
i.
Madhyamam Broadcasting Ltd. v. Union of India (2023) 13 SCC
401, particularly paragraph 38, and;
ii. Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P. (2025) 7 SCC 545,
particularly paragraph 16.
D.21. Apart from unreasonableness and irrationality, Mr. Krishnan also
focused on the aspect of bias and mala fides. Reliance was placed on Ravi
Yashwant Bhoir v. Collector, (2012) 4 SCC 407, particularly paragraphs 47
and 48, wherein it was observed that mala fide exercise of power refers to
exercise of power for “purposes foreign to those for which it is in law intended”.
It was submitted that the genesis of the proceedings lay in a family dispute
between two factions of the family, who have been involved in multifarious
civil and criminal proceedings, including disputes relating to the Will of Late
Dr. Mahender Prasad.
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D.22. Senior Counsel submitted that ED was not acting to prosecute offences
of money laundering but had clearly aligned itself with one side in a private
family dispute so as to prosecute one faction and assist the other in gaining an
upper hand. This, according to petitioners, was evident from the following
circumstances:
i) first, ED continued the ECIR against petitioners despite filing and
acceptance of the closure report;
ii) second, an addendum came to be introduced 2.5 years later based on
an unconnected FIR so as to sustain the PMLA proceedings;
iii) third, the assertion that ED became aware of the existence of the first
FIR only subsequently stood belied by its own counter affidavit filed
in 2023, as also repeated references to the first FIR in the second FIR,
the Cancellation Report, and the Trial Court’s order dated 12th June
2025.
iv) fourth, it is further submitted that there was no ‘public element’
involved in the present proceedings.
D.23. The timing, sequence, and nature of the criminal proceedings, it was
submitted, clearly demonstrate that the same have been instituted as a coercive
tool to pressurize certain family members into securing a favourable settlement
in the pending probate and estate disputes.
E.
Submissions by Mr. N. Hariharan, Senior Advocate on behalf of
petitioners in W.P.(C)15407/2025
E.1. Mr. Hariharan advanced arguments on behalf of Smt. Uma Devi.
Supplementing the submissions advanced by the other Senior Counsels
appearing for some of the petitioners, he contended that the facts relating to the
impugned addendum predate the present proceedings. He submitted that even
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assuming that an addendum is legally permissible, the addendum itself is only
an administrative act at this stage. The addendum would have to be tested on
the touchstone of whether the first FIR forms part of the “same transaction”.
The important factors for determining the “same transaction” are “continuity of
purpose and continuity of action”.
E.2. In the present case, it was submitted that these were “two entirely
separate sets of transactions” having no connection whatsoever. One set of
allegations pertains to representations allegedly made at the time of issuance of
a passport, claiming to be the wife of a person, which, according to the
submissions, she in fact was, and even assuming the allegation to be correct,
the same generated no “proceeds of crime”. The second part of the first FIR
concerned a dispute between two ladies involving allegations of confinement
and jewellery. The jewellery itself stood recovered and the order of the Trial
Court records the same.
E.3. Once the jewellery stood recovered, there could be no subsisting
“proceeds of crime”. Even independently viewed, the allegations do not
disclose any “proceeds of crime”. At best, they concern personal family
transactions. The allegations substantially pertain to domestic and interpersonal disputes. The only offence alleged in that context is under Section 406
IPC, which is not even a scheduled offence under the PMLA.
E.4. Therefore, it was emphasized that the first FIR is unconnected with the
corporate transactions forming the basis of the allegations in the second FIR; it
is not part of the “same transaction”, occurred at a separate point in time,
discloses no continuity of action, and does not involve any “proceeds of crime”,
besides the alleged offence itself not being scheduled under the PMLA.
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E.5. Mr. Hariharan submitted that at one stage there may have existed a
suspicion giving rise to proceedings under the PMLA, however, once the
predicate offence stood closed upon acceptance of the closure report,
jurisdiction under the PMLA automatically ceased. Once such jurisdiction
ceased, it could not subsequently be revived by adding an unrelated addendum
later, which, according to him, was clearly coloured by mala fides. Reliance
was placed on the judgment of the Madras High Court in K. Govindaraj v.
Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine Mad 3500.
F.
Submissions made by Mr. Anurag Jain, Advocate on behalf of the
Directorate of Enforcement
F.1.
Mr. Jain submitted that the present batch of writ petitions had been filed
only on one ground, namely, that the second FIR no longer survives and that
the closure report has been accepted by the Trial Court. There was initially no
mention of any addendum, nor any reference to a challenge to the acceptance
of the closure report pending before this Court. He, therefore, submitted that all
petitions were filed solely on the ground that since the closure report had been
accepted and in view of the decision in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra),
there was no predicate offence and, consequently, ECIR itself could not survive
and was liable to be quashed.
F.2.
He emphasized that the submissions of petitioners were conspicuously
silent on two aspects: first, the addendum itself, and second, the challenge to
the acceptance of the closure report.
F.3.
The issue, therefore, was whether the addition of an addendum to an
existing ECIR is legal and permissible in law. Mr. Jain, submits that there can
be no quarrel with the settled legal position that addition of an addendum to an
existing ECIR is permissible. In addition to the compilation already handed
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over, reliance was placed on the latest judgment of the Allahabad High Court
in Satinder Singh Bhasin v. State of U.P and Anr 2025:AHC:228033-DB,
wherein it was categorically held that “addition of an addendum is permissible
and not illegal”.
F.4.
He further contended that the present matter has been filed as a Civil Writ
Petition and that no coercive steps have been taken thus far. Therefore,
whenever such a stage arises, the issue would have to be considered at the
appropriate stage. Reliance was placed on Rajinder Singh Chadha (supra),
particularly paragraph 25, wherein the Court observed that “….It is pertinent
to note that the State has not challenged the aforesaid orders on the ground
that the matter was not settled with all the complainants”. Attention is also
drawn to para 28, where it states “the Department chose not to register separate
ECIR but record the scheduled offences registered by FIR No. 49/2021 in the
same ECIR inter alia on the ground that it related to the “same transaction”
and involved the same accused persons”
F.5.
In the said case, the Court further recorded that the second FIR was taken
on record by the Department in the said ECIR despite an order of compounding
and acquittal, which was not challenged by petitioners therein. Likewise,
inclusion of first FIR in the present matter by way of an addendum was also
never challenged by petitioners despite their knowledge of the same. It was,
therefore, submitted that an addendum can be added and such addition is neither
illegal nor contrary to law. Petitioners seek to contend that the two FIRs do not
form part of the “same transaction”. According to the ED, however, this
submission is factually incorrect and can be determined upon examination of
the FIRs.
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F.6.
The second FIR, records that taking advantage of the mental condition of
Late Dr. Mahendra Prasad, Smt. Uma Devi and Kanchana Rai hatched a
conspiracy to take away valuable assets and wrongfully and illegally confined
the complainant. It was submitted that Kanchana Rai, along with Smt. Uma
Devi, used to physically assault and torture the complainant, which played a
pivotal role in the alleged criminal conspiracy.
F.7.
According to the allegations, accused persons used physical force to take
control of valuables and transferred them in their own names. This, according
to the ED, formed the underlying theme of the first FIR. Subsequently, the
complainant came to know that several illegal transactions had also been
undertaken from her bank account and substantial sums had been transferred to
the accused persons.
F.8.
It was submitted that in 2019, the complainant had been unlawfully
confined, tortured, and was not in a fit mental condition, owing to which the
Division Bench of this Court, in habeas corpus proceedings, intervened and the
first FIR came to be registered. According to the ED, the second FIR did not
constitute a separate cause of action but was in continuation of the atrocities,
illegalities, and acts of misappropriation allegedly committed by the petitioners.
It was argued that the second FIR formed part of a continuous sequence of
events. Since the complainant’s medical condition was not stable, the entirety
of the allegations could not be recorded in the first FIR. The complete narrative,
according to ED, has been reflected in the second FIR, which is in continuation
of the first FIR.
F.9.
Both FIRs, therefore, were interconnected and ought to be read together.
Mere fact that all allegations did not find mention in the first FIR was attributed
to the medical condition of the complainant. It was further submitted that the
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second FIR pertains to misappropriation concerning the estate of Late Dr.
Mahendra Prasad and, therefore, it cannot be contended that the two FIRs are
wholly independent and unrelated.
F.10. On the issue of acceptance of the closure report, Mr. Jain submitted that
the same is subject matter of challenge pending before this Court. In the event
this Court were to set aside the judgment of the Trial Court accepting the
cancellation report, the ECIR would necessarily abide by the outcome of such
challenge. Reliance in this regard was placed on Directorate of Enforcement
v. Akhilesh Singh & Ors 2024:DHC:3399. He contended that the judgments
relied upon by the petitioners concern cases where the predicate offence had
ceased permanently. In Rajinder Singh Chadha (supra), there was a
compromise, compounding, and no challenge to the acquittal. It was, therefore,
submitted that the order accepting the closure report had not attained finality,
in terms of what has been observed by the Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal
Choudhary (supra).
F.11. In Directorate of Enforcement v. Akhilesh Singh & Ors. (supra), the
respondents had been discharged from the offence of money laundering on the
ground that they had been acquitted in the predicate offence. However, the
judgment of acquittal had not attained finality since an appeal preferred by the
State of Jharkhand remained pending. It was held that the acquittal would attain
finality only upon affirmation by the Appellate Court. Further reliance was
placed on the following judgements:
i. Director of Enforcement v. Gagandeep Singh & Ors order dated 14th
July 2017 and 11th May 2018 in Crl.Rev.Pet.493/2017;
ii. Directorate of Enforcement vs. Gagandeep Singh & Ors in SLP
(Crl.) D. No. 42315/2022 decided on 10th February 2023; and
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iii. Joint Director ED vs. A. Raja & Ors., 2020:DHC:2892
F.12. It was contended that if the “proceeds of crime” were to be returned or
proceedings under Section 17 of PMLA were allowed to lapse at this stage, the
fate of alleged “proceeds of crime” would remain uncertain. It was submitted
that seizures had already been effected and proceedings in that regard were
pending before AA by way of two Original Complaints.
F.13 Reliance was placed on various judicial precedents to contend that in
similar situations, directions had been issued to maintain status quo with respect
to properties and alleged “proceeds of crime” pending adjudication.
F.14. Mr. Jain submitted that ED can retain “proceeds of crime” only for a
limited period and thereafter it becomes the prerogative of the AA. Since
complaints before AA had already been filed, it was for the said authority to
take an appropriate decision.
F.15. Mr. Jain submitted that petitioners contend that there can be no ECIR
and consequently no action under Section 17 PMLA. According to him, if the
prayer sought is granted at this stage, ED would be unable to initiate criminal
proceedings in future on the basis of the seizure already effected. Referring to
Rajinder Singh Chadha (supra), he submitted that petitioners themselves
contend that if the second FIR ceases to survive, the ED would remain confined
to the first FIR. In the event the second FIR is revived, there would be no dispute
in that regard. He further submitted that ED would be entitled to proceed on the
basis of the first FIR and corresponding ECIR. Moreover, issues concerning
search and release of articles fall within the domain of AA, constituting an
alternative remedy available to petitioners.
F.16. The arguments regarding arbitrariness, irrationality, and mala fides,
according to Mr. Jain, proceed on the fundamental assumption that the ECIR
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has ceased to exist. However, even assuming there exists only a minimal
survival of the ECIR as on date, it cannot be contended that the ECIR has
extinguished, especially when the addendum is legally permissible and the
ECIR continues to subsist.
F.17. It was submitted that it is a settled position of law that one ECIR can be
based on multiple FIRs. Reliance was placed upon following decisions:
i.
Vijay Madanlal Choudhary & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.
(supra) particularly paragraph nos. 282, 290, 456-467;
ii. Rajinder Singh Chadha v. Union of India (supra)
iii.
M/s Ireo Private limited v. Union of India, W.P. (C)
No.29265/2023 particularly paragraph nos.3.13-3.17;
iv. Angad Singh Makkar v. Union of India & Ors. (CRM-M5228/2024 particularly paragraph no. 23;
v.
Pritpal Singh v. Directorate of Enforcement & Ors. (CRM-M24276/2022 particularly paragraph nos.14-19;
vi. Sikander Singh v. Directorate of Enforcement (CRM-M51250/2023) judgment passed by the Division Bench of the Punjab
& Haryana High Court
F.18. On the issue of “efficacious alternative remedy” being available,
reliance was placed on the following decisions:
i. Ms Krrish Realtech Pvt. Ltd. Through its Authorized
Representatives v. UOI Through Secretary, Ministry of Finance
& Anr. in W.P.(C) No. 895/2025, decided on 3rd November 2025.
ii. NIUM India Pvt. Ltd. v. UOI & Ors. (W.P.(C.)10466/2024,
decided on 30th July 2024
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G.
Submissions by Mr. Vikas Singh, Senior Advocate on behalf of
complainant Smt. Satula Devi
G.1. On the issue of two FIRs being interconnected constitute valid predicate
offences sustaining ECIR addendum, Mr. Vikas Singh, Senior Counsel for
complainant submitted that petitioners’ contention that the matter constitutes a
mere family dispute is a bald assertion unsupported by any material placed on
record before this Court. Both the first and second FIRs have been accorded
credibility in related proceedings. According to the submissions, both FIRs
disclose allegations which are financial in character and bear a ‘direct nexus’
with each other. It was contended that both FIRs are bound by a common thread,
namely, taking undue advantage of the diminished mental capacity of Late Dr.
Mahender Prasad.
G.2. Sequence of events in this regard was emphasized by the Senior Counsel.
It was submitted that in 1997, Dr. Prasad’s mental deterioration commenced
with signs of transient memory loss and that his mental faculties had severely
deteriorated by 2011. During this period, the accused persons allegedly
executed a forged and fabricated Will dated 18th July 2011 for their sole
beneficial interest. It was further submitted that Dr. Prasad’s condition
deteriorated significantly by 2017, when he was no longer capable of taking
independent decisions. During this period, Smt. Uma Devi allegedly assumed
control over the management and affairs of all assets, including the Aristo
Group of Companies.
G.3. Taking advantage of the prevailing circumstances, it was submitted that
Smt. Satula Devi was allegedly held captive by the petitioners and Smt. Uma
Devi in collusion with Mr. T.R. Narayanan, other accused persons, and certain
bank officials. It was alleged that physical force was employed to take control
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over the valuables of Smt. Satula Devi and transfer the same in their own names
for financial gain. During this period, the petitioners are alleged to have illegally
transferred 2,000 shares of Aristo Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. and 1,370 shares of
Aristo Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd., first from Rajeev Sharma to Smt. Satula Devi
and thereafter to themselves by executing false documents.
G.4. It was further submitted that, taking advantage of Dr. Prasad’s mental
condition, approximately Rs.1,000 crores were siphoned off from various
accounts and term deposit receipts were created in the names of the accused
persons and their nominees. This issue, according to the submissions, is also
the subject matter of contempt proceedings pending before this Court.
G.5. It was further submitted that in 2019, a habeas corpus petition being
W.P.(Crl.)2255/2019 was filed by Ranjeet Sharma seeking release of his
mother, Smt. Satula Devi, from alleged unlawful confinement by the accused
persons, including. Smt. Uma Devi. According to the submissions, Ranjeet
Sharma had been denied access to his mother and the accused persons were
allegedly attempting to obtain signatures forcibly while she remained in
captivity. This Court appointed a six-member Medical Committee, which
submitted a report diagnosing Dr. Prasad with “frontotemporal dementia”.
G.6. Thereafter, Smt. Satula Devi was released from confinement and, this
Court, being alarmed by the situation, directed registration of an FIR by the
Crime Branch. During investigation, it allegedly transpired that Smt. Uma Devi
had used her proximity to Dr. Prasad to exercise control over his residence,
staff, and companies for procuring execution of documents. Pursuant to
directions of this Court, the first FIR came to be registered and Smt. Uma Devi
remained in police custody for 14 days.
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G.7. It was further submitted that the financial statements of Aristo
Pharmaceuticals revealed that Umesh Sharma had transferred company assets
worth approximately Rs.4.10 crores into his own name and increased his annual
remuneration from Rs.70,00,000/- to approximately Rs.11 crores, despite no
corresponding increase in shareholder dividends. According to the submissions,
the second FIR was therefore registered in relation to creation of false
documents, fraudulent transfer of shares, and siphoning of funds.
G.8
Writ Petition being W.P.(C) 1271/2020 was filed by Smt. Satula Devi
seeking guardianship of Late Dr. Prasad and came to be decided by this Court
through appointment of a Guardianship Committee for the estate, with Justice
Rajiv Sahai Endlaw (Retd.) being appointed as Supervising Guardian. The
Single Judge made certain observations regarding suspicious circumstances
surrounding shareholdings allegedly belonging to Smt. Satula Devi having been
transferred in the name of Kanchana Rai. Reference was also made to
proceedings recorded by Justice Rajiv Sahai Endlaw (Retd.) with company
officials, wherein numerous complaints by employees regarding the alleged
modus operandi for siphoning of funds and other activities were noted.
G.9. Subsequent to the acceptance of the Cancellation Report and dismissal
of the Protest Petition by the Trial Court, CRL.M.C. 4884/2025 came to be
filed before this Court challenging the said order, which remains pending
adjudication.
G.10. By a detailed order dated 26th September 2025, this Court noted certain
procedural peculiarities which, according to complainant, made out a case of
abuse of process of law and took note of procedural improprieties in acceptance
of the cancellation report despite binding findings of this Court regarding Late
Dr. Mahender Prasad’s mental condition. It was further submitted that in
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connected writ petitions, interim protection restraining coercive action by ED
came to be granted allegedly without disclosure of the order dated 26th
September 2025.
G.11. On issuance of an addendum to the ECIR, it was submitted that addition
by way of an addendum to an existing ECIR stands fully justified in terms of
the judgment of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Satinder
Singh Bhasin v. State of U.P (supra). After a detailed examination, the Court
held that an ECIR is an internal administrative document and not a statutory
instrument, the contours of which are not fixed by any provision of the PMLA.
Accordingly, where ED receives material concerning new scheduled offence or
further transactions involving the same criminal activity, it is entitled to
incorporate such information into its investigative record through addendums.
The Court further held that Section 3 of the PMLA does not restrict proceedings
to a ‘single scheduled offence’ and the relevant test is the existence of “proceeds
of crime” connected with a ‘scheduled offence’, rather than the numerical
identity of the ‘predicate offence’.
G.12. According to the complainant, in the present case also, both FIRs are
bound by a common thread of criminal activity generating “proceeds of crime”
so as to constitute related ‘scheduled offences’.
G.13. On the issue of petitioner not being entitled to any relief approaching the
Court with unclean hands, Mr. Singh, submitted that petitioners’ contention that
acceptance of the Closure Report by the Trial Court extinguishes the predicate
offence is misconceived. According to complainant, in connected petitions,
interim protection against coercive action was obtained on the basis of a
misleading statement that the predicate offence had attained finality, while
deliberately suppressing the pendency of CRL.M.C. 4884/2025 challenging
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acceptance of the Closure Report as well as the order dated 26th September
2025 issuing notice therein.
G.14. On the issue of summons under Section 50 PMLA not rendered invalid
by reason of discharge in the predicate offence, it was submitted that the offence
of money laundering is distinct and independent and summons issued under
Section 50 PMLA do not stand vitiated merely because an accused has been
discharged in the predicate offence. Reliance was placed on the judgment of the
High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh in Niket Kansal v. Union of
India, 2025 SCC OnLine J&K 475, wherein it was held that ED’s authority to
summon individuals under Section 50 PMLA is intended for collection of
factual material pertaining to money laundering and discharge of the petitioner
in the predicate offence does not constitute a valid ground for nullifying such
proceedings, the same being procedurally distinct. The Court further held that
mere discharge or quashing of a FIR by a competent Court does not
automatically result in quashing of an ECIR under the PMLA. Whether the two
proceedings are factually linked or legally independent requires a detailed and
fact-intensive examination.
G.15. It was further submitted that the judgment in Niket Kansal v. Union of
India (supra) was challenged before the Supreme Court and, by order dated
14th July 2025, the Supreme Court directed that subject to the petitioner
cooperating with the ongoing investigation of the ED, no coercive action shall
be taken, thereby impliedly permitting continuation of investigation and
lending judicial support to the proposition that investigation under the PMLA
may continue notwithstanding discharge in the predicate offence. Therefore,
according to the complainant, the closure of the second FIR has not attained
finality and the foundational basis of the ECIR remains intact.
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G.16. Mr. Singh submitted that judgment in Rajinder Singh Chadha (supra)
is distinguishable and has no application. It was submitted that in Rajinder
Singh Chadha (supra), the ECIR had been registered solely on the basis of two
FIRs, both of which stood compounded and quashed in their entirety.
Subsequently, a third FIR disclosing a scheduled offence came to be taken on
record. The Court held that in the absence of a scheduled offence, criminal
proceedings under the PMLA cannot survive and noted that both FIRs had been
compounded and quashed pursuant to compromise. It was held that since the
scheduled offences in both FIRs stood extinguished, the department could
neither initiate nor continue proceedings, including investigation. However, the
Court declined to quash the ECIR in entirety since, in the meantime, a third FIR
disclosing a substantive offence had been taken on record. According to the
complainant, the present case stands on an entirely different footing. The first
FIR continues to subsist and the closure report in the second FIR remains
subject matter of challenge before this Court. Unlike Rajinder Singh Chadha
(supra), it is not a case where the prosecution failed to challenge the closure,
but one where the complainants/intervenors have actively pursued remedies
before this Court.
H.
Submissions by Mr. Mahesh Jethmalani, Senior Advocate on behalf of
Intervenor Rajeev Sharma
H.1. Mr. Mahesh Jethmalani, Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of Rajeev
Sharma, co-complainant, made a brief intervention relying upon Enforcement
Directorate v. High Tech Mercantile India Pvt. Ltd. on the issue of what
constitutes “finality” within the meaning of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra). Reliance was placed on paragraphs 61 to
64 of the said judgment, wherein the Division Bench of this Court held that the
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conclusion of the Sessions Judge that upon quashing of the FIR and
consequential charge sheet, there ceased to exist criminal activity and
consequently “proceeds of crime”, was erroneous. It was observed that the
offence of money laundering is stand-alone only to the limited extent that it is
separately triable, and not in the sense that it survives independently despite
quashing of charges in the predicate offence. According to the submissions, the
Directorate’s power to initiate proceedings is not confined to the four corners
of the CBI report or chargesheet. Since the judgment quashing the FIR and
chargesheet was itself under challenge before the Supreme Court, the matter
remained sub judice and, therefore, finality regarding the predicate offence had
yet to be attained. It was contended that conclusive findings ought not to be
rendered without examination of the underlying facts, evidence, and
surrounding circumstances. Mr. Dayan Krishnan, Senior Counsel, however,
pointed out that the operation of this judgment has been stayed by the Supreme
Court vide order dated 16th January 2026.
I.
Submissions by counsel on the issue of maintainability of the Civil Writ
Petitions
I.1. One of the issues which arose for consideration during the course of
arguments was whether these writ petitions were maintainable as Civil Writ
Petitions as opposed to Criminal Writ Petitions, and whether the reliefs sought
by the petitioners could be effectively pursued by availing of the alternative
remedy before the Adjudicating Authority under the PMLA. In this regard, the
submissions advanced by the respective learned counsel are noted hereunder.
I.A. Submissions by Mr. Siddharth Agarwal, Senior Advocate for the
petitioners in W.P. (C) 9799/2023, W.P. (C) 15405/2025 and W.P. (C)
1092/2026
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I.A.1. Mr. Siddharth Agarwal contended that proceedings under the PMLA are
fundamentally hybrid and sui generis in nature, comprising both civil and
criminal consequences. Reliance was placed upon the exposition of the
Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), wherein it was observed
that while the civil/executive side of the PMLA involves attachment, freezing,
adjudication, confiscation, issuance of summons and requisition of information,
the criminal side comprises arrest, prosecution, filing of a complaint and
criminal trial.
I.A.2. Mr. Agarwal referred to the scheme of PMLA and, in particular, Sections
5, 8, 17, 17(1A), 26, 42, 44, 50, 65 and 66. He submitted that these provisions
respectively deal with provisional attachment, adjudication, search and
seizure, freezing of property, appeals before the Appellate Tribunal and the
High Court, prosecution before the Special Court, the Directorate’s power to
summon persons and record evidence, the applicability of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, and the sharing of information with other statutory authorities
during the course of investigation.
I.A.3. Mr. Agarwal submitted that, in view of the aforesaid statutory
framework, it is evident that certain provisions contemplate civil action under
the PMLA, while others provide for criminal action. This hybrid character is
also reflected in the distinction between an FIR and an ECIR. While an FIR
initiates a criminal investigation, an ECIR is distinct, being merely an internal
document and an administrative exercise of the Directorate of Enforcement, as
categorically recognised by the Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal
Choudhary (supra). Proceedings arising out of the ECIR involve search,
freezing and adjudication of a civil/executive character until they culminate in
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an arrest under Section 19 of the PMLA or the filing of a prosecution complaint
under Section 44 of the PMLA.
I.A.4. The existence of a scheduled offence/predicate offence constitutes a
jurisdictional fact for the initiation and continuation of proceedings under the
PMLA. In the absence of a scheduled offence, there can be no “proceeds of
crime” and, consequently, no sustainable proceedings under the Act.
I.A.5. Mr. Agarwal clarified that, in the facts of the present case, no criminal
consequences had yet ensued since neither any prosecution complaint been
filed nor any arrest been effected. At this stage, the challenge pertains only to
the administrative/executive actions under the PMLA and is, therefore,
maintainable in civil writ jurisdiction.
I.A.6. This submission was made in the context of the ED having issued
summons under Section 50 of PMLA, conducted an investigation and exercised
powers under Section 17 of the PMLA. The challenge before this Court seeks
quashing of the ECIR, setting aside of the freezing order and consequential
reliefs.
I.A.7. As regards interim protection, proceedings before the AA were stayed
vide order dated 10th December 2023. Subsequently, interim orders dated 9th
October 2025 and 15th October 2025 granted protection against coercive
action.
I.B. Submissions on behalf of the petitioners by Mr. Dayan Krishnan,
Senior Advocate, in W.P. (C) 15406/2025, W.P. (C) 15408/2025, W.P. (C)
15886/2025, W.P. (C) 15909/2025 and W.P. (C) 1021/2025
I.B.1. The reason for filing the present petitions as Civil Writ Petitions,
according to the learned Senior Counsel, was that the Supreme Court in Vijay
Madanlal Choudhary (supra) categorically held that the ECIR is an
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administrative act. A challenge to an administrative act is ordinarily brought by
way of a writ petition, which is registered as a civil writ petition. The Supreme
Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra) held, firstly, that the PMLA is a
sui generis legislation dealing with both civil and criminal consequences;
secondly, that proceedings relating to attachment, adjudication and confiscation
undertaken before AA are civil in nature; and thirdly, that the action taken by
ED, including search and seizure under Section 17 and powers exercised under
Chapters III, V and VIII of PMLA, is not for maintaining law and order or for
purely investigating a criminal offence.
I.B.2. The aforesaid powers have been conferred to enable the authorities to
collect evidence for proceedings before the AA and to take coercive measures
such as freezing, confiscation and seizure.
I.B.3. Mr. Krishnan emphasised that every inquiry initiated pursuant to an
ECIR does not necessarily culminate in the filing of a prosecution complaint.
He further clarified that, in the facts of the present case, the stage contemplated
under Section 44 had not yet arisen. He submitted that an investigation under
the PMLA is not akin to an investigation conducted by the police, and there is
no comparison between such investigation and the investigation or trial of
criminal cases under the CrPC.
I.B.4. The PMLA is not a penal statute, and police officers are not empowered
to investigate offences thereunder or take cognizance thereof. Vijay Madanlal
Choudhary (supra) further holds that there is no requirement to formally
register an ECIR, unlike the registration of an FIR by a jurisdictional police
station. An ECIR is merely an internal document created before the initiation
of penal action and, therefore, cannot be quashed in criminal proceedings.
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I.B.5. A reference was made to the decision of the Co-ordinate Bench of this
Court in Pay 10 Services Private Limited v. Union of India & Ors
2026:DHC:1748. In that case, action had been taken under Sections 94 and 106
of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (“BNSS”) and Section 69 of the
Information Technology Act (“IT Act”). The issue before the Court was
whether such action was amenable to challenge in a civil writ petition.
I.B.6. Mr. Dayan Krishnan, Senior Counsel, (who stated that he had appeared
for the petitioners in the said matter), submitted that the petition, in Pay 10
Services Private Limited (supra), sought protection of civil rights which had
been infringed by reason of the freezing of the petitioners’ bank accounts. It
was contended that the powers of forfeiture under the said provisions were
essentially civil in nature, and that there existed several precedents wherein the
Court had entertained writ petitions challenging unlawful freezing of bank
accounts. The contention was that the petitioners’ fundamental right to carry on
business under Article 19(1)(g) and their right to property under Article 300A
of the Constitution of India had been infringed.
I.B.7. The Court, however, held that the writ petitions, though filed under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, fell within its criminal jurisdiction,
having regard to the genesis of the dispute and the nature of the challenge.
Genesis of the challenge was an impugned notice issued by the Tamil Nadu
Police in exercise of powers under Sections 94 and 106 of the BNSS, with
reference to a registered FIR. The Court observed that the said provisions
empowered the police to seize property and summon persons as part of an
ongoing criminal investigation. Consequently, the challenge was required to be
pursued by way of a criminal writ petition, notwithstanding the ancillary or
incidental consequence of freezing of bank accounts. Mr. Krishnan emphasised
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that situation in Pay 10 Services Private Limited (supra) did not arise under
PMLA but was founded upon a registered FIR.
I.B.8. On the issue of alternative remedy before AA, Mr. Krishnan submitted
that the petitioners were challenging the jurisdictional validity of the ECIR
itself. Such a challenge could not be adjudicated by AA, whose jurisdiction is
confined to issues relating to attachment, search and seizure. The questions
raised before this Court, namely whether the ECIR could validly subsist and
whether it could have been altered by way of an addendum, clearly fall outside
the jurisdiction of the AA.
I.C. Submissions by Mr. N. Hariharan, Senior Advocate, on behalf of the
petitioners in W.P. (C) 15407/2025
I.C.1. Mr. Hariharan, Senior Counsel, adopted the submissions advanced by
Mr. Siddharth Agarwal and Mr. Dayan Krishnan, Senior Advocates. In
addition, he adverted to paragraphs nos. 338–339 of Vijay Madanlal
Choudhary (supra), wherein the Supreme Court observed that summons under
Section 50 of PMLA could be issued for the purpose of collecting information
and evidence to be placed before AA, and not necessarily for the initiation of
prosecution against the notice. According to him, recording of statements under
Section 50 of the PMLA does not amount to an investigation for the purpose of
prosecution. Further, in paragraph no. 360, the Supreme Court observed that,
at the stage of issuance of summons under Section 50 of PMLA, the powers
exercised by the designated officer or authority conducting the inquiry are
analogous to those vested in a Civil Court, and the said provision is in the nature
of a deeming provision, enabling the authority to ensure the prevention of
money laundering and to take consequential steps relating to attachment and
confiscation. Therefore, criminal jurisdiction could not be invoked merely
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because summons under Section 50 of PMLA had been issued to the petitioners.
By way of the present petitions, petitioners have essentially questioned whether
ED had the jurisdiction to proceed with the inquiry under the ECIR after the
closure of the predicate offence.
I.C.2. It was submitted that this involved the existence of a “jurisdictional fact”,
as explained by the Supreme Court in Arun Kumar v. Union of India, (2007)
1 SCC 732. Mr. Hariharan further submitted that ED itself has consistently
maintained the position that the ECIR is an internal administrative document
and, therefore, an aggrieved person can only seek recourse by way of a writ of
certiorari in the exercise of civil writ jurisdiction. According to him, petitioners
have challenged the very foundational jurisdictional fact necessary to confer
authority upon the ED to proceed.
I.C.3. Reliance was placed upon Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Limited v. Director
of Enforcement, 2016 SCC OnLine Hyd 64, which stands approved in
paragraph no. 340 of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra). The High Court of
Telangana observed that “merely because an ECIR has been registered and an
investigation is underway does not render the persons being investigated as
accused”.
I.C.4. Reliance was also placed upon Pawan Insaa v. Directorate of
Enforcement, 2024 SCC OnLine P&H 5461. In the said case, a petition under
Section 482 of CrPC, seeking quashing of ECIR was filed. ED objected to the
maintainability of the petition, on the ground that the ECIR is an internal
administrative document. The Punjab and Haryana High Court accepted the
said objection and held that the ECIR is not registered under CrPC, and is
merely an internal document of ED, precedes the commencement of
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prosecution, and cannot be equated with the commencement of criminal
proceedings.
I.C.5. It was further brought to the notice of this Court that this Court, as well
as other High Courts, have consistently entertained and quashed ECIRs in
exercise of civil writ jurisdiction. Therefore, the present petitions are not
without precedent. Reference was made to EMTA Coal Ltd. & Ors. v.
Directorate of Enforcement 2023:DHC:277, upheld by the Supreme Court in
Enforcement Directorate v. Emta Coal Ltd. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 2185,
and RKM Powergen v. Assistant Director ED, 2025 SCC OnLine Mad 3272.
I.C.6. On the issue of alternative remedy, Mr. Hariharan emphasised that the
jurisdiction of AA under Section 8 of PMLA is confined to examining the
validity of provisional attachment and confiscation proceedings and does not
extend to examining the legality or validity of the ECIR itself.
I.C.7. It was submitted that once it is accepted by ED itself that ECIR is in the
nature of an administrative exercise, the jurisdiction to initiate proceedings
necessarily depends upon the existence of a predicate offence. The authority to
proceed under PMLA is derived from the existence of the predicate offence.
Once the predicate offence ceases to exist, petitioners are entitled to challenge
the executive action of registering and continuing the ECIR by invoking the
civil writ jurisdiction of this Court.
I.C.8. At this stage, the administrative action results in various civil
consequences, including ‘search and seizure’ under Section 17 of PMLA and
other connected provisions, on the basis of a suspicion regarding “proceeds of
crime”, ultimately leading to provisional attachment before adjudication by
AA.
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I.C.9. Mr. Hariharan, Senior Counsel, states that there is a discernible
threshold at which the administrative action assumes a criminal character. Such
threshold is crossed either when an arrest is effected under Section 19 of PMLA
or when a prosecution complaint is filed under Section 44 of PMLA. Until either
of these stages is reached, the proceedings remain within the realm of executive
and civil action.
I.C.10. It was further submitted that even if a criminal prosecution were to be
initiated at a later stage, the foundational jurisdictional fact would continue to
govern such prosecution, and it cannot be contended that the criminal
prosecution would survive independently of the existence of the predicate
offence.
I.C.11. The present civil writ petitions constitute an independent challenge and
continue to subsist irrespective of any subsequent prosecution. Recording of
statements under Section 50 of PMLA is itself an exercise of powers analogous
to those of a Civil Court, as recognised in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra).
I.D. Submissions by Mr. Anurag Jain, Advocate on behalf of the
Directorate of Enforcement
I.D.1. It was submitted that present petitions seeks quashing of the action taken
under Section 17 of PMLA, including the searches and seizures conducted
thereunder, as well as consequential directions for the return of all articles
seized during the course of the search.
I.D.2. Counsel for ED relied upon Pay 10 Services (supra) to contend that the
challenge essentially relates to “search and seizure” undertaken in exercise of
statutory powers and, therefore, falls within the realm of criminal jurisdiction.
It was further submitted that, pursuant to the registration of the ECIR, Original
Application No. 941/2023 and Original Application No. 319/2025 had
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already been instituted before AA, and the petitioners were at liberty to raise all
permissible contentions before the said authority. It was contended that it is
well settled that writ jurisdiction ought not to be exercised where an efficacious
statutory remedy is available. Reliance was placed upon Krrish Realtech Pvt.
Ltd. v. Union of India, W.P. (C) 895/2025, decided on 3rd November 2025, as
well as NIUM India Pvt. Ltd.(supra).
I.E. Submissions by Mr. Vikas Singh, Senior Advocate, on behalf of the
complainant in W.P. (C) 9799/2023
I.E.1. Mr. Vikas Singh, Senior Counsel, submitted that the present challenge
pertains to the initiation and continuation of a criminal investigation under a
penal statute, which may ultimately culminate in prosecution. Accordingly,
relying upon Pay 10 Services (supra), it was contended that the present
proceedings are not maintainable as civil writ petitions.
I.E.2. It was submitted that since the impugned action arises from powers
exercised pursuant to a registered FIR, the challenge is unmistakably criminal
in nature. Reliance placed by petitioners upon EMTA Coal Ltd. (supra) was
misconceived, since the said decision did not consider the question whether a
civil writ petition would be maintainable to challenge proceedings arising out
of an ECIR.
I.E.3. It was further submitted that Section 41 of PMLA expressly bars the
jurisdiction of Civil Courts in respect of matters falling within the domain of
the authorities constituted under the Act. In view of the statutory bar, it was
contended that this Court lacked the jurisdiction to entertain or adjudicate the
present proceedings.
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ANALYSIS
J.
Analysis- Maintainability as a Civil Writ Petition
J.1.
Before proceeding further with the discussion, it would be apposite to set
out the relevant provisions of the PMLA which are referred to herein or
otherwise have a bearing on the issue under consideration:
i. Section 5 of PMLA empowers the Directorate to ‘attach
property’ involved in money laundering where there is reason to
believe, to be recorded in writing on the basis of material in its
possession, are of “proceeds of crime”, which are likely to be
concealed, transferred or dealt with in any manner which may
result in frustrating any proceedings relating to confiscation of
such “proceeds of crime”.
ii. Section 17 of PMLA empowers the Directorate to conduct
‘search and seizure’ of any premises or records where there is
information in its possession and reason to believe, to be recorded
in writing.
iii. Section 17(1A) of PMLA empowers the Directorate to ‘freeze
property’ involved in money laundering, including bank accounts,
where seizure is impracticable.
iv. Section 8 of PMLA provides for ‘adjudication by AA’ upon
receipt of a complaint under Section 5(5), an application under
Section 17, or Section 18, in respect of attachment, retention or
freezing.
v. Section 26 of PMLA provides for an ‘appeal to the Appellate
Tribunal’ against any order passed by AA.
vi. Section 42 of PMLA provides for an ‘appeal to the High
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Court’ by any person aggrieved by the decision of the Appellate
Tribunal.
vii. Section 44 of PMLA provides for the filing of a prosecution
complaint before the Special Court, which marks the
commencement of the criminal stage of proceedings.
viii. Section 50 of PMLA empowers the Directorate to summon
persons, record evidence and compel them for production of
records, and such proceedings are deemed to be judicial
proceedings within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228 of IPC.
ix. Section 65 of PMLA mandates that the provisions of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [‘Cr.P.C.’] shall apply, insofar as
they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, to arrest,
search and seizure, attachment, confiscation, investigation,
prosecution and all other proceedings.
x. Section 66 of PMLA empowers the Directorate to share
information with other statutory authorities or investigating
agencies during the course of investigation.
J.2.
From the above provisions, it is evident that the PMLA creates two
distinct, yet interrelated, streams/proceedings involving civil and criminal
consequences. While the offence of money laundering is defined under Section
3 of the PMLA, the punishment therefor is prescribed under Section 4. Chapter
III [Sections 5 to 17(1A)] empowers the Directorate to take ‘civil measures’,
inter alia, attachment and freezing of property. Such measures are amenable to
adjudication before the AA under Section 8 and are further appealable to the
Appellate Tribunal under Section 26.
J.3.
The second stream concerns the criminal consequences, namely,
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prosecution for the offence of money laundering before the Special Court
constituted under Section 43 upon the filing of a complaint under Section 44.
Proceedings before the Special Court are governed by the principles of criminal
procedure, including the Cr.P.C. and its successor, the Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”). Appeals against the orders of the Special
Court lie before the High Court under Section 47.
J.4.
These two streams do not necessarily operate simultaneously and are
governed by distinct procedural mechanisms. First, pertains to civil
proceedings, while the second pertains to criminal proceedings. PMLA is,
therefore, a hybrid legislation, and the remedies relating to civil measures
undertaken pursuant to a suspicion of “proceeds of crime” are amenable to the
civil adjudicatory mechanism under the Act, whereas proceedings initiated
upon the filing of a complaint before the Special Court partake of the character
of criminal proceedings.
J.5.
It would now be apposite to examine whether this peculiar and sui
generis character of the PMLA has been recognised in the decisions of the
Supreme Court and the High Courts:
i) One of the earliest expositions on the special features of the PMLA
was rendered by this Court in Vakamulla Chandrashekhar v.
Enforcement Directorate, 2017 SCC OnLine Del 12810, wherein a
prayer was made to restrain the Directorate of Enforcement from
taking any coercive steps against the petitioner during the course of
proceedings under Section 50 of the PMLA. The petitioner, having
been summoned, apprehended that he may be arrested under Section
19 of the PMLA. In paragraphs 11 and 19 of the said decision,
extracted below, the Division Bench of this Court observed that
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proceedings under the PMLA entail both civil and criminal
consequences. The exposition of this Court in Vakamulla
Chandrashekhar
v.
Enforcement
Directorate (supra)
was
subsequently noticed with approval by the Supreme Court in Vijay
Madanlal Choudhary (supra). Relevant paragraphs are extracted as
under:
“11. The act of money laundering has both civil and
criminal consequences for the perpetrator. To deal with
the civil consequences, the Act creates, and empowers the
adjudicating authority (under Section 2(1)(a) read with
Section 6) with powers of a Civil Court to summon, direct
production of documents and evidence (see Section 11),
and adjudicate on the issue whether any property is
involved in money laundering (Section 8). It also creates
the right of appeal from orders of the Adjudicating
Authority (Section 26), and designates the
Appellate Tribunal authorized to hear appeals (Section
2(b) read with Section 25). It also creates a right of further
appeal before the High Court (Section 42).
………
19. The situation is no different under the PMLA. The
PMLA is a special Act, the object whereof is to prevent
money laundering and to confiscate properties derived
from or involved in money laundering. The authorities
under the Act are empowered to work the Act and while
doing so, inter alia, to carry out investigation i.e. to
summon persons and require them to give evidence and
produce records; to record their statements; to attach
properties involved in money laundering; to carry out
search and seizure of properties; to search persons, and;
to even arrest persons.”
(emphasis added)
ii) The opinion rendered by the three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court
in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra) in 2023 fleshed out the nature
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of the procedure employed post issuance of summons under Section
50 for conducting an inquiry into the existence of “proceeds of
crime”, which could potentially disclose the commission of an
offence. The Court also cited Vakamulla (supra) with approval in
paragraph 341 of the reported judgement. For reference, other
paragraphs for providing context, are extracted below:
“338. In the context of the 2002 Act, it must be
remembered that the summons is issued by the authority
under Section 50 in connection with the inquiry regarding
proceeds of crime which may have been attached and
pending adjudication before the adjudicating authority.
In respect of such action, the designated officials have
been empowered to summon any person for collection of
information and evidence to be presented before the
adjudicating authority. It is not necessarily for initiating
a prosecution against the noticee as such. The power
entrusted to the designated officials under this Act,
though couched as investigation in real sense, is to
undertake inquiry to ascertain relevant facts to facilitate
initiation of or pursuing with an action regarding
proceeds of crime, if the situation so warrants and for
being presented before the adjudicating authority. It is a
different matter that the information and evidence so
collated during the inquiry made, may disclose
commission of offence of money laundering and the
involvement of the person, who has been summoned for
making disclosures pursuant to the summons issued by
the authority. At this stage, there would be no formal
document indicative of likelihood of involvement of such
person as an accused of offence of money laundering. If
the statement made by him reveals the offence of money
laundering or the existence of proceeds of crime, that
becomes actionable under the Act itself.
……….
345. The purposes and objects of the 2002 Act for which it
has been enacted, is not limited to punishment for offence
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of money laundering, but also to provide measures for
prevention of money laundering. It is also to provide for
attachment of proceeds of crime, which are likely to be
concealed, transferred or dealt with in any manner which
may result in frustrating any proceeding relating to
confiscation of such proceeds under the 2002 Act. This Act
is also to compel the banking companies, financial
institutions and intermediaries to maintain records of the
transactions, to furnish information of such transactions
within the prescribed time in terms of Chapter IV of the
2002 Act [Pareena Swarup v. Union of India, (2008) 14
SCC 107] .
………
354. We have already adverted to the purposes and objects
for enacting the 2002 Act. It is a sui generis legislation, not
only dealing with the prevention, detection, attachment,
confiscation, vesting and making it obligatory for the
banking
companies,
financial
institutions
and
intermediaries to comply with certain essential formalities
and make them accountable for failure thereof, and also
permits prosecution of the persons found involved in the
money laundering activity. Keeping in mind the sweep of
the purposes and objectives of the 2002 Act, the reason
weighed with this Court while dealing with the provisions
of the NDPS Act, will have no bearing whatsoever. In
Tofan Singh case [Tofan Singh v. State of T.N., (2021) 4
SCC 1, para 320 : (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 246] , this Court
also noted that the offences under the NDPS Act are
cognizable as opposed to other statutes referred to above.
The scheme of the NDPS Act, including regarding making
offences under that Act as cognizable by the designated
officer as well as the local police, and the scheme of the
2002 Act is entirely different.”
(emphasis added)
J.6.
Another critical aspect crystallised by the Supreme Court in Vijay
Madanlal Choudhary (supra) pertains to the nature of the ECIR. The
discussion in this regard is contained in paragraphs 366 to 373 of the judgment.
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The Supreme Court observed that no comparison could be drawn between
the sui generis mechanism under the PMLA relating to prevention and
investigation, on the one hand, and the trial in respect of the scheduled offence,
which is governed by the Cr.P.C., on the other. It further held that only after an
inquiry and investigation, if sufficient credible information indicative of the
involvement of any person in relation to the “proceeds of crime” is gathered,
would it be open to the authorities to file a formal complaint before the Special
Court alleging the commission of the offence of money laundering. In this
regard, the following paragraphs are extracted below:
“367. In the scheme of the 2002 Act upon identification of
existence of property being proceeds of crime, the
authority under this Act is expected to inquire into relevant
aspects in relation to such property and take measures as
may be necessary and specified in the 2002 Act including
to attach the property for being dealt with as per the
provisions of the 2002 Act. We have elaborately adverted
to the procedure to be followed by the authorities for such
attachment of the property being proceeds of crime and the
follow-up steps of confiscation upon confirmation of the
provisional attachment order by the adjudicating
authority. For facilitating the adjudicating authority to
confirm the provisional attachment order and direct
confiscation, the authorities under the 2002 Act (i.e.
Section 48) are expected to make an inquiry and
investigate. Incidentally, when sufficient credible
information is gathered by the authorities during such
inquiry/investigation indicative of involvement of any
person in any process or activity connected with the
proceeds of crime, it is open to such authorities to file a
formal complaint before the Special Court naming the
person concerned for offence of money laundering under
Section 3 of this Act.
………
369. Suffice it to observe that being a special legislation
providing
for
special
mechanism
regarding
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inquiry/investigation of offence of money laundering,
analogy cannot be drawn from the provisions of the 1973
Code, in regard to registration of offence of money
laundering and more so being a complaint procedure
prescribed under the 2002 Act. Further, the authorities
referred to in Section 48 of the 2002 Act alone are
competent to file such complaint. It is a different matter
that the materials/evidence collected by the same
authorities for the purpose of civil action of attachment of
proceeds of crime and confiscation thereof may be used to
prosecute the person involved in the process or activity
connected with the proceeds of crime for offence of money
laundering.
Considering
the
mechanism
of
inquiry/investigation for proceeding against the property
(being proceeds of crime) under this Act by way of civil
action (attachment and confiscation), there is no need to
formally register an ECIR, unlike registration of an FIR by
the jurisdictional police in respect of cognizable offence
under the ordinary law.”
(emphasis added)
J.7.
Thus, the Supreme Court underscored that the inquiry/investigation
resulting in the collection of material and evidence is a separate and distinct
procedure, to which no analogy can be drawn from the provisions of the Cr.P.C.
In fact, there is no requirement to formally register an ECIR for carrying out
such inquiry or investigation, unlike the registration of an FIR in respect of a
cognizable offence. The Supreme Court also recorded the ED’s submission that
the ECIR is an internal administrative document and not a statutory document.
In this regard, paragraph 370 of the judgment is extracted below:
“370. There is force in the stand taken by the ED that ECIR is
an internal document created by the department before
initiating penal action or prosecution against the person
involved with process or activity connected with proceeds of
crime. Thus, ECIR is not a statutory document, nor there is any
provision in the 2002 Act requiring authority referred to in
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Section 48 to record ECIR or to furnish copy thereof to the
accused unlike Section 154 of the 1973 Code. The fact that such
ECIR has not been recorded, does not come in the way of the
authorities referred to in Section 48 of the 2002 Act to
commence inquiry/investigation for initiating civil action of
attachment of property being proceeds of crime by following
prescribed procedure in that regard.”
(emphasis added)
J.8.
It was further argued that summons under Section 50 of the PMLA may
be issued for the purpose of collection of information and evidence, including
material which may subsequently be placed before the Adjudicating Authority,
and do not necessarily signify initiation of prosecution, as noticed in Vijay
Madanlal Choudhary (supra). Recording of a statement under Section 50, by
itself, does not amount to prosecution of the person summoned, there being no
formal accusation at that stage. It was therefore contended that, in the absence
of a complaint having been filed under Section 44 of the PMLA, no criminal
prosecution had yet commenced.
J.9. Reliance was placed upon Dalmia Cement (supra), wherein the High Court
for the State of Telangana observed that merely because an ECIR has been
recorded and an investigation is underway, the persons being examined do not
automatically acquire the status of accused. It was pointed out that the ED itself
had adopted a similar stand in those proceedings.
J.10. Reliance was placed by the parties on the decision of the Co-ordinate
Bench of this Court in Pay 10 Services (supra), a decision rendered in 2026,
wherein the Single Judge concluded that the freezing of bank accounts
emanated from an ongoing criminal investigation and, therefore, the dispute lay
in the criminal domain, directing that the petition be registered as a criminal
matter. The said decision is, however, distinguishable, as the genesis of the
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dispute therein lay in an ongoing criminal investigation, and the principal
contention was that the Tamil Nadu Police had invoked the provisions of
Section 106 of the BNSS pursuant to the registration of an FIR.
J.11. Moreover, as rightly contended by the petitioners, the challenge to the
freezing of the bank accounts and the search and seizure proceedings raises
constitutional issues, as such actions, though civil in nature, affect the
petitioners' right to carry on business under Article 19(1)(g) and their right to
property under Article 300A of the Constitution. It was also noticed that, in
paragraph 360 of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), the Supreme Court
observed that the powers exercised by AA are analogous to those vested in a
Civil Court under the CPC in respect of the matters referred to therein.
J.12. Reliance was also placed on Pawan Insaa (supra), a decision of the
Punjab and Haryana High Court rendered in 2024, wherein a petition under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. was filed seeking quashing of ECIR. ED objected to
the maintainability of the petition on the ground that the ‘ECIR is merely an
internal administrative document’. The Punjab and Haryana High Court
accepted the said objection and held that the “ECIR is neither registered under
the Cr.P.C. nor can it be equated with the commencement of criminal
proceedings”.
Relying
upon
the
observations
in Vijay
Madanlal
Choudhary (supra), the Punjab and Haryana High Court observed as under:
“6. ………On a minute perusal of the above reproduced
observations of Hon'ble the Supreme Court, it can be safely
culled that an ECIR cannot be kept at the same pedestal as an
FIR. It is crucial to note that an ECIR is not registered under
the Cr. P.C., unlike a First Information Report (FIR), which is
mandatorily registered under Section 154 of the Cr. P.C., and
subsequently forwarded to the Illaqa Magistrate as per the
provisions of Section 157 of the Cr.P.C. Additionally, there
exists no legal obligation to provide a copy of the ECIR to an
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accused, and the absence of such provision does not in any
manner impinge upon any constitutional or statutory rights of
a person. Thus, an ECIR is an administrative document
prepared by the officers of the ED. It precedes the
commencement of the prosecution against individuals involved
in the offence of money laundering, which in turn is governed
by special statute i.e. PMLA.
7. This Court unhesitatingly concurs with the contentions made
by the learned counsel for the respondent-ED that the ECIR is
an internal administrative document of the ED. Consequently,
in the considered opinion of this Court, since the ECIR
precedes the stage of criminal prosecution and proceedings, it
thus falls outside the purview of the inherent jurisdiction
conferred upon this Court by Section 482 of the Cr.
P.C. Therefore, the prayer of the petitioner for quashing of the
ECIR under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. cannot be entertained.
8. Though the learned senior counsel for the petitioner has
emphatically argued that mere technicalities should not come
in the way of entertaining the instant petition under
Section 482 Cr. P.C. keeping in view the amplitude of the
powers conferred upon this Court, however, it cannot be overemphasized that the powers of this Court are not unbridled and
can be exercised under Section 482 Cr. P.C. only to give effect
to any order under the Cr. P.C.; or to prevent abuse of the
process of any Court; or to secure the ends of justice in relation
to a criminal proceeding. Since the ECIR is not a statutory
document under the Cr. P.C. and thus, cannot be equated to
initiation of any criminal proceeding, aforementioned
argument advanced by the learned senior counsel cannot be
accepted as it would result in this Court exceeding its
jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. P.C.”
(emphasis added)
J.13. The issue, therefore, is no longer res integra in view of the authoritative
pronouncement of the Supreme Court that an ECIR is not a statutory document
but merely an internal administrative document, and that its registration is not
a precondition for carrying out an inquiry or investigation or for initiating civil
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action by way of attachment of property.
J.14. Having regard to the views expressed by the Supreme Court as well as
by this Court, it is evident that the petitioners, who have essentially sought relief
in relation to proceedings under Section 17 of PMLA, including the ‘search and
seizure’ proceedings initiated or sought to be initiated by the ED, fall within the
ambit of the civil stream under the PMLA. It is an admitted position that no
complaint has yet been filed before the Special Court under Section 44 of
PMLA alleging the commission of the offence of money laundering. The
proceedings initiated by the ED are, at this stage, confined to investigation and
to securing the “proceeds of crime”, if any, so as to prevent their dissipation.
J.15. Since the challenge pertains only to the administrative/executive actions
of the ED, including the continuation of the ECIR in its original as well as
amended form, the challenge remains one to what the ED itself has
acknowledged to be an ‘administrative action’. The investigation under the
PMLA, as explained by the Courts, is not akin to an investigation conducted by
the police under the Cr.P.C. This aspect has been categorically recognised by
the Supreme Court in the following terms:
“343. …… Sensu stricto, at this stage ( of issuing summons), it
is not an investigation for initiating prosecution in respect of
crime of money laundering as such. That is only an incidental
matter and may be the consequence of existence of proceeds of
crime and identification of persons involved in money
laundering thereof.”
(emphasis added)
J.16. Therefore, on the issue of maintainability as a civil writ petition, for the
reasons stated above, there is no impediment in the Court proceeding ahead with
adjudicating these petitions.
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K.
Analysis- Alternate Remedy
K.1. It was contended by the petitioners that the jurisdiction of the Adjudicating
Authority under Section 8 of the PMLA is confined to examining the validity
of provisional attachment and confiscation proceedings and does not extend to
examining the legality or validity of the ECIR itself. Since the ECIR is an
administrative exercise dependent upon the existence of a predicate offence,
once the predicate offence ceases to exist, the petitioners would be entitled to
challenge the executive action of continuing the ECIR.
K.2. It was further contended that the administrative action resulted in various
civil consequences, including search and seizure under Section 17 of the PMLA
and provisional attachment, merely on the basis of a suspicion regarding the
existence of “proceeds of crime”. According to the petitioners, none of these
measures has crossed the criminal threshold, which would arise upon arrest
under Section 19 of the PMLA or upon filing of a prosecution complaint
under Section 44 before the Special Court. Where the validity of the ECIR itself
is challenged on the ground that no predicate offence survives and that the
addendum to the ECIR is mala fide and constitutes a colourable exercise of
power, the alternative remedy before the AA may not be efficacious, since the
challenge is to the very genesis and continuation of the ECIR.
K.3. The adjudicatory process under Section 8 of the PMLA is confined to
examining the consequential actions taken under Sections 5, 17 and 18 of the
PMLA. That, however, is not the nature or scope of the relief sought in the
present petitions.
K.4. More specifically, the jurisdiction of the Adjudicating Authority under
Section 8 extends to consideration of applications made under Sections 5(5),
17(4) and 18(10), together with the material relied upon by the ED, and to
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recording a finding as to whether the properties referred to in the notice are
involved in money-laundering. The challenge before this Court, however, goes
to the very jurisdictional basis for continuation of the ECIR following closure of
the second FIR and the subsequent introduction of the addendum taking on
record the first FIR. These are not matters which fall within the statutory remit
of the Adjudicating Authority.
K.5. Counsel for the petitioners also drew attention to two decisions, one of this
Court and the other of the Madras High Court, to demonstrate that, in
circumstances where the ECIR itself or the foundational action under the PMLA
was under challenge, Courts have entertained writ petitions under Article 226 of
the Constitution. In EMTA Coal (supra), a decision rendered by a Coordinate
Bench of this Court in 2023, the ECIR was quashed upon acceptance of the
closure report in the predicate FIR. The said decision was subsequently affirmed
by the Supreme Court.
K.6. In RKM Powergen (supra), a decision rendered by the Madras High Court
in 2025, a challenge was laid to orders passed under Section 17(1)(a) of the
PMLA. Although the issue of maintainability was raised, the Court entertained
the writ petition and ultimately set aside the impugned orders.
K.7. On the broader principle governing alternative remedy, the petitioners
relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. (supra)
concerning the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The
Supreme Court cautioned against treating a writ petition as “not maintainable”
merely because an alternative statutory remedy had not been pursued. It
reiterated that availability of an alternative remedy does not operate as an
absolute bar to the maintainability of a writ petition; rather, the rule requiring
recourse to an alternative remedy is one of policy, convenience and discretion.
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The Court further emphasised the distinction between the “maintainability” and
“entertainability” of a writ petition. The relevant observations are extracted as
under:
“4. Before answering the questions, we feel the urge to say a
few words on the exercise of writ powers conferred by article
226 of the Constitution having come across certain orders
passed by the High Courts holding writ petitions as "not
maintainable" merely because the alternative remedy
provided by the relevant statutes has not been pursued by the
parties desirous of invocation of the writ jurisdiction. The
power to issue prerogative writs under article 226 is plenary
in nature. Any limitation on the exercise of such power must
be traceable in the Constitution itself. Profitable reference in
this regard may be made to article 329 and ordainments of
other similarly worded articles in the Constitution. Article
226 does not, in terms, impose any limitation or restraint on
the exercise of power to issue writs. While it is true that
exercise of writ powers despite availability of a remedy under
the very statute which has been invoked and has given rise to
the action impugned in the writ petition ought not to be made
in a routine manner, yet, the mere fact that the petitioner
before the High Court, in a given case, has not pursued the
alternative remedy available to him/it cannot mechanically
be construed as a ground for its dismissal. It is axiomatic that
the High Courts (bearing in mind the facts of each particular
case) have a discretion whether to entertain a writ petition or
not. One of the self-imposed restrictions on the exercise of
power under article 226 that has evolved through judicial
precedents is that the High Courts should normally not
entertain a writ petition, where an effective and efficacious
alternative remedy is available. At the same time, it must be
remembered that mere availability of an alternative remedy
of appeal or revision, which the party invoking the
jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 has not
pursued, would not oust the jurisdiction of the High Court
and render a writ petition "not maintainable". In a long line
of decisions, this court has made it clear that availability of
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an alternative remedy does not operate as an absolute bar to
the "maintainability" of a writ petition and that the rule,
which requires a party to pursue the alternative remedy
provided by a statute, is a rule of policy, convenience and
discretion rather than a rule of law. Though elementary, it
needs to be restated that "entertainability" and
"maintainability" of a writ petition are distinct concepts. The
fine but real distinction between the two ought not to be lost
sight of. The objection as to "maintainability" goes to the root
of the matter and if such objection were found to be of
substance, the courts would be rendered incapable of even
receiving the lis for adjudication. On the other hand, the
question of "entertainability" is entirely within the realm of
discretion of the High Courts, writ remedy being
discretionary. A writ petition despite being maintainable may
not be entertained by a High Court for very many reasons or
relief could even be refused to the petitioner, despite setting
up a sound legal point, if grant of the claimed relief would
not further public interest. Hence, dismissal of a writ petition
by a High Court on the ground that the petitioner has not
availed the alternative remedy without, however, examining
whether an exceptional case has been made out for such
entertainment would not be proper.
(emphasis added)
K.8. The aforesaid authorities, read together, indicate that the existence of a
statutory remedy does not, by itself, oust the jurisdiction of this Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution. While EMTA Coal and RKM Powergen are
instructive in the context of proceedings under the PMLA, Godrej Sara Lee
Ltd. reiterates the broader principle that availability of an alternative remedy
bears upon the exercise of discretion in ‘entertaining’ a writ petition and does
not constitute an absolute bar to its ‘maintainability’. In the present case, where
the challenge goes to the very jurisdictional foundation and continued
subsistence of the ECIR, questions which do not fall within the remit of the
Adjudicating Authority, the existence of proceedings before the said Authority
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would not, by itself, warrant relegating the petitioners to the statutory remedy or
persuade this Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction to not entertain
this writ petition.
Analysis- Cancellation of the Second FIR
L.
L.1. The facts in this regard lie within a narrow compass. The Court is
assessing the rival contentions of the parties. i.e. the petitioners arguing that
upon closure of the second FIR, the ECIR cannot subsist, while the ED and
complainants contend that a challenge has been filed against the acceptance of
the Closure Report by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (ACJM)
Patiala House Courts, and therefore the ECIR would continue to subsist.
L.2. The second FIR, viz. FIR No. 27/2021, was registered by the EOW Delhi,
on
10th
February
under
Sections
403/409/411/
420/423/424/
463/465/467/468/472/474 and 120 B of the Indian Penal Code 1860 [“IPC”]
against all petitioners alleging that share transfers and bank transactions,
relating to Aristo Pharmaceuticals had been fraudulently carried out by forging
the signatures of Late Smt. Satula Devi on share transfer forms and cheques.
On 28th December 2021, the impugned ECIR was registered exclusively on the
basis of the second FIR, which constituted the predicate/schedule offence for
the purposes of investigation under PMLA. Upon completion of the
investigation, the EOW filed a Cancellation Report dated 8th December 2022,
concluding that no offence was made out. A Protest Petition against the
Cancellation Report was filed on 29th March 2023 by the legal representatives
of Late Smt. Satula Devi. In the meantime, proceedings under Section 17(1A)
of PMLA, directing freezing of certain bank accounts, were initiated by ED.
The same were challenged in W.P.(C) 9799/2023 and, by order dated 12th
December 2023, this Court stayed the proceedings before the AA.
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L.3. The ACJM, by order dated 12th June 2025, dismissed the Protest
Petition, accepted the Cancellation Report, and the proceedings arising from the
FIR were brought to a close. ED filed a challenge before this Court by way of
Crl.M.C. 4884/2025 and 4885/2025. The said proceedings are pending before
this Court, though no stay of the order accepting the Cancellation Report has
been passed.
L.4. The issue which, therefore, arises is as to what would be the status of the
ECIR/ proceedings emanating therefrom, once the Cancellation Report has
been accepted, the Protest Petition has been dismissed, and there is no stay
granted by this Court in the challenge preferred by the ED. For this purpose,
since the issue is essentially one of law, it may not be necessary to advert in
detail to the factual allegations forming the subject matter of the second FIR
and the consequent ECIR.
L.5. Reliance was placed by Senior Counsel for the petitioners on the decision
of the Calcutta High Court in Future Gaming (supra). The petition therein had
been filed by Future Gaming seeking quashing of proceedings pending before
the Special CBI Court under Section 3 read with Section 17 of PMLA, along
with the ECIR initiated by ED. The ECIR had been registered pursuant to FIR
No. 246/2019 and FIR No. 260/2019. In both FIRs, the police had submitted
final reports and the Closure Reports had been accepted by the Magistrate. The
ED made a specific plea that it had sought further investigation under Section
173(8) Cr.P.C., which application was pending before the Magistrate. The ED
further contended that money laundering was a continuing offence and, since
another FIR registered at Kochi, Kerala continued to subsist, it was obligatory
for the jurisdictional police to act and carry out further investigation. The Court
relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary
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(supra), where the Court categorically stated that proceedings under the PMLA
could be triggered only if a scheduled offence was in existence. The relevant
paragraph in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), relied upon by the Calcutta
High Court, is extracted as under:
“22. In Vijay Madanalal Choudhury Case (supra) Supreme
Court observed offence under section 3 of the PMLA is
dependent on the wrongful and illegal gain of property as a
result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. It
is concerning the process or activity connected with such
property which constitutes offence of money laundering and
property must qualify the definition as given in section
2(1)(u). Relevant paragraphs of said judgment may be
reproduced below:—
148. The next question is: Whether the offence under
Section 3 is a standalone offence? Indeed, it is
dependent on the wrongful and illegal gain of property
as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled
offence. Nevertheless, it is concerning the process or
activity connected with such property, which constitutes
offence of money laundering. The property must qualify
the definition of “proceeds of crime” under Section
2(1)(u) of the 2002 Act.
149. As observed earlier, all or whole of the crime
property linked to scheduled offence need not be
regarded as proceeds of crime, but all properties
qualifying the definition of “proceeds of crime” under
Section 2(1)(u) will necessarily be crime properties.
Indeed, in the event of acquittal of the person
concerned or being absolved from allegation of
criminal activity relating to scheduled offence, and if
it is established in the court of law that the crime
property in the case concerned has been rightfully
owned and possessed by him, such a property by no
stretch of imagination can be termed as crime property
and ex consequenti proceeds of crime within the
meaning of Section 2(1)(u) as it stands today. On the
other hand, in the trial in connection with the scheduled
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offence, the court would be obliged to direct return of
such property as belonging to him. It would be then
paradoxical to still regard such property as proceeds of
crime despite such adjudication by a court of competent
jurisdiction. It is well within the jurisdiction of the court
concerned trying the scheduled offence to pronounce on
that matter.
150. Be it noted that the authority of the authorised
officer under the 2002 Act to prosecute any person for
offence of money laundering gets triggered only if
there exist proceeds of crime within the meaning of
Section 2(1)(u) of the 2002 Act and further it is
involved in any process or activity. Not even in a case
of existence of undisclosed income and irrespective of
its volume, the definition of “proceeds of crime” under
Section 2(1)(u) will get attracted, unless the property
has been derived or obtained as a result of criminal
activity relating to a scheduled offence.
151. It is possible that in a given case after the discovery
of huge volume of undisclosed property, the authorised
officer may be advised to send information to the
jurisdictional police [under Section 66(2) of the 2002
Act] for registration of a scheduled offence
contemporaneously, including for further investigation
in a pending case, if any. On receipt of such information,
the jurisdictional police would be obliged to register the
case by way of FIR if it is a cognizable offence or as a
non-cognizable offence (NC case), as the case may be.
If the offence so reported is a scheduled offence, only in
that eventuality, the property recovered by the
authorised officer would partake the colour of proceeds
of crime under Section 2(1)(u) of the 2002 Act, enabling
him to take further action under the Act in that regard.
152. Even though the 2002 Act is a complete code in
itself, it is only in respect of matters connected with
offence of money laundering, and for that, existence of
proceeds of crime within the meaning of Section 2(1)(u)
PMLA is quintessential. Absent existence of proceeds of
crime, as aforesaid, the authorities under the 2002
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Act cannot step in or initiate any prosecution.
23. After laying down the aforesaid ratio by the Apex Court
in Vijay Madnalal Case (supra), thereafter on several
occasion the same question arose before Supreme Court and
before different High Courts i.e. if the predicate case is
absolved by way of either acquittal or discharge or quashing
of predicate case or by acceptance of the closure report,
whether PMLA proceeding can continue.”
(emphasis added)
L.6. The Court thereafter noted the decision in Deputy Director of
Enforcement v. EMTA (supra), where a submission on behalf of the learned
Additional Solicitor General was recorded that, since a Closure Report had been
filed in the predicate offence, no further proceedings under PMLA could
continue. However, in the event any further action was taken in respect of the
predicate offence, liberty was reserved to take further steps, including revival
of those proceedings. The Special Leave Petition was disposed of in light of the
said submission, while reserving liberty in favour of the petitioner therein, i.e.,
the ED.
L.7. In Directorate of Enforcement v. Obulapuram Mining Company Pvt
Ltd (supra), the Apex Court on 2nd December 2022 made the following
observations:
“SLP(Crl) No. 10627/2019
… Learned Solicitor General fairly states that since there is
a closure report in respect of the predicate offence which has
been accepted, the present proceeding will not survive and
consequently the ECIR No.CEZO/01/2017 stands quashed.
The application along with the Special Leave Petition stand
disposed of.
………
… Learned Solicitor General fairly states that since the
proceedings before this Court arise from an order of
attachment and there is acquittal in respect of predicate
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offence, the proceedings really would not survive.
In view of the aforesaid, the appeals filed by the Adjudicating
Authority (PMLA) do not survive and are accordingly
disposed of.”
(emphasis added)
L.8. Further, in Naresh Kumar Kejriwal v. Director of Enforcement (supra)
the Supreme Court made the following observations:
“5. Taking the totality of the facts and circumstances into
account, we find no reason to allow the proceedings against
the appellant under Prevention of Money Laundering Act,
2002 (for short, ‘PMLA’) to continue any further.
6. However, taking note of the submissions made by the
learned Additional Solicitor General and in the interest of
justice, we reserve liberty for the respondent in seeking
revival of these proceedings if there be any legitimate ground
to proceed under PMLA in accordance with law. 7. Subject
to the observations and liberty foregoing, this appeal is
allowed while quashing the proceedings qua the appellant in
Complaint/ECIR No. 02 of 2018 dated 03.11.2018 pending in
the Court of Additional Judicial Commissioner-I-cumSpecial Judge for PMLA at Ranchi”
(emphasis added)
L.9. Further, in Adjudicating Authority (PMLA) & Ors. v. Sh. Ajay Kumar
Gupta & Ors., order dated 02nd December 2022, in Criminal Appeal No.
391/2018, the Supreme Court noted as under:
“Learned Solicitor General fairly states that since the
proceedings before this court arise from an order of
attachment and there is acquittal in respect of predicate
offence, the proceedings really would not survive.
In view of the aforesaid, the appeals filed by the adjudicating
Authority (PMLA) do not survive and are accordingly
disposed of.”
(emphasis added)
L.10. Relying on the above, the Calcutta High Court in Future Gaming (supra)
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stated as under:
“30. Therefore from the aforesaid observations made by the
Apex Court after Vijay Madanlal Choudhury (supra)
Judgment in different cases, it is clear that the Apex Court
has not made any distinction as to whether the accused is
absolved by way of quashing, discharge, acquittal or closure
of the predicate case and so far as the PMLA proceedings
are concerned, the effect would be the same i.e. upon
negation of the predicate case, the PMLA proceeding will
not continue.
31. It is true that in the present context the aforesaid two FIRs
are neither quashed nor the accused persons have been
discharged. But what has been culled out from the aforesaid
decisions is that when the offender of the predicate offence
has been discharged or acquitted or the proceeding have
been quashed or final report of the proceeding has been
accepted, so long such order regarding acquittal or
discharge or quashing or acceptance of closure report are
not set aside by taking further action, it cannot said that
PMLA proceeding still survive, though in all such cases
Court also inclined to grant liberty for revival, if any of
aforesaid order is quashed at a subsequent stage.”
(emphasis added)
L.11. Counsel appearing on behalf of ED raised yet another contention before
the Calcutta High Court that it would be open to ED, upon gaining knowledge
of other FIRs, to incorporate the same into the existing ECIR. The Calcutta
High Court examined the said contention and held as under:
“37. Needless to repeat that the offence of money laundering
relates to the proceeds of crime, the genesis of which is a
scheduled offence. Accordingly before initiation of any, it
would be necessary for the concerned authorities to identify
the scheduled crime. Therefore, in cases where the schedule
offence is negated with the acceptance of final report on the
ground of mistake of fact, the fundamental principle of
continuing any proceeding under the PMLA also vanishes, at
least so long such acceptance be not set aside.”
Digitally Signed
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(emphasis added)
L.12. Thereafter, the Court analysed the contention of the ED that the Kolkata
ECIR was also registered on the basis of the Kochi CBI chargesheet and,
therefore, the Kolkata ECIR could be clubbed with the Kochi chargesheet. The
Court noted that there was no material reflecting that the “proceeds of crime”
arising from the Kolkata FIRs were also involved in the Kochi case and, there
being no nexus between them, the Kolkata ECIR was liable to be quashed.
Taking note of the submission of the ED that its application under Section
173(8) Cr.P.C. seeking further investigation was pending before the Magistrate,
liberty was reserved to seek revival of the proceedings if any legitimate ground
arose at a subsequent stage under the PMLA. It can be seen from the analysis
that the Calcutta High Court based its decision on the fundamental premise that
“proceeds of crime”, as defined under Section 2(1)(u), must arise as a result of
criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence.
L.13. Further, reliance placed upon Rajinder Singh Chadha (supra) by learned
counsel for ED was distinguished by the Calcutta High Court by observing that
in Rajinder Singh Chadha (supra), there were subsisting FIRs where the ECIR
was expanded to include other similar FIRs; however, where Closure Reports
had been accepted in respect of the FIRs, the ECIR could not survive and would
cease to exist.
L.14. Mr. Mahesh Jethmalani, Senior Counsel appearing for the intervenor,
relied upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Enforcement
Directorate v. Hi-Tech Mercantile India (P) Ltd. 2025 SCC OnLine Del 6524.
The Division Bench noticed the view of the learned Single Judge that the
offence of money laundering is a standalone offence only in the sense that it is
required to be tried separately and not in the sense that it can survive
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independently after proceedings in respect of the predicate offence have been
quashed. The Division Bench found the said reasoning to be erroneous and
observed as under in paragraphs 62 and 64:
“62. The aforesaid view taken by the LSJ is flawed on three
premises, firstly, as elaborated in the preceding paragraphs,
the Directorate's power to initiate proceedings is not
constrained to the four corners of the CBI's report or limited
to the findings of the chargesheet. Secondly, the judgment of
the High Court, quashing the first FIR and chargesheet is
currently under challenge before the Supreme Court and,
therefore, remains subjudice. As such, the finality of findings
on existence or non-existence of a predicate offence is yet to
be determined.
………
64. Therefore, at this stage, the LSJ ought not to have
rendered conclusive findings premised on an outcome that
lacks finality. More specifically, owing to the reason that, the
quashing of the FIR and chargesheet was allowed at a
preliminary stage, without delving into the examination of the
facts,
evidence
and
surrounding
circumstances.
Furthermore, when the LSJ invoked its extraordinary
jurisdiction at the stage of issuance of SCN, relying on the
principles laid down in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar
of Trademarks, it rather became necessary to exercise
judicial restraint. Thus, the LSJ must not have drawn
definitive conclusion on the existence or absence of predicate
offence at such a nascent stage.”
L.15. Mr. Dayan Krishnan, Senior Counsel for petitioners, however, pointed
out that the operation of the judgment of the Division Bench, as also the
judgment of the learned Single Judge, presently stands stayed. In those
circumstances, while the reasoning in the said decision may be noticed as part
of the rival submissions, it would not be appropriate to treat the same as
determinative of the controversy before this Court
L.16. This Court finds itself in agreement with the view expressed by the
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Calcutta High Court in Future Gaming (supra), not only because of the
similarity in the factual matrix and surrounding circumstances, but also having
regard to the reasoning and analysis adopted therein.
L.17. The birth of an ECIR is dependent upon the existence of a predicate
offence, as stated in Vijay Madanlal (supra), paragraph 253. Once it is an
admitted position of the ED that the ECIR is an internal administrative
document permitting it to inquire into an offence of money laundering, the
existence of a scheduled offence becomes imperative in view of the definition
of “proceeds of crime” under Section 2(1)(u) of PMLA. The very expression
“as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence” is premised
upon the existence of a scheduled offence. Once the investigating authority, in
the present case the EOW, files a Cancellation Report stating that the
investigation is required to be closed as no offence is made out under the said
FIR, the Cancellation Report is accepted by the competent Court, and the
Protest Petition is thereafter also dismissed, the conclusion of the investigating
agency receives a judicial imprimatur. It is difficult to comprehend how, in such
circumstances, it can still be contended that a scheduled offence continues to
exist or remains lurking in the background. Such a proposition would be
anathema to basic jurisprudence and cannot be sustained.
L.18. Of course, a subsequent challenge or appellate proceeding may
ultimately result in revival of the investigation if the Cancellation Report is set
aside by a superior Court. However, until such eventuality occurs, the
contention of the ED that the ghost of a scheduled offence continues to hover
and continues to furnish a cause of action to continue with the proceedings
under the ECIR on that basis cannot be accepted. Such a construction would be
wholly illogical and would amount to subverting the foundational premise of
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the PMLA, besides permitting misuse of the statutory process.
L.19. In Yash Tuteja v. UOI (supra), the challenge was to the complaint filed
under Section 44(1)(b) of the PMLA based upon allegations of scheduled
offences under various provisions of the Income Tax Act and the IPC. The Court
noted the conclusions of the Supreme Court in Pavana R. Dibbur (supra) and
concluded that, except Section 120-B IPC, none of the offences relied upon
were scheduled offences. The ECIR was based upon the offences referred to in
the complaint and, since those offences were not scheduled offences, and
Section 120-B IPC could arise as a scheduled offence only where the conspiracy
was to commit an offence specifically included in the Schedule to PMLA, the
Court quashed the ECIR.
L.20. Reference made to Supreme Court’s decision in Pavana R Dibbur
(supra) is instructive and needs to be appreciated. In that case, the ED had filed
a complaint under the proviso to Section 45(1) of PMLA before the Special
Court at Bangalore. Pavana R. Dibbur was arrayed as accused No. 6. The
Special Court took cognizance of the said complaint. Pavana R. Dibbur
thereafter filed a petition before the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
seeking quashing of the complaint, which came to be dismissed. The appellant
therein submitted that the properties in question were not tainted properties and
did not fall within the definition of “proceeds of crime”.
L.21. The ED responded that, even assuming that the appellant possessed the
monetary capacity to acquire the properties, it could not be concluded that funds
allegedly siphoned by accused No. 1, constituting “proceeds of crime”, had not
been utilised by the appellant for acquiring the second property. On the issue
that the appellant was not shown as an accused in the predicate offence, the
Court considered Sections 2(1)(u) and 2(1)(y) of the PMLA and relied upon the
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decision in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), particularly the following
paragraph is extracted as under:
“15. The condition precedent for the existence of proceeds of
crime is the existence of a scheduled offence. On this aspect,
it is necessary to refer to the decision of this Court in Vijay
Madanlal Choudhary [Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union
of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1] . In para 109 of the said decision
[Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12
SCC 1] , this Court held thus : (SCC p. 166)
“109. Tersely put, it is only such property which is
derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of
criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence that can
be regarded as proceeds of crime. The authorities under
the 2002 Act cannot resort to action against any person
for money laundering on an assumption that the
property recovered by them must be proceeds of crime
and that a scheduled offence has been committed, unless
the same is registered with the jurisdictional police or
pending inquiry by way of complaint before the
competent forum. For, the expression “derived or
obtained” is indicative of criminal activity relating to a
scheduled offence already accomplished. Similarly, in
the event the person named in the criminal activity
relating to a scheduled offence is finally absolved by a
court of competent jurisdiction owing to an order of
discharge, acquittal or because of quashing of the
criminal case (scheduled offence) against him/her, there
can be no action for money laundering against such a
person or person claiming through him in relation to the
property linked to the stated scheduled offence. This
interpretation alone can be countenanced on the basis
of the provisions of the 2002 Act, in particular Section
2(1)(u) read with Section 3. Taking any other view
would be rewriting of these provisions and disregarding
the express language of definition clause “proceeds of
crime”, as it obtains as of now.
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16. In paras 134 and 135, this Court held thus : (Vijay
Madanlal
Choudhary
case [Vijay
Madanlal
Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1] , SCC p. 182)
“134. From the bare language of Section 3 of the 2002
Act, it is amply clear that the offence of money
laundering is an independent offence regarding the
process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime
which had been derived or obtained as a result of
criminal activity relating to or in relation to a scheduled
offence. The process or activity can be in any form — be
it one of concealment, possession, acquisition, use of
proceeds of crime as much as projecting it as untainted
property or claiming it to be so. Thus, involvement in
any one of such process or activity connected with the
proceeds of crime would constitute offence of money
laundering. This offence otherwise has nothing to do
with the criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence
— except the proceeds of crime derived or obtained as
a result of that crime.
135.Needless to mention that such process or activity
can be indulged in only after the property is derived or
obtained as a result of criminal activity (a scheduled
offence). It would be an offence of money-laundering to
indulge in or to assist or being party to the process or
activity connected with the proceeds of crime; and such
process or activity in a given fact situation may be a
continuing offence, irrespective of the date and time of
commission of the scheduled offence. In other words,
the criminal activity may have been committed before
the same had been notified as scheduled offence for the
purpose of the 2002 Act, but if a person has indulged in
or continues to indulge directly or indirectly in dealing
with proceeds of crime, derived or obtained from such
criminal activity even after it has been notified as
scheduled offence, may be liable to be prosecuted for
offence of money laundering under the 2002 Act — for
continuing to possess or conceal the proceeds of crime
(fully or in part) or retaining possession thereof or uses
it in trenches until fully exhausted. The offence of
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money-laundering is not dependent on or linked to the
date on which the scheduled offence, or if we may say
so, the predicate offence has been committed. The
relevant date is the date on which the person indulges in
the process or activity connected with such proceeds of
crime. These ingredients are intrinsic in the original
provision (Section 3, as amended until 2013 and were in
force till 31-7-2019); and the same has been merely
explained and clarified by way of Explanation vide
Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019. Thus understood, inclusion
of clause (ii) in Explanation inserted in 2019 is of no
consequence as it does not alter or enlarge the scope of
Section 3 at all.”
(emphasis added)
L.22. The Court, therefore, concluded that the conditions precedent for
attracting the offence under Section 3 of the PMLA are that there must be a
scheduled offence and there must be “proceeds of crime” in relation to that
scheduled offence, as defined under Section 2(1)(u). Thereafter, the Court
recorded its determinative opinion in the paragraph extracted below:
“17. Coming back to Section 3 PMLA, on its plain reading,
an offence under Section 3 can be committed after a
scheduled offence is committed. For example, let us take the
case of a person who is unconnected with the scheduled
offence, knowingly assists the concealment of the proceeds of
crime or knowingly assists the use of proceeds of crime. In
that case, he can be held guilty of committing an offence
under Section 3 PMLA. To give a concrete example, the
offences under Sections 384 to 389 IPC relating to
“extortion” are scheduled offences included in Para 1 of the
Schedule to PMLA. An accused may commit a crime of
extortion covered by Sections 384 to 389 IPC and extort
money. Subsequently, a person unconnected with the offence
of extortion may assist the said accused in the concealment
of the proceeds of extortion. In such a case, the person who
assists the accused in the scheduled offence for concealing
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the proceeds of the crime of extortion can be guilty of the
offence of money-laundering. Therefore, it is not necessary
that a person against whom the offence under Section 3
PMLA is alleged must have been shown as the accused in the
scheduled offence. What is held in para 135 of the decision of
this Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary [Vijay Madanlal
Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1] supports the
above conclusion. The conditions precedent for attracting the
offence under Section 3 PMLA are that there must be a
scheduled offence and that there must be proceeds of crime
in relation to the scheduled offence as defined in clause (u)
of sub-section (1) of Section 3 PMLA.
18. In a given case, if the prosecution for the scheduled
offence ends in the acquittal of all the accused or discharge
of all the accused or the proceedings of the scheduled offence
are quashed in its entirety, the scheduled offence will not
exist, and therefore, no one can be prosecuted for the offence
punishable under Section 3 PMLA as there will not be any
proceeds of crime. Thus, in such a case, the accused against
whom the complaint under Section 3 PMLA is filed will
benefit from the scheduled offence ending by acquittal or
discharge of all the accused. Similarly, he will get the benefit
of quashing the proceedings of the scheduled offence.
However, an accused in PMLA case who comes into the
picture after the scheduled offence is committed by assisting
in the concealment or use of proceeds of crime need not be
an accused in the scheduled offence. Such an accused can
still be prosecuted under PMLA so long as the scheduled
offence exists. Thus, the second contention raised by the
learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant on the
ground that the appellant was not shown as an accused in the
charge-sheets filed in the scheduled offences deserves to be
rejected.”
(emphasis added)
L.23. The reliance placed by Mr. Vikas Singh, Senior Advocate, on the decision
of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh in Niket Kansal v. Union
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of India (supra) also needs to be assessed. Mr. Singh relied upon the said
decision of the learned Single Judge to contend that the offence of money
laundering is distinct and independent and that summons issued under Section
50 of the PMLA do not cease to operate merely because an accused has been
discharged in the predicate offence. At the outset, it may be noted that the
decision in Niket Kansal (supra) was challenged before the Supreme Court,
which, by order dated 20th July 2025, directed that, subject to the petitioner
cooperating with the ongoing investigation, no coercive action be taken against
him. Mr. Singh therefore contended that the Supreme Court had given its
imprimatur to the continuance of the investigation by the ED.
L.24. The petition before the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh
sought quashing of the ECIR, summons issued under Section 50 of the PMLA
and the related search and seizure proceedings. The Trial Court had discharged
the petitioner, while the proceedings against the other accused continued.
Relying upon Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), the High Court observed
that the offence of money laundering is a separate and distinct offence from the
scheduled offence and is prosecuted independently under the PMLA. It further
took the view that even a person who was not directly involved in the
commission of the scheduled offence could be prosecuted for the offence of
money laundering.
L.25. The High Court further observed that the issuance and enforcement of
summons under Section 50 of the PMLA is intended to facilitate the effective
collection of evidence during investigation. Reliance was also placed
upon Pavana R. Dibbur (supra), wherein the Supreme Court held that a person
accused of an offence under the PMLA need not necessarily be shown as an
accused in the scheduled offence. The High Court observed that the discharge
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of the petitioner from the predicate offence concerned the merits of the
particular accusation against him, but did not nullify the legal framework
governing the issuance of summons for the purposes of investigation. While
recognising the binding nature of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), the
High Court observed that the principles laid down therein could not be applied
mechanically or in the abstract. It consequently held that although the
scheduled offence constitutes the foundation for commencement of proceedings
under the PMLA, the offence of money laundering is a distinct and continuing
offence which requires independent evaluation.
L.26. This Court, however, is unable to agree with the view taken by the learned
Single Judge in Niket Kansal (supra) to the extent that it suggests that
proceedings under the PMLA may continue even after the predicate offence
itself has ceased to subsist. As discussed above, once the predicate offence
stands extinguished upon acceptance of the Cancellation Report and dismissal
of the Protest Petition, the very foundation of the PMLA proceedings ceases to
exist. To permit the investigation to nevertheless continue would open a
Pandora’s box whereby persons who stand discharged or acquitted, or in whose
favour the predicate proceedings have been quashed or otherwise brought to an
end, may continue indefinitely to be subjected to summons under Section 50 of
the PMLA as also search and seizure proceedings. Even in Pavana R.
Dibbur (supra) the Supreme Court stated categorically (as noted in the extract
of paragraph 18 above) that such an accused can still be prosecuted under
PMLA “as long as the scheduled offence exists”.
L.27. The expression “proceeds of crime”, as defined under Section 2(1)(u) of
the PMLA, is circumscribed to mean property derived or obtained, directly or
indirectly, by any person “as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled
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offence”. To keep an investigation alive after the scheduled offence itself has
ceased to subsist would be to proceed on an abstraction and, metaphorically
speaking, to exhume a corpse from which the life breath has gone. Vijay
Madanlal Choudhary (supra) is categorical that the existence of a scheduled
offence is a condition precedent for the existence of “proceeds of crime”. Once
that condition precedent ceases to exist, the investigation under the PMLA
cannot be sustained on that basis. In any event, the facts in Niket
Kansal (supra) are materially distinguishable. There, only one of the accused
had been discharged while the predicate proceedings continued against the
remaining accused. In the present case, the FIR itself stands cancelled upon
acceptance of the Cancellation Report and dismissal of the Protest
Petition. Niket Kansal (supra) would, therefore, in any event, be
distinguishable on this ground alone.
L.28. It would be apposite to place on record the conclusions recorded in the
Cancellation Report order dated 12th June 2025, which are extracted as under:
“Conclusion:
In view of the facts and circumstances mentioned above,
from the investigation conducted so far following facts
came on record:a. The allegations made by the complainants didn't
sustain.
b. The FSL Reports have confirmed the signatures of
Smt. Satula Devi on Cheques, joint signatory form and
share transfer forms.
c. As Sh. Rajeev Sharma has not transferred the shares
to his mother and his father, then these Original Share
Certificates must be lying with him.
d. Smt. Satula Devi handed over the Original Share
Certificates to alleged Ms. Kanchana Rai after the
transfer of shares and now the above Original Share
Certificates are in the possession of alleged Ms.
Kanchana Raj, as confirmed during investigation.
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Rs. 15.90 Crores were transferred on 16.06.2016 from
the Joint account No. 30263240439 of Sh. Rajeev
Sharma and Dr. Mahendra Prasad held with SBI,
Vasant Vihar to the account no. 90312010013405 of
Smt. Satula Devi held with Syndicate Bank, Vasant
Vihar, Delhi. On 14.11.2017, Rs. 2.58 Crores were also
transferred from the Joint account No. 30263240439 of
Sh. Rajeev Sharma and Dr. Mahendra Prasad held with
SBI, Vasant Vihar to the individual account of Dr.
Mahendra Prasad. The above said transactions have
taken place under the signatures of Dr. Mahendra
Prasad.
e. GPA dt. 16.01.2020 executed by Dr. Mahendra
Prasad in favour of Ms. Kanchana Rai before the SubRegistrar. The said GPA does not give any right or title
to sell or acquire the properties.
f. Smt. Uma Devi became the joint account holder with
Dr. Mahendra Prasad in his bank accounts
i.e. 104154287 SBI Vasant Vihar, Delhi on 04.11.2019
& 10012924049 SBI Mumbai on 25.11.2019 on their
joint request with mode of operation as “Either or
Survivor.”
g. As per bank record, the account holders (Sh.
Mahendra Prasad & Smt. Uma Devi) have signed on the
Vouchers/letters/cheques for transactions in above said
account No. 10415428760, SBI Vasant Vihar, Delhi. It
has also revealed from the scrutiny of the above
Vouchers/letters/cheques that several of the
transactions in the bank accounts are between the
accounts of DMP at Delhi and Mumbai. No monies have
been diverted from the above bank account of Dr
Mahendra Prasad and no unauthorised payments made.
The maximum amount in the said accounts has been
converted into Fixed Deposits.”
L.29. Reliance was also placed upon the order of the Supreme Court in M.
Nagarajan (supra), wherein a petition had been filed seeking quashing of
criminal proceedings, which relief had been declined by the High Court.
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Q.29. It was brought to the notice of the Supreme Court that a Closure Report
had subsequently been filed and accepted by the Magistrate. ASG submitted
that the ED proposed to question the Closure Report. The Supreme Court noted
that the respondents would always be at liberty to take appropriate action as
permissible in law. It was further observed as under:
“we close these criminal proceedings at this stage.
However, at a later stage if any change in circumstances
arises, the respondent is at liberty to take appropriate
steps available under the law including recall of the
present order, if so advised”.
(emphasis added)
L.30. In Nik Nish Retail (supra), order dated 14th July 2023, the Supreme
Court noting paragraph 187 (v) (d) in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra)
[paragraph 382.5 in SCC], in that if predicate offence is quashed by a Court of
competent jurisdiction there can be no offence of money laundering, the
Supreme Court held “appropriate proceedings can be always filed by the
concerned parties for challenging the order by which predicate offence was
quashed. If the said order is yet set aside and the case is revived, it will always
be open for the petitioner to revive the proceedings under the PMLA”.
L.31. Reliance was also placed on a decision of the single judge of this Court
in Omkar Realtors (supra), a 2023 decision filed by petitioner seeking
quashing of the attachment order passed by the ED under Section 5 (1) of
PMLA. It was noted that the closure report had been filed in the predicate
offence, accepted by the Special Court, and discharge orders had also been
issued. The SLP was filed against the single Judge order in Omkar Realtors
(supra) by the ED, was dismissed, and the Court reiterated that the ED would
be entitled to seek revival of the proceedings afresh.
L.32. The Court relied on the Supreme Court’s view Vijay Madanlal
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Choudhary (supra), particularly paragraph 281 [paragraph 148 in SCC] that
the existence of a criminal complaint pending enquiry or trial would be
necessary, and if the person has been finally discharged or acquitted, there can
be no offence of money laundering.
L.33. The Court, therefore, held that the attachment order deserves to be
quashed in view of the legal position and that once the closure report had been
filed, no criminalities are ascertainable and the attachment orders as well as the
ECIR are liable to be quashed.
L.34. In Harish Fabiani & Ors. v. Enforcement Directorate & Ors.
2022:DHC:3892-DB (a decision of Division Bench of this Court of which
undersigned was a member), the issue was continuation of proceedings in
relation to ECIR, despite the predicate offence under the FIR having been
quashed by a judgment of the High Court of Bombay. The decision in Vijay
Madanlal Choudhary (supra) had just been pronounced when the matter was
pending.
L.35. The Court found that finality had been obtained as regards the
extinguishment of the FIR, it being quashed by the High Court of Bombay and
the fact that Special Leave Petition had been filed by the ED would not “dilute
or erode the finality of the order of the High Court of Bombay”. What was also
noted in particular based on para 253 of the following extract from Vijay
Madanlal Choudhary (supra) that the that “authorities under the PMLA cannot
resort to action against any person for money laundering on an assumption that
the property recovered by them must be “proceeds of crime” and that a
scheduled offence has been committed” and that “no action under PMLA can
be resorted to unless there is a substratum of scheduled offence for the same,
which substratum should legally exist in the form of a subsisting (not caused
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criminal complaint/enquiry) or if it did exist, the accused has since been
discharged or acquitted by a court of competent jurisdiction”.
L.36. The decision in Rajinder Singh Chadha (supra) also arose in an entirely
different factual matrix. In that case, the Court permitted the ECIR to continue
in view of a subsequent third FIR, which had revived the scheduled offence that
had earlier existed in the first two FIRs, both of which had subsequently been
quashed on the basis of settlement/compounding.
L.37. The Court observed that the jurisdictional fact was the registration of the
third FIR and, therefore, the ECIR could not be said to be without a predicate
offence. Accordingly, the Court held that taking the third FIR on record, which
pertained to the same project that had formed the basis of the first two FIRs, did
not create any legal impediment. The Court categorically observed that “there
could be no prosecution under the PMLA with respect to the scheduled offences
in the first two FIRs”, since the said FIRs had already been quashed.
L.38. In the present case, however, the second FIR stands obliterated, there
being no contrary order passed by this Court in the writ petition preferred by
the prosecution. Consequently, in the absence of a surviving scheduled offence,
no prosecution under the PMLA can continue.
L.39.
The Court in Rajinder Singh Chadha (supra) also referred to the
decision in Nayati Health Care and Research NCR Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. Union
of
India,
2023:DHC:7542,
which,
relying
upon Vijay
Madanlal
Choudhary (supra) and Nik Nish Retail (supra), held that the complaint filed
by ED and all proceedings arising therefrom cannot survive once the predicate
FIR has been quashed and the order quashing the FIR has attained finality.
Consequently, no offence of money laundering under Section 3 of PMLA could
survive.
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L.40. In view of the above, it is beyond doubt that upon filing of the
Cancellation Report, its acceptance by the competent Court, and dismissal of
the Protest Petition, the scheduled offence ceases to subsist, unless the
investigation in respect thereof is subsequently revived by an order of a superior
Court.
L.41. On receipt of information about the commission of scheduled offence in
the form of FIR, the ED gets jurisdiction to investigate whether the offence of
money laundering has been committed, that is, whether any “proceeds of
crime” generated by the commission of scheduled offence is being laundered
or sought to be laundered.
L.42. The law in that regard is well-settled that in the absence of the generation
of “proceeds of crime” or its laundering, no jurisdiction vest with the
Enforcement Directorate to investigate. It is also now well-settled that even
though the offence of money laundering is an independent and a separate
offence, on the scheduled offence being put to rest either on the acquittal of
accused or at the closure of an FIR by way of quashing or closure report, the
jurisdiction of the Enforcement Directorate to proceed further, ends. Thus, any
action that may have been taken by the Enforcement Directorate, exercising
jurisdiction during the continuance of the scheduled offence would come to an
end on the closure of the FIR.
L.43. Ergo, the proceedings and coercive action taken under the ECIR, insofar
as it relates to the second FIR, is without jurisdiction and cannot subsist, subject
to liberty to the ED to seek revival at a later stage if the investigation in the
predicate offence is revived by a superior Court.
L.44. Taking into account that the PMLA does not even define or refer to the
term “ECIR”, and that the ECIR is merely an internal departmental document
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maintained for administrative purposes, the mere fact that an ECIR may relate
to “proceeds of crime” as an independent offence does not detract from the
position that every step taken pursuant thereto must necessarily relate to a
scheduled offence. Once the scheduled offence stands extinguished by a Court
of competent jurisdiction, ED cannot legitimately continue to exercise its civil
or coercive powers under the PMLA. To permit such continuation would
amount to allowing the ED to pursue a fictitious concept of “proceeds of crime”
where, in law, no crime survives.
L.45. Accordingly, all proceedings including coercive action taken by ED
pursuant to the ECIR stands quashed and ED is directed to restore status quo
ante in favour of respective petitioners.
M.
Analysis - Addendum to include first FIR
M.1. Submission on behalf of the petitioners is that the addendum dated 20th
August 2025 to the ECIR, incorporating the first FIR (FIR No. 279/2019), is
mala fide, unreasonable and arbitrary and, therefore, deserves to be quashed.
The principal arguments are that, firstly, the FIR was already in existence for
nearly two years prior to the registration of the ECIR in 2021 and was never
included as a scheduled offence until after the Cancellation Report in respect of
the second FIR had been filed in December 2022; secondly, the first FIR had
no link or nexus with the transactions forming the subject matter of the second
FIR and, if at all, ought to have triggered independent action; thirdly, no
“proceeds of crime” were generated from the first FIR and, therefore, in any
event, it could not furnish the basis for an investigation under the PMLA;
fourthly, except for Smt. Uma Devi, none of the accused in the second FIR are
even accused in the first FIR; and fifthly, the addendum was introduced in
August 2025, nearly four years after the ECIR was registered, with a view to
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reviving an ECIR which, according to the petitioners, stood legally
extinguished consequent upon acceptance of the Cancellation Report in the
second FIR.
M.2. Prior to assessing these submissions in the context of the facts of the
present case, three issues need to be clarified at the outset. First, whether the
ED is entitled to incorporate an addendum to an ECIR; second, whether the
ECIR is amenable to judicial review on the standards ordinarily applied to
administrative action; and third, whether the addendum can be challenged in
the present writ petitions or whether a separate petition is required to be filed.
M.3. On the first issue, there is no real contention advanced by the petitioners
that an addendum cannot be made to an ECIR. This, however, is qualified by
the contention that any such addendum would necessarily have to conform to
certain basic parameters, inter alia, that the scheduled offence sought to be
introduced by way of the addendum should bear a clear nexus with the prior
scheduled offence and form part of the “same transaction”; and that the
addendum must steer clear of unreasonableness, arbitrariness, mala fides,
illegality and disproportionality. To this extent, the submission of the ED is
accepted.
M.4. Reliance was placed by Mr. Anurag Jain, counsel for ED, on the following
decisions: Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), Rajinder Singh Chadha
(supra), IREO Pvt. Ltd. (supra), Angad Singh Makkar (supra), Pritpal Singh
(supra) and Sikander Singh (supra).
M.5. The stated position of the ED before the Supreme Court in Vijay
Madanlal Choudhary (supra), subsequently reiterated and echoed in several
decisions of the High Courts and the Supreme Court, that “an ECIR is an
internal document” of the ED and not a statutory document, has been pressed
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into service to support the proposition that there is no legal impediment to
incorporating other scheduled offences into the ECIR by way of an addendum.
M.6. On the third issue, namely whether a challenge to the addendum can only
be maintained by filing an independent substantive writ petition and not in the
present writ petitions, the matter requires consideration. The prayers in the writ
petitions essentially revolve around a challenge to the ECIR as it exists, which
would, therefore, necessarily include the addendum as well. Accordingly, in the
opinion of this Court, this objection does not require any elaborate deliberation.
Specific grounds in this regard have been raised in W.P.(C) 15406/2025,
W.P.(C) 15408/2025, W.P.(C) 15886/2025, W.P.(C) 15909/2025 and
W.P.(C) 1021/2026, and some of the writ petitions were also filed after the
addendum had been introduced in August 2025.
M.7. There is yet another aspect which bears consideration. The petitioners
have challenged the actions undertaken by the ED subsequent to the closure of
the predicate FIR on the foundational ground that, upon such closure, the ED
lacked jurisdiction to continue proceedings under the ECIR. The subsequent
incorporation of the addendum is itself an action undertaken in continuation of
the very ECIR whose subsistence is under challenge. Consequently, the
challenge to the ECIR and to the consequential actions emanating therefrom
would necessarily encompass the subsequent addendum as well. In such
circumstances, the petitioners cannot be compelled to institute a separate writ
petition merely because, during the pendency of the proceedings, the ED sought
to supplement the ECIR by way of an addendum.
M.8. The writ petitions, except W.P.(C) 9799/2023, were all filed after the
addendum had been introduced by the ED. They challenge the actions taken by
the ED subsequent to the closure of the predicate offence/second FIR on the
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ground of lack of jurisdiction. The subsequent addition of the first FIR by way
of the addendum would, therefore, also stand covered within the same
challenge. The objection that the addendum was required to be challenged by
way of a separate writ petition is merely hyper-technical and would not impede
the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India.
M.9. On the second issue, namely whether the settled tenets of administrative
law can be applied while exercising judicial review over an ECIR, it must at
the outset be noted that the ECIR now stands recognised, with the imprimatur
of the Supreme Court, as an internal administrative document of the ED. If
that
be
so,
being
an
administrative
action
undertaken
by
a
statutory/investigative/executive authority, it would certainly fall within the
purview of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. No
argument has been presented before this Court to contend that such action is
altogether immune from judicial review. The issue as to whether the challenge
is maintainable as a civil writ or criminal writ, and whether availability of an
alternative remedy would preclude the writ petitions from being entertained,
have already been dealt with in Sections ‘J’ and ‘K’ above, respectively.
M.10. On the aspect of the tenets of administrative law which may be employed
while assessing an ECIR in exercise of judicial review, certain decisions have
been cited by Mr. Dayan Krishnan, Senior Counsel appearing for one of the
petitioners, which may usefully be referred to as under:
i.In Krishnadatt Awasthy (supra), a 2025 decision of the Supreme Court,
the issue was considered by a three-Judge Bench in view of a split verdict
rendered by two learned Judges of the Supreme Court. The matter related
to the validity of appointments made to the posts of school teachers in a
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Panchayat. The conflict was between two foundational principles of
natural justice, namely, the rule against bias (nemo judex in causa sua) and
the right to a fair hearing (audi alteram partem). In the course of its
discussion, the Supreme Court usefully extracted the grounds of judicial
review articulated by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v.
Minister for the Civil Service, [1985] AC 374 (HL), which are extracted
as under:
“16. Judicial
review of administrative actions are
permissible on the grounds of illegality, unreasonableness
or irrationality and procedural irregularity [State of
A.P. v. McDowell & Co., (1996) 3 SCC 709; Tata
Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651; Council of
Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service, 1985 AC
374 (HL); Mohd. Mustafa v. Union of India, (2022) 1 SCC
294 : (2022) 1 SCC (L&S) 162] . Lord Diplock [Council of
Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service, 1985 AC
374 : (1984) 3 WLR 1174 (HL)] succinctly described each
of the aforementioned grounds for judicial review as under:
(Council of Civil Service Unions case [Council of Civil
Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service, 1985 AC 374 :
(1984) 3 WLR 1174 (HL)] , AC pp. 410-11)
“By “illegality” as a ground for judicial review I mean
that the decision-maker must understand correctly the
law that regulates his decision-making power and must
give effect to it. Whether he has or not is par excellence
a justiciable question to be decided, in the event of
dispute, by those persons, the Judges, by whom the
judicial power of the State is exercisable.
By “irrationality” I mean what can by now be succinctly
referred to as “Wednesbury [Associated Provincial
Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223
(CA)] unreasonableness”. It applies to a decision which
is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted
moral standards that no sensible person who had
applied his mind to the question to be decided could
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have arrived at it. Whether a decision falls within this
category is a question that Judges by their training and
experience should be well equipped to answer, or else
there would be something badly wrong with our judicial
system. To justify the court's exercise of this role, resort
I think is today no longer needed to Viscount Radcliffe's
ingenious
explanation
in Edwards v. Bairstow [Edwards v. Bairstow,
AC 14 : (1955) 3 WLR 410 (HL)] , of irrationality as a
ground for a court's reversal of a decision by ascribing
it to an inferred though unidentifiable mistake of law by
the decision-maker. “Irrationality” by now can stand on
its own feet as an accepted ground on which a decision
may be attacked by judicial review.
I have described the third head as “procedural
impropriety” rather than failure to observe basic rules
of natural justice or failure to act with procedural
fairness towards the person who will be affected by the
decision. This is because susceptibility to judicial
review under this head covers also failure by an
Administrative Tribunal to observe procedural rules
that are expressly laid down in the legislative instrument
by which its jurisdiction is conferred, even where such
failure does not involve any denial of natural justice. But
the instant case is not concerned with the proceedings
of an Administrative Tribunal at all.””
(emphasis added)
ii. Aside from the above, the landmark decision of the Supreme Court on
judicial review is Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651,
wherein the scope and parameters of judicial review were discussed.
Relevant paragraphs are extracted as under:
………
74. Judicial review is concerned with reviewing not the
merits of the decision in support of which the application for
judicial review is made, but the decision-making process
itself.
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75. In Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans
[(1982) 3 All ER 141, 154] Lord Brightman said:
“Judicial review, as the words imply, is not an appeal
from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the
decision was made.
***
Judicial review is concerned, not with the decision, but
with the decision-making process. Unless that
restriction on the power of the court is observed, the
court will in my view, under the guise of preventing the
abuse of power, be itself guilty of usurping power.”
In the same case Lord Hailsham commented on the purpose
of the remedy by way of judicial review under RSC, Ord. 53
in the following terms:
“This remedy, vastly increased in extent, and rendered,
over a long period in recent years, of infinitely more
convenient access than that provided by the old
prerogative writs and actions for a declaration, is
intended to protect the individual against the abuse of
power by a wide range of authorities, judicial, quasijudicial, and, as would originally have been thought
when I first practised at the Bar, administrative. It is not
intended to take away from those authorities the powers
and discretions properly vested in them by law and to
substitute the courts as the bodies making the decisions.
It is intended to see that the relevant authorities use their
powers in a proper manner (p. 1160).”
In R. v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex p Datafin plc
[(1987) 1 All ER 564] , Sir John Donaldson, M.R.
commented:
“An application for judicial review is not an appeal.”
In Lonrho plc v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry
[(1989) 2 All ER 609] , Lord Keith said:
“Judicial review is a protection and not a weapon.”
It is thus different from an appeal. When hearing an appeal
the Court is concerned with the merits of the decision under
appeal. In Amin, Re [Amin v. Entry Clearance Officer, (1983)
2 All ER 864] , Lord Fraser observed that:
“Judicial review is concerned not with the merits of a
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decision but with the manner in which the decision was
made…. Judicial review is entirely different from an
ordinary appeal. It is made effective by the court
quashing the administrative decision without
substituting its own decision, and is to be contrasted
with an appeal where the appellate tribunal substitutes
its own decision on the merits for that of the
administrative officer.”
………
77. The duty of the court is to confine itself to the question of
legality. Its concern should be:
1. Whether a decision-making authority exceeded its powers?
2. committed an error of law,
3. committed a breach of the rules of natural justice,
4. reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would
have reached or,
5. abused its powers.
Therefore, it is not for the court to determine whether a
particular policy or particular decision taken in the fulfilment
of that policy is fair. It is only concerned with the manner in
which those decisions have been taken. The extent of the duty
to act fairly will vary from case to case. Shortly put, the
grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to
control by judicial review can be classified as under:
(i) Illegality : This means the decision-maker must
understand correctly the law that regulates his decisionmaking power and must give effect to it.
(ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness.
(iii) Procedural impropriety.
The above are only the broad grounds but it does not rule out
addition of further grounds in course of time. As a matter of
fact, in R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex
Brind [(1991) 1 AC 696] , Lord Diplock refers specifically to
one development, namely, the possible recognition of the
principle of proportionality. In all these cases the test to be
adopted is that the court should, “consider whether
something has gone wrong of a nature and degree which
requires its intervention”.”
(emphasis added)
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M.11. Further, reference may usefully be made to the decision of the Supreme
Court in Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2025) 2 SCC 248.
Although the issue therein arose in the context of exercise of the power of arrest
under Section 19 of the PMLA, the Supreme Court expressly considered the
permissible scope of judicial review over the decision-making process of the
designated authority. It was observed that the Court is entitled to examine
whether the statutory conditions for exercise of power stand satisfied and
whether the authority has acted in accordance with law. A wrong application of
law or arbitrary exercise of statutory duty would render the decision-making
process illegal and warrant interference in exercise of judicial review. At the
same time, the Court cautioned that judicial review does not amount to a minitrial or a review on merits. The principles enunciated therein are, therefore,
instructive in delineating the parameters on which the decision-making process
of the ED may be tested. For ease of reference, the relevant paragraphs are
extracted as under:
“44. We now turn to the scope and ambit of judicial review
to be exercised by the court. Judicial review does not amount
to a mini-trial or a merit review. The exercise is confined to
ascertain whether the “reasons to believe” are based upon
material which “establish” that the arrestee is guilty of an
offence under the PML Act. The exercise is to ensure that
DoE has acted in accordance with the law. The courts
scrutinise the validity of the arrest in exercise of power of
judicial review. If adequate and due care is taken by DoE to
ensure that the “reasons to believe” justify the arrest in terms
of Section 19(1) of the PML Act, the exercise of power of
judicial review would not be a cause of concern. Doubts will
only arise when the reasons recorded by the authority are not
clear and lucid, and therefore a deeper and in-depth scrutiny
is required. Arrest, after all, cannot be made arbitrarily and
on the whims and fancies of the authorities. It is to be made
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on the basis of the valid “reasons to believe”, meeting the
parameters prescribed by the law. In fact, not to undertake
judicial scrutiny when justified and necessary, would be an
abdication and failure of constitutional and statutory duty
placed on the court to ensure that the fundamental right to
life and liberty is not violated.
………
64. A wrong application of law or arbitrary exercise of duty
leads to illegality in the process. The court can exercise their
judicial review to strike down such a decision. This would not
amount to judicial overreach or interference with the
investigation, as has been argued by DoE. The court only
ensures that the enforcement of law is in accordance with the
statute and the Constitution. An adverse decision would only
help in ensuring better compliance with the statute and the
principles of the Constitution.”
(emphasis added)
M.12. Further, reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court
in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, (1980) 2 SCC 471, wherein the Court
explained that an exercise of statutory power would be vitiated where it is
employed to achieve an object beyond the purpose for which it was entrusted,
or where considerations extraneous to the scope of such power impel the action.
The Court recognised such an exercise as a colourable exercise of power or
fraud on power, observing that where the true object sought to be achieved is
different from the legitimate purpose for which the power is conferred, the
resultant action is liable to be invalidated. Relevant observations are extracted
hereunder:
“9. The question, then, is what is mala fides in the
jurisprudence of power? Legal malice is gibberish unless
juristic clarity keeps it separate from the popular concept
of personal vice. Pithily put, bad faith which invalidates the
exercise of power — sometimes called colourable exercise
or fraud on power and oftentimes overlaps motives,
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passions and satisfactions — is the attainment of ends
beyond the sanctioned purposes of power by simulation or
pretension of gaining a legitimate goal. If the use of the
power is for the fulfilment of a legitimate object the
actuation or catalysation by malice is not legicidal. The
action is bad where the true object is to reach an end
different from the one for which the power is entrusted,
goaded by extraneous considerations, good or bad, but
irrelevant to the entrustment. When the custodian of power
is influenced in its exercise by considerations outside those
for promotion of which the power is vested the court calls
it a colourable exercise and is undeceived by illusion. In a
broad, blurred sense, Benjamin Disraeli was not off the
mark even in law when he stated: “I repeat . . . that all
power is a trust — that we are accountable for its exercise
— that, from the people, and for the people, all springs, and
all must exist”. Fraud on power voids the order if it is not
exercised bona fide for the end designed. Fraud in this
context is not equal to moral turpitude and embraces all
cases in which the action impugned is to effect some object
which is beyond the purpose and intent of the power,
whether this be malice-laden or even benign. If the purpose
is corrupt the resultant act is bad. If considerations, foreign
to the scope of the power or extraneous to the statute, enter
the verdict or impel the action, mala fides or fraud on
power vitiates the acquisition or other official act.”
(emphasis added)
M.13. No contention was advanced by counsel for ED or by the complainant
that, once the matter falls within the writ jurisdiction of this Court, the
administrative action of the ED cannot be tested on the recognised grounds of
judicial review. In fact, several judgments cited before this Court by learned
counsel appearing for all sides are themselves indicative of the fact that Courts
have entertained writ petitions and quashed proceedings under ECIRs or other
actions taken under the PMLA by applying principles which constitute the
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bulwark of judicial review.
M.14. The reference made by Mr. Vikas Singh, Senior Counsel, in this regard
to the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Satinder Singh Bhasin (supra)
is to be assessed. The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, upon
examining the scheme of the PMLA, held that since an ECIR is an internal
administrative document and not a statutory instrument akin to an FIR, its
contours are not fixed by any provision of the PMLA and, where the ED
receives material relating to new scheduled offences or further transactions
involving the same accused or entities controlled by them, it is entitled to
incorporate such information into its investigative record through addendums.
Paragraph 128 of the said decision is extracted as under for reference:
“128. The petitioner’s argument that addendums are
impermissible because the original ECIR was based on FIR
No. 353/2015 is fundamentally misconceived. Section 3
PMLA does not restrict offences arising from only one
scheduled offence. The test is the existence of “proceeds of
crime” connected with a scheduled offence, not the numerical
identity of the predicate FIR. If the accused is alleged to have
diverted or laundered funds arising from multiple
transactions, each giving rise to distinct scheduled offences,
those offences form independent predicates for PMLA
jurisdiction.”
M.15. It may, however, be noted that in Satinder Singh Bhasin (supra), the
contention was that the ECIR could not be founded upon FIRs which were
subsequently added, and that contention was held to be unsustainable. The case
is, therefore, distinguishable to the extent that, even if an addendum is legally
permissible, the question which remains is whether the particular addendum in
the present case passes muster when tested on the recognised parameters of
judicial review.
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M.16.
Having crossed the preliminary issues regarding quashing of the
addendum, or alternatively quashing of the ECIR proceedings as supplemented
by the addendum, it must now be examined whether the impugned addendum
is arbitrary, irrational, unreasonable, illegal, procedurally unfair or
disproportionate. The basic facts may be summarised thus. The first FIR was
registered in September 2019, whereas the second FIR was registered in
February 2021. The ECIR was registered in December 2021. Therefore, for the
period between September 2019 and December 2021, while the first FIR was
very much subsisting, as it continues to do even today, no ECIR was initiated
to the offences alleged therein as predicate offences. The explanation sought to
be advanced by Senior Counsel for the complainant is that the second FIR itself
recorded allegations that, taking advantage of the mental condition of Late Dr.
Mahendra Prasad, Smt. Uma Devi and Kanchana Rai had hatched a conspiracy
to appropriate valuable assets and had wrongfully and illegally confined the
complainant, Smt. Satula Devi, tortured and physically assaulted her as part of
the alleged criminal conspiracy.
M.17. It was further alleged that the accused persons used physical force to take
control of valuables and transfer them into their own names. This, according to
the complainant, constituted the underlying theme of the first FIR. It was
contended that, in 2019, the complainant had been unlawfully confined and
tortured and was not in a position to furnish the entire narrative, as was also
evident from the habeas corpus proceedings before this Court, pursuant to
which the first FIR came to be registered.
M.18. Mr. Anurag Jain’s submission was that the second FIR did not constitute
a separate cause of action but was in continuation of the alleged acts and
illegalities forming part of a continuous sequence of events. Since the entirety
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of the allegations had not been recorded in the first FIR, the complete narrative
was reflected in the second FIR, which was, according to the ED, a continuation
of the first FIR and, therefore, both FIRs ought to be read together. Moreover,
as Mr. Jain submitted, both FIRs pertain to the alleged misappropriation of the
estate of Late Dr. Mahendra Prasad and, therefore, cannot be regarded as
wholly independent and unrelated.
M.19. Similar submissions were advanced by Mr. Vikas Singh, Senior Counsel
for the complainant, who contended that both FIRs disclose allegations,
financial in character, that bear a ‘direct nexus’ with each other and are bound
together by a common thread. According to him, the events transpired on
account of the diminished mental capacity of Late Dr. Mahendra Prasad, of
which the accused persons allegedly took advantage, including by forging and
fabricating the Will dated July 2011 and assuming control over assets, including
those of the Aristo Group of Companies. Pursuant to the habeas corpus petition,
Smt. Satula Devi was released from confinement and an FIR came to be
registered. During the investigation, it allegedly transpired that Smt. Uma Devi
had used her proximity to Late Dr. Mahendra Prasad to exercise control over
his residence, staff and companies.
M.20. Mr. Vikas Singh, further submitted that the addendum stands justified in
terms of the decision of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in
Satinder Singh Bhasin (supra) and that the ED cannot be restrained or
restricted from incorporating such an addendum.
M.21. A perusal of the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Satinder
Singh Bhasin (supra) would show that it arose in the following facts and
circumstances. Satinder Singh Bhasin was one of the directors of a company
referred to as BIIPL, which was developing a large commercial project known
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as “Grand Venice” in Greater Noida, Gautam Buddha Nagar. An FIR was
registered under Sections 406/420 IPC in June 2015 alleging irregularities in
relation to the project. Thereafter, between 2015 and 2019, a large number of
similar FIRs came to be registered concerning the same project, alleging nondelivery of units, non-payment of assured returns, non-payment of invoices and
delay in handing over possession.
M.22. As regards the first FIR, the police submitted a final report opining that
the dispute was civil/commercial in nature and recommending closure. A
Protest Petition was filed and thereafter a supplementary chargesheet came to
be filed, pursuant to which Section 420 IPC was dropped and Section 406 IPC
was retained. Cognizance was taken of the chargesheet and summons were
issued. The Supreme Court thereafter consolidated the FIRs and directed that
the other charge-sheets would stand merged. While the proceedings in the
predicate FIRs were pending, the ED registered an ECIR in 2021. The petitioner
challenged the ECIR, contending that since the first predicate offence survived
only under Section 406 IPC, which is not a scheduled offence, no proceedings
under the PMLA could continue on the basis of subsequent FIRs. It was in this
context that the Court held that, an ECIR being an administrative document
whose contours are not statutorily circumscribed, offences arising from
subsequent FIRs which disclose distinct scheduled offences could also form the
predicate basis of the ECIR.
M.23. The fundamental distinguishing feature between Satinder Singh Bhasin
(supra) and the present matter is that in the former there were subsequent FIRs
concerning the same project, which had been clubbed together by the Supreme
Court and were to be investigated in a composite manner on the basis of
substantially similar allegations. It was in those circumstances that continuation
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of the ECIR proceedings on the strength of subsequent predicate offences of a
similar nature was found permissible.
M.24. In the present matter, however, the first FIR pre-dated the ECIR and
continued to subsist for nearly six years before the addendum was sought to be
introduced. The ED cannot, therefore, be permitted to take the position that it
may turn the clock backwards and selectively draw upon an earlier predicate
offence in order to sustain an existing ECIR after the original predicate offence
has ceased to subsist. If such a course were to be accepted without limitation, it
would confer an untrammelled licence upon the ED to continually rope in prior
FIRs, even where the connection is tenuous or founded upon a slender factual
thread, merely to keep an ECIR alive.
M.25. One further aspect, which was specifically highlighted by Mr. Siddharth
Agarwal, Senior Advocate, needs to be noticed. The ED, in its written
submissions filed before this Court on 11th February 2026, stated that it came
to know of the first FIR only in July 2025. Mr. Agarwal submitted that the
material on record does not bear out this assertion. On the contrary, the second
FIR, on the basis of which the ECIR was registered, itself contains a reference
to the first FIR. The Cancellation Report also refers to the first FIR. More
significantly, the counter-affidavit filed by the ED in W.P.(C) 9799/2023
expressly records both the registration of the first FIR and the filing of the
chargesheet therein.
M.26. No explanation was forthcoming on behalf of the ED in this regard.
Paragraph 10 of the counter-affidavit dated 8th August 2023 filed on behalf of
the ED in W.P.(C) 9799/2023 categorically records that “another FIR No. 279
dated 21st September 2019 was registered against Smt. Uma Devi… on the
basis of a complaint filed by Smt. Satula Devi”. Thus, even if the statement
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made in the written submissions that the ED acquired knowledge of the first
FIR only in July 2025 is treated as an inadvertent error, the ED’s own counteraffidavit establishes that it was aware of the first FIR at least as early as August
2023. Despite such knowledge, no ECIR was registered on the basis of the said
FIR, nor was it sought to be incorporated into the existing ECIR at that stage.
The addendum came to be issued only in August 2025, after the Protest Petition
against the Cancellation Report in respect of the second FIR had been
dismissed.
M.27. The conduct of the ED in this regard is found wanting and raises serious
concerns. The chronology assumes particular significance when viewed in
conjunction with the other circumstances noticed above. Despite being aware
of the first FIR at least since 2023, the ED did not seek to rely upon it as a
predicate offence until after the very FIR forming the original substratum of the
ECIR had been brought to an end. This circumstance further fortifies the
conclusion of this Court that the impugned addendum is vitiated by illegality,
procedural impropriety, irrationality and a colourable exercise of power.
M.28. From the filing of the Cancellation Report in respect of the second FIR
in December 2022 until its acceptance in June 2025, there was not even a
suggestion from the ED that the first FIR furnished any basis for its inclusion
in the existing ECIR. The ED acted only after the Cancellation Report in the
second FIR had been accepted and thereafter issued the addendum in August
2025. Having already held above that, upon acceptance of the Cancellation
Report, the predicate offence forming the foundation of the second FIR stood
extinguished and the proceedings under the ECIR, as originally registered,
could not continue to subsist, the issuance of an addendum, after such an event,
assumes significance. By issuing an addendum, to an ECIR whose original
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substratum had ceased to exist, the ED was, in effect, seeking to breathe life
into a proceeding which had lost its foundational basis.
M.29. The issuance of an addendum to such an ECIR is, in the opinion of this
Court, without jurisdiction, illegal, and procedurally irregular. Nothing
prevented the ED from independently registering an ECIR in relation to the first
FIR, which admittedly continues to subsist, if the statutory requirements for
doing so were otherwise satisfied. It chose not to do so, for reasons best known
to it. Having instead issued the addendum after the Cancellation Report had
been accepted, lends substance to the petitioners’ contention that an attempt
was made to somehow preserve the existing ECIR and, consequently, retain the
coercive powers available under the PMLA, including those relating to search,
seizure, freezing and attachment. It is another matter that consequential
coercive actions undertaken by the ED have, at different stages, been interdicted
by orders of this Court.
M.30. Putting aside, for the moment, the issue of seeking to revive proceedings
under an ECIR which, according to the petitioners, had ceased to subsist, the
contention of the ED and the complainant that the predicate offence in the first
FIR formed part of the “same transaction” and bore a clear nexus with the
predicate offence in the second FIR needs to be examined. The argument on
behalf of the ED essentially is, as noticed above, that the underlying theme of
both FIRs was the alleged illegal misappropriation of assets forming part of the
estate of Late Dr. Mahendra Prasad by Smt. Uma Devi and others. While the
second FIR related to the alleged misappropriation of shares and monies lying
in bank accounts, the first FIR related to the alleged misappropriation of
jewellery and the insertion of Smt. Uma Devi’s name in the passports as the
wife of Late Dr. Mahendra Prasad. While the offence under Section 12 of the
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Passports Act is not a scheduled offence, the other aspects would require
consideration.
M.31. The first FIR was registered by P.S. Crime Branch against Smt. Uma
Devi on the basis of the statement of Late Smt. Satula Devi that she had been
illegally confined by Smt. Uma Devi and that her ornaments had been stolen. A
chargesheet
in
the
matter
was
filed
under
Sections
323/344/406/509/411/34/420 IPC and Section 12 of the Passports Act
against Smt. Uma Devi and five others, who were stated to be domestic helps.
There was no allegation of siphoning of funds. It was argued on behalf of the
petitioners that no “proceeds of crime” were generated since the jewellery stood
recovered and, therefore, no investigation under the PMLA ensued. Moreover,
charges have not been framed as yet.
M.32. The second FIR related to the alleged transfer of shares and monies in
favour of Kanchana Rai and her minor sons during the period 2015 to 2017 by
allegedly forging signatures on various documents. Smt. Uma Devi was
amongst the several accused in the said FIR. The scheduled offences in the first
FIR, as pointed out by Senior Counsel for the petitioners, are only Sections 411
and 420 IPC. As regards Section 420 of IPC read with Section 12 of the
Passports Act, the allegation is that Smt. Uma Devi falsely represented herself
as the wife of Late Dr. Prasad. It has been argued that no “proceeds of crime”
could have been generated from the said allegation, and this assertion, ex facie,
cannot be brushed aside. Section 411 IPC was invoked on the allegation that
the ornaments belonging to Smt. Satula Devi and Renuka Devi had been stolen
by Smt. Uma Devi. As per the chargesheet, the said jewellery was recovered
during the course of investigation.
M.33. The Court has perused the chargesheet and finds that the following has
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been stated:
“It is pertinent to mention here that all the above said
jewellery and other articles recovered at the instance of Smt.
Uma Devi had been recovered from an unlocked wooden
almirah from a room, said to be used by Smt. Satula Devi and
Smt. Renuka Devi at House No.4, Safdarjung Lane, Delhi. It
must be pointed out here, that both Smt. Satula Devi and Smt.
Renuka Devi had been kept at Harit Nilaya Farmhouse,
Fatehpur Beri for a long time. It has been found during
investigation that the two ladies had been brought to House
No.4, Safdarjung Lane, Delhi very recently, after the Habeas
Corpus Petition had been filed by Sh. Ranjit Sharma in the
Hon’ble Delhi High Court, who is son of Smt. Satula Devi.”
(emphasis added)
M.34. It would now be necessary to test these issues against the judicial
precedents cited by the parties. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners
relied upon Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao (supra), a 1963 decision of the
Supreme Court which considered the test for determining when offences may
be regarded as forming part of the “same transaction”. The Supreme Court was
considering the trial of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 for different offences, the
matter having reached the Supreme Court in proceedings concerning
enhancement of sentence. The Court examined the provisions relating to joint
trial under Sections 239 and 235(1) Cr.P.C. In that context, the Supreme Court
observed as under:
“25…What is meant by ‘same transaction’ is not defined
anywhere in the Code. Indeed, it would always be difficult to
define precisely what the expression means. Whether a
transaction can be regarded as the same would necessarily
depend upon the particular facts of each case and it seems to
us to be a difficult task to undertake a definition of that which
the Legislature has deliberately left undefined. We have not
come across a single decision of any Court which has
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embarked upon the difficult task of defining the expression.
But it is generally thought that where there is proximity of
time or place or unity of purpose and design or continuity of
action in respect of a series of acts, it may be possible to infer
that they form part of the same transaction.”
(emphasis added)
M.35. In State of Jharkhand v. Lalu Prasad Yadav (supra), a 2017 decision
of the Supreme Court, various defalcations and transactions allegedly
undertaken by the accused in relation to the Animal Husbandry Department
were considered. The Court held, in the context of Sections 218 and 219
Cr.P.C., that the defalcations did not constitute the “same transaction” since
they concerned different treasuries, different years and amounts, and different
allotment letters, supply orders and suppliers. The provisions relating to the
“same transaction” were, therefore, held not to be attracted. Importantly, the
Court also noted that “they are different sets of accused persons in different
cases with respect to defalcation”.
M.36. It was further pointed out that there is a distinction between clubbing of
cases and clubbing of FIRs, and reliance was placed upon T.T. Antony (supra),
where the Supreme Court held that a single FIR ought to be registered in respect
of offences committed in the course of the “same transaction”. Applying those
principles, it was argued that since the allegations in the two FIRs arise from
entirely different transactions, the question of clubbing the FIRs and, by
necessary implication, incorporating them into the same ECIR could not arise.
This aspect may, however, not require any elaborate deliberation, considering
that the second FIR was registered considerably later and arose from a
materially different set of allegations, notwithstanding that both originated from
disputes involving Smt. Satula Devi and other members of the family. The first
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FIR principally concerned allegations against Smt. Uma Devi, whereas the
second FIR implicated a substantially wider set of persons, including her
daughter-in-law, grandchildren, brother-in-law, directors, a personal Assistant
and an employee.
M.37. In the 2024 decision of the Bombay High Court in Sagar Maruti
Suryawanshi v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., the Court was dealing with an
applicant arraigned in an ECIR registered in Mumbai while considering his
application for bail. In the context of subsequent FIRs being incorporated into
an existing ECIR, the Court observed as under:
“44. The test for subsummation of subsequent FIRs would be
whether the genesis of the subsequent FIRs and the prior one
is, one of the same. If the subsequent FIRs have their genesis
in the same transaction, in respect of a facet of which a prior
FIR was registered then, in my considered view, the fact that
the prior FIR resulted in a closure report or the proceedings
therein were otherwise terminated, may not necessarily
render the investigation into the offence of money laundering
non est, if the subsequent FIRs disclose the process or activity
connected with the proceeds of crime, as the ultimate test is
the existence of the proceeds of crime.”
(emphasis added)
M.38. The ED and the complainant sought to connect the two FIRs by
contending that they form part of a continuous sequence of events and arise
from an overarching course of conduct. However, similarities in the parties
involved, or the existence of a broader familial dispute, cannot, by themselves,
render otherwise distinct alleged offences, part of the “same transaction”. The
allegations forming the substratum of the first FIR and the second FIR are
materially different. The persons proceeded against are not the same. There is
no direct nexus between these two sets of offences registered under separate
FIRs, except that the complainant is common. Neither would they fall within
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the factual schematic of Satinder Singh Bhasin (supra) nor within the test laid
down in Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao (supra). In fact, the Supreme Court in
Lalu Prasad Yadav (supra) also did not consider the various defalcations for
which the accused was charged as constituting the “same transaction”.
M.39. The other aspects which Mr. Vikas Singh, Senior Counsel, stressed upon
were the medical circumstances of the complainant, which, according to him,
led to the second FIR being lodged in continuation of the first FIR. The
diminished mental conditions of Late Dr. Mahendra Prasad have been cited as
the common thread. The Court is consciously not adverting to these issues,
considering that they pertain to the factual merits of the underlying disputes and
would fall for determination in the respective proceedings in which they arise.
The issue before this Court is a narrow one, i.e., whether the first FIR could,
after a period of six years, be incorporated into an ECIR which itself stood
asphyxiated by the legal demise of the underlying FIR/predicate offence.
M.40.
Even
in Rajinder
Singh
Chadha (supra)
and IREO
Private
Limited (supra), it was contended that the additional FIRs were subsequent
FIRs relating to the “same transaction”. Relevant portions of these judgements
are as under:
i) In IREO Private Limited v. Directorate of Enforcement (supra), the
Punjab and Haryana High Court rejected the contention that a
subsequently registered FIR could not be incorporated into an existing
ECIR, observing that there was no express prohibition under the PMLA
against such inclusion. The Court, therefore, recognised that a
subsequent FIR may, in principle, be added to an existing ECIR. The
factual position here is, however, distinguishable: the first FIR pre-dated
the ECIR and was sought to be incorporated only after the predicate
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offence forming the original basis of the ECIR had ceased to subsist.
IREO did not consider whether an earlier FIR could be introduced by
way of an addendum in such circumstances. Relevant paragraph is
extracted as under:
“3.13 The learned senior counsels representing the petitioner
has failed to draw the attention of the Bench to any such
provision which debars the Court from adding a new FIR in
the existing ECIR. The provisions of the 2002 Act are
required to be interpreted in a manner which advance the
object sought to be achieved by the enactment. Hence, in the
absence of an express prohibition, it would not be
appropriate to hold that the subsequently registered FIR
cannot be included in the existing ECIR. Second Explanation
to Section 44 of the 2002 Act specifically provides for
inclusion of subsequent complaint. Similarly, the argument of
the learned senior counsels that the ED cannot solicit
information from the allottees lacks any substance because
Section 50 of the 2002 Act enables the Director to collect
information and material to locate the proceeds of crime.”
(emphasis added)
ii) Even in Rajinder Singh Chadha (supra), the additional FIRs taken on
record in the existing ECIR were subsequently registered FIRs. In
particular, the Court noted in paragraph 28 that FIR No. 49/2021,
registered subsequent to the ECIR, was taken on record by the ED in the
existing ECIR, inter alia, on the ground that it related to the “same
transaction” and involved the same accused persons. Relevant paragraph
is as under:
“28. It is pertinent to note that the aforesaid FIRs were
registered at the instance of investors who were aggrieved by
the non-completion of a project by the company. A perusal of
the aforesaid list of dates reflect that although the impugned
ECIR was registered initially on the basis of scheduled
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR
W.P.(C) 9799/2023 & connected petitions
10:36:56
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offences registered vide FIR No. 16/2018 dated 24.01.2018
which stood compounded vide order dated 19.11.2019, the
second FIR No. 49/2021 which was registered on 12.03.2021
was taken on record in the impugned ECIR by the department
and the proceedings continued under the same. The
department chose not to register a separate ECIR, but took
on record the scheduled offences registered vide FIR No.
49/2021 in the same ECIR, inter alia, on the ground that it
related to the same transaction and involved the same
accused persons. The fact that FIR No. 49/2021 was taken on
record by the department in the present ECIR despite an
order of compounding and acquittal was not challenged by
the petitioner.”
(emphasis added)
M.41. In view of the conclusions already reached that the proceedings under
the ECIR itself stand quashed till subsequent revival of the predicate offence,
through a judicial diktat, it is unnecessary to return a definitive finding on
whether the two FIRs constitute the “same transaction”. However, the material
differences noticed above, including the nature of the allegations, the persons
accused, the property involved and the underlying transactions, significantly
weaken the asserted nexus relied upon to justify incorporation of the first FIR
into the existing ECIR.
M.42. The Court is of the opinion that the addendum cannot subsist for two
reasons. Firstly, proceedings under the ECIR which are sought to be kept alive
by the addendum, had itself ceased to legally subsist upon acceptance of the
Cancellation Report in respect of its original predicate offence, there being no
order of a superior Court reviving the said proceedings. Secondly, the issuance
of the addendum is vitiated by illegality and procedural impropriety and, in the
circumstances noticed above, bears the imprint of a colourable exercise of
power. The addendum was issued shortly after acceptance of the Cancellation
Digitally Signed
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W.P.(C) 9799/2023 & connected petitions
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Report in June 2025, nearly two-and-a-half years after the Cancellation Report
had originally been filed in December 2022, almost six years after registration
of the first FIR, notwithstanding that the investigation in the first FIR had
continued throughout this period. The disputes between the parties have
remained heavily contested between different factions of the family. In
circumstances where rival factions continue to contest rights over a substantial
estate, successive allegations and proceedings may inevitably proliferate. This
circumstance, however, cannot by itself furnish a sufficient legal basis for
indefinitely expanding the scope of an ECIR by adding previously registering
predicate offences merely because some factual strand may be discerned
between them.
M.43. In the event that the ED considered that the first FIR disclosed a
scheduled offence generating “proceeds of crime”, nothing prevented it from
proceeding in accordance with law at the appropriate stage. The first FIR was
registered in 2019 and the chargesheet was subsequently filed. If the ED
considered that there existed “proceeds of crime” which required investigation
and preservation through attachment, freezing or seizure, appropriate steps
could have been initiated at the relevant time. The fact that no ECIR was
registered on the basis of the first FIR for almost six years, despite the disputes
between the parties being repeatedly agitated before various Courts, is a
circumstance which assumes significance while examining the timing and
purpose of the impugned addendum. It lends support to the petitioners’
contention that the first FIR had not previously been treated by the ED as
furnishing an independent basis for investigation of “proceeds of crime” under
the PMLA.
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR
W.P.(C) 9799/2023 & connected petitions
10:36:56
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M.44. Whether the entirety of the jewellery was recovered and secured by the
police during investigation of the first FIR is a disputed factual issue which
need not be determined or commented upon by this Court in the present
proceedings. What is material for the present purpose is that the addendum was
sought to be incorporated into an ECIR whose original substratum had already
ceased to subsist. On that ground alone, the addendum cannot survive.
M.45. All coercive steps taken pursuant to and in respect of the addendum to
the ECIR cannot subsist, are quashed, and status quo ante is to be restored qua
the respective petitioners.
CONCLUSION
N.1. To sum up, basis the deliberation and analysis above, this Court arrives at
the following conclusions and issues the following directions:
i. This Court has jurisdiction in a Civil Writ Petition to consider a challenge
to an ECIR instituted by the Enforcement Directorate and to the
proceedings emanating therefrom, including steps taken under Section
17(1) of the PMLA.
ii. The challenge raised by the petitioners is entertainable by this Court in
exercise of its writ jurisdiction, and the petitioners need not be relegated
to the alternative remedy before the Adjudicating Authority, as contended
by the ED and the complainant.
iii. The ED cannot initiate or continue any proceedings under the said
ECIR/DLZO/II/72/2021, including investigation in connection with FIR
No. 27/2021 (second FIR), unless and until any further orders are passed
by this Court or by a superior Court for revival of the investigation of the
predicate offence. All consequential proceedings, including coercive
action, emanating from the said ECIR/DLZO/II/72/2021 stand quashed.
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR
W.P.(C) 9799/2023 & connected petitions
10:36:56
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Status quo ante be restored in favour of the respective petitioners.
iv. Addendum dated 20th August 2025 to the ECIR/DLZO/II/72/2021
seeking to initiate PMLA proceedings, qua FIR No. 279/2019 (first FIR)
as an additional scheduled offence, is legally unsustainable. All
consequential proceedings, including coercive action, emanating pursuant
to the addendum are quashed. Status quo ante be restored in favour of the
respective petitioners.
N.2. Accordingly, the writ petitions are disposed of in terms of the above.
N.3. Pending applications, if any, be rendered as infructuous.
N.4. Judgement to be uploaded to the website of this Court.
(ANISH DAYAL)
JUDGE
AUGUST 18, 2026/sm/ak/tk
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR
W.P.(C) 9799/2023 & connected petitions
10:36:56
Page 115/115
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