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2026:JHHC:5862
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Cr.M.P. No.2686 of 2025
-------------Shri Yash Jalan, aged about 30 years, son of Shri. Mahesh
Kumar Jalan, resident of 1, Ballygunge Park Road, 11C&D,
Ballygunge,
P.O.
Ballygunge,
P.S.
Ballygunge,
District: Kolkata-700019, West Bengal
…
…
Petitioner
Versus
Directorate of Enforcement through its Assistant Director,
having it Zonal Office, Plot No.1502/B, Airport Road, P.O. &
P.S. Airport Road, District: Ranchi-834002.
…
…
Opp. Party
------CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
------For the Petitioner
: Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate
Mr. Ajay Kumar Sah, Advocate
For the Opp. Party
: Mr. Amit Kumar Das, Advocate
Mr. Saurav Kumar, Advocate
-----C.A.V. on 04.02.2026
Pronounced on 25.02.2026
1.
The instant criminal miscellaneous petition has
been filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 for quashing the entire criminal
proceedings in connection with ECIR Case No.04 of 2022
arising out of ECIR/RNZO/03/2022 including the order
taking cognizance dated 17.07.2025 passed by the learned
Special
Judge,
P.M.L.
Act,
Ranchi,
whereby
and
whereunder, learned Special Judge, has been pleased to
take cognizance under Sections 3 and 70 of the PML Act
and further directed the office to issue summon against the
accused/petitioner.
2026:JHHC:5862
Factual Matrix
2.
The prosecution case, in brief, is that: (a)
The alarming issue of illegal mining and its
impact on the environment in the Sahebganj area
has also drawn the attention of the National Green
Tribunal (NGT), Principal Bench, New Delhi, as
observed in the case of Sayyed Arshad Nasar v.
Union of India & others. In this case, damage
assessment committee was established and tasked
with
submitting
a
comprehensive
report
encompassing various parameters. Furthermore, the
NGT, in an order dated 05.12.2019, explicitly
remarked that "it is more than evident that the State
machinery
and
the
regulatory
authorities
had
allowed a free run to the operation of mines and
crusher units resulting in the present sordid
condition.
(b)
Moreover,
in
accordance
with
the
report
submitted to the Hon'ble NGT, it is explicitly stated
that 125 First Information Reports have been filed
against various persons for offences related to illegal
mining, storage, and transportation.
(c)
Despite numerous First Information Reports
being lodged regarding illegal mining in Sahebganj
and its adjacent regions, such unlawful activities
2026:JHHC:5862
persist unabated. The investigation has unveiled
significant illegal mining operations in Sahebganj,
Jharkhand,
accompanied
by
the
illicit
transportation of minerals via roads, railways, and
inland vessels. Investigation has revealed that the
syndicate
utilized
substantial
quantities
of
explosives to conduct illegal blasting.
(d)
This unlawful blasting occurred
both in
entirely unlicensed mining sites and within licensed
mining leases where it far exceeded the legally
permitted
geographical
boundaries
and/or
extraction quotas.
(e)
These activities are substantiated by several
First Information Reports filed for offences under
Sections 411 and 414 as well as various other
sections of the IPC, in addition to offences under
Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act,
1908, and Section 8 of the Environment Protection
Act, 1986, all pertaining to illegal mining as
previously
mentioned
and
are
also
designated
offences under the PMLA.
(f)
To unearth the broader context and conduct a
comprehensive investigation, the said 50 First
Information Reports relied upon were consolidated
into the existing ECIR.
2026:JHHC:5862
(g)
Furthermore, the issue of illegal mining and its
environmental ramifications is under investigation,
taking into account the NGT's observations and
various First Information Reports related to illegal
mining.
(h)
On the aforesaid facts prosecution complaint
was filed in the court of Learned Special Judge
P.M.L.
Act,
Ranchi
and
the
same
has
been
registered as ECIR 04/22. The main prosecution
complaint
and
subsequent
supplementary
prosecution complaint has been filed are: a) Original Prosecution Complaint (PC):
Filed against Pankaj Mishra (A-1), Bachhu Yadav
(A-2), and Prem Prakash (A-3) on 16.09.2022.
b) Ist Supplementary Prosecution Complaint (SPC-1)
Filed against Pashupati Yadav (A-1) on 19.06.2023.
c) IInd Supplementary Prosecution Complaint (SPCII):
Filed against Krishna Kumar Saha (A - 5) Bhagwan
Bhagat (A-6), and Tinkal Kumar Bhagat (A-7) on
02.09.2023.
d) IIIrd
Supplementary Prosecution Complaint
(SPC-III):
Filed
against
Sunil
Yadav
(A-8)
and
M/s
Singhwahini Transports and Logistics (A - 9) on
20.10.2023.
e)
IVth
Supplementary
(SPC-IV):
Prosecution
Complaint
2026:JHHC:5862
Filed against Rahul Yadav (A-10) and M/s Maya
Holiday Inn (A-11) on 01.03.2024.
f) Vth Supplementary Prosecution Complaint (SPCV):
Filed against the accused persons including the
present petitioner arraigning him as accused no. A19 alleging therein that investigation has revealed
that Pankaj Mishra, by leveraging his political
influence,
orchestrated
a
massive
criminal
syndicate that was systematically engaged in illegal
mining,
transportation,
and
extortion
in
the
Sahibganj district of Jharkhand. This criminal
enterprise generated huge proceeds of crime,
estimated to be in excess of ₹1000 Crores, through
the commission of scheduled offences. These Illicit
funds were then laundered through a complex web
of financial transactions involving the accused
persons herein and their associated entities to
conceal their criminal origin and project them as
untainted property.
The accused persons arraigned in this complaint,
namely Rajesh Yadav Dahu Yadav (A-12), Heera Lal
Bhagat (A-13), Bishnu Prasad Yadav (A-14), Pavitra
Kumar Yadav (A-15), Nimay Chandra Shil (A-16),
M/s Marine Infralink Logistics Pvt. Ltd. (A-17), M/s
Rayadav Transportation Pvt. Ltd. (A-18), and Shri
Yash Jalan (A-19) acted as key operatives and
facilitators of this syndicate. They were knowingly
and directly involved in various processes and
activities connected with the proceeds of crime.
2026:JHHC:5862
This included the generation of PoC through illegal
mining, its concealment in the form of cash; its use
in acquiring assets, and its integration into the
formal economy through a web of corporate
entities. Specifically, entities like M/s Marine
Infralink Logistics Pvt. Ltd. (A-17), through its
director Shri Yash Jalan (A-19), knowingly provided
critical logistical support by supplying the vessel
M.V. Infralink-III for the illegal transportation of
minerals.
Furthermore,
Transportation
Pvt.
Ltd.
M/s
(A-18),
Rayadav
a
company
controlled by the family of the key operative Rajesh
Yadav (A-12), was used as a corporate vehicle to
hold and launder the syndicate's illicit funds.
(i)
During the investigation, proceeds of crime
were identified and seized. This includes unexplained
cash of Rs.3,49,51,900/- (Rupees Three Crores,
Forty-Nine
Lakhs,
Fifty-One
Thousand,
Nine
Hundred) from the premises of the accused herein.
Additionally,
bank
balances
amounting
Rs.2,47,67,174.17 (Rupees Two Crore Forty-Seven
Lakh Sixty-Seven Thousand One Hundred SeventyFour and Seventeen Paise) were frozen, which
includes a balance of Rs.63,39,452/- held in the
account of M/s Rayadav Transportation Pvt. Ltd. (A-
2026:JHHC:5862
18). Various high-value movable properties, which
were used as instrumentalities of the crime, were also
seized, including an inland vessel, M.V. Infralink-III,
operated by the syndicate and owned by the company
of Shri Yash Jalan (A-19), along with several
industrial stone crushers.
(j)
The investigation has established that the
accused persons have committed the offence of
money laundering as defined under Section 3 of the
PMLA, 2002, by knowingly being a party to the
processes and activities connected with the proceeds
of crime. Accordingly vide order dated 17.07.2025
cognizance has been taken by the learned special
Court.
(k) It has been averred in the petition that the
petitioner is absolutely innocent and has committed
no offence at all and has no connection with the said
incident by any stretch of imagination and further
there of violation Section 223
of BNSS because
before taking cognizance the opportunity of hearing
has not been given to the present petitioner,
therefore,
the
entire
criminal
proceeding
in
connection with ECIR Case No.04 of 2022 arising out
of ECIR/RNZO/03/2022 including the order taking
2026:JHHC:5862
cognizance dated 17.07.2025 be quashed and set
aside.
3.
It is evident that FIR No. 85 of 2020 dated
22.06.2020 was registered by Barharwa Police Station,
Sahibganj District, Jharkhand under Section 147, 149,
341, 342, 323, 379, 504, 506 r/w 120-B of IPC, 1860
against Pankaj Mishra & Others on the basis of the
complaint of one Shri Sambhu Nandan Kumar who was
allegedly threatened and obstructed on 22.06.2020 by the
persons accused in the F.I.R. from participating in the
tender for Barharwa Toll. It was alleged by the complainant
that he was asked by the accused Pankaj Mishra over the
phone, not to participate in the tender, on the refusal of
which, he was attacked by the mob, at the behest of Pankaj
Mishra.
4.
A charge sheet bearing no. 231 of 2020 dated
30.11.2020 in connection with the aforementioned case
was filed before the Ld. Judicial Magistrate, Rajmahal,
Sahebganj under Section 147/149/341/323/504/506 of
the IPC against Eight Accused Persons.
5.
Further,
on
15.01.2021,
the
Learned
Judicial
Magistrate, Rajmahal, Sahebganj, took cognizance of the
Charge Sheet under Section 147/149/341/323 /504/506
of the IPC.
2026:JHHC:5862
6.
An
ECIR
No.
of
was
recorded
on
08.03.2022 by the Directorate of Enforcement based on FIR
No. 85 of 2020 dated 22.06.2020 lodged by Barharwa Police
Station, District Sahebganj, Jharkhand, as Section 120B is
a scheduled offence under Part A of Schedule to the PMLA,
2002.
7.
Accordingly, original prosecution complaint dated
16.09.2022 has been filed against the prime accused
namely Pankaj Mishra (A-1), Bachhu Yadav (A-2), and Prem
Prakash (A-3) and consequently, cognizance of the said
offences has been taken by the competent court on
20.09.2022 for the offence under Section 3 of PML Act
2002, punishable under Section 4 of the Act 2002.
Thereafter, series of prosecution complaint has been filed
against the accused persons and lastly Vth Supplementary
Prosecution Complaint (SPC-V) has filed against the
accused persons including the present petitioner arraigning
him as accused no. A-19 alleging therein that investigation
has revealed that Pankaj Mishra(A-1) by leveraging his
political
influence,
orchestrated
a
massive
criminal
syndicate that was systematically engaged in illegal mining,
transportation, and extortion in the Sahibganj district of
Jharkhand and this
criminal enterprise generated huge
proceeds of crime, in excess of ₹1000 Crores, through the
commission of scheduled offences and these Illicit funds
2026:JHHC:5862
were then laundered through a complex web of financial
transactions involving the accused persons including the
present petitioner herein and their associated entities to
conceal their criminal origin and project them as untainted
property.
8.
It has further been alleged that Shri Yash Jalan (A-
19) and other accused persons acted as key operatives and
facilitators of this syndicate. They were knowingly and
directly
involved
in
various
processes
and
activities
connected with the proceeds of crime. Specifically, entities
like M/s Marine Infralink Logistics Pvt. Ltd. (A-17), through
its director Shri Yash Jalan (A-19), knowingly provided
critical logistical support by supplying the vessel M.V.
Infralink-III for the illegal transportation of minerals.
During the investigation, proceeds of crime were identified
and
seized.
This
includes
unexplained
cash
of
Rs.3,49,51,900/- (Rupees Three Crores, Forty-Nine Lakhs,
Fifty-One Thousand, Nine Hundred) from the premises of
the accused herein.
consideration
the
Accordingly,
aforesaid
factual
taking
aspect
into
and
fact
unearthed during investigation vide the special Court vide
order
dated
17.07.2025
has
opined
that
since
the
cognizance has already been taken in this case, therefore,
prima facie case is made against the aforesaid accused
2026:JHHC:5862
persons including the present petitioner and accordingly
directed to issue the summons against them
9.
The instant petition has been filed for quashing of the
entire case and order dated 17.07.2025 on the ground that
the said order has been passed in the utter violation of
procedural mandate as stipulated in the Section 223 of the
BNSS.
Submission made on behalf of the petitioner
10.
Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner
has taken the following grounds for quashing of the entire
criminal proceedings including the order taking cognizance:
(a) Learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner
has
submitted that during the investigation, numbers
of
searches
constituted
were
by
conducted
the
E.D.
by
a
team
and
nothing
incriminating was recovered so far as the present
petitioner is concerned.
(b) It has been submitted that the petitioner is
absolutely innocent and
has committed
no
offence at all and has no connection with the
said incident by any stretch of imagination. The
opposite
party
has
falsely
implicated
the
Petitioner in the present case with an oblique
motive without any independent and Bonafide
application of mind.
2026:JHHC:5862
(c) He has submitted that the petitioner is not
even named in any of the First Information
reports, subject matter to ECIR Case No.04 of
2022 arising out of ECIR/RNZO/03/2022 and
the initiation of the present criminal case against
the
petitioner
by
filing
Vth
Supplementary
prosecution complaint is bad in law and liable to
be set aside.
(d) It has further been contended that on perusal
of order taking cognizance, it appears that order
as
has
been
passed
is
arbitrary
and
in
mechanical manner. The learned Special Judge
took cognizance in violation of the First Proviso
to Section 223 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023 (for short, “the BNSS”) since no
opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner
prior to taking such cognizance.
(e) Learned senior counsel contends that the
provision of affording an opportunity of hearing
to the accused prior to taking cognizance has
been introduced in the new regime of criminal
laws after the introduction of the BNSS and was
absent in its predecessor-statute, the Code of
Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.). It is argued that
the
said
provision
is
mandatory
and
any
2026:JHHC:5862
contravention of the same leads to curbing the
fundamental right to life and personal liberty,
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution
of India, of the accused.
(f) The learned counsel for the petitioner in order
to substantiate this limb of argument has placed
reliance upon the judgment rendered by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Kushal
Kumar
Agarwal
vs.
Directorate
of
Enforcement, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1221
wherein it was held that a complaint filed by the
Enforcement Directorate (ED) shall be governed
by Sections 200 to 204 of the Cr. P.C. and, as
such, the first proviso to Section 223(1) of the
BNSS, which has now replaced the Cr. P.C., and
the embargo incorporated therein is to be
complied with and in violation of the same, the
order taking cognizance has to be set aside.
(g) It has been contended that the finding of the
learned Special Court that since the cognizance
has already been taken in this case, therefore,
there is no requirement of pre-cognizance herein
in terms of Section 223 of the Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, is highly misconceived
and contrary to the judicial pronouncement as by
2026:JHHC:5862
filing 5th supplementary prosecution complaint,
new accused person is to be added to face the
trial and therefore, since the new accused
persons
are
to
be
added
by
way
of
5th
supplementary prosecution complaint, therefore
pre-cognizance herein is mandatory compliance
of the mandatory provision and due to violation
of the said mandatory provision,
the entire
criminal proceeding herein including the order
dated 17.07.2025 has already been vitiated.
(h) It has further been contended that the order
was passed without recording any subjective
satisfaction regarding issuance of process against
the accused persons. The co-accused have also
been granted bail by the various orders passed
by this Court.
(i) As per the Vth supplementary prosecution
complaint, it is alleged that the petitioner is an
accused Sahebganj (M) P.S. Case No. 84 of 2022,
which relates to the offence of illegal mining.
Even though this F.I.R. was not registered under
any
section
of
illegal
mining
or
illegal
transportation, but assuming the Sahebganj (M)
P.S. Case No. 84 of 2022 is registered for illegal
mining against the petitioner, the present ECIR
2026:JHHC:5862
is not maintainable against the petitioner as the
Sahebganj (M) P.S. Case No. 84 of 2022 has
already been quashed and set aside by the
Hon'ble High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi in
Cr.M.P. NO. 3504 of 2022 vide order dated
15.04.2024 and therefore as on date there is no
predicate
offence
is
pending
against
the
petitioner.
11.
Based upon the aforesaid grounds, learned counsel
for the petitioner has submitted that the entire criminal
proceeding in connection with ECIR Case No.04 of 2022
arising out of ECIR/RNZO/03/2022 including the order
taking cognizance dated 17.07.2025 may be quashed and
set aside.
Submission made on behalf of the Opp. Party-E.D.
12.
Mr. Amit Kr. Das, learned counsel for the Opp. Party-
E.D. has taken the following grounds in defending the order
impugned including the order taking cognizance: (a) Mr. Amit Kr. Das, learned counsel appearing for
the E.D. has vehemently opposed the prayer for
quashing
the
entire
criminal
proceeding
in
connection with ECIR Case No.04 of 2022 arising
out of ECIR/RNZO/03/2022 including the order
taking cognizance dated 17.07.2025.
2026:JHHC:5862
(b) He
has
further
submitted
that
series
of
prosecution complaints in the said case against
various individuals have been filed and entities
involved
in
the
illegal
mining
and
money
laundering.
(c) The original prosecution complaint was filed on
16.09.2022 against Pankaj Mishra (A-1), Bachhu
Yadav (A-2) and Prem Prakash (A-3). Subsequently,
the 1st Supplementary Prosecution Complaint was
filed on 19.06.2023 against Pashupati Yadav (A-4).
Lastly,
the
Vth
Supplementary
Prosecution
Complaint was filed on 30.06.2025 followed by the
2nd,
3rd
and
4th
Supplementary
Prosecution
Complaint against Rajesh Yadav @ Dahu Yadav (A12), Heera Lal Bhagat (A-13), Bishnu Prasad Yadav
(A-14),
Pavitra
Kumar
Yadav
(A-15),
Nimay
Chandra Shil (A-16), M/s Marine Infralink Logistics
Pvt. Ltd (A-17), M/s Rayadav Transportation Pvt.
Ltd. (A-18) and Yash Jalan (A-19), the present
petitioner.
(d) The petitioner's primary contention that the
proceedings are not maintainable as he is not an
accused
in
any
predicate
offence
is
legally
misconceived and irrelevant for a prosecution
under the PMLA, 2002. It is a settled position of
2026:JHHC:5862
law that the offence of money laundering under
Section 3 of the PMLA is an independent offence.
The statutory prerequisite is the existence of a
"criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence"
from which proceeds of crime are generated, not
that every person accused of money laundering
must also be an accused in the predicate FIR.
(e) In
the
instant
case,
the
investigation
is
predicated on FIR No. 85/2020, which includes the
scheduled offence of criminal conspiracy under
Section
120-B
of
the
IPC.
Furthermore,
the
investigation has subsumed over 50 other FIRs
detailing
a
massive
criminal
conspiracy
orchestrated by a syndicate led by Pankaj Mishra
(Accused No. 1). This syndicate was involved in
illegal
mining,
extortion,
and
transportation,
generating proceeds of crime estimated to be in
excess of Rs. 1000 Crores through the commission
of
scheduled
offences.
The
investigation
has
conclusively established that the petitioner and his
company, M/s Marine Infralink Logistics Pvt. Ltd.
(Accused No. 17), "knowingly assisted" in a critical
activity connected with these proceeds of crime,
thereby squarely falling within the ambit of Section
3 of the PMLA, 2002.
2026:JHHC:5862
(f) the petitioner's reliance on the quashing of FIR
No. 84/2022 is a misleading attempt to obfuscate
his role in the larger conspiracy. The PMLA
investigation is not predicated on this single FIR.
The core criminal activity that generated the
proceeds of crime is the large-scale illegal mining,
which is evidenced by numerous other subsisting
predicate
offences,
including
FIR
No.
63/21
(Section 307 IPC) and FIR No. 28/22 (Sections 307
& 120-B IPC).
(g) It has been contended that the petitioner's
claim of the transaction involving Rs. 2.75 Crores
being a
legitimate business
transaction is a
fallacious argument designed to give a colour of
legitimacy
to
the
proceeds
of
crime.
The
investigation has established a clear and direct
money trail proving that this amount was paid to
the petitioner's company, M/s Marine Infralink
Logistics Pvt. Ltd. (A-17), by M/s Singhwahini
Transport
&
Logistics
(A-9)
ie.
the
primary
operational arm of the syndicate. The accounts of
M/s Singhwahini Transport & Logistics (A-9) and
its partners were found to be repositories of illicit
funds, having received unexplained cash deposits
exceeding 20.67 Crores in the accounts of M/s
2026:JHHC:5862
Singhwahini
Transport
&
Logistics
and
its
partners.
(h) So far as the non-adherence of the mandate of
Section 223 is concerned in the present matter,
cognizance of the offence under PMLA was already
taken on 20.09.2022 in ECIR No. 04/2022, upon
the filing of the original Prosecution Complaint
against Pankaj Mishra and others. This judicial act
stands concluded and need not be repeated for
each subsequent accused.
(i) It has further been contended that under the
Explanation to Section 44(1)(ii) of the PMLA, any
supplementary complaint filed on the basis of
further investigation is deemed to be part of the
original complaint, whether or not the newly added
accused were named in the original complaint.
Therefore, the act of summoning the petitioner
based on the supplementary complaint is not a
fresh cognizance but a step taken post cognizance.
(j) Further contention has been made that grant of
bail to the accused/petitioner cannot made ipso
facto eligible to the accused for quashing of the
case under inherent power rather order granting
bail and quashing under 528 BNSS are the
provisions operating in the different field.
2026:JHHC:5862
(k) It has been contended that the instant petition
is being devoid of any merit, founded on a
misleading and selective presentation of facts and
constitutes a manifest abuse of the process of the
Court.
(l) As the controlling mind, the petitioner is
directly and vicariously liable for his company’s act
of knowingly assisting in an activity connected with
proceeds of crime and being a direct beneficiary
thereof.
(m)
Further, it has been contended that the
order which was passed by the learned Special
Judge, PMLA, Ranchi, after due application of
judicial mind to the voluminous and incriminating
evidence
presented
in
the
5th
Supplementary
Prosecution Complaint.
(n) It has further been contended that it is
incorrect on the part of the petitioner to say that
the petitioner is absolutely innocent and has
committed no offence at all and has no connection
with
the
said
incident
by
any
stretch
the
respondent-ED
of
imagination.
13.
Learned
counsel
for
has
submitted that in view of the aforesaid, no interference is
required and the instant case may be dismissed.
2026:JHHC:5862
Analysis
14.
This Court has heard learned counsel for the
parties and gone through the materials available on record.
15.
Before adverting into facts of the instant case it will
be profitable to discuss herein the ambit and scope of
inherent jurisdiction of the Court under Section 482
Cr.P.C./528 BNSS.
16.
The
powers
under
Section
Cr.P.C.
(corresponding section 528 BNSS) are the exception and
not the rule. Under this section, the High Court has
inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary
to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent the
abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the
ends of justice. But the expressions “abuse of process of
law” or “to secure the ends of justice” do not confer
unlimited jurisdiction on the High Court and the alleged
abuse of process of law or the ends of justice could only be
secured in accordance with law, including procedural law
and not otherwise. Reference in this regard may be taken
from the judgment as rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court
in the case of Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of
Maharashtra, (2019) 18 SCC 191.
17.
It is settled proposition of law that to invoke its
inherent
jurisdiction
under
Section
CrPC
(corresponding section 528 BNSS) the High Court has to be
2026:JHHC:5862
fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is
such that would lead to the conclusion that his/their
defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable
facts; the material produced is such as would rule out and
displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled
against the accused; and the material produced is such as
would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the
allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the
prosecution/complainant. Reference in this regard may be
taken by the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court
in the case of Rajiv Thapar and Others v. Madan Lal
Kapoor [(2013) 3 SCC 330] which reads as under:
“29. The issue being examined in the instant case is
the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482
CrPC, if it chooses to quash the initiation of the
prosecution against an accused at the stage of
issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even
at the stage of framing of charges. These are all
stages before the commencement of the actual trial.
The same parameters would naturally be available
for later stages as well. The power vested in the High
Court under Section 482 CrPC, at the stages referred
to
hereinabove,
would
have
far-reaching
consequences inasmuch as it would negate the
prosecution's/complainant's case without allowing
the prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. Such a
determination must always be rendered with caution,
care and circumspection. To invoke its inherent
jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC the High Court
has to be fully satisfied that the material produced by
the accused is such that would lead to the conclusion
that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable,
2026:JHHC:5862
and indubitable facts; the material produced is such
as would rule out and displace the assertions
contained in the charges levelled against the accused;
and the material produced is such as would clearly
reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations
contained
in
the
accusations
levelled
by
the
prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient to
rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled
by
the
prosecution/complainant,
without
the
necessity of recording any evidence. For this the
material relied upon by the defence should not have
been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably
refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable
quality. The material relied upon by the accused
should be such as would persuade a reasonable
person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of
the accusations as false. In such a situation, the
judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade
it to exercise its power under Section 482 CrPC to
quash such criminal proceedings, for that would
prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the
ends of justice.”
18.
In State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi
[(2005) 1 SCC 568] the powers of the High Court under
Section 482, Cr. P.C. and Article 226 of the Constitution of
India were highlighted and the Hon’ble Apex Court
observed that:
“29. Regarding the argument of the accused
having to face the trial despite being in a position
to produce material of unimpeachable character of
sterling quality, the width of the powers of the
High Court under Section 482 of the Code and
Article 226 of the Constitution is unlimited
whereunder in the interests of justice the High
Court can make such orders as may be necessary
2026:JHHC:5862
to prevent abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice within the
parameters laid down in Bhajan Lal case [1992
Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426].”
19.
In Rukmini Narvekar
v. Vijaya
Satardekar
[(2008) 14 SCC 1], the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed
that the width of the powers of the High Court under
Section 482, Cr.P.C. and under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India are unlimited, that the High Court
could make such orders as may be necessary to prevent
abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure
the ends of justice. In a concurring order passed in the very
same case, it was observed in addition that in exercising
jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr. P.C., the High Court is
free to consider even material that may be produced on
behalf of the accused to arrive at a decision whether charge
as framed could be maintained.
20.
In Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi),
Department of Home [(2019) 11 SCC 706], referring to
the provisions of Section 482, Cr. P.C., the Hon’ble Apex
Court held as follows:
“16. There is nothing in the words of this section
which restricts the exercise of the power of the Court
to prevent the abuse of process of court or miscarriage
of justice only to the stage of the FIR. It is settled
principle of law that the High Court can exercise
jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC even when the
discharge application is pending with the trial court
2026:JHHC:5862
[G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., (2000) 2 SCC 636, para
7 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 513. Umesh Kumar v. State of A.P.,
(2013) 10 SCC 591, para 20 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 338 :
(2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 237]. Indeed, it would be a
travesty to hold that proceedings initiated against a
person can be interfered with at the stage of FIR but
not if it has advanced and the allegations have
materialised into a charge-sheet. On the contrary it
could be said that the abuse of process caused by FIR
stands aggravated if the FIR has taken the form of a
charge-sheet
after
investigation.
The
power
is
undoubtedly conferred to prevent abuse of process of
power of any court.”
21.
Thus, it is settled position in the exercise of this
wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a
proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the
proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of
the Court or that the ends of justice require that the
proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High
Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters,
is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is
that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to
degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In
a
criminal
case,
the
veiled
object
behind
a
lame
prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the
structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify
the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of
justice.
2026:JHHC:5862
22.
As can be gathered from the above, Section 482
Cr.P.C./528 BNSS recognizes the inherent powers of the
High Court to quash initiation of prosecution against the
accused to pass such orders as may be considered
necessary to give effect to any order under the Cr.P.C. or to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice. It is a statutory power vested in
the High Court to quash such criminal proceedings that
would dislodge the charges levelled against the accused and
based on the material produced, lead to a firm opinion that
the assertions contained in the charges levelled by the
prosecution deserve to be overruled.
23.
While exercising the powers vested in the High
Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C./528 BNSS whether at the
stage of issuing process or at the stage of committal or even
at the stage of framing of charges, which are all stages that
are prior to commencement of the actual trial, the test to be
applied is that the Court must be fully satisfied that the
material produced by the accused would lead to a
conclusion
that
their
defence
is
based
on
sound,
reasonable and indubitable facts. The material relied on by
the accused should also be such that would persuade a
reasonable person to dismiss the accusations levelled
against them as false.
2026:JHHC:5862
24.
In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled proposition
of law this Court is now adverting to the leading
contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties.
25.
It has been contended by the learned counsel for
the petitioner that he has not been named in the predicate
offence, therefore, culpability of the present petitioner in
the alleged offence under Section 3 of the PML Act 2002 is
not maintainable. Further, it has been contended that there
is clear violation of Section 223 of the BNSS and no
opportunity of hearing has been given to the Petitioner at
pre-cognizance stage and same is the sheer violation of the
natural justice. It has further been contended that the
petitioner is absolutely innocent and has committed no
offence at all and has no connection with the said incident
by any stretch of imagination.
26.
Per
contra,
the
learned
counsel
for
ED
has
contended that there is ample evidence against the present
petitioner and since the order dated 17.07.2025 has
passed. After due consideration of all the legal and factual
aspect, therefore no interference is required by this Court.
Further it has been contended that Act 2002 focuses on the
act of concealing or converting proceeds of crime, and those
who facilitate this process, even if they were not involved in
the original criminal activity, can still be prosecuted for
money laundering. It has further been contended that in
2026:JHHC:5862
the instant, cognizance of the offence under PMLA was
already taken on 20.09.2022 upon the filing of the original
Prosecution Complaint dated 16.09.2022 as such this
judicial act stands concluded and need not be repeated for
each subsequent accused. Further under the Explanation
to Section 44(1)(ii) of the PML Act 2002, any supplementary
complaint filed on the basis of further investigation is
deemed to be part of the original complaint, whether or not
the newly added accused were named in the original
complaint, therefore for issue of summoning process there
is no need to resort the procedure as per the mandate of
Section 223 BNSS.
27.
In the backdrop of the aforesaid contention of the
learned counsel for the parties and further taking into
consideration the factual aspect of the instant case, the
following issues are to be appreciated by this Court:
“(I) Whether as per the mandate of Section
223 BNSS, at pre-cognizance stage the
opportunity
of
hearing
to
the
petitioner/accused is required to be given
even in the cases where cognizance has
already been taken on 20.09.2022 on the
basis of original prosecution complaint?
(II)
Whether
in
the
instant
case
the
proceeding against the present petitioner is
2026:JHHC:5862
not maintainable as he is not an accused in
any predicate offence?
(III)
whether
prima
facie
the
sufficient
material is available in the instant case
against
the
petitioner
for
further
proceeding?”
Re: Issue No- I
28.
This Court has gone through the order taking
cognizance as well as various paragraphs of the counter
affidavit.
29.
To comprehend the conspectus of the issue, it
would be pertinent to reproduce Section 223 BNSS, which
reads as under:—
“223 : Examination of complainant(1) A Magistrate having jurisdiction while taking
cognizance of an offence on complaint shall
examine upon oath the complainant and the
witnesses present, if any, and the substance of
such examination shall be reduced to writing and
shall be signed by the complainant and the
witnesses, and also by the Magistrate:
Provided that no cognizance of an offence
shall be taken by the Magistrate without
giving the accused an opportunity of being
heard:
Provided further that when the complaint is made
in writing, the Magistrate need not examine the
complainant and the witnesses(a) if a public servant acting or purporting to act in
the discharge of his official duties or a Court has
made the complaint; or
(b) if the Magistrate makes over the case for inquiry
or trial to another Magistrate under section 212.
Provided …..
(2) …”
2026:JHHC:5862
30.
From the comprehensive reading of this Section, it
becomes evident that though under Section 200 Cr.
P.C. (now S. 223 BNSS) at the stage of pre-cognizance, no
Notice was required to be served upon the accused, this
aspect has undergone a change in Section 223 BNSS, to
which the proviso is added that no Cognizance of an Offence
can be taken without giving a prior opportunity to the
accused of being heard.
31.
Thus, Section 223 provides an added safeguard that
no cognizance shall be taken without affording the accused
an opportunity of being heard.
32.
At this juncture, it may be pertinent to understand
the meaning of word “cognizance” which was explained by
the
Apex
Court
in
Narayan
Das
Bhagwandas
Madhavdas v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1959 SC 111
that when a cognizance is taken of an offence, would
depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and
it is difficult to attempt to define what is meant by taking
cognizance.
33.
It is only when the Magistrate applies his mind for
the purpose of proceeding under Section 200 and subsections of Chapter XVI of Cr. P.C. or under Section 204 of
Chapter XVII, that the Court can be positively stated to
have applied his mind and taken cognizance.
2026:JHHC:5862
34.
Similarly, in Darshan Singh Ram Kishan v. State
of Maharashtra, (1971) 2 SCC 654 the Apex Court
reiterated the observations made in R.R. Chari v. State of
U.P., 1951 SCC 250. The cognizance involves application
of mind to the given facts to ascertain whether the Accused
needs
to
be
summoned.
The
purpose
of
recording
statements prior to taking cognizance, is only to ascertain if
any prima facie case is disclosed in the Complaint and
thereby enable taking of cognizance in appropriate cases
and
avoid
unnecessary
harassment
of
the
Respondent/Accused.
35.
From the express language of the Section 223 and
the aforesaid meaning of “Cognizance”, it is abundantly
evident that taking Cognizance of an Offence is the stage
when the Magistrate applies his mind to the Complaint for
the purpose of proceeding as per provisions of Chapter XVI
of BNSS.
36.
While under the erstwhile Section 200 Cr. P.C. and
S. 202 Cr. P.C. (which are para materia with Section 223
and 225 of BNSS), it was clear that till the stage of
Cognizance, the Accused had no role and it is only after the
Cognizance was taken that summons were issued to the
Accused. However, under the BNSS, there is a marked
change as a procedural safeguard has been incorporated by
way of first proviso to S. 223 (1) BNSS which mandates that
2026:JHHC:5862
no cognizance of an offence shall be taken by the
Magistrate without giving the accused an opportunity of
being heard.
37.
It requires to refer herein that it is a cornerstone of
criminal jurisprudence, reiterated in numerous judgments
by the Hon’ble Apex Court. In the case of S.K. Sinha,
Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International
Ltd. (2008) 2 SCC 492, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
clarified that cognizance is taken of the offence to initiate
proceedings, not of the individual offenders. For ready
reference the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment
is being quoted as under:
“18. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and
having perused the relevant provisions of law as also
various judicial pronouncements, we are of the view that
the High Court was in error in equating issuance of
process with taking cognizance by a criminal court and
in quashing the proceedings treating them as timebarred.
19. The expression “cognizance” has not been defined
in the Code. But the word (cognizance) is of indefinite
import. It has no esoteric or mystic significance in
criminal law. It merely means “become aware of” and
when used with reference to a court or a Judge, it
connotes “to take notice of judicially”. It indicates the
point when a court or a Magistrate takes judicial notice
of an offence with a view to initiating proceedings in
respect of such offence said to have been committed by
someone.
20. “Taking cognizance” does not involve any formal
action of any kind. It occurs as soon as a Magistrate
applies his mind to the suspected commission of an
offence. Cognizance is taken prior to commencement of
criminal proceedings. Taking of cognizance is thus a
sine qua non or condition precedent for holding a valid
trial. Cognizance is taken of an offence and not of an
offender. Whether or not a Magistrate has taken
cognizance of an offence depends on the facts and
circumstances of each case and no rule of universal
2026:JHHC:5862
application can be laid down as to when a Magistrate
can be said to have taken cognizance.
21. Chapter XIV (Sections 190-199) of the Code deals
with “Conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings”.
Section 190 empowers a Magistrate to take cognizance
of an offence in certain circumstances. Sub-section (1)
thereof is material and may be quoted in extenso:
“190. Cognizance of offences by Magistrates.—(1)
Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate
of the First Class, and any Magistrate of the Second
Class specially empowered in this behalf under subsection (2), may take cognizance of any offence—
(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute
such offence;
(b) upon a police report of such facts;
(c) upon information received from any person other than
a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such
offence has been committed.”
22. Chapter XV (Sections 200-203) relates to
“Complaints to Magistrates” and covers cases before
actual commencement of proceedings in a court or before
a Magistrate. Section 200 of the Code requires a
Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence to examine
the complainant and his witnesses on oath. Section 202,
however, enacts that a Magistrate is not bound to issue
process against the accused as a matter of course. It
enables him before the issue of process either to inquire
into the case himself or direct an investigation to be
made by a police officer or by such other person as he
thinks fit for the purpose of deciding whether there is
sufficient ground for proceeding further. The underlying
object of the inquiry under Section 202 is to ascertain
whether there is prima facie case against the accused. It
thus allows a Magistrate to form an opinion whether the
process should or should not be issued. The scope of
inquiry under Section 202 is, no doubt, extremely
limited. At that stage, what a Magistrate is called upon
to see is whether there is sufficient ground for
proceeding with the matter and not whether there
is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused.
23. Then comes Chapter XVI (Commencement of
proceedings before Magistrates). This Chapter will apply
only after cognizance of an offence has been taken by a
Magistrate under Chapter XIV. Section 204, whereunder
process can be issued, is another material provision
which reads as under:
“204. Issue of process.—(1) If in the opinion of a
Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence there is
sufficient ground for proceeding, and the case appears
to be—
(a) a summons case, he shall issue his summons for the
attendance of the accused, or
2026:JHHC:5862
(b) a warrant case, he may issue a warrant, or, if he
thinks fit, a summons, for causing the accused to be
brought or to appear at a certain time before such
Magistrate or (if he has no jurisdiction himself) some
other Magistrate having jurisdiction.
(2) No summons or warrant shall be issued against the
accused under sub-section (1) until a list of the
prosecution witnesses has been filed.
(3) In a proceeding instituted upon a complaint made in
writing, every summons or warrant issued under subsection (1) shall be accompanied by a copy of such
complaint.
(4) When by any law for the time being in force any
process-fees or other fees are payable, no process shall
be issued until the fees are paid and, if such fees are
not paid within a reasonable time, the Magistrate may
dismiss the complaint.
(5) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the
provisions of Section 87.”
24. From the above scheme of the Code, in our
judgment, it is clear that “Initiation of proceedings”,
dealt with in Chapter XIV, is different from
“Commencement of proceedings” covered by Chapter
XVI. For commencement of proceedings, there must be
initiation of proceedings. In other words, initiation of
proceedings
must
precede
commencement
of
proceedings. Without initiation of proceedings under
Chapter XIV, there cannot be commencement of
proceedings before a Magistrate under Chapter XVI. The
High Court, in our considered view, was not right in
equating initiation of proceedings under Chapter XIV
with commencement of proceedings under Chapter XVI.
30. Again
in
Narayandas
Bhagwandas
Madhavdas v. State of W.B. [AIR 1959 SC 1118 : (1960)
1 SCR 93] this Court observed that when cognizance is
taken of an offence depends upon the facts and
circumstances of each case and it is impossible to
attempt to define what is meant by taking cognizance.
Issuance of a search warrant for the purpose of an
investigation or a warrant of arrest of the accused
cannot by itself be regarded as an act of taking
cognizance of an offence. It is only when a Magistrate
applies his mind for proceeding under Section 200 and
subsequent sections of Chapter XV or under Section 204
of Chapter XVI of the Code that it can be positively
stated that he had applied his mind and thereby had
taken cognizance of an offence (see also Ajit Kumar
Palit v. State of W.B. [AIR 1963 SC 765 : 1963 Supp (1)
SCR 953] and Hareram Satpathy v. Tikaram
Agarwala [(1978) 4 SCC 58 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 496] )”
38.
Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that whether
or not a Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence
2026:JHHC:5862
depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and
no rule of universal application can be laid down as to
when a Magistrate can be said to have taken cognizance.
Further it is evident that “Initiation of proceedings”, dealt
with
in
Chapter
XIV
Cr.P.C.,
is
different
from
“Commencement of proceedings” covered by Chapter XVI
Cr.P.C. For commencement of proceedings, there must be
initiation of proceedings. In other words, initiation of
proceedings must precede commencement of proceedings.
Without initiation of proceedings under Chapter XIV, there
cannot
be
commencement
of
proceedings
before
a
Magistrate under Chapter XVI. Further when cognizance is
taken
of
an
offence
depends
upon
the
facts
and
circumstances of each case and it is only when a Magistrate
applies his mind for proceeding under Section 200 and
subsequent sections of Chapter XV or under Section 204 of
Chapter XVI of the Code that it can be positively stated that
he had applied his mind and thereby had taken cognizance
of an offence.
39.
Further, there is no dispute and same cannot be
disputed that the first proviso to Section 223(1) of BNSS
puts an embargo on the power of the Court to take
Cognizance upon a Complaint, by providing that no
Cognizance of an Offence shall be taken by the Magistrate
without giving the accused an opportunity of being heard.
2026:JHHC:5862
This proviso marks a substantive procedural safeguard that
did not exist under the earlier regime.
40.
But the question arises herein that whether the said
procedural safeguard is required to be followed in the cases
where the cognizance has already been taken on the basis
of the original prosecution complaint.
41.
In the backdrop of the aforesaid discussion this
Court is now re-adverting to factual aspect of the case.
42.
In the present case, the Ld. Special Court, PMLA,
Ranchi, had already taken cognizance of the offence of
money
laundering
in
ECIR
Case
No.
04/2022
on
20.09.2022 upon the filing of the original Prosecution
Complaint against Pankaj Mishra(A-1) and others. This was
the singular point at which the court first took judicial
notice of the offence.
43.
It requires to refer herein that a Supplementary
prosecution Complaint is in a Continuation of original
prosecution complaint and it is the outcome of the further
investigation. Herein the 5th Supplementary Prosecution
Complaint, through which the petitioner has been arrayed,
an accused is not a fresh complaint and the cognizance of
the offence has already been taken on 16.09.2022.
44.
It requires to refer herein that the Explanation to
Section 44(1)(ii) of the PMLA creates a legal fiction wherein
it has been mentioned that a complaint "shall be deemed to
2026:JHHC:5862
include any subsequent complaint in respect of further
investigation... against any accused person... whether
named in the original complaint or not."
45.
Therefore, the 5th prosecution complaint is legally
subsumed into the original complaint and the issuance of
summons against the petitioner is a procedural step under
Section 204 of the Cr.P.C. (now Section 227 of the BNSS)
which has to be taken in a case where cognizance of the
offence is complete.
46.
The petitioner's reliance on the proviso to Section
223 of the BNSS is fit to be accepted since, the cognizance
of the offence in the original Prosecution Complaint was
taken on 20.09.2022, long before the BNSS came into force
i.e. 01.07.2024, hence, the applicability of said proviso of
Section 223 BNSS cannot be applied retrospectively to
overturn a judicial act that was validly completed under the
earlier law. It is settled connotation of law as settled by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Hitendra Vishnu
Thakur vs. State of Maharashtra (1994) 4 SCC 602
wherein it has been observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court
that procedural laws are not retrospective unless expressly
stated. Therefore, provision of BNSS cannot applied herein
in order to invalidate a validly completed judicial process
under existing provision of Cr.P.C.
2026:JHHC:5862
47.
Furthermore, even if the BNSS were applicable, the
stage for a pre-cognizance hearing under Section 223 had
already passed in 2022 when the Ld. Court first applied its
judicial mind to the offence.
48.
Further it needs to refer herein that the Saving
Clause of BNSS i.e. Section 531(2)(a), excludes Pending
Investigations. Thus, the saving clause under Section
531(2)(a) of the BNSS mandates that where an investigation
was pending prior to the commencement of the BNSS on
01.07.2024, all subsequent proceedings, including the
taking of cognizance, shall be governed by the erstwhile
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
49.
In the instant case, the investigation commenced
with the recording of the ECIR on 08.03.2022. Therefore,
the provisions of the Cr.P.C., 1973 which do not provide for
a pre-cognizance hearing for the accused are applicable.
Therefore, the petitioner's argument on this ground is
therefore, the petitioner's argument seeking pre-cognizance
hearing is not fit to be accepted.
50.
So far as the applicability of the ratio rendered by
the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Kushal Kumar
Agarwal (supra)
is
concerned
wherein
the
Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that since the PMLA complaint was
filed after 1 July 2024, Section 223 BNSS shall apply,
2026:JHHC:5862
mandating an opportunity of hearing to the accused before
cognizance.
51.
It is evident from the factual aspects of the said case
that a complaint was filed under Section 44(1)(b) of the
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (hereinafter
referred to as “the PMLA”) on August 2, 2024 and the
appellant of the case was shown as accused in the
complaint. The Hon’ble Apex Court while taking into
consideration that prosecution complaint was filed on 02
August 2024 and cognizance of the offence was appeared to
be taken firstly on 20.11.2024 and by that BNSS has
already been enforced 01.07.2024, has quashed the
impugned order dated 20th November, 2024, on the ground
of non-compliance with the proviso to sub-section (1) of
Section 223 of the BNSS. But herein in the instant case
since cognizance of the offence has already been taken on
20.09.2022 by the competent Court after filing of the
original prosecution complaint dated 16.09.2022 and since
the cognizance has already been taken in this case the
learned trial court
aforesaid fact
taking into consideration of the
has passed the order dated 17.07.2025 with
observation that the prima facie case is made against the
aforesaid accused persons including the present petitioner
and thereafter trial court passed the order of issuance of
summons against them. Therefore, in the given fact and
2026:JHHC:5862
circumstances of the instant case the judgment rendered
by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Kushal Kumar
Agarwal (supra) on which reliance has been placed by the
learned Counsel for the petitioner, is not applicable herein.
52.
Further it needs to refer herein settled proposition
of law that the applicability of the judgment depends upon
the facts and circumstances of each and every case and
there cannot be any universal application of the judgment
rather each judgment is to be decided on the basis of fact of
each case. Reference in this regard may be taken from the
judgment as rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dr.
Subramanian Swamy vs. State of Tamil Nadu &
Ors., reported in (2014) 5 SCC 75, for ready reference, the
relevant paragraph is being quoted herein under:
"47. It is a settled legal proposition that the ratio of
any decision must be understood in the
background of the facts of that case and the case is
only an authority for what it actually decides, and
not what logically follows from it. The court should
not place reliance on decisions without discussing
as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact
situation of the decision on which reliance is
placed."
53.
Thus on the basis of discussion made hereinabove
this Court is of the considered view that there is no dispute
and it cannot be disputed about the applicability of the
proviso of Section 223 of BNSS that at the pre-cognizance
stage the opportunity of hearing
must be given to the
accused but since in the instant case, cognizance of the
offence has already been taken on 20.09.2022 on the basis
2026:JHHC:5862
of the original prosecution complaint dated 16.09.2022 and
the said action of cognizance has already been saved by
virtue of saving clause of Section 531 (2) (a) of BNSS and
further the learned trial taking in to consideration the
aforesaid aspect has passed the order dated 17.07.2025, as
such the contention of the learned counsel for the
petitioner that the order dated 17.07.2025 may be quashed
on the basis of non-adherence of the proviso of Section 223
of BNSS is not fit to be accepted.
54.
Accordingly, issue no.I is answered against the
petitioner.
Re-Issue No. II
55.
Further the learned counsel for the petitioner has
contended that petitioner is not named in the FIRs, he
cannot be prosecuted under PMLA.
56.
In the aforesaid context it needs to refer herein that
under the scheme of the PMLA, any person who directly or
indirectly attempts to indulge, or knowingly assists in any
process
connected
with
proceeds
of
crime,
can
be
prosecuted even if is not an accused in the predicate
offence.
57.
In the aforesaid context, it needs to refer herein that
the Hon’ble Apex Court in Pavna Dibbur v. Directorate of
Enforcement (Criminal Appeal No. 2779/2023) held that
who could commit an offence under the PMLA may not be
2026:JHHC:5862
named in the scheduled offence. The statutory prerequisite
is the existence of a "criminal activity relating to a
scheduled offence" from which proceeds of crime are
generated, not that every person accused of money
laundering must also be an accused in the predicate FIR.
58.
Further
the
offence
of
money
laundering
as
contemplated in Section 3 of the PMLA has been elaborately
dealt with by the three Judge Bench in Vijay Madanlal
Choudhary and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors., (2022)
SCC OnLine SC 929 in which it has been observed that
Section 3 has a wider reach. The offence as defined
captures every process and activity in dealing with the
proceeds of crime, directly or indirectly, and is not limited
to the happening of the final act of integration of tainted
property in the formal economy to constitute an act of
money
laundering.
Of
course,
the
authority
of
the
Authorised Officer under the Act to prosecute any person
for the offence of money laundering gets triggered only if
there exist proceeds of crime within the meaning of Section
2(1)(u) of the Act and further it is involved in any process or
activity. Not even in case of existence of undisclosed income
and irrespective of its volume, the definition of “Proceeds of
Crime” under Section 2(1)(u) will get attracted, unless the
property has been derived or obtained as a result of
criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. The
2026:JHHC:5862
property must qualify the definition of “Proceeds of Crime”
under Section 2(1)(u) of the Act. As observed, in all or whole
of the crime property linked to scheduled offence need not
be regarded as proceeds of crime, but all properties
qualifying the definition of “Proceeds of Crime” under
Section 2(1)(u) will necessarily be the crime properties.
59.
The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pavana
Dibbur vs. The Directorate of Enforcement (supra) has
considered the effect of the appellant not being shown as
an accused in the predicate offence by taking into
consideration Section 3 of the Act, 2002 and has observed
that an accused under PMLA need not necessarily be
named in the scheduled offence if they are involved in
laundering proceeds of crime. The decision clarifies that the
offence of money laundering is independent of the predicate
offence. The accused need not be part of the initial crime to
be held liable for laundering the proceeds. The law focuses
on the act of concealing or converting proceeds of crime,
and those who facilitate this process, even if they were not
involved in the original criminal activity, can still be
prosecuted for money laundering. For ready reference the
relevant excerpt of the aforesaid judgment is being referred
herein which reads as under:
“It is not necessary that a person against whom the
offence under Section 3 of the PMLA is alleged must
have been shown as the accused in the scheduled
offence. What is held in paragraph 270 of the decision
2026:JHHC:5862
of this Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary
supports the above conclusion. The conditions
precedent for attracting the offence under Section 3 of
the PMLA are that there must be a scheduled offence
and that there must be proceeds of crime in relation to
the scheduled offence as defined in clause (u) of
subsection (1) of Section 3 of the PMLA."
60.
Based upon the definition Clause (u) of sub-section
(1) of Section 2 of the Act 2002 which defines "proceeds of
crime", the Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to observe
that clause (v) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of PMLA
defines "property" to mean any property or assets of every
description, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or
immovable, tangible or intangible.
61.
To constitute any property as proceeds of crime, it
must be derived or obtained directly or indirectly by any
person as a result of criminal activity relating to a
scheduled offence. The explanation clarifies that the
proceeds of crime include property, not only derived or
obtained from scheduled offence but also any property
which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a
result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled
offence. Clause (u) also clarifies that even the value of any
such property will also be the proceeds of crime.
62.
It has further been clarified that if a person who is
unconnected with the scheduled offence, knowingly assists
the concealment of the proceeds of crime or knowingly
assists the use of proceeds of crime, in that case, he can be
2026:JHHC:5862
held guilty of committing an offence under Section 3 of the
PMLA. Therefore, it is not necessary that a person against
whom the offence under Section 3 of the PMLA is alleged
must have been shown as the accused in the scheduled
offence.
63.
This ruling aligns with the Supreme Court's earlier
decision in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary & Ors. vs. Union
of India & Ors., 2022 SCCOnline SC 929, wherein it was
held
that
the
offence
of
money
laundering
is
an
independent offence.
64.
It is pertinent to mention herein that respondent ED
was not investigating the commission of illegal mining as
an independent offence but has traced the proceeds of
crime generated therefrom.
65.
In the instant case, the investigation is predicated
on FIR No. 85/2020, which includes the scheduled offence
of criminal conspiracy under Section 120-B of the IPC.
Furthermore, the investigation has incorporated over 50
other FIRs detailing a huge criminal conspiracy composed
by a syndicate led by Pankaj Mishra (Accused No. 1). This
syndicate was involved in illegal mining, extortion, and
transportation, generating proceeds of crime estimated to
be in excess of Rs. 1000 Crores through the commission of
scheduled offences.
2026:JHHC:5862
66.
It is revealed during the investigation that the
petitioner
"knowingly
assisted"
in
a
critical
activity
connected with these proceeds of crime, thereby squarely
falling within the ambit of Section 3 of the PMLA, 2002,
therefore, the Petitioner's plea that since he is not named in
the FIRs, he cannot be prosecuted under PMLA is not fit to
be accepted.
67.
Accordingly, issue no. II is answered herein.
Re-Issue No. III
68.
It has been contended that petitioner is absolutely
innocent and has committed no offence at all and has no
connection with the said incident by any stretch of
imagination. The opposite party has falsely implicated the
Petitioner in the present case without any cogent or reliable
evidence.
69.
This Court has gone through the finding recorded
by the learned trial Court in the impugned order and also
gone through the supplementary prosecution complaint.
70.
This
Court,
before
appreciating
the
argument
advanced on behalf of the parties deems it fit and proper to
discuss herein some of the provisions of law as contained
under the Act, 2002 with its object and intent.
71.
The Act 2002 was enacted to address the urgent
need to have a comprehensive legislation inter alia for
preventing money-laundering, attachment of proceeds of
2026:JHHC:5862
crime, adjudication and confiscation thereof including
vesting of it in the Central Government, setting up of
agencies and mechanisms for coordinating measures for
combating money laundering and also to prosecute the
persons indulging in the process or activity connected with
the proceeds of crime.
72.
It is, thus, evident that Act 2002 was enacted in
order to answer the urgent requirement to have a
comprehensive legislation inter alia for preventing moneylaundering, attachment of proceeds of crime, adjudication
and confiscation thereof for combating money-laundering
and also to prosecute the persons indulging in the process
or activity connected with the proceeds of crime.
73.
It needs to refer herein the definition of “proceeds of
crime” as provided under Section 2(1)(u) of the Act, 2002
which reads as under:
“2 (1) (u) “proceeds of crime” means any property
derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any
person as a result of criminal activity relating to a
scheduled offence or the value of any such property
3[or where such property is taken or held outside
the country, then the property equivalent in value
held
within
the
country]
4[or
abroad];
[Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is
hereby clarified that "proceeds of crime" include
property not only derived or obtained from the
scheduled offence but also any property which may
directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a
result of any criminal activity relatable to the
scheduled offence;]”
74.
It is evident from the aforesaid provision that
“proceeds of crime” means any property derived or
2026:JHHC:5862
obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of
criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value
of any such property or where such property is taken or
held outside the country, then the property equivalent in
value held within the country or abroad.
75.
In the explanation, it has been referred that for
removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that "proceeds of
crime" include property not only derived or obtained from
the scheduled offence but also any property which may
directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of
any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence. The
aforesaid explanation has been inserted in the statute book
by way of Act 23 of 2019.
76.
It is, thus, evident that the reason for giving
explanation under Section 2(1)(u) is by way of clarification
to the effect that whether as per the substantive provision
of Section 2(1)(u), the property derived or obtained, directly
or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity
relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such
property or where such property is taken or held outside
the country but by way of explanation the proceeds of crime
has been given broader implication by including property
not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but
also any property which may directly or indirectly be
2026:JHHC:5862
derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity
relatable to the scheduled offence.
77.
The “property” has been defined under Section
2(1)(v) which means any property or assets of every
description, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or
immovable, tangible or intangible and includes deeds and
instruments evidencing title to, or interest in, such property
or assets, wherever located.
78.
The schedule has been defined under Section 2(1)(x)
which
means
schedule
to
the
Prevention
of
Money
Laundering Act, 2002. The “scheduled offence” has been
defined under Section 2(1)(y) which reads as under:
“2(y)
“scheduled
offence”
means—
(i)
the
offences specified under Part A of the Schedule;
or (ii) the offences specified under Part B of the
Schedule if the total value involved in such
offences is [one crore rupees] or more; or (iii) the
offences specified under Part C of the Schedule.”
79.
It is evident that the “scheduled offence” means the
offences specified under Part A of the Schedule; or the
offences specified under Part B of the Schedule if the total
value involved in such offences is [one crore rupees] or
more; or the offences specified under Part C of the
Schedule.
80.
The offence of money laundering has been defined
under Section 3 of the Act, 2002 which reads as under:
“3. Offence of money-laundering.—Whosoever
directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or
2026:JHHC:5862
knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is
actually involved in any process or activity
connected with the [proceeds of crime including its
concealment, possession, acquisition or use and
projecting or claiming] it as untainted property shall
be guilty of offence of money-laundering.
[Explanation.— For the removal of doubts, it is
hereby clarified that,— (i) a person shall be guilty
of offence of money-laundering if such person is
found to have directly or indirectly attempted to
indulge or knowingly assisted or knowingly is a
party or is actually involved in one or more of the
following processes or activities connected with
proceeds of crime, namely:— (a) concealment; or (b)
possession; or (c) acquisition; or (d) use; or (e)
projecting as untainted property; or (f) claiming as
untainted property, in any manner whatsoever; (ii)
the process or activity connected with proceeds of
crime is a continuing activity and continues till such
time a person is directly or indirectly enjoying the
proceeds of crime by its concealment or possession
or acquisition or use or projecting it as untainted
property or claiming it as untainted property in any
manner whatsoever.]”
81.
It is evident from the aforesaid provision that
“offence of money laundering” means whosoever directly or
indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or
knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process
or activity connected with the proceeds of crime including
its
concealment,
possession,
acquisition
or
use
and
projecting or claiming it as untainted property shall be
guilty of offence of money-laundering.
82.
It is further evident that the process or activity
connected with proceeds of crime is a continuing activity
and continues till such time a person is directly or
indirectly enjoying the proceeds of crime by its concealment
or possession or acquisition or use or projecting it as
2026:JHHC:5862
untainted property or claiming it as untainted property in
any manner whatsoever.
83.
The punishment for money laundering has been
provided under Section 4 of the Act, 2002.
84.
The various provisions of the Act, 2002 along with
interpretation of the definition of “proceeds of crime” has
been dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Ors. Vs. Union of India
and Ors., (supra) wherein the Bench comprising of three
Hon’ble Judges of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has decided
the issue by taking into consideration the object and intent
of the Act, 2002.
85.
It is evident that the purposes and objects of the
2002 Act for which it has been enacted, is not limited to
punishment for offence of money laundering, but also to
provide measures for prevention of money laundering. It is
also to provide for attachment of proceeds of crime, which
are likely to be concealed, transferred or dealt with in any
manner which may result in frustrating any proceeding
relating to confiscation of such proceeds under the 2002
Act. This Act is also to compel the banking companies,
financial
institutions
and
intermediaries
to
maintain
records of the transactions, to furnish information of such
transactions within the prescribed time in terms of Chapter
IV of the 2002 Act.
2026:JHHC:5862
86.
The predicate offence has been considered in the
aforesaid judgment wherein by taking into consideration
the explanation as inserted by way of Act 23 of 2019 under
the definition of the “proceeds of crime” as contained under
Section 2(1)(u), whereby and whereunder, it has been
clarified for the purpose of removal of doubts that, the
"proceeds of crime" include property not only derived or
obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property
which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a
result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled
offence, meaning thereby, the words “any property which
may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result
of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence”
will come under the fold of the proceeds of crime.
87.
In the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court
in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Ors. Vs. Union of
India and Ors. (supra) it has been held that the Authority
under the 2002 Act, is to prosecute a person for offence of
money-laundering only if it has reason to believe, which is
required to be recorded in writing that the person is in
possession of “proceeds of crime”. Only if that belief is
further
supported
by tangible and
credible evidence
indicative of involvement of the person concerned in any
process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime,
action under the Act can be taken forward for attachment
2026:JHHC:5862
and confiscation of proceeds of crime and until vesting
thereof in the Central Government, such process initiated
would be a standalone process.
88.
In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled position of
law and further in order to appreciate the contention of the
learned counsel for the parties this Court has gone through
the Vth supplementary prosecution complaint (in short
referred as SPC V) which has been annexed with the main
petition.
89.
It is evident from the record that the prosecution in
the present case was initiated based on the registration of
ECIR/RNZO/03/2022 dated 08.03.2022 registered by the
Respondent (ED) under provisions of the PMLA. The said
ECIR/RNZO/03/2022 dated 08.03.2022 arises out of an
FIR Barharwa P.S. Case No. 85/2020 dated 22.06.2020
registered by the Barharwa Police Station in respect of a toll
tender
case
against
various
accused
persons.
Subsequently, the Respondent identified four more FIRs and these FIRs were also clubbed as predicate offences for
the investigation of ECIR/RNZO/03/2022.
90.
Thereafter, the Respondent further identified several
FIRs
registered
against
various
persons
for
offences
pertaining to illegal mining, storage and transportation, and
these FIRs were also clubbed as predicate offences for the
purposes of investigation into ECIR/RNZO/03/2022.
2026:JHHC:5862
91.
In
the
said
VTH
supplementary
prosecution
complaint, the role and other incriminating material
against the present petitioner has been mentioned, for
ready reference, the relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid
prosecution complaint, are being quoted as under:
“8.12 Statement of Shri Yash Jalan (A-19) dated
16.08.2022: In his statement recorded under Section 50 of
PMLA, Shri Yash Jalan, Director of M/s Marine Infralink
Logistics Pvt. Ltd. (A-17), admitted to his role in the
management and operations of the company. He confirmed
the existence of a charter agreement between his company
and M/s Singhwahini Transport for the use of the vessel
M.V. Infralink-III. While he denied having direct knowledge
of the illegal nature of the cargo being transported, his
admission of being the operational and commercial head of
the company confirms his central role in entering into the
agreement which facilitated the syndicate's illegal
transportation activities. [RUD No. 6]
8.13 Statement of Shri Mahesh Jalan dated 17.08.2022:
The statement of Shri Mahesh Jalan, father of Yash Jalan
and a co-director in the company, corroborates the key role
played by his son. Shri Mahesh Jalan stated that while he
was a director, his role was limited to handling technical
aspects only, and that his son, Shri Yash Jalan (A-19),
was exclusively responsible for all the commercial and
day-to-day operational affairs of the company. This
statement further establishes Yash Jalan's position as the
person in-charge of and responsible for the conduct of the
business of M/s Marine Infralink Logistics Pvt. Ltd. [RUD
No. 10]
10.8 Evidence against M/s Marine Infralink Logistics
Pvt. Ltd. (A-17) and its Director, Shri Yash Jalan (A19)
10.8.1 The investigation has conclusively established that
M/s Marine Infralink Logistics Pvt. Ltd., a Kolkata-based
company, was knowingly involved in the offence of money
laundering by providing its inland vessel, the M.V.
Infralink-III, for the illegal transportation of stone chips,
which constitute proceeds of crime. The vessel was found
to be an essential tool used by the criminal syndicate to
facilitate the movement of illicitly obtained materials,
thereby playing a key role in the laundering of proceeds
arising out of scheduled offences.
10.8.2 On 26.07.2022, the Directorate of Enforcement
intercepted the vessel (Registration No. WB 1809) and
found it operating without any valid permission or
regulatory clearance, which led to the registration of FIR
No. 84/2022. Statements recorded from the vessel's crew
confirmed that the vessel had routinely transported trucks
loaded with illegally mined stone chips, many of which
lacked valid challans. The operations were reportedly
2026:JHHC:5862
managed and controlled by associates of Pankaj Mishra,
further linking the vessel's activities to a well-established
money laundering network.
10.8.3 Further investigation revealed that the vessel M.V.
Infralink-III was owned by M/s Marine Infralink Logistics
Pvt. Ltd. This fact was confirmed by Shri Mangi Lal
Bhutoria, a Director and majority shareholder (holding
2/3rd shares) of the company, in his statement dated
22.11.2022. He stated that the vessel, referred to as
'Infralink 3', was purchased for approximately 27-8 Crores.
Crucially, he admitted that the company had entered into
a business arrangement with M/s Singhwahini Transport
Pvt. Ltd., a company controlled by Rajesh Yadav Dahu
Yadav (A-12), who is the identified operator of the
syndicate.
10.8.4This connection is substantiated by the financial
investigation which established that a sum of 22.75 Crores
was transferred from the bank account of M/s
Singhwahini Transport & Logistics to the account of M/s
Marine Infralink Logistics Pvt. Ltd. This payment
represents the consideration for using the vessel to further
the criminal activity and constitutes proceeds of crime
acquired by A-17 and its director, A-19. The statement of
Shri Shyamal Chandra Sarkar, affiliated with the
company, further corroborated the existence of a
commercial relationship involving the leasing of vessels to
Rajesh Yadav and Sunil Yadav. This payment and
arrangement confirm that the company was not only
aware of but also financially benefitted from the criminal
activity. [RUD No. 8]
10.8.5 As the vessel was being utilized to commit
scheduled offences under the PMLA and was instrumental
in transporting and concealing proceeds of crime, it falls
within the definition of "property" under Section 2(1)(v) of
the PMLA, 2002. Accordingly. the vessel was frozen under
Section 17(1-A) of the PMLA, and this action was later
confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority. The cumulative
evidence clearly establishes that M/s Marine Infralink
Logistics Pvt. Ltd., by knowingly providing its assets for
the commission of criminal acts and by deriving monetary
benefits from such activity, committed the offence of money
laundering and is liable to be prosecuted under Section 3
read with Section 70 of the PMLA, 2002.
10.8.6 The culpability for these actions is fixed upon Shri
Yash Jalan (A-19). While he denied direct knowledge of the
illegality in his statement dated 16.08.2022, his position
as the controlling mind of the company is firmly
established by the statements of his co-directors.
Statement of Shri Mangi Lal Bhutoria (Director and
majority shareholder) dated 22.11.2022: He unequivocally
stated that Shri Yash Jalan was solely and exclusively
responsible for all day-to-day operations and commercial
decisions, including the decision to enter into the
agreement with Rajesh Yadav's company.
2026:JHHC:5862
Statement of Shri Mahesh Jalan (Director and father of
Yash Jalan) dated 17.08.2022: He corroborated that his
own role was purely technical and that his son, Shri Yash
Jalan, was exclusively responsible for all commercial and
operational affairs of the company.
10.8.7 The cumulative evidence, therefore, proves that Shri
Yash Jalan, as the director in charge of and responsible
for the conduct of the business of M/s Marine Infralink
Logistics Pvt. Ltd., knowingly provided the company's
asset for the commission of a scheduled offence and was a
direct beneficiary of the proceeds of crime. His actions, and
those of his company, squarely fall within the definition of
money laundering under Section 3 read with Section 70 of
the PMLA.
13 SPECIFIC ROLE OF ACCUSED PERSONS/ENTITIES
IN OFFENCE OF MONEY LAUNDERING UNDER
SECTION 3 OF PMLA, 2002
13.10 M/s Marine Infralink Logistics Pvt. Ltd.
(Accused No. 17)
This corporate entity, through its directors, knowingly
became a party to the offence of money laundering by
providing its property as an instrument of crime, thereby
violating Section 3 read with Section 70 of the PMLA.
Knowingly Assisting in the Process of Money Laundering:
The culpability of the company and its management is
established by the statement of its own director, Shri
Mangi Lal Bhutoria. While attempting to feign ignorance of
the company's operations, Shri Bhutoria repeatedly stated
that all day-to-day affairs, operational decisions, and
agreements were handled exclusively by his co-director,
Shri Yash Jalan. He specifically stated that it was the
decision of Yash Jalan to enter into an agreement with the
company of Rajesh Yadav Dahu. This establishes that Shri
Yash Jalan was the person "in charge of, and was
responsible to the company for the conduct of the
business" at the relevant time, making the company
vicariously liable for knowingly allowing its asset to be
used for a criminal purpose under Section 70 of the PMLA,
2002.
Acquisition of Proceeds of Crime: The investigation has
established that the company was a direct beneficiary of
the criminal activity, having received ₹2.75 Crore from
Rajesh Yadav's firm, M/s Singhwahini Transport &
Logistics. The acquisition of this payment, derived from the
illegal transport business, constitutes a direct involvement
in the proceeds of crime.
M/s Marine Infralink Logistics Pvt. Ltd., through its
Director Shri Yash Jalan (A-19), who was in charge of and
responsible for the conduct of its business, knowingly
allowed its vessel to be used for a criminal purpose. By
permitting the use of its property in the commission of a
scheduled offence and by being a direct beneficiary of the
proceeds of crime, the company has committed the offence
of money laundering as defined under Section 3 read with
Section 70 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act,
2002, and is liable for punishment under Section 4 of the
said Act.
2026:JHHC:5862
13.12Shri Yash Jalan (Accused No. 19)
Shri Yash Jalan (A-19), as the director in charge of and
responsible for the business of M/s Marine Infralink
Logistics Pvt. Ltd. (A-17), knowingly assisted the syndicate
and was a party to activities connected with proceeds of
crime, thereby committing an offence under Section 3 read
with Section 70 of the PMLA. His role is established as
under:
Knowingly Assisting in the Process of Money Laundering:
The primary role of A-17, under the direction of A-19, was
to provide the critical instrumentality of crime-the vessel
M.V. Infralink-III-which enabled the syndicate to transport
illegally mined stone chips and thus generate proceeds of
crime. The vessel was intercepted operating illegally,
leading to FIR No. 84/2022, and was frozen as property
used in the commission of a scheduled offence. By entering
into a charter agreement with the syndicate's front firm,
M/s Singhwahini Transport & Logistics, Shri Yash Jalan
knowingly allowed the company's asset to be used for a
criminal purpose.
Acquisition of Proceeds of Crime: M/s Marine Infralink
Logistics Pvt. Ltd. was a direct beneficiary of the criminal
activity, having received ₹2.75 Crores from the syndicate's
tainted funds held in the account of M/s Singhwahini
Transport & Logistics. The acquisition of this payment,
derived from the illegal transport business, constitutes a
direct involvement in and acquisition of proceeds of crime.
Direct Culpability: While Shri Yash Jalan denied
knowledge of the illegality of the cargo, his role as the
controlling mind is established by the statements of his codirectors. Shri Mangi Lal Bhutoria (majority shareholder)
and Shri Mahesh Jalan (father and co-director) both stated
unequivocally that Yash Jalan was solely and exclusively
responsible for all operational and commercial decisions of
the company, including the decision to enter into the
agreement with Rajesh Yadav's firm. This makes him the
person "in charge of, and was responsible to the company
for the conduct of the business" under Section 70 of PMLA.
By knowingly permitting the use of his company's property
as an instrument of crime and by being a direct beneficiary
of the proceeds of crime, Shri Yash Jalan (A-19) has
committed the offence of money laundering as defined
under Section 3 read with Section 70 of the Prevention of
Money Laundering Act, 2002, and is liable for punishment
under Section 4 of the said Act.”
92.
It has come in the prosecution complaint that the
M/s Marine Infralink Logistics Pvt. Ltd., a private company
controlled by Yash Jalan, was a direct and known facilitator
in the ongoing money laundering operations. The said
company owned and operated an inland cargo vessel M.V.
2026:JHHC:5862
Infralink-III (Registration label No. WB 1809) which was
deployed for transporting stone chips mined illegally across
the river route from Sahibganj to other states. The said
vessel was intercepted by the Directorate on 26.07.2022
and was found to be plying without valid permits. FIR No.
84/2022 was registered in connection with this incident,
and Section 50 statements of the vessel crew confirmed
that the vessel routinely carried trucks loaded with illegally
mined stone chips, many of which lacked valid mining
challans.
93.
The investigation has revealed that M/s Marine
Infralink Logistics Pvt. Ltd. (A-17) received Rs. 2.75 Crores
from M/s Singhwahini Transports and Logistics, a firm
whose accounts were shown to contain proceeds of crime
from illegal mining. The said amount was received without
any legitimate commercial justification, and the petitioner
has failed to furnish any credible explanation for the same.
94.
It has come on record that the amount of Rs. 2.75
Crores transferred to the petitioner's company constitutes
proceeds of crime as defined under Section 2(1)(u) of the
PMLA and its possession and use by the Petitioner OR M/s
Marine Infralink Logistics Pvt. Ltd. constitutes the offence
of money laundering under Section 3 of the Act.
95.
Further, it has come on record that Mangi Lal
Bhutoria, Director and majority shareholder of M/s Marine
2026:JHHC:5862
Infralink Logistics Pvt. Ltd., categorically stated in his
statement dated 22.11.2022 under Section 50 of the PMLA
that Yash Jalan (present petitioner) was solely and
exclusively responsible for all day-to-day operations and
commercial decisions of the company, including its dealings
with M/s Singhwahini Transports and Logistics.
96.
The aforesaid fact has been substantiated by the
position was further corroborated by Mahesh Jalan, father
of the petitioner and a Director of the company, in his
statement dated 17.08.2022, confirming that his son Yash
Jalan was exclusively responsible for all commercial and
operational affairs of the firm.
97.
In view of the control exercised by the petitioner
over
A-17
and
the
material
demonstrating
knowing
participation in laundering of proceeds of crime, prima facie
it appears that the petitioner is squarely liable under
Section 70 of the PMLA, 2002.
98.
Further the Investigation has established a clear
and direct money trail proving that this amount was paid to
the petitioner's company, M/s Marine Infralink Logistics
Pvt. Ltd. (A-17), by M/s Singhwahini Transport & Logistics
(A-9) i.e., the primary operational arm of the syndicate. The
accounts of M/s Singhwahini Transport & Logistics (A-9)
and its partners were found to be repositories of illicit
funds, having received unexplained cash deposits in the
2026:JHHC:5862
accounts of M/s Singhwahini Transport & Logistics and its
partners. The payment of Rs. 2.75 Crores to the petitioner's
company was made directly from these proceeds of crime.
Therefore, the payment of Rs. 2.75 Crores from these
tainted accounts to the petitioner's company was not a
legitimate consideration but was, in fact, the proceeds of
crime being laundered as payment for services that
facilitated the commission of the offence.
99.
Thus, prima facie from investigation, it appears that
Yash Jalan and his company M/s Marine Infralink Logistics
Pvt. Ltd., were not mere third parties but were known
facilitators and direct recipients of proceeds of crime. The
inland vessel operated by them was a critical tool in the
syndicate's operations, and their financial dealings with key
accused entities establish a clear nexus with the predicate
offences and money laundering activities.
100.
Thus, the material on record, establishes a strong
prima facie case against the petitioner for having committed
the offence of money laundering under Section 3 read with
Section 70 of the PMLA, 2002.
101.
Thus, from the aforesaid, it is evident that the
supplementary complaint has been filed on the basis of
concrete and corroborated material, which demonstrates
the petitioner’s active participation in the offence of money
laundering. The evidence includes:
2026:JHHC:5862
i. The petitioner's vessel (M.V. Infralink-III)
being used as an instrumentality for the
transportation of illegally mined stone chips;
ii. The receipt of Rs. 2.75 Crores from the
syndicate's
main
operational
front,
M/s
Singhwahini Transport & Logistics-a sum
confirmed to be proceeds of crime; and
iii.
The
Authority
order
of
dated
the
Ld.
Adjudicating
26.12.2022,
which
confirmed the vessel's involvement in the
offence of money laundering.
102.
Thus, it would be evident from the material
collected that the present petitioner had indulged and
knowingly is a party and is actually involved in all the
activities connected with the offence of money laundering.
These multifaceted activities explicitly encompass the use
or acquisition, possession, concealment, and projecting or
claiming as untainted property of the ill-gotten proceeds of
crime.
103.
Consequently, based upon the evidence gathered
during the course of the investigation, prima facie, it
appears that the material is available against the present
petitioner.
104.
Accordingly, issue no.III is being answered.
105.
It needs to refer
herein
that the
offence of
conspiracy under Section 120B IPC is specifically included
as a scheduled offence in the PMLA when read with any
2026:JHHC:5862
other substantive offence. Further, it is settled position that
conspiracy takes its colour from the underlying offence.
106.
In the present case, the ECIR was rightly registered
as the conspiracy was integrally connected with the
commission of other offences relatable to the Schedule and
therefore, validly invoked the jurisdiction under PMLA.
107.
Further, the petitioner's reliance on the quashing of
FIR No. 84/2022 is a misleading attempt to obfuscate his
role in the larger conspiracy. The PMLA investigation is not
predicated on this single FIR. The core criminal activity that
generated the proceeds of crime is the large-scale illegal
mining, which is evidenced by numerous other subsisting
predicate offences, including FIR No. 63/21 (Section 307
IPC & Section 27 of the Arms Act) and FIR No. 28/22
(Sections 307 IPC, 120-B IPC & Section 27 of the Arms Act).
Furthermore, the evidence gathered during the interception
of the vessel M.V. Infralink-III on 26.07.2022 remains
highly relevant. The statements of the vessel's master, Ajijul
Seikh, and supervisor, Anand Singh, recorded under
Section 50 of the PMLA, 2002, confirmed that the vessel
routinely transported trucks laden with illegally mined
stone chips without valid challans and that its operations
were managed by co-accused Bachhu Yadav (Accused No.
2). This evidence irrefutably proves the use of the
petitioner's property as an "instrumentality of crime" under
2026:JHHC:5862
the Explanation to Section 2(1)(v) of the PMLA, a fact that is
not erased by quashing of a procedural FIR related to the
vessel's operating permit.
108.
Further,
multiple
scheduled
offences
exist
in
relation to the predicate acts forming the basis of the
instant case. The ECIR was not registered in isolation but
in continuation of offences disclosed in predicate FIRs
which disclose cognizable offences under the IPC and other
statutes falling within the PMLA Schedule.
109.
It
is
evident
from
the
Vth
supplementary
prosecution complaint filed against the petitioner and other
co accused persons, is supported by substantial evidence
gathered during the investigation. Furthermore, prima facie,
there
is ample evidence establishing the petitioner's
involvement in the offence of money laundering, which is
further corroborated by statements of witnesses in the
instant case. Further, the petitioner's role has already been
discussed herein in detail in the preceding paragraphs,
therefore, the averments of the petitioner are not fit to be
accepted.
110.
Be it noted that the legal presumption under
Section 24(a) of the Act 2002, would apply when the person
is charged with the offence of money laundering and his
direct or indirect involvement in any process or activity
connected with the proceeds of crime, is established. The
2026:JHHC:5862
existence of proceeds of crime is, therefore, a foundational
fact, to be established by the prosecution, including the
involvement of the person in any process or activity
connected therewith. Once these foundational facts are
established by the prosecution, the onus must then shift on
the person facing charge of offence of money- laundering to
rebut the legal presumption that the proceeds of crime are
not involved in money-laundering, by producing evidence
which is within his personal knowledge of the accused.
111.
It needs to refer herein that there are parameters of
quashing the entire criminal proceedings including the
order taking cognizance and at the time of quashing the
entire criminal proceeding, the High Court is required to
look into the matter with circumspection and if cogent
reasons
are
there, then only, the
quashing of
the
cognizance order, is made out.
112.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of
Odisha VS Pratima Mohanty, 2022 0 AIR(SC) 41 by
taking into consideration the judgment rendered in the case
of State of Haryana & Ors. vs Ch. Bhajan Lal & Ors.,
AIR 1992 SC 604 has held that normally in exercise of
powers
under
Section
proceedings/FIR
should
not
Cr.P.C.
be
the
quashed,
criminal
for
ready
reference, the relevant paragraph is being referred herein: -
2026:JHHC:5862
“At the outset, it is required to be noted that by the
impugned judgment and order the High Court in
exercise of its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has
quashed the criminal proceedings for the offences
under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the
act and Section 420 read with Section 120B IPC.
From the impugned judgment and order passed by
the High Court, it appears that the High Court has
entered into the merits of the allegations and has
conducted the mini-trial by weighing the evidence in
detail which, as such, as observed and held by this
Court in a catena of decisions is wholly
impermissible. As held by this Court in the case of
State of Haryana And Ors. vs Ch. Bhajan Lal And
Ors., AIR 1992 SC 604, the powers under Section 482
Cr.P.C. could be exercised either to prevent an abuse
of process of any court and/or otherwise to secure the
ends of justice. In the said decision this Court had
carved out the exceptions to the general rule that
normally in exercise of powers under Section 482
Cr.P.C. the criminal proceedings/FIR should not be
quashed.”
113.
It needs to be reiterated herein that the settled
position of law as discussed and referred hereinabove in the
preceding paragraphs that power under Section 482 CrPC
to quash proceedings in exceptional cases, the present
matter does not warrant the exercise of such extraordinary
jurisdiction. It is a well-settled principle that this power is
to be invoked sparingly, and only where the allegations, on
their face, do not disclose the commission of any offence.
114.
In the instant case, the Prosecution Complaint
discloses a grave economic offence involving the laundering
of proceeds of crime, supported by documentary, financial,
and testimonial evidence. Hence, allowing the trial to
proceed is in the interest of justice, and the petitioner's
attempt to prematurely terminate the prosecution is not fit
to be accepted.
2026:JHHC:5862
115.
In view of the facts as discussed hereinabove as also
taking into consideration the ratio laid down by Hon’ble
Apex Court which has been referred in the preceding
paragraphs, this Court is of the view that prima facie there
are materials against the petitioner, which has been
appreciated by the learned Court and thereafter, order
dated 17.07.2025 has been passed.
116.
Hence, on the basis of discussion made hereinabove
and taking into consideration the settled position of law as
discussed and referred hereinabove, this Court is of the
considered view that there is no illegality in the order dated
17.07.2025 passed by the learned Special Judge, PMLA
Ranchi in connection with ECIR Case No. 04 of 2022 in
ECIR/RNZO/03/2022.
117.
Considering the above discussed materials, the plea
of the petitioner that there were no sufficient grounds
against him, cannot be countenanced, consequently, the
instant petition is, hereby, dismissed.
118.
Pending Interlocutory Applications, if any, also
stand disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
A.F.R.
Rohit/
Uploaded on 27.02.2026
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