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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 25.09.2026
#
CNR No. DLHC010462882026
+
RC.REV. 366/2026, CM APPL. 66640/2026 (Ex. From filing
certified copies of annexures), CM APPL. 66641/2026 (Stay) &
CM APPL. 66715/2026 (Addl.Doc)
SHRI SURESH YADAV
Through:
.....Petitioner
Mr. Shiv Charan Garg and Ms.
Jahanvi Garg, Advocates.
versus
SMT USHA GUPTA
Through:
.....Respondent
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
%
1.
JUDGEMENT (Oral)
The present Revision Petition, filed under Section 25-B(8) of
the Delhi Rent Control Act, 19581, seeks to assails the Judgment
dated 09.03.20262 passed by the learned ARC-01, Central District,
Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi3, in Eviction Petition, being RC ARC
77662/20164, titled “Smt. Usha Gupta v. Shri Suresh Yadav”.
2.
By way of the Impugned Judgment, the learned ARC, upon
conclusion of the trial, passed an Eviction Order in favour of the
Respondent, in respect of one room situated on the ground floor of
DRC Act
Impugned Judgement
ARC
Eviction Petition
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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property bearing No. 71-D, Kamla Nagar, Delhi-1100075.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
3.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner confines
the challenge to the Impugned Judgment to the following four
grounds, articulated in the ensuing paragraphs.
4.
First, it is submitted that the Eviction Petition itself was not
maintainable as the Respondent had sought to split the tenancy.
According to learned counsel, the original tenancy comprised two
rooms, whereas the Eviction Petition came to be instituted only in
respect of one of the said rooms. It is, therefore, contended that the
Eviction Petition was not maintainable in respect of a part of the
tenanted premises. To buttress this contention, learned counsel for the
Petitioner seeks to place reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in in Habibunnisa Begum v. G. Doraikannu Chettiar
(Dead) by LRs. & Ors.6.
5.
Second, learned counsel submits that the Respondent had,
during the pendency of the proceedings, obtained possession of
another room situated on the ground floor of the very same property. It
is contended that the purpose for which the Subject Premises was
sought by the Respondent consequently stood substantially fulfilled,
and that the learned ARC failed to appreciate the effect of the
aforesaid subsequent event while passing the Impugned Judgment. In
this regard, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner seeks
to place reliance upon the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain7.
Subject Premises
(2000) 1SCC 74,
(1986) 4 SCC 736
Digitally Signed
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BHATIA
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6.
Third, learned counsel submits that the bona fide requirement
pleaded by the Respondent was for commercial purposes and that such
requirement, in the facts of the present case, was impermissible and
could not have furnished a valid basis for passing the Impugned
Judgment.
7.
Lastly, learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that the site
plan relied upon by the Respondent does not correctly depict the
Subject Premises and the surrounding portions of the property. It is,
therefore, contended that the Impugned Judgment, having been
rendered on the basis of an incorrect site plan, cannot be sustained.
8.
No other submissions were advanced by the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the Petitioner.
ANALYSIS:
9.
This Court has heard learned counsel for the Petitioner and,
with his able assistance, perused the relevant documents and material
placed on record, including the Impugned Judgment.
10.
Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged
on behalf of the Petitioner, it would be apposite to advert to the scope
and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the
proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act.
11.
The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance
Co. Ltd.8, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar
Singh9, and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua10, has
consistently held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court
(1998) 8 SCC 119
(2014) 9 SCC 78
(2022) 6 SCC 30
Digitally Signed
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BHATIA
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under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory
and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction.
12.
The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied
upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia, in Pankaj
Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors.11, and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny
Grover12.
13.
In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while
elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25-(B) of the
DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against
an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and
deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is,
therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process,
including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the
High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent
Controller merely because another view on the material available on
record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court read as under:
“23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive
power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller,
being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the
decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance.
Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its
views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate
jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The
scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and
except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the
record, which would only mean that in the absence of any
adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb
such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in
such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the
2024:DHC:9322
2025:DHC:11285
Digitally Signed
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BHATIA
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power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act,
totally forbidden by the legislature.”
14.
In Pankaj Pahwa (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court,
upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra),
reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that
this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of
the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the
decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned
Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an
absence of adjudication warranting interference.
15.
In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges
is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section
25B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to
undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to
arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute.
Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Judgment
suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material
irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the
learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous
premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left
unconsidered, or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an
error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional
jurisdiction may be warranted.
16.
It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional
scrutiny that the grounds urged by the learned counsel on behalf of the
Petitioner against the Impugned Judgment are required to be
Digitally Signed
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BHATIA
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examined.
17.
The first ground urged by learned counsel for the Petitioner
relates to the alleged splitting of the tenancy. At the outset, it is fairly
submitted that this objection was not raised before the learned ARC.
The said contention, involving an examination of the nature and extent
of the tenancy as well as the relationship between the parties, is
essentially a mixed question of fact and law. In the absence of the said
issue having been raised before the learned ARC and the requisite
factual foundation having been laid before the learned ARC, this
Court would ordinarily not permit the same to be urged for the first
time in revision.
18.
Be that as it may, this Court has also perused the Written
Statement filed by the Petitioner before the learned ARC, and in
particular, Paragraph 18(a)(ii) thereof, which reads as under:
“18(a)(ii) That in reply to the contents of para 18 (a) (ii) of the
petition, the tenanted portion i.e. one small room on the ground
floor is not denied, however, the second room with the respondent
under the landlordship of Smt. Shashi Gupta and Sh. Sidharth
Gupta, who are no more owner of the property as they have sold to
third person.”
19.
A perusal of the aforesaid pleading itself makes it apparent that
the Petitioner had admitted that the landlord-tenant relationship
between the parties extended only to the subject room on the ground
floor, whereas the other room was stated to be under the
ownership/landlordship of another person. The very factual premise
on which the present objection of splitting of tenancy is founded is,
therefore, not borne out from the Petitioner’s own pleadings.
Consequently, the challenge to the maintainability of the Eviction
Petition on the ground of alleged splitting of tenancy is without merit.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
16:01:00
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20.
Learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner, in this regard, has
placed reliance upon the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Habibunnisa Begum (supra) to contend that where the tenancy is
founded upon a single and indivisible contract, the same cannot be
severed so as to direct partial ejectment of the tenant from a part of the
demised premises. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court read as under:
“2. The only question that arises in this case is as to whether it was
open to the High Court to split the single tenancy by ordering
partial ejectment of the tenant from the premises let out to him.
In S. Sanyal v. Gian Chand [AIR 1968 SC 438 : (1968) 1 SCR 536]
it was held that where a contract of tenancy was a single indivisible
contract and in the absence of any statutory provision to that effect,
it is not open to the court to split the tenancy. Law, therefore, is that
where there is a single indivisible contract of tenancy, it cannot be
split by a court unless there is a statutory provision to that effect. In
the present case it is not disputed that the contract of tenancy is a
single indivisible contract for Doors Nos. 27 and 28. It is also not
disputed that there is no provision in the Tamil Nadu Buildings
(Lease and Rent Control) Act empowering the court to order partial
ejectment of a tenant from the premises by splitting the single
indivisible tenancy. For these reasons it was not open to the High
Court to split the tenancy and order for partial ejectment of the
tenant from the premises.”
21.
The aforesaid Judgment, however, proceeds on the specific
premise that the tenancy in question was a single and indivisible
contract covering the entire premises. The ratio, therefore, would
apply only where the portion from which eviction is sought forms part
of such an indivisible tenancy. In the present case, the Respondents
have failed to demonstrate any such indivisibility of the tenancy so as
to attract the aforesaid principle.
22.
The mere fact that the premises may form part of a larger
property cannot, by itself, establish that the tenancy was indivisible.
What is material is the nature and extent of the tenancy created
Digitally Signed
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BHATIA
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between the parties. In the absence of any material establishing that
the entire area sought to be treated as one tenancy was demised under
a single, indivisible contract, Habibunnisa Begum (supra) would
have no application.
23.
Consequently, the reliance placed upon Habibunnisa Begum
(supra) also does not disclose any infirmity in the Impugned
Judgement warranting interference in exercise of the revisional
jurisdiction of this Court.
24.
Before adverting to adjudicate upon the other grounds of
challenge raised by the learned counsel for the Petitioner, this Court
deems it apposite to reproduce the relevant portion of the Impugned
Judgement. The same read as under:
“BONAFIDE REQUIREMENT AND NON-AVAILABILITY
OF ALTERNATIVE ACCOMMODATION
17) Since the two issues are interconnected, therefore, the said two
issues are taken up together. It is pertinent to note here the
judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Abid-ul-Islam Vs. Inder
Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30 herein where it was stated by the
Hon’ble court that requirement is the existence of bona fide need,
when there is no other “reasonably suitable accommodation”.
Therefore, there has to be satisfaction on two grounds, namely, (i)
the requirement being bona fide and (ii) the non-availability of a
reasonably
suitable
residential
accommodation.
Such
reasonableness along with suitability is to be seen from the
perspective of the landlord and not the tenant. Further, it is a
well settled proposition of law that it is not sufficient that any kind
of the property should be available to the petitioner/landlord to rule
out the benefit of 14(1)(e) of D.R.C. Act. The property available
with the petitioner/landlord should also be reasonably suitable
property. In M M Quasim vs/ Manohar Lal Sharma, (1981) 3
SCC 36, the Apex Court has that the landlord does not have an
unfettered right to choose the premises but merely showing that the
landlord has some other vacant premises in his possession may not
be sufficient to negative the landlord‟s claim if the vacant premises
were not suitable for the purpose for which he required the
premises. In the light of the said principles, I proceed to consider
the contentions of the parties.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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18) Firstly, it is contended that the need is not bonafide as the
petitioner does not have any requirement as other portion is already
lying vacant as the same was handed over by the other tenant
during the pendency of the petition. However, Hon’ble Supreme
court in Baldev Singh Bajwa vs Monish Saini (2005) 12 SCC 778
has held that whenever a landlord seeks eviction of the tenant for
bonafide need, the controller shall presume the need as genuine
and bonafide. Further, in this regard, it is pertinent to note that a
person cannot be expected to sit idle and reach a state of starvation
before his need is considered bonafide. Reliance in this regard is
placed upon the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Raghunath G. Panhale Vs. M/s Chaganlal Sunderji & Co. AIR
1999 SC 3864 wherein it was observed that :
„A landlord need not lose his existing job nor resign it nor
reach a level of starvation to contemplate that he must get
possession of his premises for establishing a business.”
19) Furthermore, the provision of Section 19 (2) of DRC Act is to
be emphasized which protects a tenant in case the landlord recovers
possession of any premises and the premises are not occupied by
the landlord or by the person for whose benefit the premises are
held within two months of obtaining such possession or having
obtained the possession, the same are re-let to any other person
within three years from the date of obtaining the possession. Thus,
the said contention is also devoid of merits and does not render the
need of the petitioner as malafide.
20) Even otherwise, it is trite to state that even if the landlord has
other commercial premises available to him and even if the
landlord is letting out the said portions for earning
income/livelihood, since the petitioner intend to use the premises in
occupation of the tenant for needs of her Bonafide need, the Court
cannot intervene in the same. It is not within the purview of the
courts to impose directives on the landlord regarding the nature or
quality of their chosen usage of the tenanted premises. It is the
right of the petitioner to look after her affairs and if the tenanted
premises is suitable as per her needs, she has every right to possess
the said premises and the respondent cannot contend that she
should manage her work otherwise. Therefore, a bald assertion in
this regard without any cogent material qua availability of the
purported commercial space in the said alternative accommodation
does not assist the case of respondent. Further, it is trite to state
that the burden is upon the tenant to show that other alternative
suitable accommodation is available with landlord and how the said
premises were suitable for the pleaded requirement. Reference is
made to the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in the
case of Lalta Prasad Gupta Vs. Sita Ram, 2017 SCC Online Del
13026, wherein it was held as under:-
Digitally Signed
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BHATIA
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“18. Thus, if the tenant seeks leave to defend
controverting the requirement pleaded by landlord on the
ground of the landlord, though at the time of requirement
having alternate premises, having not used the same and
instead having commercially exploited the same, the
tenant must plead (a) the particulars of such premises; (b)
the right/title of the landlord to the same; (c) that the said
premises were vacant and available for use at the time of
pleaded requirement of landlord; (d) how the said
premises were suitable for the pleaded requirement; and
(e) how the landlord has deprived himself thereof i.e. by
sale or letting and support the said pleas with material on
the basis whereof such pleas will be proved.”
21) Furthermore, it is the prerogative of the landlord to determine
which premises best suits his requirements. It is trite to state that
an alternative accommodation, to entail denial of claim of
landlord, must be reasonably suitable, obviously in comparison
with tenanted premises, where from the landlord is seeking
eviction.
22) It is pertinent to note that in case of Gaya Prasad Vs. Shri
Pradeep Srivastava, Appeal Civil No. 1071/1072 of 2001, it was
observed as under :10. “….. During 23 years after the landlord moved for
eviction on the ground that his son needed the building.
Neither the landlord nor his son is expected to remain
idle without doing any work, lest, joining any new
assignment or starting any new work would be at the
peril of forfeiting his requirement to occupy the building.
It is a stark reality that the longer is the life of the
litigation the more would be the number of developments
sprouting up during the long interregnum. If a young
entrepreneur decides to launch a new enterprise and on
that ground he or his father seeks eviction of a tenant from
the building, the proposed enterprise would not get faded
out by subsequent developments during the traditional
lengthy longevity of the litigation. His need may get
dusted, patina might stick on its surface, nonetheless the
need would remain intact. All that is needed is to erase the
patina and see the glose. It is pernicious, and we may say,
unjust to shut the door before an appellant just on the eve
of his reaching the finale, after passing through all the
previous levels of the litigation, merely on the ground that
certain developments occurred pendentelite, because the
opposite party succeeded in prolonging the matter for
such unduly long period.”
23) Even otherwise, in the case of Ragavendra Kumar vs. Firm
Prem Machinery AIR 2000 SC 534, the Hon‟ble Supreme court
Digitally Signed
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BHATIA
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RC.REV. 366/2026
held that it is settled position of law that the landlord is best judge
of his requirement for residential or business purpose and he has
got complete freedom in the matter. Reference may also be made
to the case of Prativa Devi (Smt) v. T.V. Krishnan (1996) 5 SCC
353.
24) Secondly, the contention that respondent has no other place for
business or is dependent upon tenanted premises for livelihood has
no bearing on the merits of present case. In case titled as
“Satyawati Sharma Vs. U.O. I. AIR 2008 SC 3148”, it was held
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that Section 14 (1)(e) of the 1958
Act is violative of the doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14
of the Constitution of India in so far as it discriminates between the
premises let for residential and non-residential purposes when the
same are required bonafide by the landlord for occupation for
himself or for any member of his family dependent on him and
restricts the latter’s right to seek eviction of the tenant from the
premises let for residential purposes only. Thus, there is no bar on
landlord for seeking recovery of non-residential premises on the
ground of bonafide need under Section 14 (1) (e) of DRC Act.
Furthermore, it is a well settled principle of law that a Rent
Controller has to see the bonafide requirement of the petitioner and
not the comparative hardship of the respondent. Reliance in this
regard is placed upon the Apex Court’s decision in Bega Begum
and Ors. v. Abdul Ahad Khan and Ors (1979) AIR 272 that the
inconvenience loss and trouble resulting from denial of decree of
eviction in favour of the landlord far outweigh the prejudice or the
inconvenience which will be caused to the tenant. Hence, the said
contention is devoid of merits.
25) Thirdly, it is contended that the petitioner has failed to disclose
the business for which the tenanted premises is required by her. It
is further contended that petitioner has failed to disclose the exact
type of business the petitioner wishes to start. However, it is
pertinent to note that the DRC act is silent about any requirement of
the landlord for giving details/divulging anything qua the
nature/purpose of the proposed business. Hence, the landlord is not
required to disclose the exact nature of use of premises in eviction
petition. Reliance in this regard is placed upon the decision of
Hon’ble Delhi High Court in H S Banka vs Mohan Lal 2025 SCC
Online Del 6372. Even otherwise, in the case of Raj Kumar
Khaitan & Ors. Vs. Bibi Zubaid Khatun & Ors, AIR 1995 SC
576, it was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court that even if the nature
of business would have been indicated, nobody could bind the
landlords to start the same business in the premises after it was
vacated. Thus, it is the prerogative of the landlord to determine
which business he intends to start and whether the tenanted
premises is suitable or not for said purpose. Thus, the said
contention is also devoid of merits.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
16:01:00
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26) Further, it is contended that the need is not bonafide as the
petitioner could easily run her projected business from the other
space available on the ground floor of the subject premises adjacent
to the tenanted premises. It is stated that during the crossexamination, the petitioner has admitted that they had received
vacant possession of the other room, however, that they intend to
use both the rooms as their office-cum-sitting space and the space
of one room alone is not sufficient. It is trite to state that while
deciding the question of bonafide requirement of the landlord,
it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavor as to how else the
landlord could have adjusted. It is not for the court or the tenant
to dictate to the landlord to make alterations in his property for
making it suitable for his need when on the contrary he can use the
tenanted premises. Also, in case the petitioner fails to occupy the
premises as has been claimed by him, the Delhi Rent Control Act
also provides for recovery of possession by the respondent/tenant
of the tenanted premises for his re-entry and occupation. It is
pertinent to note herein the case of Ravichandran and Ors. Vs
Natrajan Nadar and Ors. (2004) 1 MLJ 456, wherein it was held:
“Even assuming that other premises are available, then
the choice is left to the landlord to decide as to which nonresidential premises he should occupy, and the tenant
cannot have any say in the matter. If the landlord is able
to show the bonafide, then the tenant cannot dictate
terms to the landlord that he should occupy some other
building and not the one mentioned in the petition.”
27) Thus, it is not for the tenant to dictate to landlord that he
could merge other parties of the subject premises, rather than
use the tenanted premises in his occupation. It is neither open for
the court nor for the tenant to decide as to how else the landlord
could make alterations/modification in his property. Hence, the
said contention is also devoid of merits.
28) Further, it is contended that petitioner has not come to court
with clean hands and is guilty of material concealment. Here, I also
find it pertinent to refer to the case of Nalini Kant Gupta Vs. Lajja
Gupta, 2017 SCC Delhi 10247, wherein it was held that once the
tenant has had full opportunity and the parties have gone to trial
on all facts, the petition for eviction for self-requirement cannot be
dismissed on the ground of suppression. It was held that the
argument of concealment is not available in as much as no
prejudice can be said to have been suffered by the tenant after
having an opportunity to lead evidence on all pleas. Therefore,
even if the petitioner had concealed certain facts, the same is not a
ground for dismissal of the present eviction petition since the
parties had an opportunity to lead evidence. Hence, the said plea of
respondent is also devoid of merits.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
16:01:00
RC.REV. 366/2026
29) As far as claim is concerned that petitioner does not have any
prior experience of running any business, the said contention is also
devoid of merits. In Ram Babu Aggarwal Vs. Jay Kishan Dass
2009 (4) RCR (Civil) 748, it was held that merely because the
landlord has no prior experience in business, it cannot be a ground
to doubt his bonafide.
30) Fourthly, it is contended on behalf of the respondent that
petitioner/landlord has not placed on record the correct site plan of
the suit property, however, it is pertinent to note that no counter site
plan has been filed by the respondent for a triable issue to arise. In
the case of V.S. Sachdeva Vs. M.L. Grover 1997 (2) RCR 302, it
was held that if no site plan is filed by tenant, then the site plan
filed by the landlord is deemed to be correct. Also, in the case of
Rishal Singh Vs. Bohat Ram & Ors. 2014 (144) DRJ 633, the
Hon'ble High Court of Delhi held that it is settled law that when the
tenant contests the accuracy of the site plan filed by the landlord,
he is required to file a copy of the site plan, he believes to be
correct so as to guide the Court in finding the discrepancies in the
site plan filed by the landlord. It was observed that without such
site plan being filed, the mere contentions raised to this effect will
be considered meritless. Thus, it cannot be said that the
respondents have given facts or particulars which require to be
established by way of evidence. The respondents have made
allegations for the sake of making allegations. Hence, the
aforesaid contention is devoid of merits.
31) Fifthly, it is contended that the premises falls within Slum
notified area but the petitioner has not taken the permission of the
competent authority (Slum). In this regard, it has been admitted by
ld. Counsel for the petitioner during oral arguments that the
property falls within the slum areas, however, it is stated that there
is no requirement for seeking the requisite permission as the
present petition is a petition u/s 14 (1) (e) of DRC Act. On the said
aspect, it is necessary to refer to the case titled as Shafait Ali Vs.
Shiva Mal (Dead) by LRs AIR 1988 SC 214, where in reference
was made to judgment delivered in Ravi Dutt Sharma Vs. Rattan
Lai Bhargava AIR 1984 SC 967 and it was held that:
"Section 14A, 14 (1)(E), 25A, 253 & 25C of Delhi Rent
Control Act are special provisions so far as the landlord
and tenant are concerned and further in the view of the
non- obstante clause in the Section, these provisions
override the existing law, so far as the new procedure is
concerned. In that view of that matter, we are of the
opinion that the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance)
Act, 1956 would have no application in these cases
covered by Section 14A and 14 (1) (E) of the Delhi Rent
Control Act specially in view of provisions which were
added by the Amending Act of 1976. In view of the
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
16:01:00
RC.REV. 366/2026
procedure in Chapter IIIA of the Rent Act, the Slum Act is
rendered inapplicable to the extent of inconsistency and it
is not, therefore, necessary for the landlord to obtain
permission of the Competent Authority U/s. 19(1) (A) of
the Slum Act before instituting a suit for eviction and
coming within Section 14(1) (e) of the Rent Act."
32) Accordingly, in view of the above law, no permission was
required by the petitioner before filing the present petition u/s 14
(1) (e) of DRC Act.
33) Hence, in the light of the aforesaid observations and findings,
I find that petitioner has been able to establish her bonafide need
and respondent have failed to show any suitable alternative
accommodation for the said bonafide need.
RELIEF
34) Therefore, I find that the petitioner has established the
ingredients of the eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the
DRC Act on the basis of preponderance of probabilities.
Accordingly, eviction petition stands allowed and eviction order is
passed in terms of Section 14 (1) (e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act
in favour of the petitioner and against the respondents with
respect to the tenanted premises one small room on the ground
floor of property bearing no. 71-D, Kamla Nagar, Delhi-110007
and more specifically shown in red colour in site plan.
35) File be consigned to the record room.”
(Emphasis supplied)
25.
Adverting to the facts of the present case, the next ground of
challenge to the Impugned Judgement concerns the subsequent
availability of another room on the ground floor during the pendency
of the Eviction Petition. It is not in dispute that the learned ARC was
conscious of this subsequent development. The learned ARC has
specifically considered the fact that possession of the other room had
been obtained during the pendency of the proceedings and has
recorded that the Respondent intended to utilize both rooms as officecum-sitting space, the area of one room alone being insufficient for
the requirement pleaded.
26.
The mere fact that possession of another portion of the property
became available to the Respondent during the pendency of the
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proceedings does not, by itself, render the requirement pleaded in
respect of the subject premises non-existent. The relevant enquiry is
whether,
notwithstanding
such
subsequent
development,
the
requirement of the subject premises continued to subsist. The learned
ARC, upon appreciation of the evidence led before it, has returned a
categorical finding that the Respondent required the subject premises
for the purpose pleaded.
27.
Unless the finding of the learned ARC is shown to be perverse,
unsupported by the record or founded upon a manifest error of law,
the same does not warrant revisional interference. No such infirmity
has been demonstrated.
28.
Further, the reliance placed upon the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Amarjit Singh (supra), particularly Paragraph Nos.
12, 13 and 22 thereof, also does not advance this ground of challenge
sought to be raised by the learned counsel on behalf of the Petitioner.
The said paragraphs read as under:
“12. This Court upheld that finding. This Court affirmed the
proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the
party just and meaningful as also legal and factual in accord with
the current realities, the Court could and in many cases must take
cautious cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the
institution of the proceedings, provided rules of fairness to both the
sides were scrupulously obeyed. In the instant case there is no
question of violation of any principle of rules of natural justice. If
cognizance is taken of events and developments, subsequent to the
initiation of proceedings, it must be held that the landlady had the
opportunity of occupying a floor in the house which fell vacant not
once but twice subsequent to arising of her need for reasonable
accommodation. She chose not to occupy the said premises. The
landlady asserts that she must have means to live before she can
utilise her living space to live. The landlady asserts that in order to
have her means to live, she must let one floor on rent. According to
her, that is the only source of her income. But it is not clear from
the learned Rent Controller's findings or the High Court
adjudication whether the huge bank balances alleged to belong to
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the landlady yield any income or not or is insufficient income for
her to live. Therefore, for the purpose of this appeal, we must
proceed on the assumption that the landlady needed money to live
and the income from her house letting was a source of her income.
But the question is, is it a sufficient ground which will bring her out
from the second limb of the conditions imposed by Section 14(1)(e)
of the Act? There is no dispute that subsequent events can be taken
into consideration. There is no dispute that administration of justice
demands that any changes either in fact or in law must be taken
cognizance of by the court but that must be done in a cautious
manner of relevant facts
13. Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad [(1981) 3 SCC 103 : AIR
1981 SC 1711 : (1981) 3 SCR 605] which was a case under
Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 is relevant.
There the question was whether the (sic) after filing of two eviction
suits and acquiring possession of a major portion of the suit
premises through an eviction order passed in one of them amounts
to the landlord “has a reasonably suitable non-residential
accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town
concerned” within the meaning of Section 12(1)(f) of the M.P. Act
of 1961. It was reiterated that when an action was brought by the
landlord under Rent Restriction Act for eviction on the ground of
personal requirement, his need must not only be shown to exist at
the date of the suit but must exist on the date of the appellate decree
or on the date when a higher court deals with the matter. Even at
the last stage the tenant was entitled to show that the need or
requirement no more exists. Otherwise the landlord would derive
an unfair advantage. It was further held that in order to obtain
possession under Section 12(1)(h) of the Madhya Pradesh Act, the
landlord had to establish his bona fide requirement of the
accommodation in possession of the tenant. At p. 624 of the report
(SCC p. 119), Pathak, J. reiterated that the High Court was bound
to take the fact into consideration because, it is well settled that in a
proceeding for the ejectment of a tenant on the ground of personal
requirement under a statute controlling the eviction of tenants,
unless the statute prescribes to the contrary the requirement must
continue to exist on the date when the proceeding was finally
disposed of either in appeal or revision by the relevant authority.
Therefore, subsequent events can be taken cognizance of if they are
relevant and material. In the instant case the fact that the other flat
in the premises fell vacant which the landlady could have occupied
but she did not and let it out to fetch higher income was a relevant
factor. It can be taken cognizance of.
****
22. In the premises we are of the opinion that the High Court was
wrong in the view and the approach it took and in view of the
undisputed facts that the landlady had in her choice to go into the
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premises in question but she did not, she has become disentitled to
the right of eviction. The fact that the tenant was a troublesome
tenant inasmuch as that he questioned the liability to the landlord is
irrelevant.”
29.
In Amarjit Singh (supra), the subsequent event was found to be
material as the accommodation which had fallen vacant was itself
available to the landlady for occupation, was reasonably suitable for
the requirement pleaded, and had, on more than one occasion, been
consciously not occupied by her and instead let out to earn income. It
was in that factual context that the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that
the subsequent development had a bearing upon the subsistence of the
requirement.
30.
The facts of the present case stand on a materially different
footing. The subsequent availability of the other room was not treated
by the learned ARC as an accommodation which, by itself, rendered
the
Subject
Premises
unnecessary.
On
the
contrary,
upon
consideration of the evidence, the learned ARC returned a specific
finding that the Respondent required the subject premises for the
purpose pleaded. Thus, the subsequent event relied upon by the
Petitioner was duly taken into consideration and was found not to
extinguish the requirement for the Subject Premises.
31.
The principle emerging from Amarjit Singh (supra) that
subsequent events which are relevant and material may be taken into
consideration is, therefore, not in dispute. However, the application of
that principle necessarily depends upon the nature and effect of the
subsequent event in the facts of each case. In the present case, the
subsequent availability of the other room was considered by the
learned ARC and was found not to furnish a reasonably suitable
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substitute for the Subject Premises. Such a finding, based upon the
evidence before the learned ARC, cannot be displaced merely because
another view of the effect of the subsequent event may be
conceivable.
32.
In exercise of the revisional jurisdiction under the proviso to
Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is not required to reappreciate the evidence or substitute its own assessment of the
sufficiency of the other room for that of the learned ARC. No
perversity, manifest illegality or error apparent on the face of the
record has been demonstrated in the manner in which the learned ARC
dealt with the subsequent event. The reliance placed upon Amarjit
Singh (supra) is, therefore, misplaced and does not warrant
interference with the Impugned Judgment.
33.
Learned counsel for the Petitioner has next contended that the
bona fide requirement pleaded by the Respondent being for a
commercial purpose could not constitute a valid ground for seeking
eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, as he has not
obtained the requisite permission for the competent authorities. The
said submission, however, cannot be accepted in view of the settled
legal position noticed by the learned ARC. The statutory ground under
Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act is not rendered unavailable merely
because the premises are sought to be recovered for a bona fide
commercial requirement.
34.
The question before this Court, therefore, is not whether the
requirement pleaded by the Respondent is residential or commercial,
or whether he has obtained any necessary permissions, but only
whether the Respondent has established the ingredients necessary for
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invoking Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act. The learned ARC has
examined the requirement pleaded, the availability of alternative
accommodation and the material brought on record by the parties and,
upon appreciation of the evidence, has returned a finding in favour of
the Respondent.
35.
The contention regarding the commercial nature of the
requirement and alleged lack of permission thereto, therefore, does not
disclose any error of law in the Impugned Judgment. It is also not the
case of the Petitioner that the learned ARC applied an incorrect
statutory test while examining the bona fide requirement. The
submission, in substance, seeks to question the factual conclusion
reached by the learned ARC, which cannot be revisited in the present
Revision merely because another view may be possible.
36.
The final ground urged by learned counsel for the Petitioner
relates to the correctness of the site plan relied upon by the
Respondent. The learned ARC has specifically considered this
objection and has noted that, despite disputing the correctness of the
site plan, the Petitioner did not place on record any counter site plan
depicting the property in the manner asserted by him.
37.
A mere assertion that the site plan furnished by the Respondent
is incorrect, without placing before the learned ARC the site plan
which, according to the Petitioner, correctly represents the premises,
cannot by itself constitute a triable issue, particularly where the parties
have already led evidence and the matter has proceeded to trial. The
learned ARC, therefore, cannot be faulted for declining to accept an
unsubstantiated objection regarding the site plan.
38.
More importantly, the Petitioner has not demonstrated before
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this Court how the alleged discrepancy in the site plan has resulted in
any erroneous adjudication of the Respondent’s bona fide requirement
or the availability of reasonably suitable alternative accommodation.
The objection, therefore, remains at the level of a bare assertion and
does not disclose any material infirmity in the decision-making
process adopted by the learned ARC.
39.
Viewed cumulatively, none of the grounds urged by the
Petitioner discloses any jurisdictional error, manifest illegality,
material irregularity or perversity in the Impugned Judgment. The
learned ARC has considered the objections raised by the Petitioner,
appreciated the evidence led by the parties and recorded findings on
the material issues arising for determination. What the Petitioner
seeks, in substance, is a re-appreciation of the evidence and a
substitution of the conclusions reached by the learned ARC with
conclusions that may be more favorable to him. Such an exercise falls
outside the limited scope of revisional jurisdiction under the proviso to
Section 25-B(8) of the Act.
40.
It is also significant that the Eviction Petition was adjudicated
after conclusion of the trial. The present Revision, therefore, cannot be
permitted to operate as a second appeal on questions of fact merely
because the Petitioner seeks to place a different construction on the
evidence or the subsequent events. The findings returned by the
learned ARC are neither shown to be perverse nor demonstrated to be
contrary to any settled principle of law.
DECISION:
41.
In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no
infirmity in the Impugned Judgment warranting interference in
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BHATIA
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exercise of the jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the
Act.
42.
Accordingly, the present Petition, being sans merit, is
dismissed.
43.
The present Petition, along with all pending Application(s), if
any, stands disposed of in aforementioned terms.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
SEPTEMBER 25, 2026/tk/DJ
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
16:01:00
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