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WP No. 35529 of 2025
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 6TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR
WRIT PETITION NO. 35529 OF 2025 (GM-CPC)
BETWEEN:
SHRI. SHIVARAMA KRISHNAN A.
S/O LATE ANANTHAKRISHNAN MUDALIYAR,
AGED ABOUT 69 YEARS,
R/AT MAIN, 1ST BLOCK,
RAJAJINAGAR, BENGALURU
PIN – 560 010
…PETITIONER
(BY SRI. LAKSHMIKANTH K., ADVOCATE)
AND:
Digitally
signed by
MADHURI S
Location:
High Court of
Karnataka
1.
SRI. A SUNDARAMURTHY
S/O LATE B. ANANTHA KRISHNA MUDALIYAR
AGED ABOUT 79 YEARS,
RESIDING AT FLAT NO.C-901,
SETHANA POWER TOWER,
HORAMAVU AGARA MAIN ROAD,
BABUSAPALYA,
BENGALURU – 560 043
2.
SMT. B. SHANKARI
W/O LATE A. BALAKRISHNAN,
AGED ABOUT 73 YEARS,
R/AT NO.358, 18TH CROSS,
8TH MAIN, BEML LAYOUT,
BASAVESHWARA NAGAR,
BENGALURU – 560 079.
3.
SRI B. SATISH
S/O LATE A. BALAKRISHNAN,
AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS,
R/AT NO.358, 18TH CROSS,
8TH MAIN, BEML LAYOUT,
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BASAVESHWARA NAGAR,
BENGALURU – 560 079
4.
SMT.B. SHANTHA NARAIN @ SHANTHA KUMARI
D/O LATE A. BALAKRISHNAN,
W/O SAI NARAIN,
AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS,
R/AT NO.19/10A,
CORPORATION SCHOOL ROAD,
LAKE AREA, NUNGAMBAKKAM,
CHENNAI, TAMIL NADU STATE – 600 034.
REPRESENTED BY HER MOTHER AND
GPA HOLDER SMT. B. SHANKARI,
W/O LATE A. BALAKRISHNAN
5.
SMT. B. SRILAKSHMI
D/O LATE A. BALAKRISHNAN,
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS
R/AT NO.358, 18TH CROSS,
8TH MAIN, BEML LAYOUT,
BASAVESHWARA NAGAR,
BENGALURU – 560 079
6.
SMT. M. INDUMATHI,
W/O LATE A. MOHANRAM,
AGED ABOUT 72 YEARS,
R/AT NO.11, VGNSS LAYOUT,
3RD CROSS, KAMALANAGAR,
BENGALURU – 560 079
7.
SRI. M. KUMARESH
S/O LATE A. MOHANRAM,
AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS,
R/AT NO.11, VGNSS LAYOUT,
3RD CROSS, KAMALANAGAR,
BENGALURU – 560 079
8.
SRI. M. ANAND
S/O LATE A. MOHANRAM,
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS,
R/AT NO.11, VGNSS LAYOUT,
3RD CROSS, KAMALANAGAR,
BENGALURU – 560 079
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9.
SMT. M. NALANI
D/O LATE A. MOHANRAM,
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,
W/O PARTHIBAN P.,
R/AT NO. 11, VGNSS LAYOUT,
3RD CROSS, KAMALANAGAR,
BENGALURU – 560 079
REPRESENTED BY HER BROTHER
AND GPA HOLDER MR. M. ANAND
S/O LATE A. MOHANRAM
10. SMT. G. SHARAVATHI
W/O LATE A. GOPALAKRISHNAN,
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS,
R/AT NO.17, 3RD CROSS,
NEAR ANDRAHALLI CIRCLE,
VIDYAMANYANAGAR, ANDHRAHALLI,
BENGALURU – 560 091.
11. SRI. VIVEK G. KRISHNAN
D/O LATE A. GOPALAKRISHNAN,
AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS,
R/AT NO.17, 3RD CROSS,
NEAR ANDRAHALLI CIRCLE,
VIDYAMANYANAGAR, ANDHRAHALLI,
BENGALURU – 560 091
12. SMT. VIDYA G.
D/O LATE A. GOPALAKRISHNAN,
W/O DHARMARAJ
AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS,
RESIDING AT OLD NO.67/1,
NEW NO.70/1, 3RD MAIN ROAD,
NEAR SAI BABA TEMPLE,
VIJAYANAGAR, MUDALAPALYA,
NAGARABHAVI,
BENGALURU – 560 072
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. K. R. ASHOK KUMAR, ADVOCATE FOR C/R1 TO R12)
THIS W.P. IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF CONSTITUTION
OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE WRIT OF CERTIORARI OR ANY
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OTHER APPROPRIATE WRIT BY SETTING ASIDE THE IMPUGNED
ORDER DATED 24.03.2025 PASSED BY THE HON’BLE COURT OF
XIV ADDL. CITY CIVIL AND SESSION JUDGE AT BENGALURU (CCH28) IN EX.PET.NO.2356/2023 AT ANNEXURE - A.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING,
THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR
ORAL ORDER
This petition by the Judgment Debtor in EXE.No.2356/2023
is directed on the file of XIV Additional City Civil and Sessions
Judge, Bengaluru (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Executing Court”
for short) is directed against the impugned order dated 24.03.2025,
whereby the objection raised by the petitioner/Judgment Debtor
that the execution proceedings were not maintainable as being
barred by limitation was rejected by the Executing Court.
2.
Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned
counsel for the respondents and perused the material on record.
3.
A perusal of the material on record will indicate that the
petitioner - judgment debtor is none other than the brother of the
respondents - decree holders. The petitioner instituted a suit in OS
No.6971/2000
against
the
respondents-defendants,
which
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culminated in a compromise decree dated 18.11.2009, the terms of
which are set out as hereunder:
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT UNDER SECTION
89 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE READ WITH
RULES FIND 25 OF THE KARNATAKA CIVIL PROCEDURE
(MEDIATION) RULES, 2007.
The parties above named beg to submit as follows:
I. The plaintiff has filed this suit praying for a
judgment and decree for partition and separate possession
of 1/5th share of the plaintiff in Schedule-A and B
properties and Schedule-C business and mesne profits
from the date of suit till the date of delivery, among other
reliefs. The aforesaid suit was referred to mediation for
resolving the dispute between the parties. In the course of
mediation, they have resolved their dispute and have
agreed to the following terms and conditions:
(a) Both the parties have agreed to treat that the
memorandum of partition entered into between them on
3.3.1997 and marked as Ex.P.1 in the above suit has
been acted upon.
(b) The plaintiff confirms that the Schedule-B
properties and Schedule-C business are the selfacquired properties of the concerned defendants. As
such, plaintiff does not have any claim over the BSchedule properties and C-Schedule business the
same exclusively belongs to each one of the respective
defendants.
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(c) By virtue of this settlement, both plaintiff and
defendants have jointly agreed to sell and dispose of
Schedule-A properties to the best market price and
share the proceeds equally, i.e., 1/5th share each. The
schedule properties along with the below mentioned
V.V. Puram property shall be sold in the following order
its entirety:
(i) Property bearing No.523, 1m Main Road,
Anjinaya Temple Street, V.V. Puram, Bangalore,
measuring 30ft. x 75 ft. together with existing
building.
(ii)
Property
No.221,
Sampangiramnagar,
Bangalore-560 027 (Item No.3 of the Schedule-A);
(iii) Property bearing No.1041, 20m main, 1
Block, Rajajinagar, Bangalore-560 010 (Item No.1
of A-Schedule)
(iv) Property bearing No.C-72-(Old No. 104)
P.V.R. Road, Ranasingpet, Bangalore-560 002)
Item No.2 of 'A' Schedule)
(v) Land bearing No.425/2, measuring 1 acre
and 20 Cents or as found in the Revenue record of
Seri Village, Kaveripakkam, Tamil Nadu (Item-4 of
'A' Schedule);
(d) It is the joint responsibility of plaintiff and
defendants to co-ordinate with each other in bringing
the above properties for sale (Schedule-A properties
described in the plaint). It is also mutually agreed to
bear all the expenses in connection with updating the
title deeds and obtaining encumbrance certificates and
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also payment of tax to the Corporation or to the
Revenue authorities in respect of the above properties.
(e) It is mutually agreed between the parties that
all of them will co-ordinate together for the sale of the
schedule properties and the said V.V. Puram property
and so also selecting the prospective purchaser for the
mutual advantage of all the parties.
(f) It is agreed by the defendants that the plaintiff's
share in the sale proceeds of all the above properties is
1/5th after deducting the expenses incurred thereto and
it is also agreed that the defendants shall pay a sum of
Rs. 10,00,000/- over and above his share as agreed
under the memorandum of partition entered into
between the parties as early as 3.3.1997. Apart from
the said amount the defendants have agreed to pay
another sum of Rs.8,00,000/- to the plaintiff towards
delay in bringing the properties for sale. Thus the
defendants have agreed to pay Rs. 18,00,000/-in
addition to his 1/5th share in the sale proceeds of the
schedule properties and the naid V.V. Puram property.
The said defendants at the first sale of the V.V. Puram
property amount is required to be paid to the plaintiff by
the referred to Supra.
(g) It is made clear by both the parties that all the
above properties are free from encumbrance, charge
claim and other security or security either collateral or
main/principal security for loan or advances and it is not
the
subject
matter
of
any
agreement
of
sale/lease/mortgage or third party claim. If there is any
such claim on any of the above properties, the person
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who has availed such loans or charge, such party shall
be alone is answerable/liable and it is his sole
responsibility to discharge and make the property free
from encumbrance to enable the parties to sell the
properties to a prospective purchaser free from
encumbrance.
(h) It is also mutually agreed that wherever
necessary to sign the documents such as sale
agreements/sale deeds if the purchaser insist upon the
signatures of the family member of the parties, the
same will be acted upon, as desired by the purchaser.
(i) The plaintiff has agreed to pay a sum of
Rs.44,400/ towards full and final settlement of the claim
in respect of O.S.No.8194/2001 filed by the second
defendant against the plaintiff which is pending on the
file of this Hon'ble Court, when the plaintiff receives his
amount of Rs. 18,00,000/- as stated supra.
(j) The plaintiff who is residing in Schedule Item
No.1 Rajajinagar property, agrees to vacate the said
property at the execution and registration of sale deed
of the said property to the prospective purchaser to be
identified by the parties jointly.
(k) Both the plaintiff and the defendants have
mutually
agreed
to
withdraw
all
the
allegations/contentions made against each other.
(l) The fourth defendant Smt. Sharavathi who is
the wife of late Gopalakrishnan has agreed to get her
son G. Vivek and daughter G. Vidya who are majors to
be impleaded in the suit and record the compromise.
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The said G. Vivek and G. Vidya who have also agreed
for the same have affixed their signature to this
Compromise.
(m) The parties further agree to add the above
said V.V. Puram property to A-Schedule of the suit as
Item No.5 property for better clarity of the compromise.
II. In view of the aforesaid agreement entered into
between the parties, the parties pray that the Hon'ble Court
may be pleased to dispose of the above suit, in terms of
the aforesaid agreement.
III. In view of the aforesaid agreement, the Plaintiff
prays for refund of the entire institution fee.
IV. Parties will appear on 18.11.09 before the Court
for passing orders/decree in terms of the above said
agreement
4.
In pursuance of the said compromise decree, the
property bearing No.221, Sampangiram Nagar, Bangalore –
560027 (Item No.3 of Schedule A) was jointly sold by all the parties
on 28.10.2014. Subsequently, the respondents instituted the
instant execution proceedings in Exe No.2356/2023 interalia
alleging that the petitioner - judgment debtor had committed
breach/default and was not co-operating with the respondents to
give effect to and implement and execute the compromise decree
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and as such, the compromise decree required to be executed by
the Executing Court. After entering appearance before the
Executing Court, the petitioner - judgment debtor contested the
proceedings putting forth various contentions including raising a
contention regarding limitation on the ground that the compromise
decree having been passed on 18.11.2009, the instant execution
proceedings which were instituted on 07.09.2023 beyond the
period of 12 years as contemplated under Article 136 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 was barred by limitation. The respondents decree holders opposed the said contention and contended that
there were mutual rights and obligations created under the
compromise decree as well as subsequent events which occurred
pursuant to the said compromise decree and since the petitioner judgment debtor had not complied with the terms and conditions of
the compromise decree and had committed breach/default thereof,
the respondents were entitled to file the instant execution
proceedings, which were not barred by limitation and maintainable
and sought for rejection of the said contention of the petitioner.
5.
After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the
trial Court proceeded to pass the impugned order rejecting the
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objections raised by the petitioner – judgment debtor as regards
the maintainability of the execution petition insofar as limitation was
concerned. Aggrieved by the impugned order passed by the
Executing Court, the petitioner is before this Court by way of the
present petition.
6.
Learned counsel for the petitioner would reiterate the
various contentions urged in the petition and submit that since the
compromise decree was passed on 18.11.2009, in the light of
Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the instant execution
proceedings filed on 07.09.2023 after/beyond the prescribed period
of 12 years was barred by limitation and the same was liable to be
dismissed as not maintainable and the impugned order passed by
the trial Court deserves to be set aside.
7.
Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents
submits that since there were mutual and reciprocal rights and
obligations created in favour and against both parties in the
compromise decree, the decree would become enforceable only
when the cause of action to execute the decree would arise after
committal of breach by the petitioners and period of limitation would
not commence/start from the date of the decree but subsequently,
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when the breach occurred and when the decree became
enforceable and as such, the impugned order passed by the trial
Court does not warrant interference by this Court in the present
petition.
8.
I have given my careful consideration to the rival
submissions and perused the material on record.
9.
Before adverting to the rival contentions, it would be
necessary to extract Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which
reads as under:
For
the
execution
of
any
decree
(other than a
decree
"136.
granting
a
mandatory
injunction) or
order of any
civil court.
10.
Twelve
years.
Where the decree or order becomes
enforceable or where the decree or any
subsequent order directs any payment of
money or the delivery of any property to be
made at a certain date or at recurring
periods, when default in making the
payment or delivery in respect of which
execution is sought, takes place, provided
that an application for the enforcement or
execution of a decree granting a perpetual
injunction shall not be subject to any period
of limitation."
A plain reading of the aforesaid provision is sufficient
to come to the conclusion that the limitation would commence only
when the decree becomes enforceable or from the date of default
and not from the date of the decree as provided in the said
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provision. In the instant case, a perusal of the terms and conditions
of the compromise decree would indicate that mutual and
reciprocal rights and obligations were created in favour and against
both parties in the compromise decree, as a result of which, the
decree would become enforceable only upon breach/default being
committed by either of the parties and the period of limitation would
commence when the cause of action to execute the decree arose
when it become enforceable and not from the date of decree.
11.
In this context, the Trial Court has correctly and
properly considered the material on record and taken into account
that as per the compromise decree itself, the property at
Sampangiram Nagar was jointly sold subsequently on 28.10.2014
by both the parties including the petitioner – judgment debtor, who
himself participated in giving effect to and implementing and
executing the compromise decree subsequent to the decree.
However, subsequent to the decree dated 18.11.2009 and sale
deed dated 28.10.2014, the petitioner had allegedly committed
default/breach of terms of conditions of the decree which
consequently became enforceable only thereafter, as a result of
which, the instant execution proceedings were not barred by
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limitation. While arriving at the said conclusion, executing Court
held as under:
ORDERS ON MAINTAINABILITY
The present Decree Holders namely Sundaramurthy
and 11 others have filed the present Execution Petition as
against one Shivarama Krishnan based upon the Judgment
and decree of compromise effected in O.S.No. 6971/2000
directing the Judgment Debtors to vacate and surrender
the vacant possession of the Suit Schedule
secondly
to
sell the
schedule
Property
Property,
by auction
and apportionment of sale consideration as per the decree
and for other appropriate reliefs.
2.
Based upon a compromise decree dated
18/11/2009, a decree was passed by this Court as on
12/4/2010.
The Judgment Debtors have raised an
objection, accordingly the Decree Holders have filed the
present application by way of written arguments have
addressed
their
written
arguments
with
regard
to
maintainability of Execution petition on the ground that
youngest son V. Ananthakrishna Modaliar is said to have
filed a suit for Partition & Separate Possession as against
his brothers in O.S.No. 6971/2000 and after the contest of
the matter, the matter was referred to Mediation and the
compromise was effected by virtue of a decree dated
18/11/2009. And that, in terms of the decree, execution
final decree was also drawn, whereby since the properties
were situated at various parts of the Bengaluru, that were
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listed and were ordered to be sold in priority and apportion
the sale consideration so received amongst the brothers in
1/5th share each and in case of the death of one of the
brothers, it shall be shared amongst their respective family
members.
And the details of properties were
furnished.
One such Property is situated at
V.V.Puram, the other Property at S.R. Nagar and upon the
Property that was situated at Rajajinagar and another
Property at PVR Road. And that the order of preference of
sale of Property was also settled in terms of the said
decree. Accordingly, V.V.Puram Property was sold on
17/11/2011, SR Nagar Property was sold on 28/10/2014.
Rajajinagar Property is not yet sold. And PVR Road
Property was sold on 22/6/2012. Therefore, it was clear
from the terms of the decree that Rajajinagar Property was
required to be sold but the same could not be sold since
Judgment Debtor was residing with his family and as a
good gesture not to cause inconvenience until he shifts
his residence and the Property was not taken for sale and
the order of preference No.3 was kept as a last Property.
And that it was also contended that, as per the decree,
Plaintiff was residing in Rajajinagar Property agreed to
vacate the said Property. But inspite of a compromise
decree Judgment Debtor has not yet come forwarded to
vacate and surrender the vacant possession of the
Rajajinagar Property immediately after the sale of PVR
Property on 22/6/2012, which was the last to be sold. The
Judgment Debtors family members requested
the
Decree
the
Holder
to
vacate
and
surrender
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possession of the said Property. On 28/10/2014 the SR
Nagar Property was also sold. And thereafter preference
to sell Rajajinagar Property was taken up and then the
Judgment Debtor was required to vacate and surrender the
vacant possession and to arrange the sale of the said
Property from the date of the said compromise decree.
And therefore, the Decree Holder has contended that, as
per Article 136 since there was an obligation upon the
parties, whereby the right to seek for the sale of
Rajajinagar Property arose after the sale of SR Nagar
Property on 28/10/2014. And therefore, the starting point
of limitation would apply after the sale of SR Nagar
Property, which is governed under Article 136.
3.
And also contended that it is not a normal
decree but it was a conditional decree and delivery of
possession is in terms of Order 21 Rule 35 r/w. Section (2)
(3) of C.P.C. “And that the possession of the building or
the enclosures is to be delivered and a person governed
by a decree does not offer free access to the Court through
which its office may order for delivery of possession”. And
therefore, noting the objections raised by Judgment
Debtor, wherein a contention is raised by the Judgment
Debtor that it is barred by limitation and it has crossed 12
years period of limitation from 18/11/2009 and therefore, a
contention is raised by the Judgment Debtor that it would
not attract execution since it is barred by time.
4.
Noting
these
aspects,
the
Execution
Petitioners have approached this Court by way of the
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present written arguments and have relied upon few
citations.
5.
Having
heard
both
sides,
perused
the
materials available on record.
6.
Following points arise for my consideration:-
Points for consideration
1.
Whether the objections of Judgment Debtor
relating to limitation is sustainable?
2.
What order?
7.
My findings to the above points are as under:
Point No.1 : In the Negative
Point No.2 : As per final order for the following;
REASONS
8.
Point No.1:- The Judgment Debtors have
raised an objection that Decree Holders have filed a false
petition seeking execution of decree passed in O.S.No.
6971/2000 dated 18/11/2009. And that as per Article 136
of Limitation Act 1963, the period of limitation for execution
of any decree or other of any civil Court other than a
decree granting Mandatory Injunction is 12 years. And the
maximum period of limitation for execution of a decree or
order is 12 years from the date when the decree or order
became enforceable, which is usually the date of decree or
order, as held in the case of I.Ahmad Vs. K.Bibi, reported in
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AIR 1985 ORISSA 8102. Hence, on these and other
grounds the Judgment Debtor has sought for dismissal of
the execution petition.
9.
And further the Advocate for DHR has also
relied upon another citation reported in Shaifuddin Vs.
Kanhaiya Lal reported in the case of AIR 2023 SC (Civil)
1616, wherein their Lordships referring to Article 136 have
held,
“Limitation – Compromise Decree – cause of action to
execute compromise decree arose when premises were
removed from possession of Decree Holders.”
10.
Further another citation reported in (2000) 6
SCC 259, in the case of Deep Chand and others Vs.
Mohan Lal, referring to Article 136, their Lordships have
held that,
“Execution of decree – Decree itself directing its
execution only after execution of Sale Deed in favour of
Decree Holder – Held, limitation period of 12 years will start
running from the date of execution of the Sale Deed in
favour of Decree Holder – Application for execution of the
decree filed within 12 years from that date would be
maintainable.”
11.
Further another citation reported in (2004)
12 SCC 469, wherein it is held, “Starting point of limitation
under Article 136, held, is the date on which the decree
becomes capable of execution – Where decree passed in
1973 remained unenforceable during the operation of T.N.
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Indebted Agriculturists (Temporary Relief) Ordinance,
1975.”
12.
Having noted the said citation, the contention
of the present execution Petitioners ie., Decree Holder is
that, as per the compromise entered into between the
Plaintiff
ie.,
the
present
Judgment
Debtor
Shivaramakrishnan in O.S.No. 6971/2000 and the present
Decree Holders / Defendants, as per the compromise
effected on 12/11/2009 is that, both parties have agreed for
the sale of properties in the order disclosed at Clause-1,
Page-2. Whereby the Property at V.V.Puram was to be
sold
at
the
first
instance
and
followed
by
Sampangiramanagara Property and then the Property at
Rajajinagar and subsequently in the category-4, the
Property of PVR Road and lastly the land bearing 425/2002
which is not available for sale. In the first 4 categories, the
Property in the Serial No.3 ie., Rajajinagar Property is not
yet sold since the Judgment Debtor Shivaramkrishnan is in
possession of the same. As such, the said Property was
not sold since on one or the other pretext the Judgment
Debtor has not vacated himself from the Property at
Rajajinagar.
Therefore
the
Decree
Holders
have
approached this Court. As per the said terms of the
compromise, as discussed and safely relying upon the
citation relied by the counsel for Decree Holder, the period
of limitation as stated under Article 136 of the Limitation
Act, the period of limitation would commence from the date
on which the last Property which was sold ie., the S.R.
Nagar Property which is sold on 28/10/2014. Therefore,
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from the said date, the present Decree Holders have filed
the present execution petition as on 7/9/2023, which is
within 12 years from the date of limitation. Hence sought for
rejecting the objections raised by the Judgment Debtors.
Having noted the citations relied by the Judgment Debtors
and Decree Holders which are as under :
In case of Bimal Kumar and another Vs. Shakunthala
Debi & others, wherein it is held, “Whether preliminary or
final – Decree passed in terms of compromise – Terms of
compromise clearly showing that parties had obtained
separate and exclusive possession of properties allotted to
their respective shares – Compromise thus leaves nothing
to be done for future – Decree passed by embodying such
compromise is final decree”.
Further at para-23, their Lordships have held that,
“”It is clearly admitted that they were in separate and
exclusive possession of the properties and the same had
already been allotted to them. It was also admitted that
they were in possession of their respective shares and,
therefore, no final decree or execution was required to be
filed. It is demonstrable that the compromise application
does not contain any clause regarding the future course of
action. The parties were absolutely conscious and rightly
so, that their rights had been fructified and their possession
had been exclusively determined. They were well aware
that the decree was final in nature as their shares were
allotted and nothing remained to be done by metes and
bounds. Their rights had attained finality and no further
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enquiry from any spectrum was required to be carried
out. The whole thing had been embodied in the decree
passed on the foundation of compromise.”
13.
And further the Learned Counsel for the
Decree Holder also relied upon the case of Ram Bachan
Rai and others vs. Udar Rai and 11 others, “
A contention was advanced to the effect that as the
cost for enforcement of decree was not quantified, the
period of limitation could not have commenced from the
date of Judgment and decree”.
And further at para-35 it is held that,
“The irresistible conclusion is that the initiation of an
execution proceedings was indubitably barred by limitation.
Thus analyzed, the reasons ascribed by the learned single
Judge are absolutely unsustainable. The period of limitation
stipulated under Article 136 of the Act could not have been
condoned as has been so presumed by learned single Judge.”
14.
The reasons that is based upon the said
compromise between the Decree Holder and the Judgment
Debtors, the time that would commence to run in favour of
the parties would be from the sale of S.R.Nagar Property
which is sold on 28/10/2014 and not on the date of the
drawing of a compromise decree. For the simple reason
that, parties to both the compromise had mutually agreed
that certain properties would be sold as per the serial
numbers as enclosed in their compromise petition at page2. In these circumstances, the arguments addressed by
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the Judgment Debtor that the execution petition is barred
by limitation since from the date of the decree the claim of
the execution Petitioners / Decree Holders is barred by
time cannot be accepted. Safely relying upon the citations
relied by the counsel for the Decree Holder reported in
(2000) 6 SCC 259, this execution petition is well within the
time. Therefore, I answer point No.1 in the Negative.
14.
Point No.2 :
In furtherance of my findings
to points No.1, I proceed to pass the following:
ORDER
Objections raised by the Judgment Debtors with
regard to maintainability of the Execution Petition so far as
the limitation is concerned, it hereby dismissed and does
not sustain. Hence, Decree Holders to proceed with the
case in hand by taking necessary steps.”
12.
As correctly held by the executing Court, having regard
to the undisputed fact that the compromise decree contain several
mutual/reciprocal rights and obligations cast upon by the parties
coupled with the undisputed fact that the petitioner along with
respondents
jointly
sold
Sampangiram
Nagar
property
on
28.10.2014, which is subsequent to the compromise decree dated
18.10.2009, the instant execution proceedings filed in 2023 within
the prescribed of 12 years from the date of sale of Sampangiram
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Nagar property on 28.10.2014 cannot be said to be barred by
limitation
since
the
compromise
decree
did
not
become
enforceable on 18.10.2009 which was the date of decree but only
after committal of alleged breach/default by the petitioner. Under
these circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that the Trial
Court is fully justified in adjudicating the maintainability raised by
the petitioner by passing the impugned order which cannot be said
to suffer from any illegality or infirmity nor can the same said to
have occasioned failure of justice warranting interference of this
Court in the present petition. It is also significant to note that the
petitioner who had undisputedly participated in the sale of
Sampangiram Nagar property in terms of the compromise decree
subsequently on 28.10.2014 was estopped from contending that
the instant execution proceedings within 12 years from that date
were barred by limitation.
13.
In the case of Mumtaz Yarud Dowla Wakf Vs. M/s.
Badam Balakrishna Hotel Pvt. Ltd,. And Ors. – 2023 INSC 949
the Apex Court held as under:
“1. Leave granted.
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2. A legal journey adopted by the appellant with periodical
stoppages orchestrated in the process at behest of
respondent no(s). 1 and 2 brought the lis back to the place
where it started, forcing it to undertake a fresh guard by the
impugned order.
3.
This case is a classic example of the unfortunate
situation taken note of and lamented by Right Honorable
Sir James Colvilbe in General Manager of the Raj
Durbhunga Vs. Maharajah Coomar Ramaput Singh, 1872
SCC OnLine PC 16,
“These proceedings certainly illustrate what was said by
Mr.Doyne, and what has been often stated before, that the
difficulties of a litigant in India begin when he has obtained
a Decree…”
The situation not only continues but has become more
prevalent.
xxxx
15. The conduct of a party assumes significance. If a party
is likely to have an undue advantage, despite the
availability of an opportunity to raise a plea of lack of
jurisdiction at an earlier point of time, it should not be
permitted to do so during the execution proceedings. In
other words, a plaintiff shall not be made to suffer by the
passive act of the defendant in submitting to the
jurisdiction. One has to see the consequence while taking
note of the huge pendency of the cases before various
Courts in the country. There is no gainsaying that but for
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the adverse decree suffered, a judgment-debtor would not
have ventured to raise such a plea. It is clearly a case of an
afterthought to suit his convenience. He cannot be allowed
to approbate and reprobate. Though we are conscious
about the earlier precedents dealing with the stage at which
such a plea can be raised, much water has flown under the
bridge in terms of the ground reality. Union of India and
Others v. N. Murugesan and Others, (2022) 2 SCC 25,
"Approbate and reprobate
26. These phrases are borrowed from the Scots law. They
would only mean that no party can be allowed to accept
and reject the same thing, and thus one cannot blow hot
and cold. The principle behind the doctrine of election is
inbuilt in the concept of approbate and reprobate. Once
again, it is a principle of equity coming under the contours
of common law. Therefore, he who knows that if he objects
to an instrument, he will not get the benefit he wants cannot
be allowed to do so while enjoying the fruits. One cannot
take advantage of one part while rejecting the rest. A
person cannot be allowed to have the benefit of an
instrument while questioning the same. Such a party either
has to affirm or disaffirm the transaction. This principle has
to be applied with more vigour as a common law principle,
if such a party actually enjoys the one part fully and on near
completion of the said enjoyment, thereafter questions the
other part. An element of fair play is inbuilt in this principle.
It is also a species of estoppel dealing with the conduct of a
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party. We have already dealt with the provisions of the
Contract Act concerning the conduct of a party, and his
presumption of knowledge while confirming an offer
through his acceptance unconditionally.”
14.
In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the
case, I am of the considered opinion that the impugned order does
not warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Section 227 of the Constitution of India as held in the cases
of Radhey Shyam and Ors Vs. Chhabi Nath and Ors – (2015) 5
SCC 423, K.P. Natarajan and Ors. Vs. Muthalammal and Ors –
AIR 2021 SC 3443 and Mohd. Ali Vs. V. Jaya – (2022) 10 SCC
477.
15.
In the result, I pass the following:
ORDER
i)
The petition is hereby dismissed.
ii)
Having regard to the fact that the compromise decree
is of the year 2009, the executing Court is directed to dispose
of the execution proceedings as expeditiously as possible.
Sd/(S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR)
JUDGE
MDS; List No.: 1 Sl No.: 37
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