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LAIRENM by
LAIRENMAYUM
AYUM INDRAJEET
INDRAJE SINGH
Date:
ET SINGH 2023.06.12
14:35:38 +05'30'
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR
AT IMPHAL
CRP(CRP.Art.227) No. 18 of 2018
Shri Ningthoujam Shenjai Singh aged about 32 years, S/o N. Madhu Singh
of Khangabok Part-II Meishanam Leikai, P.O. & P.S. Thoubal, Thoubal
District, Manipur.
… Petitioner
- Versus –
1. Puyam Thoiba Singh aged about 41 years, S/o (L) P. Bokul Singh of
Langathel Nepram Leikai, P.O. Wangjing, P.S. Khongjom, Thoubal
District, Manipur.
2. Sagolshem Ibocha Singh aged about 55 years, S/o (L) S. Gopal Singh of
Langathel Kangjeibung Leikai, P.O. Wangjing, P.S. Khongjom, Thoubal
District, Manipur.
3. Sagolshem Tangba Singh aged about 36 years, S/o S. Ibocha Singh of
Langathel Kangjeibung Leikai, P.O. Wangjing, P.S. Khongjom, Thoubal
District, Manipur and
4. Sagolshem Ingocha Singh aged about 33 years, S/o. S(O) Samashakhi
Devi of Langathel Keithel Macha, P.O. Wangjing P.S. Khongjom, District
Thoubal, Manipur.
… Respondents/Defendants
BEFORE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE A. GUNESHWAR SHARMA
For the petitioner
For the respondent
Date of Hearing
Date of Judgment & Order
:
:
:
:
Mr. Th. Ibohal, Sr. Advocate
Nemo
06.04.2023
12.06.2023
JUDGMENT & ORDER [CAV]
[1]
The issue involved in the present petition is as to whether the registered
sale deed and the entry in revenue record, be relied upon to presume, on their face
CRP(CRP ART.227) NO. 18 OF 2018: N. SENJAI V/S P. THOIBA & ORS.
values, the factum of possession of a party over the suit land while considering an
application for temporary injunction initiated under Order 39 CPC.
[2]
The petitioner/plaintiff herein filed the present petition under Article 227
of the Constitution of India challenging the impugned order dated 15.01.2018 passed
by the learned District Judge, Thoubal, in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 2 of 2017. By the
impugned order, the learned District Judge, Thoubal set-aside the order dated
18.09.2017 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Thoubal in Judl. Misc.
Case No. 116 of 2016 (Ref:- O.S. No. 32 of 2016). Vide order dated 28.03.2018, this
Court issued notice to the respondents/defendants who entered appearance and filed
counter affidavit. Thereafter, respondents did not appear. Vide order dated
13.02.2020 in MC[CRP(CRP.Art.227)] No. 25 of 2019, this Court allowed the
application for determination filed by the learned counsel for the respondents herein
as there was no communication between the counsel and the clients. After the
determination of the earlier counsel, none appeared on behalf of the respondents to
defend this case and accordingly, matter was heard in absence of the respondents.
[3]
Heard Mr. Th. Ibohal, learned senior counsel, assisted by Mr. L.N.
Ngamba, learned counsel for the petitioner.
[4]
Brief facts of the case is that the petitioner/plaintiff purchased an
agricultural land measuring 1.1280 hectare under Patta No. 45/448(old)/488(new)
covered by C.S. Dag No. 1027 situated in Village No. 45-Langathel, Thoubal District,
Manipur under a registered sale deed being No. 1345 of 2014 of the Sub-Registrar,
Thoubal, dated 11.11.2014 from one Lourembam Ibohanbi Singh for a sum of Rs.
8,00,000/- (Eight Lakhs). However, sale deed was registered for a sum of Rs.
2,25,000/- (Two lakhs and twenty five thousand) only for reducing the stamp value
CRP(CRP ART.227) NO. 18 OF 2018: N. SENJAI V/S P. THOIBA & ORS.
and registered charge, etc. Subsequently, the name of the petitioner/plaintiff was
mutated in the records of rights vide Mutation Case No. 705/AS & SO/TBL-II dated
12.11.2014 and has been paying taxes since then, and the petitioner/plaintiff is in
possession of the said paddy land since the date of purchase by growing various types
of paddy. On 03.07.2016, when the plaintiff was ploughing the suit land by using
tractor, the respondents/defendants and their men and agents armed with deadly
weapons entered the suit land and intervened in the peaceful possession of the
plaintiff. Later on, the local neighbours intervened and subsided the matter. Then, the
petitioner/plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of ownership and perpetual injunction
against the defendants and the same was registered as O.S. No. 32 of 2016 in the
Court of learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Thoubal. Along with the suit, the
petitioner/plaintiff also filed an application under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 of CPC r/w
Section 151 being
Judl. Misc. Case No. 116 of 2016, to restrain
the
respondents/defendants from entering the suit land and from dispossessing the
petitioner/plaintiff during the pendency of the suit. Vide order dated 12.07.2016 in
Judl. Misc. Case No. 116 of 2016, learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Thoubal,
directed the parties to maintain status quo over the suit land till the application is
determine on merit.
[5]
The respondents/defendants filed joint written statement and counter
claim. It is stated that there was no valid document for purchase of the land as the
sale deed was void. The sale deed was void as the petitioner/plaintiff being a central
government employee did not take permission for purchasing the same. It is also
stated that recording of the name of the petitioner/plaintiff in the land record and
including his name in the Jamabandi are not proof and evidence of title, and they are
CRP(CRP ART.227) NO. 18 OF 2018: N. SENJAI V/S P. THOIBA & ORS.
made only for payment of the rent. It is stated that respondent/defendant Nos. 1 to
2 are tenants paying annual rent (laushal) to the original owner. It is also stated that
respondent/defendant Nos. 1 & 2 have pre-emption right under the provisions of
Section 132 of the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960 (MLR & LR
Act). It is also stated that the suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary party because
legal heirs of L. Ibohanbi Singh (the original land owner) were not impleaded. The
respondents/defendants also raised the counter claim against the plaintiff on the
grounds that the (i) suit land belongs to L. Ibohanbi Singh, (ii) father of the
respondent/defendant Nos. 1 & 2 were tenants during the lifetime of L. Ibohanbi Singh
and after the deceased of their father they inherited the tenancy right. Accordingly, it
is prayed in the counter claim that the plaintiff is not the owner of the suit land; the
registered sale deed No. 1345 dated 11.11.2014 of the Sub-Registrar Thoubal,
Manipur, be declared void and not binding on the contesting respondents/defendants;
to declare that that Rev. Review Case No. 1/AS&SO/IW-II 31.03.2016 is without
jurisdiction and the same are not binding to the contesting defendants. The
respondents/defendants also filed joint written objection to the application under
Order 39 Rule 1 & 2, being Judl. Misc. Case No. 116 of 2016.
[6]
The petitioner/plaintiff filed rejoinder statement to the counter claim filed
by the respondents/defendants. It is stated that the respondents/defendants have
failed to proof their tenancy rights as per the provisions of MLR & LR Act, 1960 and
the respondents/defendants have no jurisdiction to challenge the sale deed executed
between the petitioner/plaintiff and the original owner.
[7]
Vide order dated 18.09.2017 in Judl. Misc. Case No. 116 of 2016, learned
Civil Judge (Junior Division), Thoubal allowed the application under Order 39 Rule 1 &
CRP(CRP ART.227) NO. 18 OF 2018: N. SENJAI V/S P. THOIBA & ORS.
2 CPC and made absolute the ex-parte temporary injunction for maintaining status
quo over the suit land till the disposal of the suit. It was held that prima facie case
was in favour of the petitioner/plaintiff and the balance of convenience was in favour
of the petitioner/plaintiff as sale deed and Jamabandi, prima facie, show that he is in
possession of the suit land and if the temporary injunction is not granted it will cause
irreparable loss to him. Being aggrieved by the order dated 18.09.2017 granting
temporary injunction in favour of the plaintiff/petitioner, the respondents/defendants
approached the Court of learned District Judge, Thoubal, by way of an appeal, being
Misc. Civil Appeal No. 2 of 2017 under Order 43 Rule 1(r) CPC. In the impugned order
dated 15.01.2018, learned District Judge observed that the factum of possession at
the relevant time is to be established by factual evidence by affidavit as contemplated
under Order 39 Rule 1(c) CPC and such cannot be accepted on the face value of the
documents, such as, Sale deed and Jamabandi. Without any factual evidence to decide
as to which party is in possession of the suit land, granting of temporary injunction is
not sustainable in law. It was also observed that purpose of temporary injunction is
to maintain status quo at the time of institution of the proceeding and the same is not
intended to establish a new state of things different from what was existed at that
time. Accordingly, temporary injunction granted by learned Civil Judge (Junior
Division), Thoubal, vide order dated 18.09.2017 in Judl. Misc. Case No. 116 of 2016
was set aside and directed to reconsider by proper inquiry relating to the factum of
possession. Relevant para of the impugned order are reproduced below:“15. Prima facie possession and enjoyment of the suit land on the date of the suit
should be established by adducing necessary evidence by affidavit and documentary
evidence. Weakness in the case of the other party can not be relied upon.
CRP(CRP ART.227) NO. 18 OF 2018: N. SENJAI V/S P. THOIBA & ORS.
16. In the present case what the Court is to see is whether the plaintiff was/is in
fact in possession of the suit land on the date of filing of the suit. Hence, what is
relevant and important is the factum of possession at the relevant time.
The factum of possession is to be established by factual evidence by affidavit
as contemplated under Order 39 Rule 1(c). The factum of possession cannot be
accepted only on the fact of documents i.e., Sale deed and jamabandi etc.
17. In the present case, there is no factual evidence to decide as to which of the
parties is in possession of the suit land. Without a clear cut picture of the factum of
possession of the suit land by the plaintiff, the grant of temporary injunction is not
sustainable in law.
18. The purpose of temporary injunction is to maintain status quo i.e., to preserve
the status quo existing at the time of the institution of the proceeding. Temporary
injunction is not intended to establish a new state of things different from the state
which existed at the time when the proceedings were instituted.
19. In the conclusion, the impugned order dated 18.09.2017 granting temporary
injunction is set aside and the temporary injunction matter may be re-considered
by proper inquiry relating to the factum of possession of the suit land at the time of
institution of the proceeding.”
[8]
Being aggrieved by the impugned order, the petitioner/plaintiff
approached this Court amongst on the following grounds:(a) Learned District Judge, Thoubal, has misconceived the 3 cardinal
principles of granting temporary injunction as direction for conducting
an inquiry before passing an order of temporary injunction is against
the object as envisaged under Order 39 of CPC which requires passing
of an order pending the main suit.
(b) While the petitioner/plaintiff is the purchaser of the suit land from
the original owner L. Ibohanbi Singh, by way of a registered sale deed,
the respondents/defendants could not produce any materials to show
that they are the tenants of the original owner L. Ibohanbi Singh. The
only option open to the respondents/defendants is to pursue the right
CRP(CRP ART.227) NO. 18 OF 2018: N. SENJAI V/S P. THOIBA & ORS.
of pre-emption under Section 132(7) of the MLR & LR Act, 1960 for
repurchase of the land from the transferee.
(c) The impugned order is in complete violation of principles of
natural justice as the same was passed on the memo of appeal filed
by the respondents.
[9]
The respondents/defendants filed counter affidavit inter alia repeating
the plea taken in the written statement cum counter claim filed by them before the
Trial Court. It is also clarified that mere failure to produce the entry of the
respondents/defendants name as tenants in the Khatian of the suit land is not
relevant, for the fact that such entry are not usually made in Manipur. It is stated that
they are tenants in actual possession.
[10]
Mr. Th. Ibohal, learned senior counsel for the petitioner/plaintiff, submits
that the learned District Judge, Thoubal wrongly construed the 3 cardinal principles
for granting temporary injunction, i.e., (i) prima facie case, (ii) balance of convenience,
and (iii) irreparable loss. He states that these 3 principles have to be ascertained on
the basis of documents filed by the parties and no roving inquiry is to be undertaken
by the Court, as the same have to be ascertained in the main suit in the course of the
trial. In the present case, the petitioner/plaintiff produced a registered sale deed for
purchase of the suit land in his favour and Jamabandi showing entry of his name in
the revenue record as per prescribed procedure to establish his possession over the
suit land. At the stage of granting temporary injunction, the Court has to examine the
prima facie case of the parties on the basis of the documents adduced by them. On
the other hand, the respondents/defendants did not produce any sort of documents
in their favour to show that they are tenants in possession of the suit land except for
CRP(CRP ART.227) NO. 18 OF 2018: N. SENJAI V/S P. THOIBA & ORS.
the oral averments made in the written statement-cum-counter claim filed by them.
Learned senior counsel has emphasized that there should be a presumption of validity
of registered deed and presumption of possession of a party over an immovable
property purchased by a registered sale deed. He also reiterates that entry in the
revenue record has a presumptive value of possession over the same, unless the same
is fabricated document or procured by fraud. It is pointed out that in the present case,
no material is placed on record to suspect that the sale deed was executed fraudulently
or entry in the revenue record was not as per law. It is submitted that the learned
District Judge wrongly set aside the order of temporary injunction granted by the
learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Thoubal.
[11]
Mr. Th. Ibohal, learned senior counsel relies upon the following case
laws:1. (1983) 1 GLR (NOC) 2
NIROD BANDHU SAHA SIKDAR versus RADHABALLAV SAHA SIKDAR.
-
The object of granting temporary injunction is the discretionary power to be
exercised on sound judicial principles, the object being to preserve status quo while
rights are being litigation. It is to consider that the applicant has a prima facie case.
2. (1984) 1 GLR 188
THE STATE BANK OF INDIA & OTHERS versus SHRI RAJENDRA SINGH
KOTHARI & ANOTHER.
-
Para 5: The rules governing the grant of interim injunction are well known.
The Court must be satisfied before granting an interim injunction that the claim of
the plaintiff is not frivolous or vexatious but well founded that there is a serious
question to be tried and there are fair chances of the suit by decreed as prayed.
The Court has to see whether the plaintiff will be put to irreparable injury if the
injunction prayed for is not granted.
3. (2013) 9 SCC 211
MOHD. MEHTAB KHAN AND OTHERS versus KHUSHNUMA IBRAHIM KHAN
AND OTHERS.
CRP(CRP ART.227) NO. 18 OF 2018: N. SENJAI V/S P. THOIBA & ORS.
-Para 21: ..... The appellate Court, therefore, should not have substituted its views
in the matter merely on the ground that in its opinion the facts of the case call for
a different conclusion. Such an exercise is not the correct parameter for exercise of
jurisdiction while hearing an appeal against a discretionary order. While we must
not be understood to have said that the appellate court was wrong in its conclusions
what is sought to be emphasized is that as longs as the view of the trial court was
a possible view the appellate court should not have interfered with the same
following the virtually settled principles of law in this regard as laid down by this
Court in Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd. [Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd.,
1990 Supp SCC 727]
[12]
Mr. Th. Ibohal, learned senior counsel for the petitioner/plaintiff prays
that the impugned order dated 15.01.2018 passed by learned District Judge, Thoubal
in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 2 of 2017 be set aside and the order dated 18.09.2017 passed
by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Thoubal in Judl. Misc. Case No. 116 of
2016 granting temporary injunction against the respondents/defendants be restored.
[13]
This Court has considered the submission of the learned senior counsel
for the petitioner/plaintiff, the materials on record, and case laws in this regard. It is
an admitted fact that the petitioner/plaintiff purchased the suit land from the original
owner i.e. L. Ibohanbi Singh, by way of a registered sale deed dated 11.11.2014 and
his name was duly registered in the land record i.e. Jamabandi as per procedure. In
the written statement-cum-counter claim filed by the respondents/defendants, they
alleged that they are the tenants of the original owner and inherited the right from
their fathers. However, no document is shown such as tenant khatian as prescribed
under Rule 57 r/w Form 9 of the MLR & LR Rules, 1961. At the stage of granting
temporary injunction, the Court is not to do a roving inquiry and the 3 cardinal
principles have to be ascertained from the materials and documents produced by the
parties. Otherwise, the very purpose of granting temporary injunction during the
CRP(CRP ART.227) NO. 18 OF 2018: N. SENJAI V/S P. THOIBA & ORS.
pendency of the main suit would be defeated. It may also be noted that oral evidence
is a weak form of evidence and Section 92 of the Evidence Act excludes oral evidence
to dispute the contents of a written document.
In the case of Jamila Begum v. Shami Mohd.: (2019) 2 SCC 727,
[14]
Hon’ble Supreme Court held that there is presumption in favour of a registered
document. The relevant para is reproduced for the sake of brevity.
“16. Sale deed dated 21-12-1970 in favour of Jamila Begum is a registered
document and the registration of the sale deed reinforces valid execution of the
sale deed. A registered document carries with it a presumption that it was validly
executed. It is for the party challenging the genuineness of the transaction to
show that the transaction is not valid in law. In Prem Singh v. Birbal2, it was held
as under: (SCC pp. 360-61, para 27)
“27. There is a presumption that a registered document is validly executed. A
registered document, therefore, prima facie would be valid in law. The onus of
proof, thus, would be on a person who leads evidence to rebut the presumption.
In the instant case, Respondent 1 has not been able to rebut the said
presumption.”
The above judgment in Prem Singh case2 has been referred to in Vishwanath
Bapurao Sabale v. Shalinibai Nagappa Sabale3”.
[2
Prem Singh v. Birbal, (2006) 5 SCC 353
3 Vishwanath Bapurao Sabale v. Shalinibai Nagappa Sabale, (2009) 12 SCC 101 :
(2009) 4 SCC (Civ) 646]
[15]
In the case of Placido Francisco Pinto (D) by L.Rs. and Ors. vs. Jose
Francisco Pinto and Ors. (30.09.2021 - SC) : MANU/SC/0748/2021, Hon’ble
Supreme Court considered the presumption of a duly registered deed and exclusion
of oral evidence to contradict the contents of written documents. Relevant para are
reproduced below:
“26. In Roop Kumar, this Court was seized of an appeal filed by the Defendant
arising out of a suit for possession and for rendition of accounts. The Plaintiff
claimed that he entered into an agency-cum-deed of license with the AppellantDefendant on 15.5.1975 and the terms of such agency-cum-licensing agreement
was incorporated in an agreement dated 15.5.1975. The stand of the Defendant
was that he was in lawful possession as a tenant under the Plaintiff. The trial
CRP(CRP ART.227) NO. 18 OF 2018: N. SENJAI V/S P. THOIBA & ORS. 10
court decreed the suit holding that the transaction between the Respondent and
the Appellant evidenced by an agreement dated 15.5.1975 amounts to license
and not sub-letting. The question before the High Court was whether a
relationship between the parties is that of a licensor and licensee or that of a
lessor and lessee. The first appeal was dismissed. This Court held that it is
general and most inflexible Rule that in respect of written instruments, any other
evidence is excluded from being used either as a substitute for such instruments,
or to contradict or alter them. This is a matter both of principle and policy. It was
held that in Section 92 of the Evidence Act, the legislature has prevented oral
evidence from being adduced for the purpose of varying the contract, such
contract can be proved by production of such writing. It was held that Section
91 is concerned with the mode of proof of a document with limitation imposed
by Section 92. If after the document has been produced to prove its terms Under
Section 91, provisions of Section 92 come into operation for the purpose of
excluding evidence of any oral agreement or statement for the purpose of
contradicting, varying, adding or subtracting from its terms. This Court held as
under:
17. It is likewise a general and most inflexible Rule that wherever written
instruments are appointed, either by the requirement of law, or by the
contract of the parties, to be the repositories and memorials of truth, any
other evidence is excluded from being used either as a substitute for such
instruments, or to contradict or alter them. This is a matter both of principle
and policy. It is of principle because such instruments are in their own nature
and origin, entitled to a much higher degree of credit than oral evidence. It is
of policy because it would be attended with great mischief if those
instruments, upon which men's rights depended, were liable to be impeached
by loose collateral evidence. (See Starkie on Evidence, p. 648.)
18. In Section 92 the legislature has prevented oral evidence being adduced
for the purpose of varying the contract as between the parties to the contract;
but, no such limitations are imposed Under Section 91. Having regard to the
jural position of Sections 91 and 92 and the deliberate omission from Section
91 of such words of limitation, it must be taken note of that even a third party
if he wants to establish a particular contract between certain others, either
when such contract has been reduced to in a document or where under the
law such contract has to be in writing, can only prove such contract by the
production of such writing.
xx xx xx
21. The grounds of exclusion of extrinsic evidence are: (i) to admit inferior
evidence when the law requires superior would amount to nullifying the law,
and (ii) when parties have deliberately put their agreement into writing, it is
conclusively presumed, between themselves and their privies, that they
intended the writing to form a full and final statement of their intentions, and
one which should be placed beyond the reach of future controversy, bad faith
and treacherous memory.
CRP(CRP ART.227) NO. 18 OF 2018: N. SENJAI V/S P. THOIBA & ORS. 11
22. This Court in Gangabai v. Chhabubai [MANU/SC/0385/1981 : (1982) 1 SCC
4 : AIR 1982 SC 20] and Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal [MANU/SC/0747/1999 :
(2000) 1 SCC 434 : AIR 2000 SC 426] with reference to Section 92(1) held
that it is permissible to a party to a deed to contend that the deed was not
intended to be acted upon, but was only a sham document. The bar arises
only when the document is relied upon and its terms are sought to be varied
and contradicted. Oral evidence is admissible to show that document executed
was never intended to operate as an agreement but that some other
agreement altogether, not recorded in the document, was entered into
between the parties.
(Emphasis Supplied)
27. A perusal of the above judgment would show that the oral evidence of a
written agreement is excluded except when it is sought to be alleged the
document as a sham transaction.
28. It is beyond dispute that a sale deed is required to be registered i.e. a
document required by law to be reduced to the form of a document. Therefore,
no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted for the
purpose of contradicting, varying, adding or subtracting from its terms. The
proviso (1) of Section 92 of the Evidence Act on which reliance was placed is a
proof of such fact which would invalidate any document such as fraud,
intimidation, illegality, want of due execution, want of capacity in any contracting
party, want or failure of consideration, or mistake in fact or law. Section 92 of
the Evidence Act reads as under:
92. Exclusion of evidence or oral agreement.-When the terms of any such
contract, grant or other disposition of property, or any matter required by law
to be reduced to the form of a document, have been proved according to the
last section, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be
admitted, as between the parties to any such instrument or their
representatives in interest, for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding
to, or subtracting from, its terms:
Proviso (1).--Any fact may be proved which would invalidate any document,
or which would entitle any person to any decree or order relating thereto;
such as fraud, intimidation, illegality, want of due execution, want of capacity
in any contracting party, want or failure of consideration, or mistake in fact or
law.
29. The Respondents were free to prove fraud in execution of the sale deed.
However, factually, the Respondents have not alleged any fraud in their suit or
in the written statement in the suit filed by Appellant No. 1. The feigned
ignorance about the nature of document cannot be said to be an instance of
fraud. In the absence of any plea or proof of fraud, Respondent No. 1 is bound
by the written document on which he admitted his signatures and of his wife.
There is no oral evidence which could prove fraud, intimidation, illegality or
failure of consideration to permit the Respondents to lead oral evidence to
dispute the sale deed dated 14.9.1970. Therefore, the judgments referred to by
CRP(CRP ART.227) NO. 18 OF 2018: N. SENJAI V/S P. THOIBA & ORS. 12
Mr. Mehta are of no help to support his arguments. Thus, the findings recorded
by the First Appellate Court as affirmed by the High Court are clearly erroneous
in law and are, thus, set aside.”
[16]
In the case of Rattan Singh and Ors. vs. Nirmal Gill and Ors.
(16.11.2020 - SC) : MANU/SC/0860/2020: AIR 2021 SC 899, Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that there is presumption of validity of a registered document.
Relevant para are reproduced below for clarity.
“32. To appreciate the findings arrived at by the Courts below, we must first see
on whom the onus of proof lies. The record reveals that the disputed documents
are registered. We are, therefore, guided by the settled legal principle that a
document is presumed to be genuine if the same is registered, as held by this
Court in Prem Singh and Ors. v. Birbal and Ors. MANU/SC/8139/2006 : (2006) 5
SCC 353. The relevant portion of the said decision reads as below:
27. There is a presumption that a registered document is validly executed.
A registered document, therefore, prima facie would be valid in law. The
onus of proof, thus, would be on a person who leads evidence to rebut the
presumption. In the instant case, Respondent 1 has not been able to rebut
the said presumption.
(emphasis supplied)
In view thereof, in the present cases, the initial onus was on the Plaintiff, who
had challenged the stated registered document.”
[17]
From the above cited case laws, it is clear that there is a statutory
presumption of validity of a duly executed registered deed and the onus is on the
person who denies the same and it is to be proved in the proceedings of the main
suit. It will be pertinent to conclude that a Court, while deciding an application for
temporary injunction under Order 39 CPC, has to presume the validity and
genuineness of the sale deed.
[18]
In the case of Partap Singh v. Shiv Ram: (2020) 11 SCC 242, Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that entries in the revenue record are generally to be accepted
at their face value without any inquiry, if the same is not forged or fabricated one. It
CRP(CRP ART.227) NO. 18 OF 2018: N. SENJAI V/S P. THOIBA & ORS. 13
will not be proper to rely on oral evidence to rebut the statutory presumptions.
Relevant portions are reproduced below:
“21. This Court in Vishwa Vijay Bharati v. Fakhrul Hassan3 held that the entries
in the revenue record ought to be generally accepted at their face value and
courts should not embark upon an appellate inquiry into their correctness. But
the presumption of correctness can apply only to genuine, not forged or
fraudulent entries. This Court held as under: (Fakhrul Hassan case3, SCC p. 645,
para 14)
“14. It is true that the entries in the revenue record ought, generally, to be
accepted at their face value and courts should not embark upon an appellate
inquiry into their correctness. But the presumption of correctness can apply
only to genuine, not forged or fraudulent, entries. The distinction may be fine
but it is real. The distinction is that one cannot challenge the correctness of
what the entry in the revenue record states but the entry is open to the attack
that it was made fraudulently or surreptitiously. Fraud and forgery rob a
document of all its legal effect and cannot found a claim to possessory title.”
22. This Court in Guru Amarjit Singh v. Rattan Chand4 was examining a dispute
of relationship of landlord and tenant. A copy of more than thirty years old lease
deed was produced to prove the relationship between landowner and tenant.
However, the revenue record did not show any payment of rent but only
existence of terms of lease to pay rent. This Court held that non-production of
the receipts of payment of rent clearly indicates that there was no relationship
between landlord and tenants.
……………………………………………………………………………………………………..
25. The presumption of truth attached to the revenue record can be rebutted if
such entry was made fraudulently or surreptitiously (Vishwa Vijay Bharati case3)
or where such entry has not been made by following the prescribed procedure
(Bhimappa Channappa Kapali v. Bhimappa Satyappa Kamagouda7). Even in Guru
Amarjit Singh4, where thirty years’ old lease deed was produced, this Court had
not accepted the proof of the relationship between landowner and tenant in
absence of receipt of payment of rent.
26. Therefore, we find that the presumption of truth attached to the record-ofrights can be rebutted only if there is a fraud in the entry or the entry was
surreptitiously made or that prescribed procedure was not followed. It will not
be proper to rely on the oral evidence to rebut the statutory presumption as the
credibility of oral evidence vis-à-vis documentary evidence is at a much weaker
level.
[3.Vishwa Vijay Bharati v. Fakhrul Hassan, (1976) 3 SCC 642
4.Guru Amarjit Singh v. Rattan Chand, (1993) 4 SCC 349 : AIR 1994 SC 227
7.Bhimappa Channappa Kapali v. Bhimappa Satyappa Kamagouda, (2012) 13 SCC 759 : (2014) 5 SCC (Civ)
419]
CRP(CRP ART.227) NO. 18 OF 2018: N. SENJAI V/S P. THOIBA & ORS. 14
[19]
As per the decision of Partap Singh (supra), the entries in the revenue
record are ought to be generally accepted on their face value and Courts are not to
embark upon an appellate inquiry into its correctness. The presumption of truth of the
revenue record can be rebutted if only there is a fraud in the entry or the entry was
surreptitiously made without following the prescribed procedures.
[20]
In the present case, the respondents/defendants have challenged the
validity of the sale deed in the counter claim and the same has to be ascertained
during the trial by adducing and leading proper evidence. It is not the case of the
respondents/defendants that the entry of the name of the petitioner/plaintiff in the
land record was made without following procedures prescribed by MLR & LR Act &
Rules. The oral averments made against the statutory presumption will be barred by
the provision of Section 92 of the Evidence Act.
[21]
Accordingly, this Court is of the view that the registered sale deed and
the revenue record i.e. Jamabandi, produced by the petitioner/plaintiff before the
learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Thoubal in a proceeding for temporary injunction
initiated under Order 39 CPC, are relevant and have statutory presumptive value and
can be considered by the Court while passing an order for temporary injunction. On
the other hand, the respondents/defendants have failed to produce any document or
material in support of their case except for the oral averment that sale deed and
revenue entry were void and are not applicable. This is to be established during the
trial. The Court, while considering an application for temporary injunction under Order
39 CPC, has to rely on the documents produced by the parties. This Court is of the
view that learned District Judge, Thoubal was wrong in holding that factum of the
possession over the suit land is to be established in an inquiry and such factum cannot
CRP(CRP ART.227) NO. 18 OF 2018: N. SENJAI V/S P. THOIBA & ORS. 15
be accepted on the face value of the Sale Deed and Jamabandi. This finding is in
contrast to the law propounded by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Partap
Singh (supra), Rattan Singh (supra), etc.
[22]
In view of the above discussions, the revision petition under Article 227
of the Constitution of India is allowed. The impugned order dated 15.01.2018 passed
by the learned District Judge, Thoubal in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 2 of 2017 is set aside
and the order dated 18.09.2017 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division),
Thoubal in Judl. Misc. Case No. 116 of 2016 granting a temporary injunction in favour
of the petitioner/plaintiff and against the respondents/defendants is upheld. Parties
are to bear their own expenses. Interim orders, if any, are vacated and pending
applications, if any, are disposed of accordingly.
[23]
Send a copy of this order to the learned District Judge, Thoubal and
learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Thoubal for information and proceeding as per
law.
JUDGE
FR/NFR
Indrajeet
CRP(CRP ART.227) NO. 18 OF 2018: N. SENJAI V/S P. THOIBA & ORS. 16
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