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[ 348e I
rN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE qT-ATE
il
*
OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
(SPecial Original Jurisdiction)
ii
:
THURSDAY,THE EIGHTH DAY OF JANUARY
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX
PRESENT
KOSHY
THE HONOURABLE SRI J-USTICE P.SAM
AND
SUDDALA CHALAPATHI RAO
JUSTICE
SRI
THE HONOURABLE
WRIT PETI TION NO 40 454 0F
Between
'56b'"'ii;;
Shri.B.SreenivasaGandhi,slpgl.B.Narasimha.RaoAoedabout5Tyears'
Is' vasant Nasar'
occ Govt Emplovee, Bl-o Plot N;
occ
A.g."d about 4e vears,
-Kukatpally'
Gandhi,-16'
5[Lt''ll;,Hj,",il8oJoor_:$ir1a9a
J's' Vtt'ni Nagar'
Business, R/o proi r'r1' :96, noJo
occ
subbaiah, Ag_ed about 82 ve{s,
B
"No1"55,
Poranki'
3ilfl".6oRX,.11tff,: Rao, ,lo r-^qtq
Colony'
pfot
Retired Govt Employeer-R/o
G'
'i
:
i
.j
.l
tii''p'i"n
'
ijJ,i.rrrrru trlanoht, krishna District- 521
a' si"qniva'sa
M! Bollineni-Sai ffin)siruiii'',-pro ^snl
596' Road N3.'1t'' #Si^i',ii'nZl,
vears, occ ar.in.lsl -B1;^,i,- No'
Rao' 4g"! about 58
r chandra Jshekhar
5H|.1"*rtl?"J:Bi$&:i^?o
Penamalu ru
+OI','Tiriiarf towers' Poranki'
vears, Occ B usin..:.i il;' Hrri lo
illtar';;l, kiitn"i Distiict-52 1 137
...PETITIONERS
AND
i
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tl
!
i
i,
t"
!
AdiudicatingAuthority,Ul9q,PreventionofMoneyLaunderingAct2oo2
li'ii;;,""rrio-26' 4th
Rebresented by Regidtrar/AoministrliiiJ'b#i""i-o(""
st,""t New Delhi 110001
Floor, Jeevan D"iH;it;i;;'i;;;iifi6iii
ij#;i;,--,"t,; ei E;i&ffi"nil-qsp tv
Zonat office at ii? 'r:illrrb.:n:':i.",",Xf:Sl"?J'Xltfl:
tii.l;itv;i Finrn"e,
Hyderdbad- 5oo oo4.
...RESPONDENTS
,i
i,
I
I
I
t.
t.
i
t'
in the
constitution of lndia praying that
Petition under Article 226 of the
may be
fired therewith, the High court
circumstances stated in the affidavit
calling
one in the nature of Certiorari
particularly
more
Writ,
a
issue
to
pleased
forrecordinCaseNo'PtVlLA/oCl375tDEL/2025(FilingNo
Show cause
of Respondent No'1 and set aside
2025010202020395) on the file
section
of Notice to Show cause Under
Notice dated 12t0g12025 i.e., lntimation
ti
it
N-
8ofPMLAct2002issuedbyCoramNonJudice,asrespondentNo.lisnot
of Section B(2) of PML Act 2002 as
constituted as per Mandatory requirement
arbitrary contrary to law laid down by
illegal'
highly
law,
of
eyes
the
in
non-est
(lndia) Ltd Vs Axis Bank reported
the Honourable Supreme Court in Opto Circuits
P
order dated 13-09-2023 passed W
interim
in
retreated
707,
SCC
in 2021(6)
No 25457 of 2023
IA NO: 20 F 2021i
in the
Petitionundersectionl5lCPCprayingthatinthecircumstancesstated
the High Court may be pleased to
affidavit filecl in support of the petitron'
No PMLA/OC/37S tDELt2O2s (Filing No
stay of all further proceedings in Case
Respondent No 1 including show cause
2025010202020395) on the files of
of the main Writ petition
notice dated 12llgt2o25 pending disposal
Counsel for the Petitioner: SRI' MIR MUKARRAM
ALI
RAO
- N' BHUJANGA
Counsel for the Respondent No'1: SRt
GENERAL OF INDIA
SOLICITOR
DEPUTY
counsel for the Respondent No'2: sRlB?31$'3-?="H[r?=-? DtREcroRArE
The Court made the following: ORDER
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
AND
DATE OF ORDER: OB.OL,2026
Between :
Shri. B.Sreenivasa Gandhi,
S/o. Sh. B.Narasimha Rao,
Aged about: 57 years, Occ: Govt. Employee,
R/o. Plot No.596, Road No.15, Vasant Nagar,
Kukatpally, Hyderabad - 500 085 and 4 others.
...Petitioners
AND
Adj ud icati ng AuthoritY,
Under Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2OO2
Represented by Registrar/Administrative Officeq
Office at Room No.26, 4th Floor,
Jeevan Deep Building Parliament Street,
New Delhi - 110001 and 1 other'
...Respondents
ORDER: (per the Hon'bte Sri )ustice P'Sam Koshv)
Heard Mr. Syed Ahmed saud, learned counsel representing
Mr. Mir Mukaram Ali, learned counsel for the petitioners;
Mr. B.Mukherjee, learned counsel representing Mr. N.Bhujanga Rao,
learned Deputy Solicitor General of India for respondent No'1, and
:{a
Mr. Dominic Fernandes, learned Standing Counsel for Enforcement
Directorate, appearing for respondent No.2.
2.
Tht: present writ petition has been filed by the petitioners
under Ar:icle 226 of the Constitution of India sebking quashment of
the shovr-cause notice dated L2.09.2025, issued by respondent
No.1, unCer Section B of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act,
2OO2 (for short'PMLA Act')'.
3.
Tht: brief facts of the case relevant for adjudication of the
present <iispute are that petitioner No.1 is a government employee
and has been implicated in an First Information Report registered
by CBI, ACB, Hyderabad Branch, vide RC.No.10(A)/2019CBI/ACB,rHyderabad, dated 08.07.2019, under Section 13(2) read
with 13( 1)(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 19BB (as
amendec in the year 2018) and under Section 109 of the Indian
Penal Oode, 1860. Subsequent to the lodging of the
aforemerrtioned First Information Report and charge-sheet being
issued, the Enforcement Directorate registered an ECIR under the
provisions of the PMLA Act vide ECIR No.ECIR/HYZOILg/2Ot9, and
invoking Section 5(1) of the PMLA Act issued Provisional
Attachmernt Order (PAO) No.30/2025, dated 06.08.2025, attaching
various movable and immovable properties standing in the name of
petitioner No.1 and his family members. Thereafter, the impugned
show-cause notice was issued on L2.O9.2025 under Section B of
the PMLA Act.
4,
The impugned show-cause notice was assailed primarily on
the ground of Coram non judice.
5.
The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners or
the primary ground oi challenge was that the impugned showcause notice is not issued by the proper adjudicating authority
under the statute. Another ground raised by the learned counsel for
the petitioners was that the authority who had issued the
impugned show-cause notice is not a judicial member.
5.
According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the
adjudicating authority mandatorily requires three persons i.e. the
Chairperson and two other members. Whereas in the present case,
show-cause notice has been issued by only one person. Therefore,
the impugned show-cause notice is attracted by doctrine of Coram
non judice. He further contended that since the show-cause notice
has been issued not by the adjudicating authority as defined under
the statute, inasmuch as the show-cause notiiE"ffaving not been
issued rnder the seal and signature of the three member
adjudicating authority as is defined under Section 6(2) of the pMLA
Act, the entire show-cause notice and the proceedings drawn
thereon would get vitiated.
7.
Per contra, the learned Standing counsel for Enforcement
Directorrrte referring to the provisions of Section 6 of the pMLA Act
contendr:d that Section 6(2) is not to be read in isolation so as to
reach tr> a conclusion or give an impression that the terrn
'adjudicerting authority' has to consist of a Chairman along with two
members and in the absence of which the adjudicating agency
cannot be treated as an adjudicating ar-rthority and it would amount
to Coran non judice. whereas, according to the learned Standing
counsel for Enforcement Directorate, entire Section 6 has to be
read as ;l whole and on reading entire Section 6 by itself would give
a clear indication that the provisions of Section 6(2) does not mean
that every proceedings initiated by the adjudicating authority has
to be rooted through three member Bench. Rather; it could also be
initiated by a single Bench committee which is also permissible
under Se:ction 5.
8.
In the course of his contentions, the learned Standing
Counsel for Enforcement Directorate also took the Bench through
the entire provisions of Sectiorr 6 and the provisos attached to the
said Section.
9.
Having heard the contentions put forth on either side and on
perusal of records, it would be trite at this juncture to refer to the
provisions of Section 6 of the PMLA Act. For ready reference,
Section 6 of the PMLA Act is reproduced hereunder:
"The Central Government shall, by notification, appoint 1[an
Adjudicating Authorityl to exercise jurisdiction, powers and
authority conferred by or t,nder this Act.
(2) An Adjudicating Authority shall consist of a Chairperson
and two other Members: Provided that one Member each
shatt be a person having experience in the field of law,
administration, finance or accountancy.
(3) A person shall, however, not be qualified for
appointment as Member of an Adiudicating Authority,--
(a) in the field of law, unless he--
(i) is qualified for appointment as District Judge; or
(ii) has been a member of the Indian Legal Service
and has held a post in Grade I of that service;
'',' :
(b) in the field of finance, accountancy or administration
unless he possesses such qualifications, as may be
prescribed.
(4) fhe Central Government shall appoint a Member to be
the, Chairperson of the Adjudicating Authority.
(5) Subject to the provisions of this Act,-(a) the jurisdiction of the Adjudicating Authority may be
exercised by Benches thereof;
(b) a Bench may be constituted by the Chairperson of
the Adjudicating Authority with one or two Members as
the Chairperson of the Adjudicating Authority may deem
f it;
(c) the Benches of the Adjudicating Authority shatt
ordinarily sit at New Delhi a: d at such other places as
the Central Government may, in consultation with the
Chairperson, by notification, specify;
(d) the Central Government shall, by notification,
specify the areas in relation to which each Bench of the
Adjudicating Authority may exercise jurisdiction.
(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (S),
the Chairperson may transfer a Member from one Bench to
ancther Bench.
(7) If at any stage of the hearing of any case or matter it
appears to the Chairperson or a Member that the case or
mat.ter is of such a nature that it ought tg.Q_e* heard by a
Bench consisting of two Members, the case or matter may
.'1
be transferred by the Chairperson oL as the case may be,
referred to him for transfer, to such Bench as the
Chairperson may deem fit.
(B) fhe Chairperson and every Member shall hold office as
such for a term of five years from the date gn which he
enters upon his office:
Provided that no Chairperson or other Member shalt hold
office as such after he has attained the age of 2(sixty-five)
years.
Q) fhe salary and allowances payable to and the other
terms and conditions of service of the Member shall be such
as may be prescribed:
Provided that neither the salary and allowances nor the
other terms and conditions of service of the Member shall be
varied to his disadvantage after appointment.
(10) If, for reasons other than temporary absence, any
vacancy occurs in the office of the Chairperson or any other
Member, then, the Central Government shall appoint
another person in accordance with the provisions of this Act
to fill the vacancy and the proceedings may be continued
before the Adjudicating Authority from the stage at which
the vacancy is filled.
(11) The Chairperson or any other Member may, by notice
in writing under his hand addressed to the Central
Government, resign his office:
Provided that the Chairperson or any other Member shal[
unless he is permitted by the Central Government to
relinquish his office sooner, continue to hold office until the
expiry of three months from the date of recdipt of such
"'!,:
1..':.
noiice or until a person duly appointed as his successor
en,:ers upon his office or until theexpiry of his term of office,
whichever is the earliest.
(1./) The Chairperson or any other Member shall not be
rernoved from his office except by an order made by the
Cettral Government after giving necessary opportunity of
hearing.
(13) In the event of the occurrence of any vacancy in the
office of the Chairpeison by reason of his death, resignation
or otherwise, the senior-most Member shall act as the
Chairperson of the Adjudicating Authority/ until the date on
which a new Chairperson, appointed in accordance with the
prctvisions of this Act to fill such vacancy, enters upon his
off,;ce.
(14) When the Chairperson of the Adjudicating Authority is
unable to discharge his functions owing to absence, illness
or any other cause, the senior-most Member shall discharge
thet functions of the Chairperson of the Adjudicating
Aulhority until the date on which the Chairperson of the
Ad.iudicating Authority resumes his duties.
(1:;) The Adjudicating Authority shall not be bound by the
procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1905 (5
of 1908), but shall be guided by the principles of natural
justice and, subject to the other provisions of this Act, the
Ad,iudicating Authority shall have powers to regulate its own
procedure."
10. Now if we dissect the said Section, what is clearly reflected
iS, what is meant by Sub-Section (2) of Section 6 is that the
adjudicating authority shall consist of a Chairperson and two other
members. Further reading of Section 6, particularly Sub-Section
(5) goes to show that the adjudicating authority can function in
Benches as well and a Bench has always to be constituted by the
Chairperson. Sub-Section (5) also shows that a Bench can consist
of one or two members as the Chairperson deems fit. Sub-Section
(6) also empowers the Chairperson to transfer a member from one
Bench to another. Likewise, Sub-Section (7) also empowers the
Chairperson for allotting a matter to a Bench of one or to a Bench
consisting of two memberi,
11. In addition, if we read Sub-Section (13) and Sub-Section
(14), it further clarifies the fact that the statute also mandates that
when the post of Chairperson is lying vacant on account of death,
resignation or otherwise, the senior-most member shall act as the
Chairperson until a new Chairperson is appointed. In addition, the
senior-most member shall discharge the functions of the
Chairperson and is also empowered to discharge all the duties that
are otherwise to be discharged by a duly appointed Chairperson
which includes taking up of matters and hearing the same.
t2. It would be relevant at this juncture to refer to a recent
decision of the Division Bench of this High court in Directorate of
Enforcement vs. M/s. Karvy rndia Rearty t-i-it.o and ors.1
wherein the appeal was preferred against the order of the learned
Single Bench in I.A.No.1 of 2o2z in w.p.No.4i133 of 2022, which
was allowed on the ground of coram non judice and also on the
ground rf the adjudicating authority not being a judicial member.
The Div sion Bench in the said case, in paragraph Nos.23 to 25,
while setting aside the order of the learned Single Bench has held
as under':
"2.7. Tltus, powers under Section 6 can be exercised by an
Ad.iudicating Authority comprising single member.
Th=refore, the proposition that powers under Section B of
PN'LA can be exercised by the Adjudicating Authority
comprising only from member in the field of law does not
de.;erve acceptance as the same would render provisions of
Section 6(5) and 6(7) of 7MLA nugatory and ineffective.
24. Insofar as decision in Utility llsers, Welfare
Association (supra), on which reliance has been placed, it
is noteworthy that the supreme court in aforesaid decision
de,zlt with Section 86(1)(f) of the Electricity Act, 2073 and
he,'d that Commission has the option of adjudicating the
disputes between the licensees and generating companies
or refer. the same to arbitration. In the aforesaid context,
' WritAppe:rl No 6'11 of 2023, dated 12.02.2024
a
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::
:
the Supreme Court dealt with the issue whether the State
Regulatory Commission constituted under Electricity Act
which necessarily performs the function of adjudication is
required to have one member who was or is holding a
judicial office or
a person possessing professional
qualification with substantial experience in the practice of
law. The aforesaid decision is of no assistance to the
respondents.
25. It is also pertinent to note that the validity of Sections
6(2), 6(3)(a)(ii) and 6(5)(b) ot PMLA was challenged before
the Madras High Court. A Division Bench of Madras High
Court in Pay Perform India Private Limited vs. the
Union of India (judgment dated 31.01.2024 passed in
W.P.No.12925 of 2023 and batch) has uphetd the vatidity of
the aforesaid provisions and has held that composition of
Adjudicating Authority in the absence of j,tldicial officer is
not bad in law. A Division Bench of Calcu'tta High Court in
R.P.Infosystems Limited (supra) has also held that
. Adjudicating Authority can comprise of a single member
bench. We are in agreement with the view taken by the
Division Benches of Madras High Court and Calcutta High
Court. "
13. In another case of the Delhi High Court in Naresh Bansal
and Ors vs. Adjudicating Authority and Anr2, in paragraph
Nos.45 to 49, it was held as under:
,,
non iudice?
'w.R 1c; 11361t2015 and connected matters
45. Since the present issue concerning the validity of the
SCN has been argued on two distinct limbs, this Court
de=ms it appropriate to bifurcate the contentions under
distinct heads and deal with thern separately, the issues are
as follows:
i.
Whether the SCff rssued by AA is valid in view of the
AA allegedly acting coram non judice under Section 6 of the
PN|LA; and
ii.
Whether an SCN can be issued even in the absence of
prior attachment of properties by the Directorate.
(i) Whether the SCff rcsued by AA is valid in view of
the AA allegedly acting coram non judice under
Section 6 of the PMLA?
46, Section 6 (2) of the PMIA provides that AA shall
comprise of a Chairperson and two other members;
whereas, Section 6(5)(h) authorizes the Chairperson to
cottstitute Benches with either one or two members, as
de,=med necessary/ thereby enabling functional flexibility of
thet AA. Section 6(7) of the PMLA, also enables the
Chairperson to formulate a two-mernber Bench, wherein
she/he is of a view that the matter is of such a nature which
needs to be heard by a Bench consisting of two members.
Th'=se three provisions when read W.P.(C) 11361/2015 and
connected matters Page 33 of 36 in harmony, reveal that
alt,\ough the statute provides a prescription for the
cornposition of AA, nevertheless, the usage of word 'shall'
under Section 6(2) cannot be considered in isolation so as
to suggest that a three-member compositilon is a
cornpulsory and only acceptable composition, enabling the
AA to exercise the power vested in it by the statute. It
further reveals that the statute provides a threefold
legislative design, permitting the AA to function in three
distinct configurations, either as a three-member authority
or for purposes of functional expediency, as a two'member
Bench or even as a single-member Bench, depending on the
nature of the matter before it.
47. The aforesaid interpretation of the provision also aligns
with the fundamental principle of statutory interpretation, ut
res magis valeat quam pereat, which mandates that every
statutory provision must be given effect and shall not be
rendered as ineffectual, inoperative or redundant. In view of
the aforesaid, if the argument advanced by the learned
counsel for the Petitioner is accepted and the provisions of
Section 6 of the PMLA are interpreted in a manner that it
prohibits the existence or constitution of AA as a singlemember Bench, such interpretation would nullify the effects
and intention behind adding Section 6(5)(b) and Section
6(7) of the PMLA, which is impermissible under the
recognised principles of statutory provisions. A similar view
has also been taken by the Division of Bench of Telangana
High Court in Enforcement Directorate v- Karuy India
Reatity Limited and Other€.
48. The Court in Karvy India (supra) further clarified that
although AA performs quasi-iudicial functions, it is neither a
tribunal within the meaning of Articles 3234 or 3238 of the
COI, nor has it been vested with any adiudicatory function
transferred from traditional courts. Additionally, it was also
' zo2q scc online TS 18
Page J-6 of 23
no,:ed that the powers under Section B of the pMLA may
vatidly be exercised by a single-member bench, even in
ab:;ence of a judicial officer. While elaborating further, it
was observed by the Court that under pMLA there exist
sulficient checks and balances, since the order of the AA is
subject to challenge before the AT undei Sei:ction 26 of the
PMLA, which is presided over by a retired Chief lustice.
49. To conclude, applying the aforesaid principles to the
pre:sent case, this Court is of the view that the SCN issued
by a Bench, comprising of a technical member, was valid.
Consequently, the contention that the AA was acting coram
non jurlice is founded on a misinterpretation or ignorance of
thet statutory framework. Thus, in the view of this Court, the
isstance of the SCN is well within the contours of the pMLA,
and as such, the first limb of argument advanced by the
Petitioners, in furtherance of validity of SCN, is devoid of
me rit."
t4.
As regards the ground of the show-cause notice being bad on
the ground that it has been issued by non-judicial membe[ it is
relevant to take note of an another decision of the Delhi High Court
in J.sekar vs. Union of rndia & ors.a, wherein in paragraph
Nos.79 and 80, it has been held as under:
"Composition of the AA and AT
79, The Court next takes up the question of the composition
of lhe AA on which extensive arguments were advanced by
o
2018 scc online Del6523
I
j
the learned counsel for the Petitioners. In this context, it
must be noticed that under Section 6 PMLA, the AA is
supposed to consist of the Chairperson and two other
members - one of whom shall be a person having
experience in the field of law. Section 6(3) further sets out
what the qualifications for appointment as.a member of an
AA should be. One of those qualifications is that the person
has to be qualified for appointment as a District Judge or a
person in the field of law or a member of an Indian Legal
Service. The other qualification /s possession of a
qualification in the field of finance, accountancy or
administration as may be prescribed. It is, therefore, not
the case that all the members of the AA should be judicial
members.
80. It is seen that under Section 5 PMLA, the jurisdiction of
the AA "may be exercised by the Benches thereof". llnder
Section 6(5)(b) PMLA, a Bench may be constituted by the
Chairperson of the AA "with one or two members" as the
Chairperson may deem fit. Therefore, it is possible to have
single-member benches. The word 'bench' therefore does
not connote plurality. There could, even under Section
6(5)(b) PMLA, be a 'single member bench'. When Section
6(6) PMLA sfafes that a Chairperson can transfer a member
from one bench to another bench, it has to be understood in
the above context of there also being single-member
benches."
15. Another reason which compels this Bench not to entertain the
present writ petition is that an alternative statutory remedy is
.:.
Page lB of 23
availabler to the petitioner under the PMLA Act itself, rather than
seeking quashment under Article 226 of the constitution of India.
Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme court in pHR rnvent Educational
Society vs. UCO Bank and Ors.u, in paragraph Nos.15,29,30,
32 and 33, has held as under:
"7!;. It could thus be seen that, this Court has ctearly held
that the High court will ordinarily not entertain a petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy
is available to the aggrieved person. It has been held that
thi:; rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving
recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money
ancl the dues of banks anci other financial institutions. The
court clearly observed that, while dealing with the petitions
inv,tlving challenge ta the action taken for recovery of the
public dues, etc., the High Court must keep in mind that the
legtlslations enacted by parliament and state Legislatures for
recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch
as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for
recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-
judi'cial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any
aggrieved person. It has been held that, though the powers
of the High court under Article 226 of the constitution are
of widest amplitude, still the courts cannot be obtivious of
the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court.
The court further held that though the rule of exhaustion of
alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of
con,pulsion, still it is difficutt to fathom any reason why the
tArR zo2+
sc 1894
]
I
,;
High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226
of the Constitution.
29. It could thus clearly be seen that the Court has carved
out certain exceptions when a petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution could be entertained in spite of availability
of an alternative remedy. Some of them are ihus:
(i) where the statutory authority has not acted in
accordance with the provisions of the enactment in
question;
(ii) it has acted in defiance of the fundamental principles
of judicial procedure;
(iii) it has resorted to invoke the provisions which are
repealed; and
(iv) when an order has been passed in total violation of
the principles of natural justice.
30. It has however been clarified that the High Court will
not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
if an effective alternative remedy is available to the
aggrieved person or the statute under which the action
complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism
for redressal of grievance.
32. We are therefore of the considered view that the High
Court has grossly erred in entertaining and altowing the
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.
33. While dismissing the writ petition, we will have to
remind the High Courts of the following words of this Court
in the case of Satyawati Tondon (supra) since we have
Page 2O of 23
co'ne across various matters wherein the High Courts have
been entertaininq petitions arising out of the DRT Act and
the SARFAESI Act in spite of availability of an effective
alternative remedy:
"55. It is a matter of serious coticern that despite
repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts
continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies
under the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act and exercise
jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which
have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and
other financial institutions to recover their dues. We
hope and trust that in future the High Caurts will
exercise their discretion in such matters with greater
ca ution, care and circumspection. ""
16. A :;imilar view was also taken by the High Court at Hyderabad
in Sri P.Trivikrama Prasad vs. Enforcement Directorate6,
wherein in paragraph Nos.33,34,37 and 38, it has been held as
u nder:
"3-1. Thus, there is no merit in the contention urged by the
pedtioners that they have no effective or efficacious remedy
under the Act necessitating institution of the writ petition by
invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court.
Entertainment of writ petition at this stage would amount to
sct,ttling the statutorily engrafted mechanism on attachment
of properties.
u
2014 SCC online Hyd 819
Page 2l of 23
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34. Article 226 of the Constitution vests wide discretion in
the Writ Court to entertain the writ petition on any
grievance and to grant appropriate relief. It is an
extraordinary jurisdiction vested in the writ Court. The Writ
Courts observe self-imposed restraint in exercising the
jurisdiction under Article 226. Availability o'f alternative
remedy is not a bar to entertain a writ petition. Ordinarily
the writ petition is not entertained under Article 226 if the
aggrieved person has an efficacious and effective remedy
provided by concerned statute where under an adverse
decision is taken against the person, which he seeks to
assail in the writ petition. Notwithstanding availability of
alternative remedy in a case of exceptional nature or a case
of glaring injustice writ Court can entertain a writ petition.
Constitutional Courts have laid down parameters for
exercising of such discretion.
37. The petitioners have effective and efficacious statutory
remedies to prove the nature of acquisition of assefs and to
ventilate their grievances. Furthermore, at the stage of
provisional attachment the person concerned is not
dispossessed of the property, but is only prevented from
dealing with the property till orders are passed by the
adjudicating authority under Section B(2). Against order of
the adjudicating authority under Section B(2), appeal shall
lie to the Appellate Tribunal under Section 26 and further
appeal to the High Court under Section 42. The statute has
provided enough safeguards and layers of redress
mechanism. The writ Court cannot go into the merits of the
issue at this stage even before the attachment order has
become final, investigation is completed and trial concluded
?age 22 of 23
and issue of attachment is considered by Adjudicating
Authority, first Appellate Authority and second Appellate
Authority. It is premature to go into the validity of
atrachment order at the threshold and even before the
Aa'judicating Authority consii-lers the issue. It is also to be
born in mind that any observations made by the Court
wc,uld have bearing on the pending investigation and trial.
38. The loint Director is competent to pass orders of
atrachment. It is not a case of lack of jurisdiction to
Enforcement Directorate. Violation of principles of natural
ju:;tice at the provisional attachrnent stage does not arise as
st;ttute has not made provision of opportunity of hearing
pr,or to provisional attachment. Decision to attach is based
on the assessment by Enforcement Directorate as per
material in its possession. It is a tentative decision. Such
decision is to be placed before the Adjudicating Authority.
Riqht' of hearing is provided before adjudicating authority.
Sections 5(1) and B are in the statute book and have stood
the test of judicial scrutiny. It is not a case of exceptional
nature warranting interference by writ Court at the
threshold. Not a case of glaring injustice demanding
aft'irmative action notwithstanding an effective statutorily
engrafted layers of remedies."
L7. For all the aforesaid reasons and the judicial precedents
referred to in the preceding paragraphs, it is hard to accept the
contenticns put forth by the learned counsel for the petitioner of
the impugned show-cause notice being hit by Coram non judice.
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The writ petition thus being devoid of merit, deserves to be and is
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accordingly, dismissed
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18. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending if doy, shall
stand closed. HoweveL there shall be no order as to costs.
SD'. T. SRINIVASA REDDY
sisraur REGISTRAR
//TRUE COPY/'
SECTION OFFICER
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ORDER
WP.No.40,l54 of 2A25
DISMISSING THE WRIT PETITION WITHOUT COSTS
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