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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 16.09.2026
#
CNR No. DLHC010439832026
+
CM(M) 2041/2026, CM APPL. 63230/2026 (Stay), CM APPL.
63231/2026 (Ex. From filing the certified copy of the impugned
order dt. 30.05.2026) & CM APPL. 63232/2026 (Delay of 7
days in Re-filing the petition)
SHIKHA SINGH
Through:
.....Petitioner
Mr. Kuldeep Gola and Mr.
Harsh Kumar, Advocates along
with Petitioner in person.
versus
SAURABH SINGH
.....Respondent
Through:
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
%
1.
JUDGEMENT (Oral)
The present Petition has been filed under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, 1950 [“the Constitution”], assailing the Interim
Order dated 30.05.2026 [“Impugned Order”] passed by the learned
Judge, Family Court, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts [“learned
Family Court”], in the case being GP No. 77/2023, seeking the
following reliefs:
“a) Set aside and/or modify the Impugned Order dated 30.05.2026
passed by the Ld. Judge, Family Court, THC, District Centre, in
GP No. 77/2023, to the extent it:
i) extends the visitation time from one hour to one and a half
hours; and/or
ii) directs the Petitioner to remain outside the Children Room
during visitation;
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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CM(M) 2041/2026
b) Restore the visitation arrangement as earlier operating
pursuant to order dated 05.10.2023 passed by the Ld. Mahila
Court, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, in CT No. 138/2023, or
pass such structured visitation schedule as this Hon’ble Court may
deem fit in the best interests of the minor child;
c) Pass appropriate directions ensuring that visitation remains
child-friendly and non-coercive, including but not limited to:
supervised visitation, restraint on intimidation/threats, and any
other safeguards deemed necessary;
d) Pass appropriate directions regarding clearance of maintenance
arrears as per existing orders, including timelines for payment and
consequences of default, in accordance with law;
e) Pass any other or further order(s) as this Hon’ble Court may
deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.”
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
2.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner submits
that the Impugned Order would require to be interfered with, as the
learned counsel appearing before the learned Family Court had not
consented to various aspects which have been incorporated in the said
Order. However, during the course of oral submissions, it has been
fairly admitted by the learned counsel for the Petitioner that the
Petitioner had expressly consented to the extension of the visitation
period from one hour to one and a half hours.
3.
The second challenge essentially pertains to the direction
requiring the Petitioner to remain outside the Children Room during
the period of visitation. Learned counsel, in this regard, submits that
the minor child is of tender age and, during the course of visitation,
keeps crying. It is, therefore, submitted that the Petitioner ought to be
permitted to remain inside the Children Room during the period of
visitation.
4.
It is further submitted that the visitation ought to be restored to
the arrangement which was operating earlier, or, in the alternative, a
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:00:40
CM(M) 2041/2026
structured visitation schedule ought to be put in place in the best
interests of the minor child.
5.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner also
submits that the Petitioner is aggrieved by the direction that the parties
shall not undertake any video recording of the visitation. It is
submitted that such direction also requires reconsideration. Learned
counsel further seeks directions with respect to clearance of the
maintenance
arrears,
including
timelines
for
payment
and
consequences of default.
ANALYSIS:
6.
This Court has heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Petitioner at length and, with his able assistance, perused the material
available on record.
7.
Before proceeding to examine the contentions raised by the
Petitioner, it would be apposite to delineate the scope of jurisdiction
exercised by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. The said
jurisdiction is supervisory in nature and is to be exercised sparingly, to
ensure that the subordinate Court acts within the bounds of its
jurisdiction and in accordance with law. It is not an appellate
jurisdiction enabling this Court to substitute its own view merely
because another view may be possible. Interference would, therefore,
be warranted only where the order under challenge suffers from a
patent jurisdictional error, perversity, manifest illegality or results in a
gross failure of justice. The aforesaid principles have been iterated by
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:00:40
CM(M) 2041/2026
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra
Shankar Patil1, and Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel2.
8.
In Shalini Shyam Shetty (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court
has held that the power under Article 227 of the Constitution is to be
exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where interference is
necessary to keep the subordinate Courts within the bounds of their
authority. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
read as under:
“
****
(c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power
of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere
with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in
exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of
the court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative
statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also
operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High
Court.
(d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of
their power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by
this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the
principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court
in Waryam Singh3 and the principles in Waryam Singh (Supra)
have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches
and various other decisions of this Court.
(e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (Supra), followed in
subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of
superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals
and courts subordinate to it, “within the bounds of their authority”.
(f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and
courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not
declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them.
(g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can
interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has
been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunals and courts
subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest
failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been
flouted.
(h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot
(2010) 8 SCC 329
(2022) 4 SCC 181
AIR 1954 SC 215
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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CM(M) 2041/2026
interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because
another view than the one taken by the tribunals or courts
subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction
has to be very sparingly exercised.
****”
9.
In Garment Craft (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court
reiterated that Article 227 of the Constitution does not permit the High
Court to act as a court of first appeal and reappreciate/reweigh
evidence. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
read as under:
“15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the
view that the impugned order [Prakash Chand Goel v. Garment
Craft4] is contrary to law and cannot be sustained for several
reasons, but primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdiction
exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution
of India. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does
not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the
evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is
based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact
or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be
supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on
facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal.
[Celina Coelho Pereira v. Ulhas Mahabaleshwar Kholkar5] The
jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to
set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of
fundamental principles of law or justice. The power under Article
227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there is
no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that no
reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion that the
court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionary
relief must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice.
16. Explaining the scope of jurisdiction under Article 227, this
Court in Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd.6 has observed :
(SCC pp. 101-102, para 6)
“6. The scope and ambit of exercise of power and
jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India is examined and explained in a number
of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this
article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior
2019 SCC OnLine Del 11943
(2010) 1 SCC 217
(2001) 8 SCC 97
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:00:40
CM(M) 2041/2026
courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and
to see that they do the duty expected or required of them in a
legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any
unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or
wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of
the subordinate courts or tribunals. Exercise of this power
and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunals is
restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant
violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where
if the High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice
remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High
Court while acting under this Article cannot exercise its
power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in
place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error,
which is not apparent on the face of the record. The High
Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of an
inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to
justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable
person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the
court or tribunal has come to.”
10.
Keeping in view the aforesaid scope and parameters governing
the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, this
Court shall now examine the contentions raised by the learned counsel
for the Petitioner and the Impugned Order to determine whether any
jurisdictional or legal infirmity warranting interference by this Court is
made out.
11.
The Impugned Order is confined to the issue of visitation of the
minor child. The question of clearance of maintenance arrears,
timelines for payment thereof or the consequences of any default does
not form the subject matter of the Impugned Order. Consequently, the
said relief, as sought in Prayer (d), does not arise for consideration in
the present proceedings and would appropriately have to be agitated
before the learned Family Court in accordance with law.
12.
Insofar as Prayer (a)(i) is concerned, the challenge is to the
extension of the visitation period from one hour to one and a half
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:00:40
CM(M) 2041/2026
hours. However, the Petitioner has, during the course of the present
proceedings, fairly admitted that consent had been expressly accorded
to the said extension. In view of the aforesaid admission, there
remains no basis for the Petitioner to seek interference with the said
direction. The challenge to the extension of the visitation period,
therefore, does not merit consideration.
13.
The principal issue which, therefore, remains for consideration
is the direction contained in Prayer (a)(ii), whereby the Petitioner has
been directed to remain outside the Children Room during the period
of visitation. The grievance of the Petitioner in this regard is
essentially founded on the tender age of the minor child and the
submission that the child keeps crying during the visitation.
14.
In this context, the settled principles governing visitation rights,
particularly with respect to preserving the child’s relationship with
both parents, assume significance. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Yashita Sahu v. State of Rajasthan7, has held the following:
“20. It is well settled law by a catena of judgments that while
deciding matters of custody of a child, primary and paramount
consideration is welfare of the child. If welfare of the child so
demands then technical objections cannot come in the way.
However, while deciding the welfare of the child, it is not the view
of one spouse alone which has to be taken into consideration. The
courts should decide the issue of custody only on the basis of what
is in the best interest of the child.
21. The child is the victim in custody battles. In this fight of egos
and increasing acrimonious battles and litigations between two
spouses, our experience shows that more often than not, the parents
who otherwise love their child, present a picture as if the other
spouse is a villain and he or she alone is entitled to the custody of
the child. The court must therefore be very wary of what is said by
each of the spouses.
22. A child, especially a child of tender years requires the love,
affection, company, protection of both parents. This is not only the
(2020) 3 SCC 67
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:00:40
CM(M) 2041/2026
requirement of the child but is his/her basic human right. Just
because the parents are at war with each other, does not mean that
the child should be denied the care, affection, love or protection of
any one of the two parents. A child is not an inanimate object
which can be tossed from one parent to the other. Every separation,
every reunion may have a traumatic and psychosomatic impact on
the child. Therefore, it is to be ensured that the court weighs each
and every circumstance very carefully before deciding how and in
what manner the custody of the child should be shared between
both the parents. Even if the custody is given to one parent, the
other parent must have sufficient visitation rights to ensure that the
child keeps in touch with the other parent and does not lose social,
physical and psychological contact with any one of the two parents.
It is only in extreme circumstances that one parent should be
denied contact with the child. Reasons must be assigned if one
parent is to be denied any visitation rights or contact with the child.
Courts dealing with the custody matters must while deciding issues
of custody clearly define the nature, manner and specifics of the
visitation rights.
23. The concept of visitation rights is not fully developed in India.
Most courts while granting custody to one spouse do not pass any
orders granting visitation rights to the other spouse. As observed
earlier, a child has a human right to have the love and affection of
both the parents and courts must pass orders ensuring that the child
is not totally deprived of the love, affection and company of one of
her/his parents.”
15.
The aforesaid principles assume significance in the present
case, where the issue is not one of denying custody to either parent,
but of regulating the manner in which the Respondent-father is to
exercise his visitation with the minor child. The arrangement,
therefore, has to be considered bearing in mind the child’s tender age,
while also ensuring that the child is not deprived of meaningful
interaction with the biological father.
16.
The nature of the arrangement prescribed by the learned Family
Court is required to be considered in this context. The Impugned
Order permits the Respondent-father to meet the minor child for a
period of one and a half hours, between 03:00 PM and 04:30 PM, on
every first, third and fourth Saturday. During the said period, the
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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Petitioner is permitted to remain within the same premises, though
outside the Children Room, while the Respondent is permitted to
interact with the child. The Impugned Order further directs that the
parties shall not undertake any video recording of the visitation,
particularly in view of the fact that CCTV cameras are already
installed at the premises, and that any incident arising during the
course of visitation can be brought to the notice of the learned Family
Court.
17.
The aforesaid arrangement is, therefore, only an interim
arrangement regulating the manner in which the Respondent-father is
to interact with the minor child. It does not amount to a final
adjudication of the rights of either parent. The direction requiring the
Petitioner to remain outside the Children Room has to be viewed in
the context of the purpose of visitation itself, namely, to facilitate
interaction between the minor child and the biological father.
18.
Merely because the minor child is at an early stage of life and
may cry during the course of visitation cannot, by itself, be a ground
to set aside the arrangement directed by the learned Family Court. The
child is of tender age and has been primarily in the care of the
Petitioner-mother. In such circumstances, the introduction of the
biological father into the life of the child and the development of a
relationship between the father and the child would necessarily require
the child to gradually become familiar with such interaction.
19.
The welfare of a minor child necessarily includes the
preservation and development of a meaningful relationship with both
parents. The Courts, while regulating visitation, are required to
balance the tender age and immediate comfort of the child with the
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:00:40
CM(M) 2041/2026
larger requirement of facilitating a healthy relationship between the
child and both parents. The mere fact that the child may initially
experience discomfort or cry during such interaction cannot, without
more, result in the biological father being denied an opportunity to
interact with the child.
20.
In the present case, the arrangement prescribed by the learned
Family Court does not completely exclude the Petitioner from the
premises. The Petitioner remains permitted to be present in the same
premises, though outside the Children Room, while the Respondent is
permitted to interact with the minor child. The arrangement is also
subject to the supervision afforded by the CCTV cameras installed at
the premises, and any grievance or incident arising during visitation
can be placed before the learned Family Court.
21.
It is also relevant that the Impugned Order is only an interim
arrangement and is not a final determination of the visitation rights of
the parties. In the event that any genuine difficulty arises in the
implementation or operation of the arrangement, or circumstances
subsequently arise warranting a modification thereof, it would remain
open to the Petitioner to approach the learned Family Court by way of
appropriate proceedings in accordance with law. The learned Family
Court would, in such eventuality, consider the matter on its own
merits, keeping the welfare and best interests of the minor child
paramount.
CONCLUSION:
22.
In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds no infirmity
in the Impugned Order warranting interference by this Court in
exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:00:40
CM(M) 2041/2026
It is reiterated that the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution is supervisory in nature and is not to be exercised as an
appellate jurisdiction, particularly where the order passed by the Court
below does not suffer from any patent illegality, perversity or
jurisdictional infirmity. The arrangement prescribed by the learned
Family Court appropriately regulates the visitation of the Respondentfather while safeguarding the interests of the minor child.
23.
In view of the above, the present Petition stands dismissed.
24.
Accordingly, the present Petition, along with pending
Application(s), if any, stands disposed of in the above terms.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
SEPTEMBER 16, 2026/tk/ma
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:00:40
CM(M) 2041/2026
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