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2026:HHC:46973
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No. 1156 of 2026
Reserved on: 14.10.2026
Date of Decision: 28.10.2026.
Sher Singh
...Petitioner
Versus
Kanwar Shiv Pal Singh
...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting? 1 No
For the Petitioner
:
Mr Devender K. Sharma, Advocate.
For the Respondent
:
Nemo
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present petition is directed against the order
dated 11.09.2026 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate
Kullu, District Kullu (learned Trial Court) vide which the defence
evidence was closed by the order of the Court. (The parties shall
hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed
before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)
2.
It has been asserted that the respondent/complainant
has filed a complaint against the petitioner/accused for the
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:46973
commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act) for the dishonour of the
cheque of ₹4,90,000/-. The petitioner/accused had filed an
application under Section 145(2) of the NI Act for the crossexamination of the complainant, which was allowed by the
learned Trial Court. The matter was listed before the learned
Trial Court on 12.12.2023, but the petitioner/accused could not
appear before the Court as he was arrested by the police of Police
Station, Devsar, District Kulgan, Jammu and Kashmir. The
petitioner was released on bail on 20.02.2024. The petitioner
suffered from a major paralytic attack and was unable to walk.
The learned Trial Court initiated proceedings for proclamation.
The petitioner filed an application under Section 70(2) of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) for cancellation of
non-bailable warrants of arrest and grant of bail, which was
allowed. The matter was listed for defence evidence. The accused
could not take steps to produce defence evidence, and the learned
Trial Court closed the evidence by order of the Court. A false
complaint has been filed against the petitioner/accused, and he
would be deprived of a chance to prove his defence. The learned
Trial Court has mechanically closed the evidence, and this order
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will cause serious prejudice to the petitioner/accused. Hence, it
was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order
passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
3.
Mr Devender K. Sharma, learned counsel for the
petitioner, submitted that the petitioner/accused could not
produce the evidence before the learned Trial Court because of
his medical condition. He would be deprived of his right to
produce the evidence to prove his innocence. Therefore, he
prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed
by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
4.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
5.
The petitioner/accused has filed the medical record
regarding his treatment by a physiotherapist in October, 2023.
He has also filed a prescription slip showing that he was treated
on 05.06.2025 with a complaint of recurrent CVA. It is difficult to
see how these documents would assist in establishing that the
petitioner/accused had a reasonable cause for not producing the
evidence on 11.09.2026, the date fixed before the learned Trial
Court. The treatment record pertained to the years 2023 and 2025
2026:HHC:46973
and not to the year 2026. Therefore, the plea that the
petitioner/accused was unable to produce the evidence because
of his serious medical condition is not acceptable.
6.
Section 346 of Bharatiya Nyaya Suraksha Sanhita,
2023 (BNSS), corresponding to Section 309 of the Cr.P.C., deals
with the adjournments. It reads that every inquiry or trial shall be
concluded on a day-to-day basis unless the Court finds the
adjournment necessary for reasons to be recorded. It was
submitted that a fair trial demands that adequate opportunities
be granted to the accused to defend himself. This submission will
not help the petitioner/accused. It was held in Asha Ranjan v.
State of Bihar, (2017) 4 SCC 397: (2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 376: 2017 SCC
OnLine SC 140 that the accused cannot go on seeking
adjournments in the name of a fair trial. It was observed at page
435:
“63. While appreciating the concept of public interest in
such a situation, the Court is required to engage itself in
construing the process of fair trial, which ultimately
subserves the cause of justice and remains closer to
constitutional sensibility. An accused, in the name of a fair
trial, cannot go on seeking adjournments, defeating the
basic purpose behind the conducting of a trial as enshrined
under Section 309 CrPC. He cannot go on filing
applications under various provisions of the Criminal
Procedure Code, whether tenable or not, and put forth a
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plea on each and every occasion on the bedrock that the
principle of fair trial sanctions it. In such a situation, as
has been held by this Court, the prosecution, which
represents the cause of the collective and the victim, who
fights for a remedy of his individual grievance, is allowed
to have a say, and the court is not expected to be a silent
spectator. Thus, the discord that arises when there is
intra-conflict in the same fundamental right, especially in
the context of a fair trial, has to be resolved with regard
being had to the obtaining fact situation. An accused who
has been able to, by his sheer presence, erode the idea of
safety of a witness in court, or, for that matter, impair and
rust the faith of a victim in the ultimate justice, and such
erosion is due to fear psychosis prevalent in the
atmosphere of trial, is not to be countenanced as it is an
unconscionable situation. Such a hazard is not to be
silently suffered because the “Majesty of Justice” does not
allow such kinds of complaints to survive.”
7.
It was submitted that the adjournment should have
been granted in the interest of justice. This submission cannot be
accepted. Delhi High Court held in Jasbir Sobti v. Surender Singh,
2008 SCC OnLine Del 845, that adjournments cannot be granted in
the interest of justice. It was observed:
6. The question that arises for consideration is whether
another opportunity is to be given to the plaintiffs under
the cloak of ‘in the interest of justice’. The answer to this
question would lie in replying to the related question,
namely, whether the interest of justice demands that the
case be decided on merits even when there are lapses
galore on the part of the plaintiffs in not prosecuting the
case diligently, thereby delaying the process endlessly. We
are afraid, in the name of justice, that no such licence can
be given to the plaintiffs. No doubt, if there is a minor
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procedural lapse, that can be condoned, and the main
purpose of the Court is to see that such cases are decided
on the merits. However, that would not mean that the
plaintiffs or the defendants are allowed to drag on the
proceedings unnecessarily by taking adjournments
continuously. Again, that does not mean that the parties
do not take steps in further progress of/the case, namely,
fail to file the documents, conduct admission/denial and
even fail to appear repeatedly. We have to keep in mind the
interests of the opposing party as well. If the matter is
dragged out like this and the opposing party is made to
appear on each date and asked to come on the next date
only because nobody is appearing on behalf of the
plaintiffs, it causes unnecessary harassment to the
opposite party as well. Therefore, in all such matters, the
Court is under a duty to weigh the interests of both parties
and maintain balance insofar as these conflicting interests
are concerned.
7. The problem of arrears in the Indian courts is well
known. We have 30 million cases pending in the various
District Courts and the High Courts. Many attempts are
being made to clear these arrears and to ensure that the
cases are decided speedily, and there is no unnecessary
delay in the disposal of these cases. If the proceedings in a
particular case linger until the judgment is delivered and
the case is decided after a number of years, the adverse
effects of this are well known. No doubt, if we have the
dictum ‘Justice hurried is justice buried’ on the one hand,
we cannot gloss over another equally forceful maxim
‘Justice delayed is justice denied’. In a situation like this,
callousness, indifference and laxity on the part of the
plaintiffs in pursuing the suit cannot be tolerated. It
cannot be the privilege of the plaintiffs to file a suit and
not prosecute it, enter an appearance or keep the matter
pending indefinitely.”
8.
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Similarly, it was held in Ishwarlal Mali Rathod v. Gopal,
(2021) 12 SCC 612: (2023) 2 SCC (Civ) 625: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 921
that the grant of repeated adjournments without any justification
is not proper. It was observed at page 616:
8. Grant of repeated adjournments in a routine manner
and how it ultimately affects the justice delivery system,
as such came to be considered by this Court in a catena of
decisions, and asking/granting of repeated adjournments
have been repeatedly condemned by this Court.
8.1. In Shiv Cotex v. Tirgun Auto Plast (P) Ltd. [Shiv
Cotex v. Tirgun Auto Plast (P) Ltd., (2011) 9 SCC 678 : (2011)
4 SCC (Civ) 817], it is observed and held in paras 14 to 17 as
under : (SCC pp. 682-83)
“14. … Is the court obliged to give adjournment after
adjournment merely because the stakes are high in
the dispute? Should the court be a silent spectator
and leave control of the case to a party to the case
who has decided not to take the case forward?
15. It is sad, but true, that the litigants seek—and the
courts grant—adjournments at the drop of a hat. In
the cases where the Judges are a little proactive and
refuse to accede to the requests for unnecessary
adjournments, the litigants deploy all sorts of
methods to protract the litigation. It is not
surprising that civil disputes drag on and on. The
misplaced sympathy and indulgence by the
appellate and revisional courts compound the
malady further. The case in hand is a case of such
misplaced sympathy. It is high time that courts
become sensitive to delays in the justice delivery
system and realise that adjournments do dent the
efficacy of the judicial process, and if this menace is
not controlled adequately, the litigant public may
2026:HHC:46973
lose faith in the system sooner or later. The courts,
particularly trial courts, must ensure that on every
date of hearing, effective progress takes place in the
suit.
16. No litigant has a right to abuse the procedure
provided in CPC. Adjournments have grown like
cancer, corroding the entire body of the justice
delivery system.…
17. … A party to the suit is not at liberty to proceed
with the trial at its leisure and pleasure and has no
right to determine when the evidence would be let in
by it or the matter should be heard. The parties to a
suit—whether the plaintiff or the defendant—must
cooperate with the court in ensuring the effective
work on the date of the hearing for which the matter
has been fixed. If they do not, they do so at their own
peril.”
8.2. Commenting on the delay in the justice delivery
system, although in respect of the criminal trial, Krishna
Iyer, J. in Babu Singh v. State of U.P. [Babu Singh v. State of
U.P., (1978) 1 SCC 579: 1978 SCC (Cri) 133] has observed in
para 4 as under : (SCC p. 581)
“4. … Our justice system, even in grave cases, suffers
from slow motion syndrome, which is lethal to “fair
trial”, whatever the ultimate decision. Speedy justice is
a component of social justice since the community, as a
whole, is concerned in the criminal being condignly
and finally punished within a reasonable time and the
innocent being absolved from the inordinate ordeal of
criminal proceedings.”
8.3. In Noor Mohammed v. Jethanand [Noor Mohammed v.
Jethanand, (2013) 5 SCC 202 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 754], using
very harsh words and condemning the repeated
adjournments sought by the lawyers and granted by the
courts, this Court has observed in paras 1, 12, 13, 27 and 28
as under : (SCC pp. 206-07, 209-10 & 215-16)
2026:HHC:46973
“1. In a democratic body politic which is governed by a
written Constitution and where the Rule of Law is
paramount, the judiciary is regarded as a sentinel on
the qui vive not only to protect the fundamental rights
of the citizens but also to see that the democratic values
as enshrined in the Constitution are respected and the
faith and hope of the people in the constitutional
system are not atrophied. The sacrosanctity of the Rule
of Law neither recognises a master and a slave nor does
it conceive of a ruler and a subject, but, in
quintessentiality, encapsulates and sings in the glory of
the values of liberty, equality and justice in accordance
with the law, requiring the present generation to have
the responsibility to sustain them with all fairness for
the posterity, ostracising all affectations. To maintain
the sacredness of democracy, sacrifice in the
continuum by every member of the collective is a
categorical imperative. The fundamental conception of
democracy can only be preserved as a colossal and
priceless treasure where virtue and values of justice
rule supreme and intellectual anaemia is kept at bay by
constant patience, consistent perseverance, and arguseyed vigilance. The foundation of justice, apart from
other things, rests on the speedy delineation of the lis
pending in courts. It would not be an exaggeration to
state that it is the primary morality of justice and the
ethical fulcrum of the judiciary. Its profundity lies in
not allowing anything to cripple it or to do any act
which would freeze it or make it suffer from impotence.
Delayed delineation of a controversy in a court of law
creates a dent in the normative dispensation of justice,
and in the ultimate event, the Bench and the Bar
gradually lose their reverence, for the sense of divinity
and nobility really flows from the institutional
serviceability. Therefore, historically, emphasis has
been laid on individual institutionalism and collective
institutionalism of an adjudicator while administering
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justice. It can be stated without any fear of
contradiction that collective collegiality can never be
regarded as an alien concept to the speedy dispensation
of justice. That is the hallmark of duty, and that is the
real measure.
***
12. The proceedings in the second appeal before the
High Court, if we allow ourselves to say so, epitomise
the corrosive effect that adjournments can have on
litigation and how a lis can get entangled in the
tentacles of an octopus. The philosophy of justice, the
role of a lawyer and the court, the obligation of a
litigant and all legislative commands, the nobility of
the Bench and the Bar, the ability and efficiency of all
concerned and ultimately the divinity of law are likely
to make way for apathy and indifference when delay of
the present nature takes place, for procrastination on
the part of anyone destroys the values of life and
creates a catastrophic turbulence in the sanctity of law.
The virtues of adjudication cannot be allowed to be
paralysed by adjournments and non-demonstration of
due diligence to deal with the matter. One cannot be
oblivious to the necessities of the time. No one can
afford to sit in an ivory tower. Neither a Judge nor a
lawyer can ignore “the total push and pressure of the
cosmos”. It is devastating to expect infinite patience.
Change of attitude is the warrant and command of the
day. We may recall with profit what Justice Cardozo had
said:
“It is true, I think, today in every department of the
law that the social value of a rule has become a test
of growing power and importance.” [Benjamin N.
Cardozo, The Nature of Judicial Process (Cosimo Inc.,
2009) 73]
13. It has to be kept in mind that the time of leisure has
to be given a decent burial. The sooner it takes place,
2026:HHC:46973
the better it is. It is the obligation of the present
generation to march with the times and remind oneself
every moment that the rule of law is the centripodal
concern, and delay in the delineation and disposal of
cases injects an artificial virus and becomes a vitiating
element. The unfortunate characteristics of endemic
delays have to be avoided at any cost. One has to bear in
mind that this is the day, this is the hour, and this is the
moment when all soldiers of law fight on the path. One
has to remind oneself of the great saying, “Awake,
Arise, ‘O’ Partha”.
***
27. The anguish expressed in the past, and the role
ascribed to the Judges, the lawyers and the litigants, is
a matter of perpetual concern, and the same has to be
reflected upon every moment. An attitude of
indifference can neither be appreciated nor tolerated.
Therefore, the serviceability of the institution gains
significance. That is the command of the Majesty of
Law, and none should make any maladroit effort to
create a concavity in the same. Procrastination,
whether at the individual or institutional level, is a
systemic disorder. Its corrosive effect and impact are
like a disorderly state of the physical frame of a man
suffering from an incurable and fast progressive
malignancy. Delay either by the functionaries of the
court or the members of the Bar significantly exhibits
indolence, and one can aphoristically say, borrowing a
line from Southwell, “creeping snails have the weakest
force [Robert Southwell, “Loss in Delay”, in William B.
Turnbull (Ed.), The Poetical Works of the Rev. Robert
Southwell (John Russell Smith, London 1856), p. 60] ”.
Slightly more than five decades back, talking about the
responsibility of the lawyers, Nizer Louis had put it
thus:
2026:HHC:46973
‘I consider it a lawyer's task to bring calm and
confidence to the distressed client. Almost everyone
who comes to a law office is emotionally affected by
a problem. It is only a matter of degree and of the
client's inner resources to withstand the pressure
[ Nizer Louis, My Life in Court (Doubleday & Co. Inc.,
New York 1961), p. 213] .’
A few lines from the illustrious Justice Frankfurter are
fruitful to recapitulate:
‘I think a person who throughout his life is nothing
but a practising lawyer fulfils a very great and
essential function in the life of society. Think of the
responsibilities on the one hand, and the
satisfaction on the other, to be a lawyer in the true
sense [ Felix Frankfurter, “Proceedings in Honour of
Mr Justice Frankfurter and Distinguished Alumni,
Occasional Pamphlet No. 3” (Harvard Law School,
Cambridge, 1960), pp. 45] .’
28. In a democratic set-up, intrinsic and embedded
faith in the adjudicatory system is of seminal and
pivotal concern. Delay gradually declines the citizenry's
faith in the system. It is faith and faith alone that keep
the system alive. It provides oxygen constantly.
Fragmentation of faith has the potential to bring about
a state of cataclysm where justice may become a
casualty. A litigant expects a reasoned verdict from a
temperate Judge but does not intend to, and, rightly so,
to guillotine much of the time at the altar of reason.
Timely delivery of justice keeps the faith ingrained and
establishes sustained stability. Access to speedy justice
is regarded as a human right that is deeply rooted in the
foundational concept of democracy, and such a right is
not only the creation of law but also a natural right.
This right can be fully ripened by the requisite
commitment of all concerned with the system. It
cannot be regarded as a facet of Utopianism because
2026:HHC:46973
such a thought is likely to make the right a mirage,
losing the centrality of purpose. Therefore, whoever
has a role to play in the justice-dispensation system
cannot be allowed to remotely conceive of a casual
approach.”
8.4. In the aforesaid decision [Noor Mohammed v.
Jethanand, (2013) 5 SCC 202: (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 754], this
Court also considered the role of the advocate in the justice
delivery system and considered the earlier decisions in
paras 17 to 22 which read as under: (Noor Mohammed
case[Noor Mohammedv. Jethanand, (2013) 5 SCC 202 : (2013)
2 SCC (Civ) 754], SCC pp. 212-14)
“17.
In Ramon
Services
(P)
Ltd. v. Subhash
Kapoor [Ramon Services (P) Ltd. v. Subhash Kapoor,
(2001) 1 SCC 118: 2001 SCC (Cri) 3: 2001 SCC (L&S) 152],
after referring to a passage from Mahabir Prasad
Singh v. Jacks Aviation (P) Ltd. [Mahabir Prasad
Singh v. Jacks Aviation (P) Ltd., (1999) 1 SCC 37], the
Court cautioned thus : (Ramon Services case [Ramon
Services (P) Ltd. v. Subhash Kapoor, (2001) 1 SCC 118: 2001
SCC (Cri) 3: 2001 SCC (L&S) 152], SCC p. 126, para 15)
‘15. … Nonetheless, we put the profession on notice
that in future the advocate would also be answerable
for the consequences suffered by the party if the
non-appearance was solely on the ground of a strike
call. It is unjust and inequitable to cause the party
alone to suffer for the self-imposed dereliction of its
advocate. We may further add that the litigant who
suffers entirely on account of his advocate's nonappearance in court has also the remedy to sue the
advocate for damages, but that remedy would
remain unaffected by the course adopted in this
case. Even so, in situations like this, when the court
mulcts the party with costs for the failure of his
advocate to appear, we make it clear that the same
court has the power to permit the party to realise the
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costs from the advocate concerned. However, such a
direction can be passed only after affording an
opportunity to the advocate. If he has any justifiable
cause, the court can certainly absolve him from such
a liability.’
Be it noted, though the said passage was stated in the
context of a strike by the lawyers, yet it has its accent
on non-appearance by a counsel in the court.
18. In this context, we may refer to the pronouncement
in P.D. Khandekar v. Bar Council of Maharashtra [P.D.
Khandekar v. Bar Council of Maharashtra, (1984) 2 SCC
556: 1984 SCC (Cri) 335], wherein the Court observed
that : (SCC p. 563, para 9)
‘9. … An advocate stands in a loco parentis towards
the litigants, and it therefore follows that the client
is entitled to receive disinterested, sincere and
honest treatment, especially where the client
approaches the advocate for succour in times of
need.’
19. In S.J. Chaudhary v. State (Delhi Admn.) [S.J.
Chaudhary v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1984) 1 SCC 722: 1984
SCC (Cri) 163], a three-Judge Bench, while dealing with
the role of an advocate in a criminal trial, has observed
as follows : (SCC pp. 723-24, para 3)
“3. We are unable to appreciate the difficulty said to
be experienced by the petitioner. It is stated that his
advocate is finding it difficult to attend court from
day to day. It is the duty of every advocate who
accepts the brief in a criminal case to attend the trial
from day to day. We cannot over-stress the duty of
the advocate to attend to the trial from day to day.
Having accepted the brief, he will be committing a
breach of his professional duty if he so fails to
attend.”
2026:HHC:46973
20.
In Mahabir
Prasad
Singh [Mahabir
Prasad
Singh v. Jacks Aviation (P) Ltd., (1999) 1 SCC 37], the
Bench, emphasising the obligation of a lawyer in his
duty towards the Court and the duty of the Court to the
Bar, has ruled as under : (SCC p. 44, paras 17-18)
‘17. … “A lawyer is under obligation to do nothing
that shall detract from the dignity of the court of
which he is himself a sworn officer and assistant. He
should at all times pay deferential respect to the
Judge, and scrupulously observe the decorum of the
courtroom.” (Warevelle's Legal Ethics, p. 182)
18. Of course, it is not a unilateral affair. There is a
reciprocal duty for the court also to be courteous to the
members of the Bar and to make every endeavour for
maintaining and protecting the respect which members
of the Bar are entitled to have from their clients as well
as from the litigant public. Both the Bench and the Bar
are the two inextricable wings of the judicial forum,
and therefore, the aforesaid mutual respect is sine qua
non for the efficient functioning of the solemn work
carried on in courts of law. But that does not mean that
any advocate or a group of them can boycott the courts
or any particular court and ask the court to desist from
discharging judicial functions. At any rate, no advocate
can ask the court to avoid a case on the ground that he
does not want to appear in that court.’
21. While recapitulating the duties of a lawyer towards
the court and society, being a member of the legal
profession, this Court in O.P. Sharma v. High Court of
P&H [O.P. Sharma v. High Court of P&H, (2011) 6 SCC 86 :
(2011) 3 SCC (Civ) 218 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 821 : (2011) 2
SCC (L&S) 11] has observed that : (SCC p. 92, para 17)
‘17. The role and status of lawyers at the beginning
of sovereign and democratic India is accounted as
extremely vital in deciding that the nation's
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administration was to be governed by the rule of
law.’
The Bench emphasised the role of eminent lawyers in
the framing of the Constitution. The emphasis was also
laid on the concept that lawyers are the officers of the
court in the administration of justice.
22. In R.K. Garg v. State of H.P. [R.K. Garg v. State of H.P.,
(1981) 3 SCC 166: 1981 SCC (Cri) 663], Chandrachud, C.J.,
speaking for the Court pertaining to the relationship
between the Bench and the Bar, opined thus: (SCC p.
170, para 9)
‘9. … the Bar and the Bench are an integral part of
the same mechanism which administers justice to
the people. Many members of the Bench are drawn
from the Bar, and their past association is a source
of inspiration and pride to them. It ought to be a
matter of equal pride to the Bar. It is unquestionably
true that courtesy breeds courtesy, and just as
charity has to begin at home, courtesy must begin
with the Judge. A discourteous Judge is like an illtuned instrument in the setting of a courtroom. But
members of the Bar will do well to remember that
such flagrant violations of professional ethics and
cultured conduct will only result in the ultimate
destruction of a system without which no
democracy can survive.’ ”
9. Today, the judiciary and the justice delivery system are
facing the acute problem of delay, which ultimately affects
the right of the litigant to access to justice and the speedy
trial. Arrears are mounting because of such delay and
dilatory tactics, and asking for repeated adjournments by
which advocates and mechanically and in a routine
manner granted by the courts. It cannot be disputed that
due to the delay in access to justice and not getting timely
justice, it may shake the trust and confidence of the
litigants in the justice delivery system. Many a time, the
2026:HHC:46973
task of adjournments is used to kill justice. Repeated
adjournments break the back of the litigants. The courts
are enjoined to perform their duties with the object of
strengthening the confidence of the common man in the
institution entrusted with the administration of justice.
Any effort that weakens the system and shakes the faith of
the common man in the justice dispensation has to be
discouraged. Therefore, the courts shall not grant
adjournments in a routine manner and mechanically, and
shall not be a party to the cause for delay in dispensing
justice. The courts have to be diligent and take timely
action in order to usher in an efficient justice dispensation
system and maintain faith in the rule of law.
10. We are also aware that whenever the trial courts refuse
to grant unnecessary adjournments, many times they are
accused of being strict, and they may face the displeasure
of the Bar. However, the judicial officers shall not worry
about that if their conscience is clear, and they, as judicial
officers, have to bear in mind his duties to the litigants
who are before the courts and who have come for justice
and for whom the courts are meant, and all efforts shall be
made by the courts to provide timely justice to the
litigants.
9.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Vinod Kumar v. State of Punjab, (2015) 3 SCC 220: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri)
226: (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 712: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 53 that
adjournments in criminal trials have become a malignancy. It
was observed at page 226:
“If one is asked a question, what afflicts the legally
requisite criminal trial in its conceptual eventuality in this
country the two reasons that may earn the status of
phenomenal signification are, first, procrastination of trial
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due to non-availability of witnesses when the trial is in
progress and second, unwarranted adjournments sought
by the counsel conducting the trial and the unfathomable
reasons for acceptation of such prayers for adjournments
by the trial courts, despite a statutory command under
Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC)
and series of pronouncements by this Court. What was a
malady at one time, with the efflux of time, has
metamorphosed into malignancy. What was a mere
disturbance once has become a disorder, a diseased one, at
present.”
10.
It was held in Bablu Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2015) 8
SCC 787: (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 862: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 632 that the
Court must see that neither the defence nor the prosecution takes
unnecessary adjournments. It was observed at page 798:
“22 Keeping in view the concept of a fair trial, the
obligation of the prosecution, the interest of the
community and the duty of the court, it can irrefragably be
stated that the court cannot be a silent spectator or a mute
observer when it presides over a trial. It is the duty of the
court to see that neither the prosecution nor the accused
plays truant with the criminal trial nor corrodes the
sanctity of the proceeding. They cannot expropriate or
hijack the community interest by conducting themselves
in such a manner as a consequence of which the trial
becomes a farcical one. The law does not countenance a
“mock trial”. It is a serious concern for society. Every
member of the collective has an inherent interest in such a
trial. No one can be allowed to create a dent in the same.
The court is duty-bound to see that neither the
prosecution nor the defence takes unnecessary
adjournments and takes the trial under their control. The
court is under the legal obligation to see that the witnesses
who have been cited by the prosecution are produced by it,
or if summons are issued, they are actually served on the
2026:HHC:46973
witnesses. If the court is of the opinion that the material
witnesses have not been examined, it should not allow the
prosecution to close the evidence. There can be no doubt
that the prosecution may not examine all the material
witnesses, but that does not necessarily mean that the
prosecution can choose not to examine any witness and
convey to the court that it does not intend to call the
witnesses. The Public Prosecutor who conducts the trial
has a statutory duty to perform. He cannot afford to take
things in a light manner. The court is also not expected to
accept the version of the prosecution as if it were sacred. It
has to apply its mind on every occasion. Non-application
of mind by the trial court has the potential to lead to the
paralysis of the conception of a fair trial.”
11.
Therefore, no party can be permitted to drag on the
litigation by taking frequent adjournments.
12.
The printout of the case history filed by the petitioner
shows that the case has been dragged for service since
28.02.2024. The petitioner claimed that he could not produce the
evidence because of his medical condition, which is not correct as
noticed above and the learned Trial Court was justified in
refusing to grant the further adjournment in the absence of
sufficient cause for the same.
13.
The present petition has been filed under Section 528
of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023.
The
jurisdiction vested in the Court under Section 528 of BNSS is
extraordinary and is to be exercised to prevent the abuse of the
2026:HHC:46973
process of the Court or to secure the ends of justice. In the
present case, the circumstances do not justify the exercise of
inherent jurisdiction.
14.
No other point was urged.
15.
In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it
is dismissed.
16.
The observations made hereinbefore shall remain
confined to the disposal of the petitions and will have no bearing
whatsoever on the merits of the case.
28th October, 2026
(Nikita)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
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