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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SYAM KUMAR V.M.
TUESDAY, THE 6TH DAY OF AUGUST 2024/15TH SRAVANA, 1946
D.S.R.NO.2 OF 2017
CRIME NO.96/2006 OF KARAMANA POLICE STATION, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 17.05.2016 IN S.C.NO.1121 OF 2008 OF
THE ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE – I, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM ARISING OUT
OF C.P.NO.12/2009 OF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE OF FIRST CLASS-I,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
COMPLAINANT:
STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY THE POLICE ASST. COMMISSIONER,
CRIME DETACHMENT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM CITY.
BY SRI.S.U.NAZAR, SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
RESPONDENTS:
ANILKUMAR @ JACKY
S/O.SIVATHANU PILLAI, ATTUKAL KUNJU VEEDU,
T.C.22/994, BACK SIDE OF ATTUKAL TEMPLE,
ATTUKAL WARD, MANACAUD VILLAGE.
AJITHKUMAR @ AMMAKKORU MAKAN @ SOJU
AGED 44 YEARS, S/O.SIVANANDAN, T.C.57/12,
CHIRAPPALAM, KALADY WARD, MANACAUD VILLAGE.
BY ADV.SRI.P.VIJAYA BHANU (SR.)
BY ADV.SMT.MITHA SUDHINDRAN
BY ADV.SRI.V.C.SARATH
BY ADV.SRI.B.RAMAN PILLAI (SR.)
BY ADV.SRI.R.ANIL
BY ADV.SRI.M.SUNILKUMAR
THIS D.S.R. HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 30.07.2024
ALONG WITH CRL.A.NO.497 OF 2016 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE
COURT ON 06.08.2024 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
Crl.A.Nos.497, 552, 645, 676,
693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
:: 2 ::
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SYAM KUMAR V.M.
TUESDAY, THE 6TH DAY OF AUGUST 2024/15TH SRAVANA, 1946
CRL.A.NO.497 OF 2016
CRIME NO.96/2006 OF KARAMANA POLICE STATION, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 17.05.2016 IN S.C.NO.1121 OF 2008 OF
THE ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE – I, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM ARISING OUT
OF C.P.NO.12/2009 OF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE OF FIRST CLASS-I,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
APPELLANT/ACCUSED NO.1:
ANILKUMAR @ JACKY
AGED 36 YEARS, S/O.SIVATHANU PILLAI, ATTUKAL KUNJU
VEEDU, T.C.NO.22/994, BACK SIDE OF ATTUKAL TEMPLE,
ATTUKAL WARD, MANACAUD VILLAGE.
BY ADV.SRI.P.VIJAYA BHANU (SR.)
BY ADV.SMT.MITHA SUDHINDRAN
BY ADV.SRI.V.C.SARATH
BY ADV.SMT.SRUTHY K K
BY ADV.SRI.P.M.RAFIQ(K/45/2001)
BY ADV.SRI.M.REVIKRISHNAN(K/1268/2004)
BY ADV.SRI.AJEESH K.SASI(K/166/2006)
BY ADV.SMT.SRUTHY N. BHAT(K/000579/2017)
BY ADV.SRI.RAHUL SUNIL(K/000608/2017)
BY ADV.SMT.NIKITA J. MENDEZ(K/2364/2022)
RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT:
STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM.
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
Crl.A.Nos.497, 552, 645, 676,
693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
:: 3 ::
BY SRI.S.U.NAZAR, SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
30.07.2024, ALONG WITH D.S.R.NO.2 OF 2017 AND CONNECTED
CASES, THE COURT ON 06.08.2024 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
Crl.A.Nos.497, 552, 645, 676,
693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
:: 4 ::
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SYAM KUMAR V.M.
TUESDAY, THE 6TH DAY OF AUGUST 2024/15TH SRAVANA, 1946
CRL.A.NO.552 OF 2016
CRIME NO.96/2006 OF KARAMANA POLICE STATION, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 17.05.2016 IN S.C.NO.1121 OF 2008 OF
THE ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE – I, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM ARISING OUT
OF C.P.NO.32 OF 2007 OF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE OF FIRST CLASS-I,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
APPELLANT/7TH ACCUSED:
AJITHKUMAR @ AMMAKKORU MAKAN @ SOJU
AGED 44 YEARS, S/O.SIVANANDAN, TC 57/12,
CHIRAPPALAM, KALADY WARD, MANACAUD VILLAGE,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695 009.
BY ADV.SRI.B.RAMAN PILLAI (SR.)
BY ADV.SRI.R.ANIL
BY ADV.SRI.M.SUNILKUMAR
BY ADV.SRI.SUJESH MENON V.B.
BY ADV.SRI.T.ANIL KUMAR
BY ADV.SRI.THOMAS ABRAHAM (NILACKAPPILLIL)
BY ADV.SRI.THOMAS SABU VADAKEKUT
BY ADV.SRI.MAHESH BHANU S.
BY ADV.SMT.S.LAKSHMI SANKAR
BY ADV.SRI.RESSIL LONAN
RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT:
STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM-682 031.
BY SRI.S.U.NAZAR, SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
30.07.2024, ALONG WITH D.S.R.NO.2 OF 2017 AND CONNECTED
CASES, THE COURT ON 06.08.2024 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
Crl.A.Nos.497, 552, 645, 676,
693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
:: 5 ::
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SYAM KUMAR V.M.
TUESDAY, THE 6TH DAY OF AUGUST 2024/15TH SRAVANA, 1946
CRL.A.NO.645 OF 2016
CRIME NO.96/2006 OF KARAMANA POLICE STATION, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 17.05.2016 IN S.C.NO.1121 OF 2008 OF
THE ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE – I, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM ARISING OUT
OF C.P.NO.12 OF 2009 OF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE OF FIRST CLASS-I,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
APPELLANT/10TH ACCUSED:
C.L. KISHORE
AGED 32 YEARS, S/O.CHANDRASEKHARAN NAIR,
PULLIYIL VEEDU, TC 21/531, NEAR KOTHALAM JUNCTION,
SREEVARAHAM WARD, MUTTATHARA, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM.
BY ADV.SRI.S.RAJEEV
BY ADV.SRI.K.K.DHEERENDRAKRISHNAN
BY ADV.SRI.V.VINAY
BY ADV.SRI.D.FEROZE
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM – 682 031.
BY SRI.S.U.NAZAR, SPL. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
30.07.2024, ALONG WITH D.S.R.NO.2 OF 2017 AND CONNECTED
CASES, THE COURT ON 06.08.2024 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
Crl.A.Nos.497, 552, 645, 676,
693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
:: 6 ::
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SYAM KUMAR V.M.
TUESDAY, THE 6TH DAY OF AUGUST 2024/15TH SRAVANA, 1946
CRL.A.NO.676 OF 2016
CRIME NO.96/2006 OF KARAMANA POLICE STATION, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 17.05.2016 IN S.C.NO.1121 OF 2008 OF
THE ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE – I, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM ARISING OUT
OF C.P.NO.32 OF 2007 OF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE OF FIRST CLASS-I,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
APPELLANT/ACCUSED NO.5:
SURESHKUMAR @ SURA
AGED 48 YEARS, S/O.SIVANANDAN, RESIDE ON RENT
AT THENNIVILAKAM VEEDU, T.C.50/290, ATTUPURAM,
SOUTH KALADY, ATTUKAL WARD, MANACAUD VILLAGE,
FROM ATTUVARAMBU VEEDU, T.C.50/7, CHIRAPPALAM,
ATTUKAL WARD, MANACAUD VILLAGE, NOW RESIDING AT
T.C.21/1359, CHULLAKADAVIL PUTHENVEEDU, NEDUMKADU,
KARAMANA P.O., THIRUVANANTHAPURAM.
BY ADV.SRI.C.P.UDAYABHANU
BY ADV.SRI.NAVANEETH N. NATH
BY ADV.SRI.RASSAL JANARDHANAN A.
BY ADV.SRI.ABHISHEK M. KUNNATHU
BY ADV.SRI.BOBAN PALAT
BY ADV.SRI.P.U.PRATHEESH KUMAR
BY ADV.SRI.P.R.AJAY
BY ADV.SRI.K.U.SWAPNIL
BY ADV.SRI.PRANAV USHAKAR
RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT:
STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM.
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
Crl.A.Nos.497, 552, 645, 676,
693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
:: 7 ::
BY SRI.S.U.NAZAR, SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
30.07.2024 ALONG WITH D.S.R.NO.2 OF 2017 AND CONNECTED
CASES, THE COURT ON 06.08.2024 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
Crl.A.Nos.497, 552, 645, 676,
693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
:: 8 ::
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SYAM KUMAR V.M.
TUESDAY, THE 6TH DAY OF AUGUST 2024/15TH SRAVANA, 1946
CRL.A NO.693 OF 2016
CRIME NO.96/2006 OF KARAMANA POLICE STATION, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 17.05.2016 IN S.C.NO.1121 OF 2008 OF
THE ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE – I, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM ARISING OUT
OF C.P.NO.32 OF 2007 OF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE OF FIRST CLASS-I,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
APPELLANT/2ND ACCUSED:
BINUKUMAR @ PRAVU BINU
S/O.DAMODHARAN, THENGUVILA PUTHEN VEEDU,
T.C.22/980, BACK SIDE OF ATTUKAL TEMPLE,
ATTUKAL WARD, MANACAUD VILLAGE.
BY ADV.SRI.RENJITH B. MARAR
BY ADV.SMT.RESHMI JACOB
BY ADV.SRI.P.S.SYAMKUTTAN
RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT:
STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF POLICE,
CRIME. DETACHMENT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM CITY,
THROUGH THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KERALA,
ERNAKULAM - 682 031.
BY SRI.S.U.NAZAR, SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
30.07.2024 ALONG WITH D.S.R.NO.2 OF 2017 AND CONNECTED
CASES, THE COURT ON 06.08.2024 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
Crl.A.Nos.497, 552, 645, 676,
693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
:: 9 ::
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SYAM KUMAR V.M.
TUESDAY, THE 6TH DAY OF AUGUST 2024/15TH SRAVANA, 1946
CRL.A NO.796 OF 2016
CRIME NO.96/2006 OF KARAMANA POLICE STATION, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 17.05.2016 IN S.C.NO.1121 OF 2008 OF
THE ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE – I, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
APPELLANT/9TH ACCUSED:
BIJU @ BIJUKUTTAN
S/O. PAPPAN @ THANKI, BINDHU BHAVAN, ALATHARAKONAM
HARIJAN COLONY, NEAR POLARAM MARKET, PANGODE WARD,
VILAVOORKAL VILLAGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM.
BY ADV.SRI.G.SUDHEER (KARAKONAM)
RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT:
STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM – 682 031.
BY SRI.S.U.NAZAR, SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
30.07.2024, ALONG WITH D.S.R.NO.2 OF 2017 AND CONNECTED
CASES, THE COURT ON 06.08.2024 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
Crl.A.Nos.497, 552, 645, 676,
693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
:: 10 ::
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SYAM KUMAR V.M.
TUESDAY, THE 6TH DAY OF AUGUST 2024/15TH SRAVANA, 1946
CRL.A.NO.1307 OF 2024
CRIME NO.96/2006 OF KARAMANA POLICE STATION, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 17.05.2016 IN S.C.NO.1121 OF 2008 OF
THE ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE – I, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
APPELLANT(S)/8TH ACCUSED:
SHAJI @ KOCHU SHAJI
AGED 45 YEARS, S/O.THANKAPPAN @ THANKAYYAN,
V.P 3/348, ALANTHARAKONAM HARIJAN COLONY,
VILAVOORKAL DESOM, VILAVOORKAL VILLAGE,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN – 695571
BY ADV.SRI.A.CHANDRA BABU
RESPONDENT(S)/COMPLAINANT:
STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT OF KERALA, PIN – 682031
BY SRI.S.U.NAZAR, SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
30.07.2024 ALONG WITH D.S.R.NO.2 OF 2017 AND CONNECTED
CASES, THE COURT ON 06.08.2024 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
Crl.A.Nos.497, 552, 645, 676,
693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
:: 11 ::
“C.R.”
JUDGMENT
Dr. A.K. Jayasankaran Nambiar, J.
These Criminal Appeals and DSR arise from the judgment of the
Additional Sessions Judge - I, Thiruvananthapuram in Sessions Case
No.1121 of 2008. The trial court found A3 and A12 not guilty of the
charges alleged against them, but found A1, A2, A5, A7, A8, A9 and A10
guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 120B, 143, 147, 148,
449, 323, 302, 294(b), 201, 364 read with Section 149 of the Indian
Penal Code [hereinafter referred to as to 'IPC']. In connection with the
offences punishable under Section 120B read with 302 IPC, A1 and A7
were sentenced to death, whereas A2, A5, A8, A9 and A10 were
sentenced to life imprisonment. Separate sentences of imprisonment and
fine were also imposed on all the above accused for the other offences
they were convicted for.
A4 turned approver, A6 died during the
investigation of the case and A11 absconded.
The Prosecution Case:
2. Angered by the news that Santhosh Kumar @ Jet Santhosh was
having an adulterous relationship with his wife A3 Usha, A5 Suresh
Kumar @ Sura along with A3 Usha and A1 Anilkumar @ Jacky, who was
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
Crl.A.Nos.497, 552, 645, 676,
693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
:: 12 ::
also on inimical terms with Santhosh Kumar, entered into a criminal
conspiracy to murder him. In implementation of the said conspiracy, A5
Suresh Kumar and his brother A6 Anil Kumar @ Motta Ani invited the
deceased to their house on 22.11.2004, using the help of A3 Usha, and he
reached there by around 4 pm.
After a brief conversation, A5 Suresh
Kumar took the deceased in his autorickshaw bearing Registration No.KL
01 T 7795 to the Prince Hair Dressing Salon belonging to PW2
Sudhakaran for a haircut. Thereafter, A5 Suresh Kumar and A6 Anil
Kumar went to Thaliyal and waited near the statue of Smt. Indira Gandhi
for the other conspirators whom A6 Anil Kumar had informed of their
arrival there.
3. On getting the said information, A1 Anilkumar, A2 Binukumar,
A7 Ajithkumar @ Soju, A8 Shaji @ Kochi Shaji, A9 Biju @ Bijukuttan, A10
C.L.Kishore, A11 Shaju and A12 Boby reached Thaliyal in a Tata Sumo
vehicle bearing Registration No.KL 01 AD 6143, arranged by A11 Shaju
and A12 Boby and driven by A4 Nazarudeen. They then formed an
unlawful assembly armed with weapons and proceeded towards the
Prince Hair Dressing Salon and on reaching there, A7 Ajithkumar entered
the salon and on seeing the deceased there, he confirmed the latter’s
presence to the others in the vehicle. Immediately thereafter, all of the
accused except A4 Nazarudeen committed rioting and stormed into the
Salon where the deceased was getting his haircut. After assaulting PW2
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
Crl.A.Nos.497, 552, 645, 676,
693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
:: 13 ::
Sudhakaran the owner of the Salon, they manhandled and forcefully took
the deceased into the vehicle by threatening onlookers with a chopper.
They then kidnapped the deceased and drove away from the place after
pulling away A4 Nazarudeen from the driver seat of the vehicle and
getting A10 Kishore to drive the vehicle as per the directions of A6 Anil
Kumar. A12 Boby rode a motorcycle bearing Registration No.KL 01 AC
4921 in front of the Tata Sumo vehicle and they sped away to
Alantharakkonam Harijan Colony where A8 Shaji and A9 Biju were
staying. On the way to the Colony, the victim was tortured by those in the
vehicle except A4 Nazarudeen and A10 Kishore. He was then pushed out
of the vehicle near the house of A8 Shaji and was again tortured in the
compound. A2 Binukumar also inflicted a severe wound on the victim's
head. When A8 Shaji's mother intervened, the accused pushed the victim
into the car and drove away towards Valiyottukonam cemetery where
they again pushed the victim out of the car and laid him on the ground.
All the accused except A4 Nazarudeen continued to torture the victim
there. Thereafter, A1 Anilkumar obtained a chopper from A7 Ajithkumar,
through A9 Biju, and on A6 Anil Kumar holding the left leg of the
deceased, and A7 Ajithkumar holding his left hand, A1 Anilkumar hacked
the right leg of the deceased above the knee and his right hand above the
elbow joint and gave the severed portions of the leg and hand to A8 Shaji
and A2 Binukumar for disposal. A8 Shaji placed the severed leg on the
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
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693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
pavement
and
A2
:: 14 ::
Binukumar
threw
the
severed
hand
into
the
neighbouring compound.
4. Thereafter, and in furtherance of the conspiracy to destroy the
evidence, A7 Ajithkumar to A9 Biju rushed to the road, stopped an
autorickshaw by threatening its driver PW3 Sajikumar and brought the
autorickshaw to the cemetery where they placed the dead body of the
victim in the autorickshaw and forced PW3 Sajikumar to drive towards
the General Hospital. A7 Ajithkumar to A9 Biju who had boarded the
autorickshaw along with PW3 Sajikumar, got out of the vehicle en route
after directing PW3 Sajikumar to take the corpse to the General Hospital.
The investigation:
5.
The investigation in this case began with the recording of
Ext.P2 FI Statement given by PW2 Sudhakaran, who was the owner of
the Salon from where the deceased was kidnapped, and based on the said
FI Statement, Ext.P53 FIR was prepared by PW34 Sri. A.Jalaludeen, the
then ASI of Fort Police Station, @ 1900 hrs on 22.11.2004. Crime
No.686/2004 of Fort Police Station was accordingly registered under
Sections 143, 147, 451, 323, 341 and 365 read with Section 149 IPC.
Later that evening, however, PW34 Jalaludeen came across information
regarding the discovery of a corpse at Valiyottukonam within the
territorial limits of the Malayinkeezh Police Station. He therefore
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
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693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
proceeded
to
the
:: 15 ::
Mortuary
of
the
Medical
College
Hospital,
Thiruvananthapuram, along with PW2 Sudhakaran, on 23.11.2004, where
PW2 Sudhakaran identified the corpse as being that of the man who had
come to his salon for the haircut the previous day.
PW34 Jalaludeen
thereupon filed Ext.P56 report before the Judicial First Class Magistrate I on 23.11.2004, altering the charges in Ext.P53 FIR from Sections 451
and 365 IPC to Sections 449 and 364 IPC.
6.
In the meanwhile, PW38 Sri. Jnanadas, the then SI of
Malayinkeezh Police Station, had recorded Ext.P7 FI Statement of PW3
Sajikumar, who was the driver of the autorickshaw in which the body of
the deceased was found, and based on the said statement Ext.P59 FIR
was prepared and Crime No.524/2004 of Malayinkeezh Police Station
registered under Sections 302, 341, 506 (ii) and 294 (b) read with
Section 34 IPC. The case was then clubbed with Crime No.686/2004 of
Fort Police Station, on 26.11.2004, and the investigation was carried on
by PW45 Sri. T.F.Xavier, the then CI of Police, Fort Police Station.
7.
In 2006, consequent to the establishment of the Karamana
Police Station, the place of occurrence of the crime fell within the
territorial limits of the Karamana Police Station. PW44 K.E.Baiju, the CI
of Police, Thampanoor was then instructed by the Commissioner of Police,
Thiruvananthapuram City to issue directions to the SHO, Karamana to
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
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:: 16 ::
re-register the case as one of the Karamana Police Station. Accordingly,
Ext.P54 FIR came to be prepared by PW42 K.Saseendran Nair, the then
SI of Police, Karamana Police Station, who re-registered the case as
Crime No.96/2006 under Sections 120B, 143, 147, 148, 449, 323, 506
(ii), 364, 302, 294 (b), 201 read with Section 149 IPC. The investigation
was thereafter taken up by PW49 M.Sekharan, the then ACP, Crime
Detachment, Thiruvananthapuram City, who filed the final report before
the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court - I, Thiruvananthapuram.
During the investigation of the case, the ranks of the accused were
re-arranged
consequent
to
the
death
of
A6
Anil
Kumar
during
investigation, A4 Nazarudeen having turned into an approver under
Section 306 Cr.PC, and Jayan and Prasanth having been deleted from the
array of the accused.
Proceedings before the Trial Court:
8. The case was committed by the Judicial First Class Magistrate
Court - I to the Court of Sessions, Thiruvananthapuram under Section
209 Cr.PC after complying with the provisions of Section 207 Cr.PC. On
receipt of the records, the case was numbered as S.C.No.1121/2008
before the Principal Court of Sessions, Thiruvananthapuram and made
over to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge - I, Thiruvananthapuram
for trial and disposal.
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
Crl.A.Nos.497, 552, 645, 676,
693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
:: 17 ::
9. On appearance of the accused before it, the charges were read
over to them by the trial court. The accused pleaded not guilty and
therefore proceeded to trial. On the side of prosecution, PW1 to PW49
were examined and Exts.P1 to P112 were marked. MO1 to MO18 were
identified. No witnesses were cited, or any document marked, on behalf
of the defence. At the conclusion of the trial, the parties were heard
through their counsel, including on the aspect of sentencing, and the
impugned judgment was passed by the trial court. The conviction and
sentence imposed on the various accused, in the impugned judgment,
reads as follows:
Accused No.1 is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life
and to pay a fine of ₹ 1,00,000 (Rupees one lakh only) in default to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for 2 years for the offence punishable
under Section 120(B) I.P.C. He is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment
for 6 months for the offence punishable under Section 143 read with
Section 149 of I.P.C. He is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 3
years and to pay a fine of ₹ 50,000 (Rupees fifty thousand only) in
default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 6 months for the
offence punishable under Section 148 read with Section 149 of I.P.C.
He is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 5 years and to pay a
fine of ₹ 50,000 (Rupees fifty thousand only) in default to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for one year for the offence punishable under
Section 449 read with Section 149 of I.P.C.
He is sentenced to
rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of ₹ 1,00,000
(Rupees one lakh only) in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment
for one year for the offence punishable under Section 364 read with
Section 149 of IPC. He is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one
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year for the offence punishable under Section 323 read with Section
149 of I.P.C. He is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one year
for the offence punishable under Section 506(ii) read with Section
149 of I.P.C.
For the offence punishable under Section 302/120(B)
read with Section 149 of I.P.C., I sentence A-1 Anilkumar to be hanged
by neck till he is dead. He is also sentenced to pay a fine of ₹ 2,00,000
(Rupees two lakhs only), in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment
for 5 years.
Accused No.2 is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life
and to pay a fine of ₹ 1,00,000 (Rupees one lakh only) in default to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for 2 years for the offence punishable
under Section 120(B) I.P.C. He is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment
for 6 months for the offence punishable under Section 143 read with
Section 149 of I.P.C. He is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for
one year and to pay a fine of ₹ 25,000 (Rupees twenty five thousand
only) in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3 months for
the offence punishable under Section 147 read with Section 149 of
IPC. He is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 5 years and to pay
a fine of ₹ 50,000 (Rupees fifty thousand only) in default to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for one year for the offence punishable under
Section 449 read with Section 149 of I.P.C. He is sentenced to
rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of ₹ 1,00,000
(Rupees one lakh only) in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment
for one year for the offence punishable under Section 364 read with
Section 149 of I.P.C. He is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one
year for the offence punishable under Section 323 read with Section
149 of I.P.C. He is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one year
for the offence punishable under Section 506(ii) read with Section
149 of I.P.C.
For the offence punishable under Section 302/120(B)
read with Section 149 of I.P.C., he is sentenced to rigorous
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imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of ₹ 2,00,000 (Rupees two
lakhs only), in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 5 years.
Accused No.5 is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life
and to pay a fine of ₹ 1,00,000 (Rupees one lakh only) in default to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for 2 years for the offence punishable
under Section 120(B) I.P.C. He is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment
for 6 months for the offence punishable under Section 143 read with
Section 149 of I.P.C. He is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for
one year and to pay a fine of ₹ 25,000 (Rupees twenty five thousand
only) in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3 months for
the offence punishable under Section 147 read with Section 149 of
I.P.C. He is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 5 years and to
pay a fine of ₹ 50,000 (Rupees fifty thousand only) in default to
undergo
rigorous imprisonment for
one year
for the offence
punishable under Section 449 read with Section 149 I.P.C.
He is
sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of
₹ 1,00,000 (Rupees one lakh only) in default to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for one year for the offence punishable under Section
364 read with Section 149 of I.P.C.
He is sentenced to rigorous
imprisonment for one year for the offence punishable under Section
323 read with Section 149 of I.P.C.
He is sentenced to rigorous
imprisonment for one year for the offence punishable under Section
506(ii) read with Section 149 of IP.C.
For the offence punishable
under Section 302/120(B) read with Section 149 of I.P.C., he is
sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of
₹ 2,00,000 (Rupees two lakhs only), in default to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for 5 years.
Accused No.7 is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life
and to pay a fine of ₹ 1,00,000 (Rupees one lakh only) in default to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for 2 years for the offence punishable
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under Section 120(B) I.P.C. He is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment
for 6 months for the offence punishable under Section 143 read with
Section 149 of I.P.C. He is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 3
years and to pay a fine of ₹ 50,000 (Rupees fifty thousand only) in
default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 6 months for the
offence punishable under Section 148 read with Section 149 of I.P.C.
He is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 5 years and to pay a
fine of ₹ 50,000 (Rupees fifty thousand only) in default to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for one year for the offence punishable under
Section 449 read with Section 149 of I.P.C.
He is sentenced to
rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of ₹ 1,00,000
(Rupees one lakh only) in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment
for one year for the offence punishable under Section 364 read with
Section 149 of I.P.C. He is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for
one year for the offence punishable under Section 323 read with
Section 149 of I.P.C. He is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for
one year for the offence punishable under Section 506(ii) read with
Section 149 of I.P.C.
For the offence punishable under Section
302/120(B) read with Section 149 of I.P.C I sentence A-7 Ajithkumar
@ Soju to be hanged by neck till he is dead. He is also sentenced to
pay a fine of ₹ 2,00,000 (Rupees two lakhs only), in default to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for 5 years.
Accused No.8 is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life
and to a fine of ₹ 1,00,000 (Rupees one lakh only) in default to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for 2 years for the offence punishable
under Section 120(B) I.P.C. He is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment
for 6 months for the offence punishable under Section 143 read with
Section 149 of I.P.C. He is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for
one year and to pay a fine of ₹ 25,000 (Rupees twenty five thousand
only) in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3 months for
the offence punishable under Section 147 read with Section 149 of
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I.P.C. He is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 5 years and to
pay a fine of ₹ 50,000 (Rupees fifty thousand only) in default to
undergo
rigorous imprisonment for
one year
for the offence
punishable under Section 449 read with Section 149 of I.P.C. He is
sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of
₹ 1,00,000 (Rupees one lakh only) in default to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for one year for the offence punishable under Section
364 read with Section 149 of I.P.C.
He is sentenced to rigorous
imprisonment for one year for the offence punishable under Section
323 read with Section 149 of I.P.C. He is sentenced to rigorous
imprisonment for one year for the offence punishable under Section
506(ii) read with Section 149 of I.P.C.
For the offence punishable
under Section 302/120(B) read with Section 149 of I.P.C., he is
sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of
₹ 2,00,000 (Rupees two lakhs only), in default to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for 5 years.
Accused No.9 is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life
and to pay a fine of ₹ 1,00,000 (Rupees one lakh only) in default to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for 2 years for the offence punishable
under Section 120(B) I.P.C. He is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment
for 6 months for the offence punishable under Section 143 read with
Section 149 of I.P.C. He is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for
one year and to pay a fine of ₹ 25,000 (Rupees twenty five thousand
only) in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3 months for
the offence punishable under Section 147 read with Section 149 of
I.P.C. He is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 5 years and to
pay a fine of ₹ 50,000 (Rupees fifty thousand only) in default to
undergo
rigorous imprisonment for
one year
for the offence
punishable under Section 449 read with Section 149 of I.P.C. He is
sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of
₹ 1,00,000 (Rupees one lakh only) in default to undergo rigorous
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imprisonment for one year for the offence punishable under Section
364 read with Section 149 of I.P.C. He is sentenced to rigorous
imprisonment for one year for the offence punishable under Section
323 read with Section 149 of I.P.C.
He is sentenced to rigorous
imprisonment for one year for the offence punishable under Section
506(ii) read with Section 149 of I.P.C.
For the offence punishable
under Section 302/120(B) read with Section 149 of I.P.C., he is
sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of
₹ 2,00,000 (Rupees two lakhs only), in default to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for 5 years.
Accused No.10 is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life
and to pay a fine of ₹ 1,00,000 (Rupees one lakh only) in default to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for 2 years for the offence punishable
under Section 120(B) I.P.C. He is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment
for 6 months for the offence punishable under Section 143 read with
Section 149 of I.P.C. He is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for
one year and to pay a fine of ₹ 25,000 (Rupees twenty five thousand
only) in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3 months for
the offence punishable under Section 147 read with Section 149 of
I.P.C. He is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 5 years and to
pay a fine of ₹ 50,000 (Rupees fifty thousand only) in default to
undergo
rigorous imprisonment for
one year
for the offence
punishable under Section 449 read with Section 149 of I.P.C. He is
sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of
₹ 1,00,000 (Rupees one lakh only) in default to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for one year for the offence punishable under Section
364 read with Section 149 of I.P.C.
He is sentenced to rigorous
imprisonment for one year for the offence punishable under Section
323 read with Section 149 of I.P.C.
He is sentenced to rigorous
imprisonment for one year for the offence punishable under Section
506(ii) read with Section 149 of I.P.C.
For the offence punishable
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under Section 302/120(B) read with Section 149 of I.P.C., he is
sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of
₹ 2,00,000 (Rupees two lakhs only), in default to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for 5 years.
Out of the fine amount if realised or
remitted, a sum of ₹ 10,00,000 (Rupees ten lakhs only) will be paid to
P.W.21, Smt. Yasodha, the mother of the deceased.
All the material objects will be retained for trial in the case
pending against the co-indictee No.11.
The substantive sentence of imprisonment imposed on all the
accused shall run concurrently.
The trial court also referred the death sentence imposed on A1 and
A7 to this court for its approval.
The arguments before us:
10.
We have heard the learned Senior Counsel Sri. B.Raman
Pillai, Sri. P. Vijayabhanu, and Advocates Sri.C.P.Udayabhanu, Sri.Ranjith
Marar, Sri.S.Rajeev, Sri.G.Sudheer and Sri.A.Chandra Babu for the
appellants - accused before us and Sri. S.U.Nazar, the learned Special
Public Prosecutor on behalf of the State. The contentions put forward by
the learned counsel for the appellants - accused, briefly stated are as
follows:
● While it is settled law that the evidence of an approver can be the
basis of a conviction subject to it satisfying the double test of
reliability and corroboration in material particulars, the evidence
of PW1 Nazarudeen is wholly unreliable since it is riddled with
inconsistencies
and
contradictions.
A
comparison
of
Ext.P1
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statement given by him before PW41 Magistrate and his deposition
in court as PW1 would clearly reveal the inconsistencies with
regard to the persons who hacked and severed the limbs of the
deceased as also the persons who were present in the vehicle that
was allegedly used to transport the accused and the deceased to
the place of occurrence.
PW1’s deposition in cross-examination
also suggests that he was coached, coerced and tortured by the
Police into turning an approver. The decisions in R v. Baskerville –
[(1916) 2 KB 658]; Bhuboni Sahu v. The King – [AIR 1949 PC
257]; Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan – [1952 KHC 299];
Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab – [1957 KHC
403];
Jnanendra Nath Ghose v. State of West Bengal – [1959 KHC
603]; Major E. G. Barsay v. State of Bombay & Anr – [1961
KHC 766]; Haroom Haji Abdulla v. State of Maharashtra –
[1968 KHC 617]; Sheshanna Bhumanna Yadav v. State of
Maharashtra – [(1970) 2 SCC 122]; Balwant Kaur v. Union
Territory
of
Chandigarh
–
[(1988)
SCC
1];
M.O.
Shamsudhin v. Sate of Kerala – [(1995) 3 SCC 351]; Narayan
Chetanram Chaudhary & Anr v. State of Maharashtra –
[(2000) 8 SCC 457]; K. Hashim v. State of Tamil Nadu –
[(2005) 1 SCC 237] and Somasundaram @ Somu v. State
Represented by the Deputy Commissioner of Police – [(2020) 7
SCC 722] are relied upon in support of the above submissions.
● Other than the uncorroborated testimony of PW1 Nazarudeen,
there is no other reliable oral testimony to support the prosecution
case as almost all the eye witnesses that they had obtained
statements from, turned hostile to their case before the trial court.
The citing of contradictions, after obtaining the permission of the
trial court to put questions as in cross-examination to the said
witnesses, was only with a view to establish the lack of credibility
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of the said witnesses. The prosecution cannot therefore rely on the
previous statements of the said witnesses as substantial evidence
to prove their case against the appellants - accused. While PW2
Sudhakaran and PW3 Sajikumar deposed along the lines of the
prosecution case to some extent, they were declared hostile to the
case of the prosecution when they failed to identify the assailants
in court. The other witnesses viz. PW8 Damodharan, PW12
Dasamma, PW13 Nelson, PW14 Madhavankutty, PW15 Sasidharan
Nair, PW16 Ramachandran and PW33 Biju are totally hostile to the
prosecution case.
● The reliance placed by the prosecution on Exts.P33, P57 and P58
FSL reports is wholly misplaced as the said reports are wholly
unreliable. While in Ext.P33 report it is stated that a tuft of cut
black hair found from the Hair Salon is similar to that of the scalp
hair taken from the deceased, there is nothing to suggest that the
tuft of hair taken from the Salon was actually that of the deceased
especially when it is nobody’s case that there were no other
customers who had visited the Salon that day. Further, the FSL
report only states that the hair samples were similar and not
identical. Reliance is placed on the decisions in Fr. George
Cherian v. State of Kerala – [1989 KHC 663]; Shahbuddin v.
The State (NCT of Delhi) – [ILR (2001) II Delhi 845];
Muhammed Yousuf @ Sajid and Anr v. State of Kerala –
[2022 KHC Online 136]; Biju Kumar v. State of Kerala –
[2022 (1) KHC 463].
● In Ext.P57 FSL report it is stated that the blood stains detected
from the personal wear of the deceased showed his blood group to
be 'A'. The blood stains alleged recovered from the Tata Sumo Car
was also seen to be of group 'A'. The prosecution uses this to prove
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the presence of the deceased in the Tata Sumo car on the date of
occurrence of the murder. The said findings cannot, however,
support the prosecution case since there is inconsistency in the
evidence of PW1 Nazarudeen as regards the time and place of his
arrest and the recovery of the car. While PW1 Nazarudeen states
that the car was seized on 08.12.2004 from Pampa (Sabarimala),
according to the prosecution the car was seized as per Ext.P48
Mahazar on 11.12.2004 based on the disclosure statement of PW1
Nazarudeen under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Further, the
prosecution case at one stage was that PW1 Nazarudeen and
Prasanth had cleaned the car and they were investigated for the
offence under Section 201 IPC, although for reasons that are not
entirely clear, Prasanth was later dropped from the list of accused.
If as a matter of fact the car was seized only on 11.12.2004, then
the possibility of the blood belonging to someone else who had
been in the car between 22.11.2004 and 11.12.2004 when the car
was plying as a hired vehicle cannot be ruled out. There is also
unexplained delay in producing the seized vehicles and other
material objects before the court thereby enhancing the possibility
of a tampering with the seized objects.
● While there is an absolute lack of evidence to support the charge of
conspiracy against any of the appellants-accused, the instant is a
clear case of defective and shoddy investigation. The properties
were not properly seized, there was inordinate delay in producing
the seized material before the court and thereafter in forwarding it
to the FSL. There was no attempt to obtain the call data records of
the mobile phones used by the accused persons or the deceased.
There is also no explanation as to why persons like Prasanth and
Jayan were dropped from the list of accused during the course of
the investigation, while others like PW1 Nazarudeen whose alleged
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complicity in the offence was similar in nature, were retained in
the list of accused.
11.
Per Contra, the submissions of Sri. S.U.Nazar, the learned
Special Public Prosecutor, briefly stated is as under:
● The basis of a tender of pardon to an accused person is not the
extent of his culpability in the offence but it is with a view to
preventing the escape of the other offenders from punishment in
heinous offences for lack of evidence. There can therefore be no
objection to the grant of pardon to an accomplice simply because
in his confession he does not implicate himself to the same extent
as the other accused. All that Section 306 requires is that pardon
may be tendered to any person believed to be involved directly or
indirectly in or privy to an offence. Reliance is placed on the
decision in Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar – [1995
KHC 556].
● A4 Nazarudeen was made an approver as per order dated
05.07.2006 of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Thiruvananthapuram
who had examined him as envisaged under Section 306(4)(a) of the
Cr.PC. His deposition in court with regard to inflicting injury on the
deceased using MO2 chopper is corroborated by his identification
of MO2 chopper in court. The said chopper was recovered in terms
of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, based on the disclosure
statement of A7 Ajithkumar. The blood stains detected on the
chopper were found to be of human origin by PW35 Joint Director
of the FSL, as certified in Ext.P58 report. Similarly, the blood stains
found in the Tata Sumo car were also found to be of the same blood
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group – A – as that of the deceased person. PW3 Sajikumar, the
autorickshaw driver who gave Ext.P7 FI Statement at the
Malayinkeezh Police Station also deposed that certain persons had
put the body of the deceased person in his autorickshaw and forced
him to drive the vehicle towards the Medical College hospital.
Together
with
the
identification
of
the
deceased
by
PW2
Sudhakaran, as the same person who had come to his Salon the
previous day, the above proved facts corroborate the evidence
given by PW1 Nazarudeen as regards the commission of the
offences of kidnapping and murder of the deceased by the
appellants-accused.
Discussion and Findings:
12. On a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case,
the evidence on record, the judgment of the trial court and the
submissions
made
on
behalf
of
the
appellants-accused
and
the
prosecution, we find that the entire case of the prosecution hinges on the
evidence of the approver PW1 Nazarudeen. This is because almost all the
witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution to prove the material
aspects of their case, turned hostile to the case of the prosecution. Save
for the recovery of MO2 Chopper, based on the disclosure statement of
A7 Ajithkumar, to the extent admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence
Act, and Medical/Forensic evidence that points to the said chopper as the
weapon that could have caused the death of the deceased, there is not
much in the form of material evidence to connect the various accused
with the offences with which they stand charged and convicted.
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13. PW1 Nazarudeen was initially arrayed as an accused (A4) by
the then investigating officer PW45 T.F. Xavier, who suspected his
complicity in the matter by taking note of his role as the driver of the Tata
Sumo vehicle that had allegedly been hired by the other accused to
commit the gruesome offences. However, Ext.P111 report submitted by
the later investigating officer before the JFMC I court, clearly suggests
that the investigation team did not make much headway in terms of
gathering any material or forensic evidence in the initial stages of
investigation, and they were quite content with the statements obtained
from various witnesses, many of whom claimed to be eye witnesses to
different aspects of the crime that was alleged to have been committed by
the appellants/accused. In 2016, when PW49 M. Sekharan came to be
entrusted with the investigation, he was sceptical about the sufficiency of
the evidence collected till then, and of the available witnesses endorsing
what had been recorded as their previous statements, and chose to
approach the court with Ext.P111 report, seeking to turn A4 Nazarudeen
into an approver by recommending him for the tender of pardon under
Section 306 of the Cr.PC, prior to the committal of the case to the
Sessions Court.
14. It is trite that a pardon is granted under Section 306 of the
Cr.PC with a view to obtaining the evidence of any person concerned in or
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privy to the offence, on condition that he makes a full and true disclosure
of what he knows relative to the offence, before the court at the time of
trial. The object behind the grant of pardon to one of the accused is to
obtain such evidence through him that would prevent the escape from
punishment, of the other offenders in a grave offence, for lack of
evidence. Accordingly, the evidence of an approver follows the tender of
pardon to him on condition that he makes a full and true disclosure, and
the pardon once granted would operate in respect of all offences
pertaining to that transaction. Once the approver has accepted a tender
of pardon, he stands on the same footing as any other witness, with the
exception that he is liable to forfeit his pardon if he does not comply with
the conditions on which the tender was made.
15. The law relating to the manner of appreciation of the evidence
tendered by an approver is also well settled. It recognises that an
approver is very often an accomplice ie. a person who participates in the
commission of the actual crime charged against an accused. He is a
participes criminis. When he agrees to be an approver, and to testify
against an accused, he becomes a prosecution witness. The evidence of
an accomplice therefore requires to be accepted with a great deal of
caution and scrutiny because (i) he has a motive to shift guilt from
himself (ii) he is an immoral person likely to commit perjury on occasion;
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and (iii) he hopes for pardon or has secured it, and so favours the
prosecution [Lal Chand v. State of Haryana – [(1984) 1 SCC 686]].
16.
Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act states that an
accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person and a
conviction
is
not
illegal
merely
because
it
proceeds
upon
the
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Section 114 of the Evidence
Act states that a court may presume the existence of such facts as it
thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course
of natural events, human conduct, and public and private business in
their relation to the facts of the particular case. By way of illustration (b),
it is clarified that the court may presume that an accomplice is unworthy
of credit unless he is corroborated in material particulars. Reading
Section 133 and Illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act
together, the courts in India have held that while it is not illegal to act
upon the uncorroborated testimony of the accomplice, the rule of
prudence so universally followed as to amount to a rule of law, is that it is
unsafe to act on the evidence of an accomplice unless it is corroborated
in material aspects, so as to implicate the accused. [Rameswar v. State
of Rajasthan – [AIR 1952 SC 54]; Dagdu v. State of Maharashtra –
[(1977) 3 SCC 68]; D.Velayudham v. State - [AIR 2015 SC 2506]].
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17. Thus, an approver's evidence has to satisfy the double test ie.
(i) his evidence must be reliable and (ii) his evidence should be
sufficiently corroborated. If the first test of reliability is not satisfied,
there is no necessity to look for a satisfaction of the second test. As
observed by the Court in Rampal Pithwa Rahidas & Ors v. State of
Maharashtra – [(1994) Supp. 2 SCC 73], it is only when the
approver's evidence is considered otherwise acceptable that the court
applies its mind to the rule that his testimony requires corroboration in
material particulars, connecting or tending to connect each of the
accused to the crime charged. This, however, is as a matter of prudence.
[Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab – [AIR 1957 SC 637]; Jnanendra
Nath Ghose v. State of West Bengal – [AIR 1959 SC 1199]].
18. On the aspect of corroboration, firstly, the court has to satisfy
itself that the statement of the approver is credible in itself and there is
evidence other than the statement of the approver that the approver
himself had taken part in the crime. For this, the court must consider the
question as to how the approver came to be arrested, how he became a
participant in the crime, the role played by him in the crime and the
circumstances in which he decided to become an approver. Secondly, the
court has to seek corroboration of the approver's evidence with respect to
the part of other accused persons in the crime, and this evidence has to
be of such a nature as to connect the other accused with the crime. The
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
Crl.A.Nos.497, 552, 645, 676,
693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
:: 33 ::
corroboration should be sufficient to afford some sort of independent
evidence to show that the approver is speaking the truth with regard to
the accused person whom he seeks to implicate. [Rameshwar v. State
of Rajasthan - [AIR 1952 SC 54]; Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab –
[AIR 1957 SC 637]; Ranjeet Singh and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan –
[(1988) 1 SCC 633]].
19. To paraphrase Justice Vivian Bose in Rameshwar (supra), the
nature and extent of corroboration required of an approver's statement
has to be determined by the following principles viz. (i) it is not necessary
that there should be independent confirmation of every material
circumstance in the sense that the independent evidence in the case,
apart from the testimony of the complainant or the accomplice, should in
itself be sufficient to sustain conviction; all that is required is that there
must be some additional evidence rendering it probable that the story of
the accomplice is true and that it is reasonably safe to act upon it (ii) that
independent evidence must not only make it safe to believe that the crime
was committed, but must in some way reasonably connect or tend to
connect the accused, with it by confirming in some material particular
the testimony of the accomplice or complainant that the accused
committed the crime (iii) that the corroboration must come from
independent sources and thus ordinarily the testimony of one accomplice
would not be sufficient to corroborate that of another and (iv) that the
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
Crl.A.Nos.497, 552, 645, 676,
693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
:: 34 ::
corroboration need not be direct evidence that the accused committed
the crime - it is sufficient if it is merely circumstantial evidence of his
connection with the crime.
20.
In these appeals, we are essentially required to examine
whether the evidence of PW1 Nazarudeen satisfies the double test
required for acceptance of his evidence as the basis for sustaining the
conviction and sentence imposed on the appellants-accused by the trial
court. For the reasons that are to follow, we do not think so.
21.
As already noticed above, the double test for acceptance of
the testimony of an approver requires the court to first examine whether
the testimony is reliable in itself ie. without any corroboration in material
particulars. For this, as noticed in Rampal Pithwa (supra), the court
must consider the question as to how the approver came to be arrested,
how he became a participant in the crime, the role played by him in the
crime and the circumstances in which he decided to become an approver.
For ascertaining the answers to the above questions, we need look no
further than to Ext.P111 report of PW49 M.Sekharan, the then ACP,
Crime Detachment, Thiruvananthapuram City, that was filed before the
Chief
Judicial
Magistrate's
Court,
Thiruvananthapuram
while
recommending the grant of pardon to the approver under Section 306 of
the Cr.PC. A perusal of the report clearly brings out the following facts:
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
Crl.A.Nos.497, 552, 645, 676,
693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
:: 35 ::
Firstly, that according to the prosecution, PW1 Nazarudeen was arrested
at 11 pm on 10.12.2004 from his house, as stated in Ext.P75 arrest
memo. This is as against the deposition of PW1 Nazarudeen in court, that
he was brought from Pampa (Sabarimala) directly to the Fort Police
Station on 09.12.2004 and was produced before the Magistrate on
11.12.2004.
Secondly, the role played by PW1 Nazarudeen in the crime was allegedly
that of an accomplice in that, according to the prosecution, he had driven
the Tata Sumo vehicle that carried the accused persons and the deceased
to the Valiyottukonam cemetery and therefore was privy to the incidents
that took place near the Salon, the Alanthara colony and thereafter at the
cemetery. It is also evident that he was involved along with Prasanth in
washing the blood stains off the Tata Sumo vehicle before the vehicle was
seized. Yet, the investigating officer chose to exclude Prasanth and one
Jayan, whose name was also mentioned by PW1 Nazarudeen as a person
who was in the vehicle at the time, from the list of accused in the case;
Thirdly, that it was on account of a mere hunch entertained by PW49 M.
Sekharan, that the witnesses, including eye-witnesses, cited by the
prosecution would not endorse their previous statements and would turn
hostile to the case of the prosecution at the trial, that the decision was
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
Crl.A.Nos.497, 552, 645, 676,
693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
:: 36 ::
taken to tender pardon to PW1 Nazarudeen and turn him into an
approver.
22. Many aspects that led to the grant of pardon to the approver in
the instant case trouble our conscience. Firstly, we do not think it was
proper for the Chief Judicial Magistrate to have granted pardon to the
approver PW1 Nazarudeen based on nothing more than an apprehension
of the investigating officer that prosecution witnesses might turn hostile
to the prosecution case at the time of trial. While we do not want to
speculate as to why/how the prosecution would/could anticipate a hostile
attitude from their witnesses, we also feel that the public interest served
through an effective prosecution of a person accused of committing a
crime cannot be sacrificed by granting him a pardon merely on the basis
of unjustified apprehensions harboured by an investigating officer. We
also find from his evidence during trial that it might have been the threat
and coercion exerted by the investigating agencies that forced PW1
Nazarudeen to turn into an approver. Secondly, the pardon was granted
to the approver [PW1] after nearly 18 months since the start of the
investigation in 2004, and the statement given by PW1 Nazarudeen
before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court - I under Section 306 (4)
(a) of the Cr.PC, is almost exculpatory in nature. No doubt it is trite, as
held in Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar – [(1995) Supp. 1
SCC 80] that there can be no objection against the tender of pardon to
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
Crl.A.Nos.497, 552, 645, 676,
693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
:: 37 ::
an accomplice simply because in his confession he does not implicate
himself to the same extent as the other accused. However, as pointed out
in Rampal Pithwa (supra), a statement of an approver that is almost
exculpatory in nature can render his evidence unreliable.
This is
especially so when we consider the inconsistencies in the evidence of
PW1 Nazarudeen in court which are many, as
discussed hereinafter.
Thirdly, we also find that the statements recorded from the approver,
prior to his being granted pardon and becoming an approver, were not
placed before the court along with the final report laid by the
Investigating officer and, consequently not furnished to the other accused
before commencement of the trial. Once an accused has turned approver,
he becomes a prosecution witness and copies of statements obtained
from him while he was arrayed as an accused, have to be given to the
other accused as contemplated under Section 207 of the Cr.PC. This
salutary requirement flows from the need to ensure that no prejudice is
caused to the other accused in the trial that follows, where they can test
the evidence tendered by the approver, for any contradictions or
improvements from
the previous statements given by him before the
investigating officer.
23. We now proceed to highlight the inconsistencies noticed in the
testimony of PW1 Nazarudeen. At the outset, we find that while he
portrayed himself as as an accomplice who could testify against the other
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
Crl.A.Nos.497, 552, 645, 676,
693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
:: 38 ::
accused as regards the commission of the crimes alleged against each of
them, his efforts while giving the statement under Section 306 (4)(a) as
also while deposing at the trial as PW1, have been largely to portray
himself as a person who was forced to drive the Tata Sumo vehicle under
the directions of the other accused and who had no active role to play in
the sequence of events that led to the commission of the crimes. He is
therefore not able to give accurate details of even material aspects of the
crime such as the identity of the accused who committed it. For instance,
while he deposed to having seen A1 Anilkumar sever the hands and limbs
of the deceased, during cross-examination by A7 Ajithkumar, he stated
that he came to know about the severing of the limbs only from the
newspaper. He was also not able to state material aspects of the crime
such as, to whom the severed limbs of the deceased were handed over;
Likewise, while in Ext.P1 statement, he states that he did not mention
about the incident to anyone, in Ext.P48 seizure mahazar it is recorded
that he disclosed the details of the crime to Prasanth.
24. Even if we were to accept the evidence of PW1 Nazarudeen as
sufficient to show that the crime in question was in fact committed, there
is nothing in the form of corroborative evidence thereto that would point
to any of the appellants-accused as the persons who committed the crime.
As observed in Rameshwar (supra) there must exist independent
evidence that not only makes it safe to believe that the crime was
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
Crl.A.Nos.497, 552, 645, 676,
693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
:: 39 ::
committed, but which must in some way reasonably connect or tend to
connect the accused, with it by confirming in some material particular
the testimony of the accomplice or complainant that the accused
committed the crime. In the instant case, Exts.P33, P57 and P58 FSL
reports on which reliance is placed by the prosecution, do not help
connect the appellants-accused with the kidnapping or the murder of the
deceased person. In Ext.P33 report, the hair sample taken from the Salon
is found to be merely similar to that taken from the scalp of the deceased.
While the similarity in hair samples will not suffice to establish the
presence of the deceased at the Salon on 22.11.2004, it is also not
established by the prosecution that the deceased was the only customer
at the Salon on that date, so as to exclude the possibility of the hair
sample collected therefrom belonging to someone else. Similarly, in
Ext.P57 report, the blood stains on MO2 chopper are found merely to be
of human origin. A DNA test that could have pointed to the blood therein
being that of the deceased, was never done. The discovery of the chopper
and its seizure itself is contested for in Ext.P45 mahazar, PW25 is cited as
a witness and on examination he deposed to not having seen the actual
seizure of the chopper but to having merely signed on a prepared
mahazar. PW46 Rajan who is the scribe of the same mahazar deposed
that the place of concealment of the chopper is not mentioned in the
mahazar and that it is not recorded therein that it was as led and shown
by A7 Ajithkumar that the chopper was discovered. While under ordinary
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
Crl.A.Nos.497, 552, 645, 676,
693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
:: 40 ::
circumstances, we would not have taken serious note of the contention
that the seizure witnesses do not support the version of the prosecution,
in the light of the fact that the prosecution has virtually admitted to there
being no reliable evidence other than the testimony of the approver in the
instant case, we cannot but take note of the said irregularities in the
seizure procedures. Further, no finger prints were lifted from the
autorickshaw that carried the body of the deceased, when discovered. As
regards the offence of conspiracy, there is no evidence in the form of call
data records [CDR] or oral testimony that would point to the existence of
any conspiracy to kidnap and murder the deceased. There is also no
independent eye-witness testimony that either testifies to the commission
of any of the alleged offences or to the identity of its perpetrators.
25. While we have independently analysed the evidence on record
to ascertain whether the conviction and sentence imposed on the
appellants-accused by the trial court is justified, and find ourselves
unable to agree with the findings of the trial court in the judgment
impugned in these appeals, legal propriety demands that we give specific
reasons for our disagreement. We therefore proceed to deal with some of
the specific findings entered by the trial court.
26.
The trial court after noting that there exists inconsistencies
and contradictions in the deposition of PW1 Nazarudeen as also vis-a-vis
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
Crl.A.Nos.497, 552, 645, 676,
693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
:: 41 ::
Ext.P1 statement given by him before the Magistrate, in paragraph 31 of
its judgment proceeded to give reasons for such inconsistencies by
stating that the said “somersault was because he was scared of the
miscreants” and since he “was under great pressure, panic and terror
and that he was not inclined to reveal the truth before court.”
Accordingly, the trial court proceeded to condone and brush aside the
contradictions and inconsistencies in the deposition of PW1 Nazarudeen,
and find the accused guilty of the offences with which they were charged.
The unsustainability of the reasoning given by the trial court in the
impugned judgment need not be overemphasized in the light of the law
regarding the evidentiary worth of an approver’s evidence, as discussed
above.
Further, PW1 Nazarudeen being an accused turned approver
ought not to have had any reason or cause to be afraid of his own
compatriots while deposing, especially since he had by that time obtained
his conditional pardon and rendered Ext.P1 statement before the
Magistrate. Further, the purported fear stated by him, which swayed the
trial court during the appreciation of evidence, is totally misplaced as we
note that he had been lodged in Jail for months along with the other
accused till they were all released on bail. After having thus chosen to
give a detailed statement under Section 306 (4) which was recorded by
the Chief Judicial Magistrate and the pardon was tendered, the reasoning
of the trial court that the glaring contradictions and variations in his
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
Crl.A.Nos.497, 552, 645, 676,
693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
:: 42 ::
deposition can be brushed aside as caused due to fear, pressure and
panic, is legally unsustainable.
27. We also find that the trial court relied on the uncorroborated
statements of PW1 Nazarudeen, vis-a-vis each of the appellants, to base
the finding of guilt against them all. The trial court, appears to have
sought corroboration to the statements of PW1 Nazarudeen, as recorded
vide Ext.P1, in the deposition of PW1 Nazarudeen itself when he was
examined as a witness. Such an exercise was faulty and contrary to the
settled principles of law. As laid down by precedents discussed above,
corroboration to an approver’s testimony has to be found not based on his
own statement or deposition but with other independent evidence. It is
trite that corroboration of an approver’s testimony with the testimony of
even another approver is illegal, and a conviction based thereon cannot
be sustained.
28. Further, the trial court in paragraph 35 of its judgment while
considering the evidence regarding the culpability of A7 Ajithkumar with
respect to the allegation that he had at the Alanthara colony, inflicted a
wound on the forehead of the deceased using MO2 chopper, has termed
the deposition of PW1 Nazarudeen in that regard as ‘accurate’. The
fallacy of the said finding has already been referred to above. Similarly,
the trial court has in paragraph 36 of its judgment concluded that the
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
Crl.A.Nos.497, 552, 645, 676,
693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
:: 43 ::
deposition of PW1 Nazarudeen regarding injuries Nos.1 and 2 on the
deceased, alleged to have been caused by A7 Ajithkumar, tallies with the
incidents narrated by PW1 Nazarudeen in Ext.P1 statement to the
Magistrate and is hence reliable and sufficient to establish the guilt of A7
Ajithkumar. The trial court further proceeds to term the said deposition of
PW1 Nazarudeen as “clear and cogent in respect of the entire cruel
episode right from its outset till its climax" overlooking the fact that the
said evidence tendered by PW1 Nazarudeen had no independent
corroboration whatsoever.
29. As regards the deletion of Jayan from the array of the accused
by the Investigating Officer (PW49), about whom PW1 Nazarudeen had
specifically mentioned in Ext.P1 statement, the trial court at paragraph
40 of its judgment concluded that such deletion of Jayan “does not evoke
any vital consequence”. The trial court thus overlooked the fact that PW1
Nazarudeen had in his cross examination specifically contradicted
himself from his own statement in Ext.P1 by stating that he does not
know whether a person named Jayan was present in the Tata Sumo Taxi
driven by him. Such instances in the testimony of PW1 Nazarudeen which
clearly pointed to the need to seek corroboration for the statements of
PW1 Nazarudeen from independent sources was lost sight of by the
court. The trial court also overlooked the fact that PW1 Nazarudeen had
mentioned both Jayan and Prasanth in his depositions and their
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
Crl.A.Nos.497, 552, 645, 676,
693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
:: 44 ::
subsequent deletion from the array of accused for lack of evidence
against them, tells upon the unreliability of the deposition of PW1
Nazarudeen.
30. Similarly, the finding arrived at by the trial court in paragraph
42 of its judgment that the narratives of PW1 Nazarudeen have been
corroborated by the confession made by A7 Ajithkumar which led to the
recovery of MO2 and hence the mandate for corroboration discernible
from illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act has been
satisfactorily met, is unsustainable. As discussed in detail above, the
recovery of MO2 based on the purported disclosure statement of A7
Ajithkumar is by itself unreliable and fraught with deficiencies. Recovery
of MO2 has not been reliably proved in a manner acceptable to law.
31. The trial court in paragraph 43 of its judgment concluded that
PW1 Nazarudeen “..has no personal interest of his own to avenge the
indictees or to mourn for the victim and that he is a total stranger to the
criminal plot and he does not thus deserve to be styled as an interested
or infamous witness and not even as an accomplice”. The said finding of
the trial court not only militates against the basic and fundamental
approach of caution to be adopted while relying on an approver’s
evidence but is also contrary to the facts and circumstances of the case.
That PW1 Nazarudeen had an active role to play in the incident and was
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
Crl.A.Nos.497, 552, 645, 676,
693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
:: 45 ::
present all through the same; that he had attempted to clean the vehicle
and destroy the evidence; that he had on the next day of the incident
accepted money from the accused for his services rendered the day
before, are all facts that are prima facie disclosed from the prosecution
evidence. Further, that PW1 Nazarudeen who was arrayed as accused
No.4 was retained in the said array at the same rank till the fag end of
the investigation when it was taken over by PW49 Sekharan is also not in
dispute.
32.
The finding of the trial court that PW1 Nazarudeen cannot
even be termed as an ‘accomplice’ militates against the express
provisions of Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act and Section 306 of
the Cr.P.C. The finding hence arrived at by the trial court that PW1
Nazarudeen stands “on a high pedestal and his testimony is more
qualified, genuine and sanctified since he expects no gain out of it” also
cannot be countenanced in the light of the settled law concerning the
probative value of an approver's evidence.
33. The finding of the trial court in paragraph 44 of its judgment
that the evidence tendered by PW1 Nazarudeen narrates the role played
by each indictee and the particular pattern of lynching the victim to death
by each accused, cannot be sustained in the light of the numerous
contradictions noticed in the statement and the deposition of PW1
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
Crl.A.Nos.497, 552, 645, 676,
693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
Nazarudeen.
:: 46 ::
So also the finding that the defence could not raise any
valid dispute regarding the identity and consistency of the crime spot
where the deceased breathed his last cannot be countenanced in view of
the fact that all the eyewitnesses to the incident had turned hostile, and
except for the approver’s statement as PW1 and his deposition, there was
nothing to convincingly prove and corroborate the exact place where the
crime was committed. It is relevant to note that even the Chief Judicial
Magistrate in Ext.C1 had, based on PW1's statement, recorded that the
amputation of the leg and hand of the deceased was done in the Tata
Sumo taxi driven by PW1 Nazarudeen [who was A4] during the relevant
time.
34. While discussing the incongruity in the evidence tendered by
PW1 Nazarudeen and by PW45 T.F. Xavier regarding the recovery of the
Tata Sumo car and the arrest of PW1 Nazarudeen, the trial court had duly
taken note of the fact that PW1 Nazarudeen had consistently narrated
that the vehicle was seized by the police from Sabarimala and that he was
also apprehended along with the vehicle from Sabarimala and brought
directly to the police station. That this statement of PW1 Nazarudeen
contradicts the official version in the deposition by PW45 Xavier as well
as by PW49 Sekharan that the Tata Sumo car was recovered from the
house of its owner vide P48 seizure mahazar and that PW1 Nazarudeen
was arrested from his house, was also noted by the trial court. However,
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
Crl.A.Nos.497, 552, 645, 676,
693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
:: 47 ::
the court then concluded that “though there is no supporting evidence to
strengthen the version of PW1”, the said version of PW1 “had its own
spontaneity”. The contra depositions by PW45 Xavier as well as PW49
Sekharan as regards the Tata Sumo car were disbelieved by the trial
court stating that “The factual niceties enabled me to disbelieve PW45 in
this regard.” The trial court thereafter proceeded to conclude that “All
the same, very obviously there is some incongruity in his evidence in
respect of seizure of the Tata Sumo vehicle.”
The “anomaly in evidence”
regarding the said aspect “would not defeat the prosecution case”. It was
also concluded that the contradictions in the statements of PW1
Nazarudeen and that of PW5 Harikumar revealed by Ext.P48 seizure
mahazar are “not of any fatal consequence to the prosecution case and
does not affect its credibility”. The said findings and conclusions arrived
at by the trial court are erroneous and unsustainable in the light of the
stark contradictions in the statements of PW1 Nazarudeen and the other
official witnesses as well as the documents evidencing seizure of Tata
Sumo car. The same were clear pointers to the slip shod manner in which
the investigation had been carried out and the necessity of handing over
of the investigation from PW45 Xavier to PW49 Sekharan.
The
contradictions also pointed to the unreliability of the deposition of PW1
Nazarudeen, which was the sole fulcrum on which the entire findings of
the trial court leading to the conviction of all the accused, had rested.
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
Crl.A.Nos.497, 552, 645, 676,
693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
:: 48 ::
35. As regards the sustainability of the charge under Section 120B
IPC against the accused, the trial court in paragraphs 59 and 60 of its
judgment had noted that “the prosecution had reasonably made out that
personal rivalry prevailed between the deceased and some of the accused
during the relevant period” and that “there was sufficient cause for the
indictees to stand together in a common platform to wreck their personal
vendetta”. Thereafter, it proceeded to conclude as follows regarding
criminal conspiracy: “To further their unlawful common object and evil
motive, they stood together and hatched the criminal conspiracy to
eliminate him.” This finding was arrived at notwithstanding that there
was no iota of evidence to show the existence of any of the elements
essential to constitute a criminal conspiracy or to make out a charge
under Section
120B IPC.
The further finding of the trial court that
“though motive is not relevant in a case based on direct evidence still
motive has its own significance in substantiating and complementing the
prosecution case” is irrelevant on the facts and circumstances of the case
since no independent legally reliable evidence had been put forth by the
prosecution in the case at hand.
36. The trial court in paragraph 66 of its judgment has, concerning
the inability to identify the blood group from MO2 chopper concluded
that “the absence of proof regarding the group of blood on MO2 is
insignificant since the eventual recovery of the said MO is in pursuance
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
Crl.A.Nos.497, 552, 645, 676,
693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
:: 49 ::
of the information disclosed by A7 negatives the requirement for
detecting human blood on the same”. This conclusion was arrived at on
the reasoning that human blood had been detected on MO2 and that
“what could not be detected is its group alone.” The court then proceeded
to brush aside the absence of evidence regarding blood group by
reasoning that since recovery of the weapon had been effected based on
the disclosure statement of A7 Ajithkumar the absence of proof regarding
blood group is “insignificant”. The said reasoning is unsustainable more
so because MO2 is the only weapon that has been seized with respect to
the crime, and the seizure of the same, effected through A7 Ajithkumar
vide
Ext.P45,
is
fraught
with
errors,
legal
inadequacies
and
contradictions.
37.
As regards the delay occasioned in the production of MO2
weapon before the court, the trial court concluded that the same was not
inordinate and that it had been sufficiently explained by the Investigating
Officer. The reasoning of the court that "very lengthy and extensive
evidence had to be undertaken by the investigator in the given case and
during the course of investigation, they needed the legal weapon to prove
its identity" is not a legally sustainable reason to explain the delay. The
further justification that "the scientific evidence emerged from MO2
weapon renders the duration taken for production of article before court
totally inconsequential" is incongruous and devoid of any substance since
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
Crl.A.Nos.497, 552, 645, 676,
693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
:: 50 ::
the court had earlier in the judgment stated that the the lack of scientific
evidence with respect to blood grouping from MO2 is not consequential.
Thus in so far as no reliable scientific evidence had emerged from the
scientific examination of MO2 weapon, the reasoning put forth by the
trial court is circular and self defeating.
38. As regards other scientific evidence, the trial court concluded
that MO9 scalp hair and MO8 tuft of scalp hairs recovered from the
saloon had been consistently proved and confirmed to be exactly identical
and similar vide Ext.P33 report and so, “there is no doubt on the fact that
the deceased had been kidnapped from the saloon of PW2”. This finding
overlooks the fact that Ext.P33 report had only stated that “the hairs in
item No.3 are human scalp hairs which are similar to the sample scalp
hairs in item No.4 (C)”.
Ext.P33 does not report that MO9 and MO8
belong to the deceased.
39. The finding of the trial court in paragraph 73 of its judgment
that “there are ample evidence on record proving that indictees No.1, 2,
5, A6 (late) to A10 have hatched the criminal conspiracy to eliminate the
deceased and they unlawfully assembled together in prosecution of their
common objective to implement their evil plan” is not substantiated by
any evidence placed by the prosecution. The finding that "it is well come
out in evidence that he tortured the victim mercilessly and inhumanly
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
Crl.A.Nos.497, 552, 645, 676,
693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
:: 51 ::
from the moment he was abducted" also lacks any reliable substantiation.
The findings of the trial court in paragraph 73 of its judgment that all the
said accused “joined together in attacking the deceased mercilessly as
proved by PW1” is devoid of any evidence and substantiation. Even
though the trial court had in the judgment elaborated on the “barbarous
act” and the “sadistic impulse” by which the crime was carried out and
termed it as one that “shocks human mind”, not only was necessary
substantiation in the form of legally reliable evidence in that regard
lacking in the prosecution evidence, but the evidence tendered by the
prosecution was fraught with inconsistencies and contradictions.
40. In paragraph 75 of its judgment, the trial court concluded that
the defence contention that the identity of the accused has not been
proved by the prosecution since no test identification parade is conducted
by the investigator is of no consequence in so far as PW1 Nazarudeen had
identified the accused clearly and cogently. It was also justified on the
ground that PW1 Nazarudeen who had spent a long duration of time
along with the accused in the vehicle had enough time to “never loose
their identity from his sense of perception”. Further relying on
precedents it was reasoned by the trial court that test identification by
itself is not necessary for identifying the accused since the deposition of
PW1 Nazarudeen and his “credibility and impartiality and the absence of
reasons for false implication of the indictees and the circumstances
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
Crl.A.Nos.497, 552, 645, 676,
693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
:: 52 ::
indicating truth of their identification, do enter the judicial mind of the
court in the assessment”. This finding of the trial court overlooks the
fact that the deposition of PW1 Nazarudeen is replete with contradictions
and is totally unreliable. Further the fact remains that no other witness
had identified any of the accused and it was on the sole uncorroborated
testimony of PW1 Nazarudeen that the conviction was based.
41.
The trial court has in paragraph 76 of its judgment opined
about the severity and brutality of the murder of the victim and has
stated that the same is well pictured in the medical evidence and “the
oral narration of the eye witness / approver”. This observation has been
made solely relying on the uncorroborated oral testimony of PW1
Nazarudeen. The said reasoning cannot therefore be termed as legal.
42. The trial court in paragraph 77 of its judgment finds that the
co-accused “though they had not actually handled the weapon at the
victim they very actively stood, rendering whole support aid and
assistance by promoting the crime”. This conclusion was arrived at by
justifying it on the principle of vicarious liability relying on operation of
the Section 149 of the IPC. It is trite that to convict a person under
Section 149 IPC prosecution has to establish with the help of evidence
that firstly, the accused shared a common object and were part of
unlawful assembly and secondly, that they were aware that the offences
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
Crl.A.Nos.497, 552, 645, 676,
693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
:: 53 ::
likely to be committed were to achieve the said common object [Naresh
@ Nehru and another v. State of Haryana - [(2023) SCC OnLine SC
1274]]. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the common object
of the unlawful assembly can be gathered from the nature of the
assembly, arms used by them and the behavior of the assembly at or
before the scene of occurrence. It is an inference to be deduced from the
facts and circumstances of each case.
In the instant case, however, the
trial court proceeded to find the co-accused liable under Section 149 on
the premise that once the members of an unlawful assembly knew
beforehand that the offence committed was
likely to be committed in
prosecution of the common object then all those persons constituting the
unlawful assembly are vicariously liable. The court however overlooked
the fact that there was a total absence of any independent evidence
regarding the existence of a common object or that the individual
accused were aware of the same.
43. Though there was absolutely no evidence to conclude that all
the accused had a common objective in mind while they boarded PW1's
vehicle from the respective places, the trial court concluded that such a
plot, putting their minds together, was already in existence. The court
then proceeded to conclude that though PW3 Sajikumar [auto driver]
could not prove the identity of the accused who had boarded his
autorickshaw ‘it could be unerringly concluded that the said three
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
Crl.A.Nos.497, 552, 645, 676,
693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
:: 54 ::
persons are none other than three of the accused.’ The said reasoning
apart from defying common logic is unsustainable for want of any
evidence.
44. The trial court in paragraph 81 of its judgment concluded that
PW1 Nazarudeen had “given a graphic description of the savage
occurrence by detailing the nature of the brutal attack caused on the
victim” and had detailed the nature of the attack on the deceased and the
nature of injuries ‘with a photogenic description’ and that the same
cannot be termed as tainted as contended by the defence.
The court
went on to state that the minor discrepancies in his version highlighted
by the defence prompts it to add that “photographic picturisation cannot
be expected from a witness.” The said observations were made without
taking note of the stark contradictions in PW1's deposition which
substantially varied from his own statement given before the Magistrate
and marked as Ext.P1. Further, the correctness of the said testimony of
the approver, so far it remained uncorroborated could not have been
relied upon by the court to convict the accused.
45. The above discussion of the manner in which the trial court
had appreciated the prosecution evidence leads us to conclude that the
trial court had erred from the very threshold in appreciating an
approver's evidence. The extent of reliance that could be placed thereon
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
Crl.A.Nos.497, 552, 645, 676,
693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
:: 55 ::
and the nature of corroboration required before proceeding to find a
guilty verdict based on the same were not at all within the contemplation
or understanding of the trial court. The sole reliance, based on the
deposition of PW1 Nazarudeen and Ext.P1 statement given by him before
the Magistrate, by the trial court lacked legal sustainability. The
observation of the trial court in paragraph 37 of its judgment that the
version of PW1 Nazarudeen in his examination in chief is the verbatim
reproduction of what he had narrated before the learned Magistrate and
had scrupulously proved the exact identity of each and every assailant
and the particular roles played by them in murdering the deceased
clearly points to the erroneous understanding of the legal precepts on the
point by the trial court. This conclusion arrived at by the trial court
overlooks the very basic requirement of law as laid down in a catena of
precedents that an approver's statement needs corroboration and sole
reliance of his own statement if at all buttressed by his examination as a
witness does not by itself stand to prove any fact as reliably proved.
46. The above discussion on the appreciation of evidence by the
trial court leaves us with no manner of doubt as regards the absence of
any material before the court below on which it could arrive at a finding
of conviction against any of the accused on any of the charges leveled
against them, much less to sentence two among them to capital
punishment and the rest to various terms of punishment including, life
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
Crl.A.Nos.497, 552, 645, 676,
693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
:: 56 ::
imprisonment. We have therefore no hesitation in concluding that the
only substantive evidence that is relied upon by the prosecution in the
instant case is the testimony of PW1 Nazarudeen and the same lacks
credibility making it not worthy of acceptance. Since the evidence of the
approver does not satisfy the reliability test itself, the aspect of
corroboration does not arise in the instant case. We are therefore of the
view that the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellants-accused
by the impugned judgment of the trial court cannot be legally sustained.
We therefore set aside the conviction and sentence of the appellantsaccused and allow these Criminal Appeals. The DSR is accordingly
answered in the negative. The appellants-accused shall be set at liberty
forthwith.
The D.S.R. is dismissed and the Crl.Appeals are allowed.
Sd/-
DR. A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR
JUDGE
Sd/-
SYAM KUMAR V.M.
JUDGE
prp/
D.S.R.NO.2/2017
&
Crl.A.Nos.497, 552, 645, 676,
693 & 796/2016 & 1307/2024
:: 57 ::
APPENDIX OF CRL.A.NO.497/2016
PETITIONER ANNEXURES:
ANNEXURE 1
THE MARRIAGE INVITATION
APPLICANT'S DAUGHTER.
RESPONDENTS ANNEXURES:
NIL.
//TRUE COPY//
P.S. TO JUDGE
CARD
OF
THE
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